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The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(E) rejecting the assessee's application for registration. The Tribunal found that the assessee had not adequately substantiated its explanation for the substantial and recurring surplus. The profit margins, accumulation of funds, interest income, and increase in the Corpus Fund were considered significant, especially in the absence of supporting material on fee fixation methodology, necessity of accumulation, student concessions, and specific expansion plans. While acknowledging that generating a surplus, building reserves, and developing infrastructure are not inherently inconsistent with charitable objects, the Tribunal noted that a 65% surplus margin might not align with the spirit of charity. Charging high fees from vulnerable students and using the surplus to develop another institution without management or government contribution raised questions about the charitable nature of the activity. The Tribunal clarified that its decision was based on the specific facts and material presented, where the assessee failed to sufficiently justify the substantial surplus. It also clarified that this order does not preclude the assessee from making a fresh application with materially changed circumstances and supporting evidence, such as a documented fee policy, details of concessions, and a supported plan for fund utilization.
The Tribunal admitted the additional legal grounds of appeal for adjudication, noting they did not require appreciation of new facts. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's arguments regarding the invalidity of reassessment proceedings due to flawed reasons to believe and borrowed satisfaction, referencing various judicial precedents. The assessee also contended that the AO made errors in calculating the sale consideration and the cost of acquisition as on 01.04.1981 in the reasons recorded for reopening. Furthermore, the assessee raised a crucial legal ground that the assessment order was passed against a deceased person. The Tribunal heard arguments from both the assessee's counsel and the revenue's representative. The judgment indicates that the Tribunal would proceed to adjudicate these grounds, but the specific findings and reasoning on each issue, as well as the operative directions, are not fully detailed in the provided excerpt. The excerpt concludes with the AO's rejection of the assessee's claim regarding transfer in AY 2006-07 and the basis for the cost of acquisition.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, were invalid and quashed them. The primary reason for this decision was that the reopening was based on information received from another authority (Directorate of Enforcement via ACIT) without independent verification and due application of mind by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal noted that the recorded reasons did not demonstrate any independent verification by the AO to establish that the alleged cash payments were made by the assessee or that the assessee had any business nexus with Shri Tarlochan Singh. The reliance on third-party material and statements, without independent corroboration or establishing a live nexus between such material and the assessee, was insufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of Section 147, especially when the original assessment was completed under Section 143(3). The Tribunal cited various High Court and Tribunal decisions to support the view that suspicion cannot replace the statutory requirement of 'reasons to believe' and that reopening beyond four years requires demonstrating the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. Since the jurisdictional requirements of the first proviso to Section 147 were not fulfilled, the reassessment proceedings were quashed. Consequently, the addition under Section 69C was also deleted, as it could not be sustained on merits. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the Pr. CIT erred in invoking revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal found that the assessment proceedings were conducted under complete scrutiny, and the AO had specifically called for information concerning the issues later flagged by the Pr. CIT. The assessee furnished the requisite explanations and documentary evidence, which the AO considered before accepting the claim. The Tribunal emphasized that the assessment record demonstrated that the issues were specifically examined and replied to by the assessee to the satisfaction of the AO, indicating an enquiry followed by acceptance, not a complete lack of enquiry. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's decision in Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, stating that where the AO has adopted one of the permissible views, the order cannot be treated as erroneous merely because the Commissioner prefers another view. The Tribunal concluded that the Pr. CIT had essentially substituted his own view for that of the AO, which is not permissible under Section 263. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that on one of the issues, there was ultimately no loss to the revenue. Therefore, the jurisdiction assumed by the Pr. CIT was not sustainable, and the impugned order was quashed, restoring the original assessment order.
