ITAT Cochin Judgments — August 2025

The Tribunal held that since no additions were made based on the seized material, its non-consideration does not impact the total income determination. Therefore, the previous orders of the Tribunal continue to hold the field.

The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer made no additions based on the seized material. Therefore, even without considering the seized material, the determination of total income remains unaffected.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO on account of disallowance of provisions for bonus etc. would enhance the business profits, qualifying for deduction under section 80P. The Tribunal relied on CBDT circular and High Court decisions.

The Tribunal observed that the appellant is a primary agricultural credit cooperative society and does not hold a banking license. Therefore, section 80P(4) of the Act is not applicable. The Supreme Court's decision in Mavilayi Service Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. CIT was found to be squarely applicable.

The Tribunal held that since no addition was made by the AO based on the seized material, its non-consideration does not affect the determination of total income. The earlier orders of the Tribunal still hold the field.

The Tribunal held that since the appellant is a cooperative society registered under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969, and does not hold a banking license, sub-section (4) of section 80P is not applicable. The Supreme Court's ruling in Mavilayi Service Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. CIT is applicable.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is a primary agricultural cooperative society and is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. The presence of nominal members, permitted by the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, does not disentitle the assessee from claiming the deduction.

The Tribunal held that for a deduction under section 80P to be admissible, a valid return of income must be filed, and the claim must be made within the prescribed time. Following the jurisdictional High Court's decision, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant, having not filed a valid return, is not eligible for the deduction u/s 80P.

The Tribunal held that jurisdictional objections must be raised at the earliest opportunity and failure to do so bars them at a later stage. Concealment of income was established due to the assessee's failure to disclose substantial income despite multiple opportunities. The penalties under Section 271(1)(c) and Section 270A were therefore upheld, subject to re-computation.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee could not respond to hearing notices due to issues with email delivery during the Covid-19 pandemic and that the Sr. DR had no objection to remanding the matter. Consequently, the Tribunal decided to remand the case back to the AO.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to substantiate the unexplained credits and the cost of improvement claimed. Therefore, the additions made by the AO and sustained by the CIT(A) were justified.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It held that the assessee, being a primary co-operative society, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court had overruled the High Court judgment relied upon by the AO, and that the presence of nominal/associate members or disbursing agricultural loans does not bar the deduction. Furthermore, the issue was covered by the Tribunal's own earlier decisions in favour of the assessee.

The Tribunal upheld the orders of the lower authorities, stating that the jurisdictional objections were raised belatedly and should have been brought up at the assessment stage. The Tribunal found that concealment of income was established due to the assessee's failure to disclose substantial income and comply with statutory notices. Therefore, the penalties under Section 271(1)(c) and Section 270A were justified, subject to re-computation as per the order giving effect in quantum appeals.

The Tribunal held that the assessee's failure to disclose substantial income despite multiple opportunities established concealment. Jurisdictional objections raised late were rejected, as such objections must be raised at the earliest opportunity. The penalties were upheld, subject to re-computation.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in not considering the bank statements and the fact that the assessee is an NRI who transferred funds from Dubai to his NRO account for the purchase. The Tribunal found that the source of funds was sufficiently proved and the observation regarding creditworthiness was incorrect.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 600 days due to change of auditors and lack of proper communication. The Tribunal observed that the source of deposits from members was explained and recorded in the assessee's books, and the cash was remitted to the bank.

The Tribunal held that the assessee's failure to disclose substantial income despite multiple opportunities established concealment. Jurisdictional objections raised late were rejected, as such objections must be raised at the earliest opportunity. The penalties were upheld, subject to re-computation in accordance with the order giving effect in quantum proceedings.

The Tribunal upheld the penalties, agreeing with the lower authorities that jurisdictional objections must be raised at the earliest opportunity. Concealment of income was established due to the failure to disclose substantial income despite opportunities. The penalty under Section 270A was also dismissed based on earlier adjudication.

The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee's consultant failed to file proper grounds of appeal and that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal on technical grounds without deciding the merits. The Tribunal also considered that the mistake was made by the consultant, not the assessee.

The Tribunal observed that the AO noted the assessee did not respond to notices or file a return, but the assessee provided proof of filing the return. It was found that the assessment order under Section 144 might not be correct as the assessee claimed to have filed all details and that monies received during demonetisation were properly recorded. The assessee also claimed not to have received notices from the lower authorities.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is not eligible for deduction u/s 80P because no valid return of income was filed. The court followed the jurisdictional High Court's decision, stating that filing a valid return within the prescribed time is a pre-condition for claiming deduction u/s 80P.

The Tribunal considered the submissions regarding cash payments made on Sundays and public holidays, which were claimed to be covered under Rule 6DD exceptions. Both parties agreed to a remand for verification.

The CIT(A) allowed set off of brought forward losses for AY 2011-12 but confirmed the disallowance of business losses for AY 2007-08 to 2014-15. The assessee appealed against this order, and the tribunal found that the CIT(A) ignored proceedings condoning delay in filing returns for AYs 2011-12 to 2014-15.

The Tribunal, following the Jurisdictional High Court's decision, ruled that the assessee was ineligible for deduction under section 80P as no valid return of income was filed, a prerequisite mandated by section 80A(5). Consequently, the argument that an addition under section 69A could qualify for section 80P deduction was also rejected, leading to the dismissal of the assessee's appeals.

The learned CIT(E) rejected the application for registration without addressing the appellant's petition for condonation of delay. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(E) had not dealt with the condonation petition. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the CIT(E) for fresh disposal.

The tribunal noted that the PCIT had condoned the delay in filing returns for certain assessment years, a fact that the CIT(A) had seemingly ignored. The learned Sr. DR had no objection to remanding the matter for fresh disposal.

