6,746 tribunal orders from the Chandigarh bench.
Counted from the judgments of this bench on BharatTax. The figure is how many of them cite each decision.
Interest received under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is considered part of the enhanced compensation on compulsory acquisition of land. It is taxable as 'capital gains' and not separately as 'interest income' under the head Income from Other Sources.
Appellate authorities can consider new claims and additional grounds if the relevant facts are already on record. The purpose of assessment is to correctly determine tax liability, allowing both parties to raise issues.
An assessment under section 153A is without jurisdiction if there is an absence of incriminating material for an unabated assessment year.
Interest income is taxable on either an accrual or cash basis, determined by accounting principles. This method was applicable prior to legislative changes that simplified the taxation of interest income.
Interest on enhanced compensation received under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is considered part of the compensation, not merely interest income, and is exigible to tax on a receipt basis.
In a search assessment under Section 153A, additions can only be made for completed or non-abated assessment years if incriminating material relevant to those years is found during the search, although notice under Section 153A(1) is mandatorily issued for six assessment years preceding the search.
Delay in filing appeals, when supported by sufficient or justifiable cause, should be condoned with a liberal approach to ensure substantial justice. This principle prioritizes the cause of justice over mere technicalities.
Interest received as enhanced compensation under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for compulsory acquisition of land is taxable as "income from other sources" under Sections 56(2)(viii) and 57(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and is not exempt under Section 10(37).
For interest on borrowed capital to be deductible under Section 36(1)(iii), there must be a nexus between the use of the borrowed funds and the purpose of the business. This decision has been overruled by the Supreme Court in Munjal Sales Corporation v. CIT (2008).
For revision under Section 263, the Assessing Officer's order must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue; if either condition is not met, the revisionary jurisdiction cannot be invoked. An order is not erroneous merely because the Assessing Officer did not record the details of enquiries conducted, provided due enquiries were made.
Employees' contributions to welfare funds, such as provident fund, are not allowable as a deduction under section 36(1)(va) if deposited beyond the due date prescribed under the respective welfare statutes, even by a single day. Such delayed deposits are not cured even if made before the income-tax return filing due date.
The Commissioner cannot revise an assessment under Section 263 merely because the assessment order does not explicitly reflect an inquiry, or because the Commissioner holds a different opinion. An inquiry, even if considered inadequate, or an assessment based on a plausible view by the Assessing Officer after due examination, does not automatically make the order erroneous or prejudicial to the interests of the revenue.
For exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 263, the Commissioner must first find that the Assessing Officer's order is erroneous and unsustainable in law, as this is a condition precedent. An order is not erroneous merely because two views are possible, or if the Commissioner disagrees with the Assessing Officer's permissible view, or to simply remit the matter for further enquiries.
Interest received under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on enhanced compensation does not form part of the compensation itself but is taxable as 'income from other sources', analogous to interest under Section 34 of the Act.
Interest received under Sections 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for delayed or enhanced compensation, is a revenue receipt and is taxable under the Income Tax Act.
Interest received on delayed payment or enhanced compensation awarded under compulsory acquisition is a revenue receipt and is liable to income tax.
A court's pronouncement derives its scope and color from the specific questions involved in the case, thus, due regard must always be given to the questions framed before the court when interpreting its judgment.
Belated remittance of employees' contribution to ESI and PF, even if deposited before the due date for filing the return of income under Section 139(1), is not allowed as a deduction. This disallowance falls under Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 2(24)(x), as Section 43B applies only to employer's contributions.
The amendment to the second proviso of Section 43B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2003, is curative in nature and applies retrospectively. This means employee contributions to welfare funds like ESI and PF are deductible if paid before the due date for filing the income tax return, even if paid beyond the statutory due date.
