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The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient interest-free funds to cover the advances made. Therefore, the disallowance of interest expenditure was not justified, and the deletion by the CIT(A) was upheld.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It held that additions under Section 153A can only be made based on specific incriminating material found during the search, which was absent in this case. Therefore, the additions were not sustainable.
The Tribunal observed that both the Assessing Officer and the Ld. CIT(A) passed impugned orders without properly considering the material facts, documentary evidence, and submissions made by the assessee. Since the issue was not decided on merit by the lower authorities, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh adjudication on merit, ensuring due opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal found that the lower authorities passed impugned orders without considering material facts, documentary evidence, and submissions, thereby violating principles of natural justice. Consequently, the case is remanded back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication on merit, with explicit instructions to provide the assessee a due opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal observed that both lower authorities passed ex-parte orders without addressing the merits of the case and without providing adequate opportunity of hearing, violating natural justice. Consequently, the Tribunal remanded both appeals back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits after affording a proper hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding the reasons for the 3350-day delay vague and unsubstantiated. It dismissed the application for condonation of delay and consequently the assessee's appeal, emphasizing the need for satisfactory explanations for delay and citing Supreme Court precedents.
The Tribunal held that Section 115BAA is a concessional regime, not an exemption, hence procedural lapses like filing the wrong form should not defeat the substantive benefit when the assessee's intent was clear. It distinguished this case from those requiring strict interpretation of exemption provisions, concluding that the denial of benefit by CPC and CIT(A) was unsustainable.
The Tribunal observed that both lower authorities passed ex-parte orders without addressing the merits of the case and without providing adequate opportunity of hearing, violating natural justice. Consequently, the Tribunal remanded both appeals back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits after affording a proper hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of the deduction under Section 80-IC. The core issue was whether the assessee was engaged in manufacturing or production of an article or thing as required for the deduction. The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving manufacturing activity through tangible evidence. Despite multiple notices from the CIT(A), the assessee did not produce credible evidence of manufacturing or utilization of claimed machinery. The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not make a meaningful attempt to controvert the findings of the AO and CIT(A) or seek cross-examination of specific persons. The plea for cross-examination was raised for the first time before the Tribunal and was not urged at earlier stages. The Tribunal held that the right to cross-examination is not absolute and requires specificity and purpose, and no prejudice was established. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee was not engaged in any manufacturing activity and thus not entitled to the deduction under Section 80-IC. The appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the issue of allowing deduction under Section 80-IC needs to be decided based on the profit element embedded in scrap sales. Since this was not decided by the lower authorities, the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for further examination.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A)'s order was passed ex-parte without providing adequate notice for hearing and without deciding the case on merits. To ensure natural justice, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, with due opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving that it was engaged in manufacturing or production of an article or thing as required for deduction under Section 80-IC read with Section 2(29BA) of the Act. Despite multiple notices from the CIT(A), the assessee did not produce credible evidence of manufacturing activity or the use of 61 claimed machines. The Tribunal noted that the AO and CIT(A) provided details of machinery, inspection findings, and statements, but the assessee made no meaningful attempt to controvert these or seek cross-examination. The right to cross-examination is not absolute and requires specificity and purpose, and the assessee did not demonstrate prejudice. The plea for cross-examination was raised for the first time before the Tribunal and was not urged before the lower authorities. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of the Section 80-IC deduction, finding no manufacturing activity. Consequently, the orders of the lower authorities were upheld, and the appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that additions based solely on uncorroborated WhatsApp chats are not sustainable. It also found that the peak credit concept was correctly applied by the CIT(A) for computing profits and that no separate addition was warranted for loan repayments when the peak credit was NIL.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge its primary onus to establish that it was engaged in the manufacture or production of an article or thing, as required for deduction under Section 80-IC read with Section 2(29BA) of the Act. The assessee did not produce credible or contemporaneous evidence to substantiate its claim of manufacturing activity or the utilization of 61 claimed machines. The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to make a meaningful attempt to controvert the findings of the AO and CIT(A) with cogent material or seek cross-examination. The plea for cross-examination was raised for the first time before the Tribunal and was not urged at the assessment or CIT(A) stage. The Tribunal found no prejudice caused by the denial of cross-examination, as the assessee was provided with material evidence and ample opportunity to respond. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of the Section 80-IC deduction, finding that the assessee was not engaged in manufacturing. Consequently, the orders of the lower authorities were affirmed, and the appeals were dismissed. The findings in the lead case were applied mutatis mutandis to the other appeals.