The Tribunal held that the penalty order passed under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, dated 28.02.2022, cannot be sustained. The Tribunal found that the statutory notices issued under Section 274 read with Section 270A of the Act were fundamentally defective. Specifically, the show-cause notice dated 19.05.2021 vaguely mentioned "under-reporting and/or misreporting of income" without specifying the distinct categories under Section 270A, which attract different penalty rates. Furthermore, the notice mistakenly directed the assessee to explain why penalty under Section 271A (failure to keep books of account) should not be levied, indicating a lack of application of mind. Following the precedents set by the Delhi High Court in GE Capital US Holdings Inc. vs. DCIT and coordinate benches, the Tribunal quashed the penalty order of Rs. 32,39,679/-.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's books of account under Section 145(3) and the consequential estimation of income at 8% could not be sustained. The Tribunal reasoned that to reject books, a defect affecting their correctness or completeness must be established. In this case, the primary basis for rejection was the difference in turnover with GSTR-9C. The assessee, acting as a Kachha Arhatia, provided a detailed reconciliation explaining that a significant portion of the GSTR-9C turnover represented sales on behalf of principals, which, as per CBDT Circular No. 452, are not to be treated as the assessee's own turnover. The Tribunal found that the reconciliation was not merely a general explanation but provided figures for agency sales and reconciled the balance with audited books. Furthermore, the AO's estimation of 8% profit lacked any supporting comparable cases, past history, or material. Therefore, the AO was directed to accept the returned income of the assessee. The issue of the specific amount of commission income was not expressly left undecided, but the AO was directed to accept the returned income.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer was not justified in applying the higher rate of tax under Section 115BBE to the additional income offered by the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the amendment enhancing the rate of tax under Section 115BBE to 60% came into force with effect from 01.04.2017. Consequently, for the Financial Year 2016-17 (Assessment Year 2017-18), the law as it stood on 01.04.2016, which prescribed a rate of 30%, governs the assessment. The enhanced tax rate of 60% applies prospectively from FY 2017-18 onwards. The Tribunal relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in Deepak Maratha vs. Union of India and the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in S.M.I.L.E. Microfinance Ltd. V. ACIT. The Tribunal ordered that the Assessing Officer should levy tax on the declared income at the normal applicable rates. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's challenge to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer (Grounds 1, 2, and 3) was rejected. The Tribunal noted that the assessee filed a return in response to the section 148 notice and participated in assessment proceedings without raising any jurisdictional objection. Citing section 124(3)(a) of the Act, the Tribunal held that such an objection cannot be raised after assessment completion. Grounds 4 and 5, being general, did not require separate adjudication. Regarding Grounds 6 and 7, concerning the taxability of interest on compensation, the Tribunal, respectfully following a coordinate bench decision, dismissed these grounds, holding that such interest is taxable under sections 56(2)(viii) and 145B(1) of the Act. For Grounds 8, 9, and 10, relating to additions under section 69A, agricultural income, and section 80C disallowance, the Tribunal, considering the ex-parte nature of the CIT(A)'s order and the assessee's plea for an opportunity to present evidence, restored these grounds to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence. The assessee was directed to cooperate and comply with notices.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the credit of TDS of Rs. 7,05,307/- in Assessment Year 2017-18. The reasoning was that the assessee had discharged its obligation by offering the entire interest income to tax in the year of receipt, and the TDS was deducted and reflected in Form 26AS at that time. The subsequent modification by the deductor, over which the assessee had no control, cannot be a ground to deny the TDS credit. The Tribunal emphasized that once the income is taxed in a particular year, the corresponding TDS must be granted credit in the same year. The CIT(A)'s reliance solely on the subsequently modified Form 26AS was considered insufficient given the peculiar facts. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had made representations to the TDS authorities to correct the mismatch. The consequential interest under sections 234B and 234C was also to be recomputed. The operative direction was to set aside the CIT(A)'s order restricting TDS credit and to allow credit of Rs. 7,05,307/-, subject to verification by the AO that the TDS pertains to the offered interest income.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had disclosed a substantial and abnormal variation in trading results, showing a gross loss of Rs. 58,61,129/- against positive gross profits in the preceding two years. Crucially, the assessee failed to furnish requisite details regarding purchases, sales, expenses, and other particulars despite specific requests from the AO, depriving the AO of material for verification. The assessee also did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the loss or the abnormal increase in salary expenses. The CIT(A) deleted the additions by stating the AO had not established suppression of sales or inflation of expenditure, but failed to consider the assessee's non-furnishing of basic details. The Tribunal noted that the salary and wages expenditure increased substantially despite a decline in turnover, which also lacked explanation. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication, allowing the assessee one further opportunity to substantiate its claims with documentary evidence, including explanations for the loss and increased salary expenses. The AO was directed to examine the material and determine income afresh, considering the implications of rejecting books versus disallowing expenditure to avoid duplication.