Most recent orders on record, from 2026.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(E) rejecting the assessee's application for registration. The Tribunal found that the assessee had not adequately substantiated its explanation for the substantial and recurring surplus. The profit margins, accumulation of funds, interest income, and increase in the Corpus Fund were considered significant, especially in the absence of supporting material on fee fixation methodology, necessity of accumulation, student concessions, and specific expansion plans. While acknowledging that generating a surplus, building reserves, and developing infrastructure are not inherently inconsistent with charitable objects, the Tribunal noted that a 65% surplus margin might not align with the spirit of charity. Charging high fees from vulnerable students and using the surplus to develop another institution without management or government contribution raised questions about the charitable nature of the activity. The Tribunal clarified that its decision was based on the specific facts and material presented, where the assessee failed to sufficiently justify the substantial surplus. It also clarified that this order does not preclude the assessee from making a fresh application with materially changed circumstances and supporting evidence, such as a documented fee policy, details of concessions, and a supported plan for fund utilization.
The Tribunal admitted the additional legal grounds of appeal for adjudication, noting they did not require appreciation of new facts. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's arguments regarding the invalidity of reassessment proceedings due to flawed reasons to believe and borrowed satisfaction, referencing various judicial precedents. The assessee also contended that the AO made errors in calculating the sale consideration and the cost of acquisition as on 01.04.1981 in the reasons recorded for reopening. Furthermore, the assessee raised a crucial legal ground that the assessment order was passed against a deceased person. The Tribunal heard arguments from both the assessee's counsel and the revenue's representative. The judgment indicates that the Tribunal would proceed to adjudicate these grounds, but the specific findings and reasoning on each issue, as well as the operative directions, are not fully detailed in the provided excerpt. The excerpt concludes with the AO's rejection of the assessee's claim regarding transfer in AY 2006-07 and the basis for the cost of acquisition.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, were invalid and quashed them. The primary reason for this decision was that the reopening was based on information received from another authority (Directorate of Enforcement via ACIT) without independent verification and due application of mind by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal noted that the recorded reasons did not demonstrate any independent verification by the AO to establish that the alleged cash payments were made by the assessee or that the assessee had any business nexus with Shri Tarlochan Singh. The reliance on third-party material and statements, without independent corroboration or establishing a live nexus between such material and the assessee, was insufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of Section 147, especially when the original assessment was completed under Section 143(3). The Tribunal cited various High Court and Tribunal decisions to support the view that suspicion cannot replace the statutory requirement of 'reasons to believe' and that reopening beyond four years requires demonstrating the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. Since the jurisdictional requirements of the first proviso to Section 147 were not fulfilled, the reassessment proceedings were quashed. Consequently, the addition under Section 69C was also deleted, as it could not be sustained on merits. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the Pr. CIT erred in invoking revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal found that the assessment proceedings were conducted under complete scrutiny, and the AO had specifically called for information concerning the issues later flagged by the Pr. CIT. The assessee furnished the requisite explanations and documentary evidence, which the AO considered before accepting the claim. The Tribunal emphasized that the assessment record demonstrated that the issues were specifically examined and replied to by the assessee to the satisfaction of the AO, indicating an enquiry followed by acceptance, not a complete lack of enquiry. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's decision in Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, stating that where the AO has adopted one of the permissible views, the order cannot be treated as erroneous merely because the Commissioner prefers another view. The Tribunal concluded that the Pr. CIT had essentially substituted his own view for that of the AO, which is not permissible under Section 263. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that on one of the issues, there was ultimately no loss to the revenue. Therefore, the jurisdiction assumed by the Pr. CIT was not sustainable, and the impugned order was quashed, restoring the original assessment order.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) had rejected the assessee's application for registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(v) on the grounds of non-maintainability, as there was no modification in the trust's objects. The assessee admitted to a mistake in selecting the correct sub-clause. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to set aside the order of the CIT(E). The direction was to allow the assessee an opportunity to rectify the mistake in Form No. 10AB. If a fresh Form No. 10AB was required, the CIT(E) was directed to condone any delay in filing it. Subsequently, the CIT(E) was to decide the matter on merits based on the corrected or fresh application. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had disclosed a substantial and abnormal variation in trading results, showing a gross loss of Rs. 58,61,129/- against positive gross profits in the preceding two years. Crucially, the assessee failed to furnish requisite details regarding purchases, sales, expenses, and other particulars despite specific requests from the AO, depriving the AO of material for verification. The assessee also did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the loss or the abnormal increase in salary expenses. The CIT(A) deleted the additions by stating the AO had not established suppression of sales or inflation of expenditure, but failed to consider the assessee's non-furnishing of basic details. The Tribunal noted that the salary and wages expenditure increased substantially despite a decline in turnover, which also lacked explanation. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication, allowing the assessee one further opportunity to substantiate its claims with documentary evidence, including explanations for the loss and increased salary expenses. The AO was directed to examine the material and determine income afresh, considering the implications of rejecting books versus disallowing expenditure to avoid duplication.