The Tribunal held that the assessee provided a plausible explanation for the cash deposits, which were withdrawn from her son-in-law's NRE account for house construction. Since there was no evidence that the money was used for other purposes, it should be considered available for subsequent deposit.

The Tribunal held that the settled position of law is that cash withdrawn earlier, if not utilized for other purposes, should be considered available for subsequent deposits. The CIT(A) ought to have accepted the explanation and granted relief.

The Tribunal held that since the appellant society did not have a banking license and was classified as a primary agricultural credit cooperative society, the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 80P were not applicable. The Supreme Court's ruling in Mavilayi Service Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. CIT was deemed applicable.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, accepting the medical grounds as sufficient reasonable cause. It held that notices served through the ITBA portal, which remained uncomplied with, did not constitute valid service under section 282(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and Rule 127(1) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, relying on the Punjab & Haryana High Court decision in Munjal BCU Centre of Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication, granting the appellant an opportunity to present her case.

The Tribunal found that the NFAC passed a cryptic order without considering the appellant's submissions. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the NFAC for a fresh disposal in accordance with law.

The Tribunal noted that the tax effect was less than Rs. 60 lakhs, and consequently, the appeal should be dismissed as not pressed/maintainable in light of the CBDT Circular. The issues raised were left open for future examination if any exceptions to the circular applied.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not dispute the finding that the CIT(A) had indeed confirmed the penalty earlier. Therefore, the appeal before the NFAC was considered a duplicate appeal. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the NFAC's order and dismissed the grounds raised by the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 194C apply to the payments made for services. The assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving that the payment was merely reimbursement. The claim that the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) is retrospective was rejected as it was introduced prospectively from April 1, 2013. The principle of consistency was not applicable due to lack of identical facts and established legal position.

The Tribunal held that the payment was for services and not mere reimbursement, and thus, TDS was deductible under Section 194C. The second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) was not applicable as it was introduced from 01.04.2013 and the assessee had not obtained any certificate for non-deduction. The principle of consistency was not applicable.

The Tribunal held that Section 40(a)(ia) is automatically attracted upon failure to deduct tax at source. The contention that the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) has retrospective effect was rejected as it was introduced prospectively. The assessee also failed to prove that the payment was purely reimbursement and did not obtain any certificate for non-deduction of tax. The principle of consistency was not applied due to a well-settled legal position.

The Tribunal noted that similar issues were decided in favor of the assessee by other benches and the High Court had directed examination of the Section 10A claim. They also observed that the CIT(A) accepted the alternative claim for Section 10A for a subsequent assessment year.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had invoked Section 68 without confronting the assessee about its applicability and had failed to consider the material placed before it. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer had considered the evidence related to agricultural income and allotted shares. The CIT(A)'s finding that no explanation was offered was contrary to the record. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were bad in law because they were initiated based on a mere change of opinion and a reappraisal of the same material that was already examined during the original assessment. No fresh tangible material was available to the AO to form a belief of escaped income.

The CIT(A) has a duty to dispose of matters judiciously by deciding the merits of the additions, irrespective of the assessee's appearance. The Tribunal cited a Bombay High Court judgment to support this.

The tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had decided the appeals ex parte without dealing with the merits of the additions. The assessee's counsel contended that no notice of hearing was received. The tribunal observed that the CIT(A)'s order was silent regarding the service of notices and that the CIT(A) is duty-bound to decide appeals on merits.

The Tribunal held that service of notice through the ITBA Portal is not a valid method of service as per Section 282(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and Rule 127(1) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. The Tribunal relied on a Punjab & Haryana High Court decision stating that such service is invalid and the matter should be remanded.

The Tribunal considered the Revenue's contention that the NFAC should not have entertained the appeal due to a bar under Section 264(4)(c) of the Income Tax Act, as the intimation was subject to revision proceedings. The Tribunal held that the embargo under Section 264(4)(c) is not applicable to appeals filed under Section 246A of the Act, and therefore, the NFAC was justified in entertaining the appeal.

The Tribunal observed that since the High Court had already quashed the assessment order, the present appeal of the assessee was rendered infructuous. The CIT DR did not raise any objection, and the assessee's AR also confirmed this was mentioned in the grounds of appeal.

The Tribunal held that the NFAC was justified in entertaining the appeal. The embargo under section 264(4)(c) of the Income Tax Act, which prevents revision petitions when an item is subject to appeal before CIT(A), does not apply to appeals filed under section 246A of the Act. No merit was found in the Revenue's grounds of appeal.

The Tribunal held that a mere claim, even if not sustainable, does not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars. The assessee had made full disclosures and acted on a bonafide belief, supported by judicial precedents. Therefore, the penalties were not leviable.

The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the Assessee was eligible for deduction. The Assessee had acted in good faith and made full disclosures. The penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) and Section 270A was not sustainable as the Assessee had a bonafide belief and reasonable cause, supported by judicial precedents.

The Tribunal held that the Assessee had a bonafide belief regarding the eligibility of the deduction and had disclosed all material facts. Reliance was placed on judicial precedents that supported the Assessee's claim that interest income from deposits of surplus funds is eligible for deduction. Therefore, the levy of penalty was unjustified.

The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the cooperative society on deposits of surplus profit is eligible for deduction. The assessee had made full disclosure and acted in bonafide belief, thus penalty under Section 271(1)(c) and Section 270A was not sustainable.

The Tribunal held that a mere claim of deduction, even if not sustainable, does not automatically amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars. The Assessee had made a full disclosure and acted in good faith, believing the deduction was allowable based on judicial precedents. The penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was deleted for AYs 2011-12 to 2014-15. Similarly, for AYs 2018-19 and 2020-21, the penalty under Section 270A was also deleted as the Assessee's explanation was considered bonafide and supported by full disclosure.