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293 orders · Page 4 of 6
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the appellant did not possess the required registration under Section 12AC for AY 2021-22. It reiterated the legal position that without valid registration under Section 12AC, the exemption benefit under Section 11 cannot be granted.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. CIT, the Tribunal ruled that Section 80P is a benevolent provision to be interpreted liberally and that the appellant is entitled to the deduction. The Tribunal directed the AO to allow the Section 80P deduction to the appellant society.
The Tribunal upheld the addition of Rs. 4,17,000 as business income. However, it directed that this business income could be 'telescoped' into the cash deposit, thereby deleting the separate addition of Rs. 4,48,000 made on account of cash deposit during demonetisation.
The Tribunal found the assessee's claim that repayment of loan used for acquiring charitable assets is an application of income to be justifiable, relying on a Madras High Court judgment. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the AO's order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue and the CIT(E) erred in exercising jurisdiction under Section 263. The AO's order was restored, and the CIT(E)'s order was quashed.
The Tribunal, relying on the Kerala High Court decision in PCIT v. Peroorkada Service Co-op. Bank Ltd., held that interest earned by a co-operative society from deposits with District Co-operative Bank and Treasury is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. It clarified that interest from Treasury is inadmissible, but interest from Co-operative Societies is eligible for deduction.
The Tribunal found that the ld. CIT(A) erred in admitting additional evidence without confronting the AO, violating Rule 46A. The Tribunal directed the AO to re-examine the matter de novo in light of a relevant Bombay High Court judgment, affording the assessee a meaningful opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the AO and DRP erred by summarily disregarding the Registered Valuer's report and relying solely on circle rates for Fair Market Value (FMV), which is not tenable in law. It emphasized that Section 50C of the Income Tax Act mandates a referral to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) when an assessee objects to circle rates. Therefore, the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes, and the matter is restored to the AO for a fresh de novo assessment after referring the valuation to the DVO.
The Tribunal held that the AO and DRP erred by summarily disregarding the Registered Valuer's report and relying solely on circle rates for Fair Market Value (FMV), which is not tenable in law. It emphasized that Section 50C of the Income Tax Act mandates a referral to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) when an assessee objects to circle rates. Therefore, the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes, and the matter is restored to the AO for a fresh de novo assessment after referring the valuation to the DVO.
The Tribunal found that no return of income was pending on the date of search, nor was one filed before the notice under Section 142(1). Therefore, the question of recording satisfaction under Section 153C did not arise. The Tribunal allowed the Revenue's appeal and the assessee's cross-objection for statistical purposes, remanding the matter back to the CIT(A) to examine the issue of Section 153D, which was not adjudicated previously.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to establish a bonafide belief or reasonable cause for violating section 269SS. The mere genuineness of transactions does not constitute a reasonable cause for non-levy of penalty. Therefore, the penalty levied under section 271D was rightly sustained.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's request for withdrawal and the lack of objection from the learned Departmental Representative. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, noting that the ld.CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal ex parte without considering the submissions on merits despite issuing multiple notices. In the interest of justice, the ITAT restored the matter to the ld.CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, directing that the assessee be given a meaningful opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal noted that a bonafide reason or sufficient cause for belated audit could prevent the levy of penalty under Section 271B, citing a High Court judgment. As the exact date of audit by the prescribed authority was unclear, the matter was restored to the AO to ascertain this fact and provide the assessee a fresh opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal, relying on the jurisdictional High Court's decision in *Nileshwar Range Kallu Chethu Vyavasaya Thozhilali Sahakarana Sangham v. CIT*, held that since the assessee failed to file its return of income within the stipulated time under Section 139(1), it is not entitled to the deduction under Section 80P of the Act. Consequently, the orders of the lower authorities denying the deduction were affirmed.