The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of the deduction under Section 80-IC. The core issue was whether the assessee was engaged in manufacturing or production of an article or thing as required by Section 80-IC read with Section 2(29BA). The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to discharge the primary onus to establish manufacturing activity through tangible and reliable evidence. Despite multiple notices from the CIT(A), the assessee did not produce credible evidence of manufacturing or utilization of claimed machinery, nor did it make a meaningful attempt to controvert the findings of the AO and CIT(A) with cogent material. The plea for cross-examination was raised for the first time before the Tribunal and was not urged at the assessment or CIT(A) stage. The Tribunal noted that the right to cross-examination is not absolute and requires specificity and purpose, and no prejudice was established. The assessee failed to demonstrate the necessity and relevance of cross-examination. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the assessee was not engaged in any manufacturing activity and was not entitled to the deduction under Section 80-IC. The appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the revisionary proceedings and order passed under Section 263 against a deceased person, without impleading the legal heir, are void ab initio and violative of natural justice. It was also noted that the issue was already pending before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s decision was based on assumptions from a third party's proceedings and not a specific appreciation of the assessee's case. The CIT(A) failed to independently evaluate the assessee's submissions.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving manufacturing activity with tangible evidence. The claim for deduction under Section 80-IC was therefore not allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving manufacturing activity with tangible evidence. The claim for deduction under Section 80-IC was therefore not allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving manufacturing activity with tangible evidence. The claim for deduction under Section 80-IC was therefore not allowed.
The Tribunal held that additions made based on documents seized from third parties, without corroborative evidence from the assessee or proper satisfaction note from the AO, are not sustainable. The Tribunal also noted that cross-examination of the third party was not allowed.
The Tribunal held that additions made based on documents seized from third parties, without corroborative evidence from the assessee or proper satisfaction note from the AO, are not sustainable. The Tribunal also noted that cross-examination of the third party was not allowed.
The Tribunal held that the onus is on the Department to prove the cash was utilized elsewhere. Given that the assessee provided evidence of earlier withdrawal and the deposit occurred within a reasonable timeframe, the addition was not warranted.
The tribunal held that the unregistered agreement, a photocopy without buyer signatures, could not be relied upon for addition, especially since the assessee discharged the onus of proving the transaction as per the registered deed. For the second issue, the tribunal concurred with the CIT(A)'s order which restricted the addition by applying a business profit rate.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the wife's serious illness and death as sufficient cause. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's explanation for the source of funds, considering the local practice of oral lease agreements for agricultural land. Consequently, the additions made by the AO were deleted.
The Tribunal held that deduction under Section 80P(2)(e) is only for letting godowns to third parties, not for own business use. Regarding dividend income, it found that the AO's disallowance under Section 14A duplicated the assessee's voluntary disallowance, which was not permissible.
The Tribunal held that deduction under Section 80P(2)(e) is only for letting godowns to third parties, not for own business use. Regarding dividend income, it found that the AO's disallowance under Section 14A duplicated the assessee's voluntary disallowance, which was not permissible.
The Tribunal held that deduction under Section 80P(2)(e) is only for letting godowns to third parties, not for own business use. Regarding dividend income, it found that the AO's disallowance under Section 14A duplicated the assessee's voluntary disallowance, which was not permissible.
The tribunal noted that the assessee sought to withdraw the appeal. The Revenue's representative had no objection to the withdrawal application.
The Tribunal held that an order passed in the name of a deceased person, without impleading legal heirs, is null and void and a violation of natural justice, citing a Supreme Court judgment. The CIT(A) failed to take steps to substitute the legal heirs or issue them notice.
The Tribunal held that the AO erred in denying the benefit of Section 11 for payments to office bearers and for expenses related to starting a new educational course, as these activities were considered charitable and consistent with past assessments. The disallowance of depreciation was also found unsustainable.
The tribunal found that the applications were not decided on merit but rejected for want of prosecution. Therefore, the tribunal set aside the orders and restored the applications for re-adjudication.
The Tribunal confirmed the disallowance under Section 14A for computing income under normal provisions, affirming the AO's application of Rule 8D due to the absence of separate accounts for investment portfolios. However, the Tribunal deleted the adjustment of this disallowance for computing 'Book Profits' under Section 115JB, relying on the Special Bench decision in *Vireet Investments Pvt. Ltd.*.
The Tribunal held that the assessment ought to have been framed under Section 153C, not Section 147, as the seized material pertained to the assessee but was found from a partner's possession. The AO failed to follow the mandatory procedure under Section 153C, including recording satisfaction and transmitting it to the relevant AO.
