ITAT Cochin Judgments — May 2025

The Tribunal held that the assessee acted merely as an intermediary between bar owners and the Government of Kerala for stock transfer and payment disbursement. It concluded that the assessee never had ownership of the liquor stock, and thus, the addition of Rs. 12,32,57,000/- to the closing stock was deleted.

The Tribunal held that the expenditure incurred on renovation and refurbishment of the International Convention Centre was revenue in nature as no new asset was created and the expenditure was for upgrading the existing facility to maintain business standards. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order.

The Tribunal observed that the V.A.O. report was not communicated to the assessee and the Ld. CIT(A) had decided the appeal without proper submissions from the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and remitted the appeal back for a fresh decision on merits after hearing the assessee in accordance with law.

The ITAT held that the CIT(A) erred in rejecting the admission of additional grounds, citing various Supreme Court and High Court judgments allowing appellate authorities to entertain fresh claims. Since the additional grounds require factual verification related to the Section 263 order for AY 2014-15, the matter was restored to the file of the AO for fresh examination and decision.

The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) failed to consider the satisfaction note recorded by the AOs of both the searched person and the appellant, and the assessment order itself was silent on this crucial aspect. As the CIT(A) merely confirmed the addition without proper review of seized material and evidence, the Tribunal remanded the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication with a reasonable opportunity of hearing for the appellant.

The Tribunal held that the AO and CIT(A) erred by not appreciating that any disallowance would ultimately increase the profit eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act. Relying on a coordinate bench decision where a similar disallowance was added back to profit eligible for deduction, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal.

The Tribunal found that the audit report was submitted before the completion of assessment, and the illness of the assessee's son constituted a reasonable cause under Section 273B of the Act for the delay. Therefore, the Tribunal deleted the penalty levied under Section 271B.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal, affirming that no deduction under Section 80P is available to an assessee who fails to file the return of income in time. The Tribunal based its decision on the jurisdictional High Court's judgment in *Nileshwar Range Kallu Chethu Vyavasaya Thozhilali Sahakarana Sangham v. CIT*.

For AY 2015-2016, the Tribunal restored the matter to the PCIT, directing a fresh examination due to a natural justice violation. For AY 2017-2018, it was held that the AO must make corresponding adjustments to purchases, sales, and opening stock as per Section 145A when adding VAT on closing stock.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) dismissed the application summarily without fully appreciating the facts and wrongly relied on an assessment-related judgment. It clarified that at the registration stage, the focus should be on the trust's objects and genuineness of activities, not assessment considerations, and restored the matter to the CIT(E) for fresh examination.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals, affirming the CIT(A)'s decision. The Tribunal held that the assessee was a builder/developer eligible for Section 80IB(10) deduction, not a works contractor, citing previous ITAT rulings. It also found the inclusion of other income in the profit computation to be correct as per the audit report.

The Tribunal confirmed the disallowance under Section 35(2AB) due to the admitted excess claim in Form 3CL. However, the alternative claim for allowance under Section 35(1)(iv) and the claim for deduction under Section 80G were restored to the AO for fresh examination in accordance with law.

The Tribunal found that the sale proceeds were first credited to the assessee's account and then transferred to SBIL, indicating it was an application of income rather than a diversion by overriding title. The assessee's property served as collateral for the sister concern's overdraft, and the assessee also claimed TDS benefits from the acquisition. Distinguishing the cited case of Smt.Thressiamma Abraham, the Tribunal concluded that the assessee's action amounted to an application of income, not a diversion, and thus upheld the lower authorities' decision.

The Tribunal acknowledged the AO's valid jurisdiction given no return of income was filed. However, considering the additional evidence submitted by the assessee under Rule 29, the Tribunal decided that the merits of the case required fresh consideration. The matter was restored to the file of the AO for re-examination, with a direction to afford the assessee a meaningful opportunity of being heard.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals, affirming the CIT(A)'s decision. The Tribunal held that the assessee was a builder/developer eligible for Section 80IB(10) deduction, not a works contractor, citing previous ITAT rulings. It also found the inclusion of other income in the profit computation to be correct as per the audit report.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals, affirming the CIT(A)'s decision. The Tribunal held that the assessee was a builder/developer eligible for Section 80IB(10) deduction, not a works contractor, citing previous ITAT rulings. It also found the inclusion of other income in the profit computation to be correct as per the audit report.

The Tribunal observed that the DRP had not judiciously considered the assessee's objections. Therefore, the matter was restored back to the file of the AO for fresh examination in accordance with the law, ensuring a reasonable opportunity of being heard is afforded to the assessee.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the applicability of Section 14A. It rejected the appellant's primary contention of not being the real owner and denied the request for remand, noting that the 'own funds' argument was not presented or substantiated before lower authorities.

The Tribunal held that the amount received by the assessees for relinquishing their trusteeship in Carmel Educational Trust is taxable under the head 'income from other sources' as it does not fall under any other head of income.

The Tribunal held that the Commissioner's approach was hyper-technical. It set aside the impugned order and directed the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) to dispose of the application afresh, considering the correct application form submitted by the assessee in response to the show cause notice.

The Tribunal held that the Commissioner's approach was hyper-technical. It set aside the impugned order and directed the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) to dispose of the application afresh, considering the correct application form submitted by the assessee in response to the show cause notice.

The Tribunal held that the amount received by the assessees for relinquishing their trusteeship in Carmel Educational Trust is taxable under the head 'income from other sources' as it does not fall under any other head of income.

The Tribunal held that the amount received by the assessees for relinquishing their trusteeship in Carmel Educational Trust is taxable under the head 'income from other sources' as it does not fall under any other head of income.

The Tribunal held that the amount received by the assessees for relinquishing their trusteeship in Carmel Educational Trust is taxable under the head 'income from other sources' as it does not fall under any other head of income.

The Tribunal held that the amount received by the assessees for relinquishing their trusteeship in Carmel Educational Trust is taxable under the head 'income from other sources' as it does not fall under any other head of income.

The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had not judiciously adjudicated the Section 43B disallowance. Consequently, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication in accordance with law, after providing the assessee an opportunity of being heard.

The Tribunal held that the Commissioner's approach was hyper-technical. It set aside the impugned order and directed the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) to dispose of the application afresh, considering the correct application form submitted by the assessee in response to the show cause notice.

The ITAT found the assessee's reason for the delay, specifically the closure of their office and late awareness of the assessment order, to be plausible. Consequently, the ITAT restored the matter to the file of the ld. CIT(A) to condone the delay and decide the appeal on merits, ensuring a meaningful opportunity of hearing for the assessee.

The ITAT held that the CIT(A) is obligated under Section 250(6) to decide appeals on merits, even if heard ex parte, and cannot dismiss them solely for non-prosecution. Citing a High Court decision, the ITAT remanded the case to the CIT(A) for a fresh disposal on merits after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

The Tribunal observed that the assessee's contention of customer deposits lacked documentary evidence and details of goods supplied. Given the submission of additional evidence under Rule 29, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo examination, directing that the assessee be provided a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

Following precedents, including the jurisdictional High Court's decision in Sahyadri Co-operative Credit Society Ltd., the Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the assessee from investing its surplus funds in scheduled banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal distinguished the case from situations where the funds belonged to members, and thus allowed the appeal.