The Tribunal, relying on the jurisdictional High Court's decision in *Nileshwar Range Kallu Chethu Vyavasaya Thozhilali Sahakarana Sangham v. CIT*, held that since the assessee failed to file its return of income within the stipulated time under Section 139(1), it is not entitled to the deduction under Section 80P of the Act. Consequently, the orders of the lower authorities denying the deduction were affirmed.
The Tribunal observed that it was an admitted fact that the service tax was not deposited before the due date of filing the return of income. Following a precedent from a co-ordinate bench, the Tribunal held that if service tax collected is not paid to the government before the return filing due date, the assessee is not entitled to its deduction. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was incorrect in dismissing the appeal in limine, especially since the income was determined through an assessment under Section 147 read with Section 144. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh examination and decision, with directions to provide a meaningful opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) passed a cryptic order without dealing with the issues involved. Consequently, the matter was restored to the file of the Assessing Officer to decide afresh, granting the assessee a meaningful opportunity of being heard, in light of the Supreme Court judgment in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd.
The Tribunal noted that a bonafide reason or sufficient cause for belated audit could prevent the levy of penalty under Section 271B, citing a High Court judgment. As the exact date of audit by the prescribed authority was unclear, the matter was restored to the AO to ascertain this fact and provide the assessee a fresh opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal found it unclear whether notice for hearing was properly served on the assessee by the ld. CIT(A) before the ex parte dismissal. Emphasizing the ld. CIT(A)'s duty to decide appeals on merits under Section 250(6), the Tribunal restored the matter for fresh examination, directing the ld. CIT(A) to provide a meaningful opportunity of hearing and consider the High Court judgment in Nileshwar Range Kallu Chethu Vyavasaya Thozhilali Sahakarana Sangham v. CIT.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) could not prove valid service of hearing notices on the assessee. Consequently, the ITAT allowed the assessee's appeal for statistical purposes, setting aside the ex parte order and remanding the matter back to the CIT(A) to provide a fresh and meaningful opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal found that the learned CIT(A) was not correct in dismissing the appeal *in limine*, especially since the income chargeable to tax was determined after the completion of assessment under Section 147 read with Section 144. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the learned CIT(A) for fresh examination in accordance with law, ensuring the assessee is given a meaningful opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that since the present appeal was a duplicate of a previously decided case, it was rendered infructuous. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal upheld the PCIT's revisionary order, concluding that the AO's failure to examine whether the objects of the donee institutions were charitable and aligned with the appellant's, crucial for eligibility of donations for exemption u/s 11, rendered the original assessment erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Merely being registered u/s 12AA or FCRA does not automatically qualify for exemption of donations made to them without such an inquiry by the AO.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received by the appellant firm for agreeing to withdraw suits or for the termination of the original agreement is a capital receipt. Therefore, it is not taxable.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 96 days, considering the assessee's explanation of filing a rectification petition as a sufficient cause. It also held that the net profit declared as gross total income was actual net profit as per the Income Tax Act, but remitted the issue of determining income from house property and other sources for separate taxation.
The Tribunal held that since the appeal was a duplicate of one already disposed of by the Tribunal, it had become infructuous. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received by the appellant firm for agreeing to withdraw suits or for the termination of the original agreement is a capital receipt. Therefore, it is not taxable.
The Tribunal held that CSR expenditure, even if mandatory, can qualify for deduction under Section 80G if made to eligible institutions and conditions are met. The disallowance of CSR expenditure under Section 37(1) is for business income computation and does not preclude 80G deduction.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 96 days, considering the assessee's explanation of filing a rectification petition as a sufficient cause. It also held that the net profit declared as gross total income was actual net profit as per the Income Tax Act, but remitted the issue of determining income from house property and other sources for separate taxation.
The Tribunal held that the assessee demonstrated a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the audit report, citing last-minute queries from the auditor, heavy workload, and demonetization-related issues. The delay was considered a technical breach without malafide intention or loss to the exchequer.