The Tribunal held that the cost of acquisition should be adopted as per the assessee's valuation report since the AO failed to invoke Section 55A. It partly allowed the Section 54F deduction to the extent of Rs.27.90 Lacs, for which evidence was clear. The procedural challenge regarding the Section 143(2) notice was rejected due to the assessee being a non-filer and non-compliance with statutory timelines post-Section 148 notice.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had submitted additional evidence in the form of Jamabandi copies, bank statements, and affidavits, which were not produced before the lower authorities. Considering the ex-parte nature of the orders below, the Tribunal set aside both orders and restored the issue to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the rule of consistency favored the assessee, as in previous years, the AO had made only a partial disallowance. The Tribunal found no fault with the CIT(A)'s adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT (Exemptions) did not adjudicate the issue on merit. Considering the circumstances, the Tribunal decided to provide one more opportunity to the assessee to prosecute its case.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was due to a misunderstanding of the new registration procedure. The Tribunal also found that the impugned application was rendered infructuous as a fresh application for permanent registration had already been accepted and granted.
The Tribunal quashed the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and consequently the reassessment order. The Tribunal respectfully followed the judgment of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Shri Aman Batra Vs DCIT (CWP No. 11870 of 2025), which in turn followed its earlier decisions in Jatinder Singh Bhangu and Jasjit Singh. The reasoning was that the notice dated April 6, 2022, was issued by the jurisdictional AO after March 29, 2022, which is beyond his powers as per the notification mandating issuance by a Faceless Authority. The Tribunal found no disparity in facts between the present case and the cited High Court judgments, as the notices that should have been issued by the Faceless Authority were issued by the jurisdictional AO. Therefore, the reopening was held to be bad in law and unsustainable. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the AO erred in denying the benefit of Section 11 for payments to office bearers and for expenses related to starting a new educational course, as these activities were considered charitable and consistent with past assessments. The disallowance of depreciation was also found unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was bad in law due to the violation of the principles of natural justice, as the notice under Section 142(1) was not properly served. It also found that the CIT(A)'s order was non-speaking and did not properly adjudicate the grounds of appeal. The Tribunal concluded that the cash deposits were sufficiently explained by the opening cash balance from the previous year.
The Tribunal held that the Pr. CIT cannot substitute his own view for that of the AO when the AO has taken a plausible view based on facts. The revisionary order was not sustainable as the AO had applied his mind and accepted the assessee's explanation.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was ex-parte and passed without considering the material on record or affording an adequate opportunity of hearing. Consequently, the case was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merit.
The tribunal found that the applications were not decided on merit but rejected for want of prosecution. Therefore, the tribunal set aside the orders and restored the applications for re-adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order could not be considered erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had issued multiple notices under Section 142(1) calling for comprehensive details on turnover reconciliation, GST returns, depreciation schedules, and sundry debtors. The assessee had provided detailed submissions with documentary evidence, which were duly considered and accepted by the AO after due deliberation. The Tribunal noted that the requisite information pertaining to unabsorbed depreciation, sundry debtors, and turnover mismatch was placed before the AO and formed part of the record. The AO had specifically raised queries and taken a considered view after examining the evidence. The inquiries made by the AO were not cursory or mechanical but exhibited due application of mind. Therefore, the twin conditions for invoking revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 were not satisfied. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT v. V-Con Integrated Solutions Pvt. Ltd., which held that Section 263 cannot be invoked merely to substitute the Commissioner's opinion when the AO has taken a plausible view after conducting inquiries. The Tribunal also noted that the PCIT's order was predominantly based on legal principles without addressing the specific facts and lacked concrete findings. Consequently, the impugned order passed by the PCIT under Section 263 was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT (Exemptions) did not adjudicate the issue on merit. Considering the circumstances, the Tribunal decided to provide one more opportunity to the assessee to prosecute its case.
The Tribunal held that the entire compensation received on closure of the undertaking, even if styled as VRS, is exempt under Section 10(10B), following previous precedents. The relief under Section 89(1) was revised accordingly.
The Tribunal held that the notices issued under Section 148 were jurisdictionally invalid and time-barred because they were issued manually in violation of CBDT notifications mandating automated allocation. Consequently, the reassessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that both commission income and interest income were intrinsically linked to the core business operations of the cooperative society, which is marketing agricultural produce of its members. Therefore, these incomes qualify as business income eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) and cannot be treated as 'income from other sources'.