The Tribunal held that the penalty order passed under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, dated 28.02.2022, cannot be sustained. The Tribunal found that the statutory notices issued under Section 274 read with Section 270A of the Act were fundamentally defective. Specifically, the show-cause notice dated 19.05.2021 vaguely mentioned "under-reporting and/or misreporting of income" without specifying the distinct categories under Section 270A, which attract different penalty rates. Furthermore, the notice mistakenly directed the assessee to explain why penalty under Section 271A (failure to keep books of account) should not be levied, indicating a lack of application of mind. Following the precedents set by the Delhi High Court in GE Capital US Holdings Inc. vs. DCIT and coordinate benches, the Tribunal quashed the penalty order of Rs. 32,39,679/-.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's challenge to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer (Grounds 1, 2, and 3) was rejected. The Tribunal noted that the assessee filed a return in response to the section 148 notice and participated in assessment proceedings without raising any jurisdictional objection. Citing section 124(3)(a) of the Act, the Tribunal held that such an objection cannot be raised after assessment completion. Grounds 4 and 5, being general, did not require separate adjudication. Regarding Grounds 6 and 7, concerning the taxability of interest on compensation, the Tribunal, respectfully following a coordinate bench decision, dismissed these grounds, holding that such interest is taxable under sections 56(2)(viii) and 145B(1) of the Act. For Grounds 8, 9, and 10, relating to additions under section 69A, agricultural income, and section 80C disallowance, the Tribunal, considering the ex-parte nature of the CIT(A)'s order and the assessee's plea for an opportunity to present evidence, restored these grounds to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence. The assessee was directed to cooperate and comply with notices.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer was not justified in applying the higher rate of tax under Section 115BBE to the additional income offered by the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the amendment enhancing the rate of tax under Section 115BBE to 60% came into force with effect from 01.04.2017. Consequently, for the Financial Year 2016-17 (Assessment Year 2017-18), the law as it stood on 01.04.2016, which prescribed a rate of 30%, governs the assessment. The enhanced tax rate of 60% applies prospectively from FY 2017-18 onwards. The Tribunal relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in Deepak Maratha vs. Union of India and the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in S.M.I.L.E. Microfinance Ltd. V. ACIT. The Tribunal ordered that the Assessing Officer should levy tax on the declared income at the normal applicable rates. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that there was no infirmity in the order of the learned CIT(E). The reasoning was that even if the Tribunal were to grant relief to the appellant, the matter would have to be restored to the CIT(E) for consideration under the appropriate section. Since the CIT(E) had already provided the assessee with the liberty to file a fresh application under the correct section along with an application for condonation of delay, the impugned order did not suffer from any infirmity. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal with a direction to the CIT(E) to consider any fresh application filed by the appellant, along with an application for condonation of delay, liberally and sympathetically in accordance with the law.
The Tribunal held that the legal ground concerning the reopening of assessment under Section 147 was without merit. The notice under Section 147 was issued within three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Furthermore, as per the amended provisions of Section 147 effective from April 1, 2021, the AO is empowered to initiate reassessment proceedings if escapement of income comes to his notice. The Tribunal distinguished the cases relied upon by the assessee, stating their facts were different as the reopening in those cases was done beyond four years, requiring fulfillment of specific conditions. Therefore, the legal ground on reopening was dismissed. Regarding the merits of the addition, the Tribunal respectfully followed the Gujarat High Court's decision in Gujarat Flurochemicals Ltd. (supra), which held that disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D cannot exceed the exempt income. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer was directed to restrict the disallowance to the extent of the exempt income of Rs. 1,66,349/- earned by the assessee during the year. The ground on merits was partly allowed.