The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s dismissal for non-prosecution arbitrary and in violation of natural justice, emphasizing that the CIT(A) is obligated under Section 250(6) to dispose of appeals on merits. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for a de novo disposal on merits, with directions to provide the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal found that the AO and CIT(A) did not consider the detailed submissions and evidence provided by the assessee. Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication after considering all submitted documents.
The Tribunal found no material on record to controvert the CIT(A)'s findings. It confirmed the CIT(A)'s decision to apply Section 44AF at a 5% profit rate, thereby upholding the reduced addition.
The Tribunal condoned a 59-day delay in filing the appeal, attributing it to the income tax portal displaying only the financial year, and found the CIT(A)'s approach to be hyper-technical. The case was remanded to the AO for a de novo adjudication to verify the declarations and determine any default in TDS deduction under Section 197A.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) wrongly dismissed the appeal, as the penalty u/s 271D is independent of quantum assessment and other penalty proceedings. The assessee's withdrawal letter specifically related to a s. 270A penalty, not the s. 271D penalty. The appeal regarding the s. 271D penalty was thus restored to the CIT(A) for disposal on merits.
The Tribunal upheld the decisions of the lower authorities, ruling that the assessee was not entitled to the deduction under Section 80P of the Income Tax Act because it failed to file its return of income within the due date. The Tribunal relied on the jurisdictional High Court judgment in NileshwarRangekalluChethuVyavasayaThozhilaliSahakarana Sangham Vs. CIT, which stated that filing a return within the due date is a statutory pre-condition for claiming such deductions.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as the assessee's counsel conceded the inability to discharge the onus of proving creditors' genuineness, identity, and creditworthiness, and could not explain the circumstances for cash payments.
The CIT(A) dismissed the assessee's appeal in limine without condoning the delay, despite the assessee citing medical reasons (breast cancer, surgery, chemotherapy). The Tribunal, acknowledging the assessee's severe health issues and inability to attend to tax matters, remitted the entire issue back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to substantiate her claim.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the assessee's explanation for the 63-day delay (lack of awareness or consultant's busyness) lacked bona fides and indicated negligence. Citing judicial precedents, the Tribunal stressed that litigants cannot simply blame their counsel for delays and have a responsibility to track their cases.
The ITAT condoned the delay in filing the appeal by the Revenue. It found that the CIT(A) had erred by deleting additions based on additional evidence without obtaining a remand report from the AO, which is a violation of Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules. Consequently, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh disposal in accordance with law, ensuring the appellant is provided a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal observed that the expenditure on the Rotary Calciner replacement did not increase production capacity and the part could not function independently. Distinguishing the Supreme Court's ruling in Saravana Spinning Mills, and relying on other judgments like Elgi Equipments Ltd. and Ramaraju Surgical Cotton Mills, the Tribunal concluded that the expenditure should be classified as revenue expenditure. Accordingly, the AO was directed to treat it as such.
The Tribunal held that the expenditure was not mandatory CSR under the Companies Act, 2013, nor was Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) applicable for AY 2012-13. It was incurred for business expediency to earn goodwill in the community, hence allowable as a business deduction under Section 37(1) of the Income Tax Act, based on Supreme Court precedents on commercial expediency.
The ITAT condoned the 327-day delay in filing the appeal, noting the appellant's age (72 years) and illness. The case was remanded back to the AO to reconcile gross receipts as per Form 26AS with the Profit & Loss Account and to consider collected service tax as income after providing the appellant a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding that the issue of reducing capital subsidy from the actual cost for depreciation purposes, as per Explanation 10 to Section 43(1), is covered against the assessee by the Jurisdictional High Court decision in Kinfra Export Promotion Industrial Parks Ltd. v. JCIT. The Tribunal noted that there was no dispute on the nature of the receipt (capital) but on its treatment.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by dismissing the appeal ex-parte without considering its merits or framing points of determination as required by Section 250(6) of the Act. Consequently, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for a fresh disposal on merits, providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of hearing.