On the issue of Section 80IA deduction, the Tribunal followed its coordinate bench's decision in the assessee's own case for earlier years, which held the assessee eligible after examining tender documents and nature of work. The Tribunal found no material change in the current year's projects and noted the Revenue failed to produce distinguishing features or tender documents. Thus, the deletion of disallowance under Section 80IA was upheld for both assessment years, dismissing the relevant grounds of the Revenue. Regarding Section 14A, the Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s deletion incorrect because the assessee earned exempt income and the AO's disallowance was justified. The addition of Rs. 1,66,667/- was upheld for AY 2017-18. The Tribunal also held that this disallowance must be considered for book profit computation under Section 115JB. For Section 80G, the Tribunal noted that only donations to Swachha Bharat Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund are ineligible. As the assessment and appellate orders did not specify the recipient of the CSR donation, the matter was set aside to the AO to verify if the donation was to these specific funds and, if not, to examine other eligibility conditions under Section 80G. The ground was allowed for statistical purposes.
On the issue of Section 80IA deduction, the Tribunal followed its coordinate bench's decision in the assessee's own case for earlier years, which held the assessee eligible after examining tender documents and nature of work. The Tribunal found no material change in the current year's projects and noted the Revenue failed to produce distinguishing features or tender documents. Thus, the deletion of disallowance under Section 80IA was upheld for both assessment years, dismissing the relevant grounds of the Revenue. Regarding Section 14A, the Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s deletion incorrect because the assessee earned exempt income and the AO's disallowance was justified. The addition of Rs. 1,66,667/- was upheld for AY 2017-18. The Tribunal also held that this disallowance must be considered for book profit computation under Section 115JB. For Section 80G, the Tribunal noted that only donations to Swachha Bharat Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund are ineligible. As the assessment and appellate orders did not specify the recipient of the CSR donation, the matter was set aside to the AO to verify if the donation was to these specific funds and, if not, to examine other eligibility conditions under Section 80G. The ground was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the legal ground concerning the reopening of assessment under Section 147 was without merit. The notice under Section 147 was issued within three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Furthermore, as per the amended provisions of Section 147 effective from April 1, 2021, the AO is empowered to initiate reassessment proceedings if escapement of income comes to his notice. The Tribunal distinguished the cases relied upon by the assessee, stating their facts were different as the reopening in those cases was done beyond four years, requiring fulfillment of specific conditions. Therefore, the legal ground on reopening was dismissed. Regarding the merits of the addition, the Tribunal respectfully followed the Gujarat High Court's decision in Gujarat Flurochemicals Ltd. (supra), which held that disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D cannot exceed the exempt income. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer was directed to restrict the disallowance to the extent of the exempt income of Rs. 1,66,349/- earned by the assessee during the year. The ground on merits was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) had rejected the assessee's application for registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(v) on the grounds of non-maintainability, as there was no modification in the trust's objects. The assessee admitted to a mistake in selecting the correct sub-clause. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to set aside the order of the CIT(E). The direction was to allow the assessee an opportunity to rectify the mistake in Form No. 10AB. If a fresh Form No. 10AB was required, the CIT(E) was directed to condone any delay in filing it. Subsequently, the CIT(E) was to decide the matter on merits based on the corrected or fresh application. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the interests of justice would be best served by giving the assessee an opportunity to present their case before the Ld. CIT(A). Consequently, the impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to pass a fresh order after providing due opportunity to the assessee. The assessee was instructed to submit all relevant materials and supporting documents before the Ld. CIT(A) and to comply with notices without seeking unnecessary adjournments. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions made by the AO or the grounds raised by the assessee, as the primary issue was the procedural fairness of the appellate proceedings before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that there was no infirmity in the order of the learned CIT(E). The reasoning was that even if the Tribunal were to grant relief to the appellant, the matter would have to be restored to the CIT(E) for consideration under the appropriate section. Since the CIT(E) had already provided the assessee with the liberty to file a fresh application under the correct section along with an application for condonation of delay, the impugned order did not suffer from any infirmity. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal with a direction to the CIT(E) to consider any fresh application filed by the appellant, along with an application for condonation of delay, liberally and sympathetically in accordance with the law.