The Tribunal, acknowledging the principle of natural justice, accepted the assessee's prayer. It held that the assessee should be granted another opportunity to present and prove their case before the Ld. CIT(A). Consequently, the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal directed the assessee to plead and prove its case forthwith. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the assessment itself, as the primary issue was the procedural fairness of the appellate proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's books of account under Section 145(3) and the consequential estimation of income at 8% could not be sustained. The Tribunal reasoned that to reject books, a defect affecting their correctness or completeness must be established. In this case, the primary basis for rejection was the difference in turnover with GSTR-9C. The assessee, acting as a Kachha Arhatia, provided a detailed reconciliation explaining that a significant portion of the GSTR-9C turnover represented sales on behalf of principals, which, as per CBDT Circular No. 452, are not to be treated as the assessee's own turnover. The Tribunal found that the reconciliation was not merely a general explanation but provided figures for agency sales and reconciled the balance with audited books. Furthermore, the AO's estimation of 8% profit lacked any supporting comparable cases, past history, or material. Therefore, the AO was directed to accept the returned income of the assessee. The issue of the specific amount of commission income was not expressly left undecided, but the AO was directed to accept the returned income.
On the issue of Section 80IA deduction, the Tribunal followed its coordinate bench's decision in the assessee's own case for earlier years, which held the assessee eligible after examining tender documents and nature of work. The Tribunal found no material change in the current year's projects and noted the Revenue failed to produce distinguishing features or tender documents. Thus, the deletion of disallowance under Section 80IA was upheld for both assessment years, dismissing the relevant grounds of the Revenue. Regarding Section 14A, the Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s deletion incorrect because the assessee earned exempt income and the AO's disallowance was justified. The addition of Rs. 1,66,667/- was upheld for AY 2017-18. The Tribunal also held that this disallowance must be considered for book profit computation under Section 115JB. For Section 80G, the Tribunal noted that only donations to Swachha Bharat Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund are ineligible. As the assessment and appellate orders did not specify the recipient of the CSR donation, the matter was set aside to the AO to verify if the donation was to these specific funds and, if not, to examine other eligibility conditions under Section 80G. The ground was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal, while acknowledging the well-settled principle that technicalities should not impede substantial justice, decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity to contest the case on merits before the Ld. AO. The Tribunal held that the lapse on the part of the assessee in causing the delay needs to be compensated. Accordingly, the appeal was admitted, and the AO was directed to frame a de novo assessment. The assessee was directed to plead and prove its case forthwith. This opportunity was made subject to a cost of Rs. 5,000/- to be deposited by the assessee within 30 days from the receipt of the order to the Poor Patient Relief Fund of PGI Hospital, Chandigarh. Proof of payment was to be furnished to the AO, who would then proceed with the fresh assessment. The Tribunal expressly left undecided the merits of the addition made by the AO.
On the issue of Section 80IA deduction, the Tribunal followed its coordinate bench's decision in the assessee's own case for earlier years, which held the assessee eligible after examining tender documents and nature of work. The Tribunal found no material change in the current year's projects and noted the Revenue failed to produce distinguishing features or tender documents. Thus, the deletion of disallowance under Section 80IA was upheld for both assessment years, dismissing the relevant grounds of the Revenue. Regarding Section 14A, the Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s deletion incorrect because the assessee earned exempt income and the AO's disallowance was justified. The addition of Rs. 1,66,667/- was upheld for AY 2017-18. The Tribunal also held that this disallowance must be considered for book profit computation under Section 115JB. For Section 80G, the Tribunal noted that only donations to Swachha Bharat Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund are ineligible. As the assessment and appellate orders did not specify the recipient of the CSR donation, the matter was set aside to the AO to verify if the donation was to these specific funds and, if not, to examine other eligibility conditions under Section 80G. The ground was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the interests of justice would be best served by giving the assessee an opportunity to present their case before the Ld. CIT(A). Consequently, the impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to pass a fresh order after providing due opportunity to the assessee. The assessee was instructed to submit all relevant materials and supporting documents before the Ld. CIT(A) and to comply with notices without seeking unnecessary adjournments. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions made by the AO or the grounds raised by the assessee, as the primary issue was the procedural fairness of the appellate proceedings before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the credit of TDS of Rs. 7,05,307/- in Assessment Year 2017-18. The reasoning was that the assessee had discharged its obligation by offering the entire interest income to tax in the year of receipt, and the TDS was deducted and reflected in Form 26AS at that time. The subsequent modification by the deductor, over which the assessee had no control, cannot be a ground to deny the TDS credit. The Tribunal emphasized that once the income is taxed in a particular year, the corresponding TDS must be granted credit in the same year. The CIT(A)'s reliance solely on the subsequently modified Form 26AS was considered insufficient given the peculiar facts. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had made representations to the TDS authorities to correct the mismatch. The consequential interest under sections 234B and 234C was also to be recomputed. The operative direction was to set aside the CIT(A)'s order restricting TDS credit and to allow credit of Rs. 7,05,307/-, subject to verification by the AO that the TDS pertains to the offered interest income.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the discrepancy in recording cash deposits occurred at the assessee's end. Since the assessee had no other source of income, the Tribunal considered the shortfall to be attributable to sales. The Tribunal directed the AO to estimate a Gross Profit (GP) of 10% on the addition of Rs. 4.70 Lacs, treating this estimated GP as business income. This decision was based on the principle that where a discrepancy arises from an accounting error and the funds are demonstrably linked to business activity, an estimation of profit is more appropriate than adding the entire unexplained amount. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided. The operative direction was to re-estimate the addition based on a GP rate.
The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and directed the AO to frame a fresh assessment. The reasoning was that the bank account apparently belonged to a proprietorship concern and was reflected in the ITR of the proprietor, Shri Nitin Khosla. Crucially, none of the replies or documents filed by the assessee had been considered by the AO. The Tribunal found that these submissions and documents would have a material bearing on the assessment of the partnership firm. The assessee was directed to plead and prove its case before the AO. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. No specific issue was left undecided, but the entire assessment was to be redone.
The Tribunal, acknowledging the principles of natural justice, admitted the appeal despite the significant delay of 641 days. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's prayer for a remand, subject to the payment of a cost of Rs. 5,000/-. This cost is to be deposited by the assessee within 30 days from the receipt of the order to the Poor Patient Relief Fund of PGI Hospital, Chandigarh. The assessee is required to furnish proof of payment to the Ld. AO, who will then proceed with a de novo assessment. The assessee is directed to present its case and evidence promptly. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal, while hearing the appeals, noted that it is a well-settled principle of law that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a liberal approach should be adopted in condoning delays where gross negligence or deliberate inaction is not attributable to the assessee. Considering these principles, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders passed by the Ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal directed the Ld. AO to frame a fresh assessment, with a specific instruction to the assessee to plead and prove its case forthwith. The issue of penalty under section 271(1)(c) will be reconsidered in light of the outcome of the fresh quantum assessment. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal. Regarding the Rs.81 Lacs addition, the Tribunal found that the cash deposits were duly evidenced by the cash book, audited financial statements, and VAT returns. The assessee successfully demonstrated that the cash deposits were sourced from available cash in hand in the cash book, representing proceeds of its regular jewellery business turnover. The Tribunal held that a mere increase in cash sales, where recorded in regular books, could not be conclusive, and making this addition would amount to double taxation. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s deletion was upheld. For the Rs.60 Lacs addition, the Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s finding that this was a duplicate addition as the bank account was already considered while computing the Rs.81 Lacs. For the Rs.25.14 Lacs and Rs.2.50 Lacs additions, the Tribunal noted that bank certificates confirmed these accounts did not belong to the assessee-firm, thus the additions could not be made in its hands. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal accepted the assessee's prayer for an opportunity to present additional evidence, citing the principle of natural justice. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the file of the AO for a de-novo assessment. The assessee was directed to plead and prove its case before the AO. The reasoning was that granting another opportunity would allow the assessee to substantiate its case. The ratio decidendi is that in the interest of natural justice, an assessee should be given a fair chance to prove the source of unexplained cash credits, even if it involves presenting additional evidence at a later stage, provided the matter is remanded for a fresh assessment. The operative direction is to remand the matter to the AO for de-novo assessment.