The Tribunal, while acknowledging the well-settled principle that technicalities should not impede substantial justice, decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity to contest the case on merits before the Ld. AO. The Tribunal held that the lapse on the part of the assessee in causing the delay needs to be compensated. Accordingly, the appeal was admitted, and the AO was directed to frame a de novo assessment. The assessee was directed to plead and prove its case forthwith. This opportunity was made subject to a cost of Rs. 5,000/- to be deposited by the assessee within 30 days from the receipt of the order to the Poor Patient Relief Fund of PGI Hospital, Chandigarh. Proof of payment was to be furnished to the AO, who would then proceed with the fresh assessment. The Tribunal expressly left undecided the merits of the addition made by the AO.
The Tribunal, acknowledging the principle of natural justice, accepted the assessee's prayer. It held that the assessee should be granted another opportunity to present and prove their case before the Ld. CIT(A). Consequently, the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal directed the assessee to plead and prove its case forthwith. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the assessment itself, as the primary issue was the procedural fairness of the appellate proceedings.
The Tribunal noted that the learned CIT(A) had not adjudicated the substantive grounds raised by the assessee, dismissing the appeal solely on the issue of limitation. The Tribunal acknowledged the factual material presented by the assessee regarding discrepancies in her identity and address between PAN particulars and the registered sale deed. However, the Tribunal decided not to adjudicate on the legal consequences of these discrepancies, including the validity of reopening and service of notices, leaving these issues open. Instead, the Tribunal found it necessary to verify a limited factual aspect concerning the computation of capital gain, specifically the assessee's claim of a cost of acquisition of ₹4,22,200/-, which was stated to be disclosed in the computation of income. The Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer with specific directions to examine the return, verify the cost of acquisition from supporting documents, provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee, and recompute the taxable capital gain accordingly. The Tribunal clarified that no addition would be sustained to the extent of the duly verified cost of acquisition. All other legal and jurisdictional grounds were expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal set aside the impugned order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) and restored the appeal back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to plead and prove its case forthwith before the Ld. CIT(A). It was also noted that the earlier decisions in favor of the assessee would be considered during the fresh adjudication. The Tribunal did not decide the substantive issue of the allowability of expenses claimed under the head 'income from other sources'. The operative direction is to remand the matter for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for full exemption under Sections 11 & 12 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasoning was that the assessee's aggregate income was Rs. 434.25 Lacs, and it had applied Rs. 403.62 Lacs towards charitable purposes. Even after excluding depreciation of Rs. 35.04 Lacs from the application of income, the remaining application of Rs. 368.58 Lacs (Rs. 403.62 Lacs - Rs. 35.04 Lacs) still exceeded 85% of its gross receipts. The Tribunal found that the assessee had applied funds more than the threshold limit required for full exemption. Consequently, the impugned addition of Rs. 30.62 Lacs made by the Ld. AO was directed to be deleted. The Tribunal noted that the legal grounds raised in the appeal had become academic in nature due to this finding. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal accepted the assessee's prayer for an opportunity to present additional evidence, citing the principle of natural justice. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the file of the AO for a de-novo assessment. The assessee was directed to plead and prove its case before the AO. The reasoning was that granting another opportunity would allow the assessee to substantiate its case. The ratio decidendi is that in the interest of natural justice, an assessee should be given a fair chance to prove the source of unexplained cash credits, even if it involves presenting additional evidence at a later stage, provided the matter is remanded for a fresh assessment. The operative direction is to remand the matter to the AO for de-novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that since the very foundation of the impugned penalty, which is the quantum addition, no longer survives in its confirmed form and has been restored back to the Assessing Officer for reconsideration, the penalty order also requires re-examination. The Tribunal found it fit to set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and restore the penalty back to the Assessing Officer. The AO is directed to re-consider the penalty in light of the outcome of the quantum assessment. The assessee is directed to plead and prove its case forthwith before the AO. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal, while hearing the appeals, noted that it is a well-settled principle of law that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a liberal approach should be adopted in condoning delays where gross negligence or deliberate inaction is not attributable to the assessee. Considering these principles, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders passed by the Ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal directed the Ld. AO to frame a fresh assessment, with a specific instruction to the assessee to plead and prove its case forthwith. The issue of penalty under section 271(1)(c) will be reconsidered in light of the outcome of the fresh quantum assessment. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal, while hearing the appeals, noted that it is a well-settled principle of law that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a liberal approach should be adopted in condoning delays where gross negligence or deliberate inaction is not attributable to the assessee. Considering these principles, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders passed by the Ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal directed the Ld. AO to frame a fresh assessment, with a specific instruction to the assessee to plead and prove its case forthwith. The issue of penalty under section 271(1)(c) will be reconsidered in light of the outcome of the fresh quantum assessment. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal accepted the prayer of the assessee's authorized representative (AR) to withdraw the appeal. The primary reason for this decision was the assessee's submission that necessary rectifications had already been carried out by the lower authorities, rendering the appeal infructuous. The Tribunal noted that the Revenue's representative did not raise any objection to the withdrawal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the original assessment or the CIT(A)'s order. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal. Regarding the Rs.81 Lacs addition, the Tribunal found that the cash deposits were duly evidenced by the cash book, audited financial statements, and VAT returns. The assessee successfully demonstrated that the cash deposits were sourced from available cash in hand in the cash book, representing proceeds of its regular jewellery business turnover. The Tribunal held that a mere increase in cash sales, where recorded in regular books, could not be conclusive, and making this addition would amount to double taxation. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s deletion was upheld. For the Rs.60 Lacs addition, the Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s finding that this was a duplicate addition as the bank account was already considered while computing the Rs.81 Lacs. For the Rs.25.14 Lacs and Rs.2.50 Lacs additions, the Tribunal noted that bank certificates confirmed these accounts did not belong to the assessee-firm, thus the additions could not be made in its hands. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the discrepancy in recording cash deposits occurred at the assessee's end. Since the assessee had no other source of income, the Tribunal considered the shortfall to be attributable to sales. The Tribunal directed the AO to estimate a Gross Profit (GP) of 10% on the addition of Rs. 4.70 Lacs, treating this estimated GP as business income. This decision was based on the principle that where a discrepancy arises from an accounting error and the funds are demonstrably linked to business activity, an estimation of profit is more appropriate than adding the entire unexplained amount. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided. The operative direction was to re-estimate the addition based on a GP rate.
The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and directed the AO to frame a fresh assessment. The reasoning was that the bank account apparently belonged to a proprietorship concern and was reflected in the ITR of the proprietor, Shri Nitin Khosla. Crucially, none of the replies or documents filed by the assessee had been considered by the AO. The Tribunal found that these submissions and documents would have a material bearing on the assessment of the partnership firm. The assessee was directed to plead and prove its case before the AO. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. No specific issue was left undecided, but the entire assessment was to be redone.
The Tribunal, acknowledging the principles of natural justice, admitted the appeal despite the significant delay of 641 days. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's prayer for a remand, subject to the payment of a cost of Rs. 5,000/-. This cost is to be deposited by the assessee within 30 days from the receipt of the order to the Poor Patient Relief Fund of PGI Hospital, Chandigarh. The assessee is required to furnish proof of payment to the Ld. AO, who will then proceed with a de novo assessment. The assessee is directed to present its case and evidence promptly. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) had validly exercised the power of remand under Section 251(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasoning was that the original assessment was framed on a best judgment basis. The remand was carried out after considering the assessee's submissions, and therefore, it could not be faulted. This exercise of power was in adherence to the established principles of natural justice. Consequently, both appeals filed by the revenue were dismissed. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided. The ratio decidendi is that a remand by the CIT(A) is justified when the original assessment was on a best judgment basis and the remand is done after considering the assessee's submissions, upholding principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order suffered from inconsistencies and cryptic findings, failing to address the issues raised in the assessment order. Specifically, the Tribunal noted ambiguity regarding whether fresh loans were received during the year, which was not confirmed by either the AR or the DR. The CIT(A)'s reasoning for deleting the addition on account of unexplained sales, stating that bank credits comprise receipts from all sources and may not match sales, was considered insufficient. The Tribunal held that in the interest of justice, the matter should be restored to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to consider all aspects, potentially call for a Remand Report from the AO, and pass a well-reasoned speaking order. The appeal of the Revenue was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the assessee's age and circumstances, and admitted the appeal for adjudication. The Tribunal, while considering the rival contentions and in light of the principles of natural justice, decided to set aside the impugned order and restore the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for a de novo assessment. The assessee was directed to ensure compliance before the AO. The Tribunal relied on the order of a Coordinate Chandigarh Bench in ITA No. 1673/Chd/2025 for AY 2012-13, which was the case of the assessee's brother, where the matter was also restored to the AO for a fresh assessment to grant another opportunity of hearing. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. No specific finding was given on the individual grounds of appeal as the matter was remanded.
The Tribunal noted that while the contentions of the AO and the assessee were reproduced in the CIT(A)'s order, the finding of the CIT(A) was cryptic and confined to one paragraph, not constituting a well-reasoned order. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication. The Tribunal clarified that it had not decided the issue on merits and directed the CIT(A) to examine all evidence on record and any further evidence required, and then pass a well-reasoned order dealing with all contentions raised by the AO and the assessee. The appeal filed by the Revenue was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) had validly exercised the power of remand under Section 251(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasoning was that the original assessment was framed on a best judgment basis. The remand was carried out after considering the assessee's submissions, and therefore, it could not be faulted. This exercise of power was in adherence to the established principles of natural justice. Consequently, both appeals filed by the revenue were dismissed. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided. The ratio decidendi is that a remand by the CIT(A) is justified when the original assessment was on a best judgment basis and the remand is done after considering the assessee's submissions, upholding principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal accepted the prayer of the Learned Authorized Representative (AR) for remand. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had applied for registration under section 12A in 2003, which was initially rejected. However, significant subsequent developments occurred, including the grant of provisional and permanent registration under the new regime (Forms 10AC and 10AB) for AY 2022-23 onwards, and exemption under section 10(46A). Crucially, the Hon'ble P&H High Court, in the assessee's own case, had set aside previous orders and remanded the matter to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision on the section 12AA application, considering Supreme Court judgments. The Tribunal acknowledged that these developments, including the retrospective effect of the section 12AB registration, had a direct bearing on the appeals. The Learned CIT-DR also conceded that these subsequent developments were material. Therefore, the Tribunal held that it would be appropriate for these issues to be first examined by the lower authorities. Accordingly, all four impugned orders were set aside, and the assessments for all four years were restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment, taking into account the subsequent developments and the directions of the Hon'ble Court. All issues were kept open, and the assessee was directed to plead its case forthwith. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal accepted the prayer of the Ld. AR, citing the principle of natural justice. The impugned order of the CIT(A) for AY 2015-16 was set aside, and the matter was restored back to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was directed to plead and prove its case forthwith. The Tribunal noted that no other grounds were urged in the appeal. For AY 2019-20, the facts were identical, and therefore, this appeal was also restored back to the Ld. CIT(A) on similar lines. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide the substantive merits of the assessment.
The Tribunal accepted the prayer of the Learned Authorized Representative (AR) for remand. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had applied for registration under section 12A in 2003, which was initially rejected. However, significant subsequent developments occurred, including the grant of provisional and permanent registration under the new regime (Forms 10AC and 10AB) for AY 2022-23 onwards, and exemption under section 10(46A). Crucially, the Hon'ble P&H High Court, in the assessee's own case, had set aside previous orders and remanded the matter to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision on the section 12AA application, considering Supreme Court judgments. The Tribunal acknowledged that these developments, including the retrospective effect of the section 12AB registration, had a direct bearing on the appeals. The Learned CIT-DR also conceded that these subsequent developments were material. Therefore, the Tribunal held that it would be appropriate for these issues to be first examined by the lower authorities. Accordingly, all four impugned orders were set aside, and the assessments for all four years were restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment, taking into account the subsequent developments and the directions of the Hon'ble Court. All issues were kept open, and the assessee was directed to plead its case forthwith. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal, acknowledging the assessee's non-resident status which prevented their attendance before the lower authorities, and in consideration of the principles of natural justice, accepted the prayer of the assessee's Learned AR. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order passed by the CIT(A). The matter has been restored back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment. The assessee has been directed to plead and prove its case forthwith. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that since the quantum assessments for both AYs 2015-16 and 2016-17, from which the penalties under Section 271(1)(c) emanated, have been remanded back to the Assessing Officer (AO) by the Ld. CIT(A) vide orders dated 08.09.2025, the very foundation of these penalties no longer survives. Consequently, both the penalties also stand restored back to the Ld. AO. The AO is directed to adjudicate the penalties afresh in light of the outcome of the quantum additions that will be made after the fresh assessment proceedings. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, meaning the Tribunal did not decide the merits of the penalty but restored them to the AO for fresh consideration based on the revised quantum assessment.
The Tribunal held that since the quantum assessments for both AYs 2015-16 and 2016-17, from which the penalties under Section 271(1)(c) emanated, have been remanded back to the Assessing Officer (AO) by the Ld. CIT(A) vide orders dated 08.09.2025, the very foundation of these penalties no longer survives. Consequently, both the penalties also stand restored back to the Ld. AO. The AO is directed to adjudicate the penalties afresh in light of the outcome of the quantum additions that will be made after the fresh assessment proceedings. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, meaning the Tribunal did not decide the merits of the penalty but restored them to the AO for fresh consideration based on the revised quantum assessment.
The Tribunal, acknowledging the delay of 52 days, admitted the appeal by condoning the delay. The decision was based on the principles of natural justice and consideration of the assessee's background. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's prayer for remand. The admission of the appeal and the remand were made subject to the assessee paying a cost of Rs. 5,000/- within 30 days of receiving the order, to be deposited with the Poor Patient Relief Fund of PGI Hospital, Chandigarh. The assessee was directed to furnish proof of payment to the Ld. CIT(A), who would then proceed with a de novo adjudication of the appeals on merits. The assessee was also directed to plead and prove its case forthwith. No other grounds were urged. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal accepted the assessee's prayer for remand. The reasoning was based on the assertion by the assessee's AR that all requisite documents were available. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order passed by the Ld. CIT(E) and restored the matter of registration back to the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh consideration. The Tribunal directed the assessee to supply the requisite documents and substantiate its registration application. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the Pr. CIT was not justified in invoking revisional jurisdiction under Section 263. On the issue of CSR expenditure, the Tribunal noted that the assessee is an individual and not covered by CSR regulations applicable to corporate entities. The expenditure was incurred wholly for business and allowable under Section 37(1), making the invocation of Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) by the Pr. CIT unwarranted. Regarding the 'Rehabilitation and Restoration fund', the Tribunal found that it was a refundable deposit and not claimed as an expenditure, thus Section 43B was not applicable, and revision on this ground was incorrect. Concerning mining and quarrying activity, the Tribunal observed that the AO had conducted detailed inquiries, issued notices under Section 142(1), and received extensive replies with supporting documents, including financial statements, GST summaries, and royalty payment proofs. The AO, after considering these, had substantially accepted the assessee's claims. The Tribunal relied on precedents like Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT and CIT v. Max India Ltd., stating that an order cannot be branded as erroneous merely because the Commissioner disagrees with a plausible view taken by the AO after due application of mind. The Tribunal emphasized the distinction between lack of enquiry and inadequate enquiry, citing CIT v. Sunbeam Auto Ltd., and concluded that the AO had conducted an enquiry, and the assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the revenue. Therefore, the impugned order under Section 263 was set aside, and the assessment order passed by the AO was restored.
The Tribunal held that the allegation of cash payment for the property purchase remained inconclusive. The assessee had denied making any cash payment, and the judgment noted that it was not demonstrated that any such quantum addition was made in the hands of the assessee. Furthermore, the Tribunal considered that the property was acquired jointly by the assessee and his wife. It was observed that the additional requirement to deduct TDS on an aggregate basis for transferors/transferees was brought into effect only from 01.10.2024. Therefore, this provision could not be applied retrospectively to AY 2019-20. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the impugned demand raised against the assessee was not sustainable and directed its deletion. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that for invoking Section 263, both conditions – that the AO's order is erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue – must be met. It distinguished between a lack of inquiry and an inadequate inquiry. The Tribunal noted that the AO had issued a notice under Section 142(1) and received detailed responses from the assessee, including documents and explanations regarding the nature of receipts as consultancy charges, not salary. The Tribunal found that the assessee's prior employment as a salaried individual with the same company did not, by itself, determine the character of receipts in the current year. The Pr. CIT had not provided material to demonstrate an employer-employee relationship persisted. The Tribunal concluded that the AO had made an inquiry and applied his mind, even if the order lacked elaborate discussion. The Pr. CIT's differing view, without substantiating material or showing the AO's view was unsustainable in law, did not warrant revision. Therefore, the Pr. CIT's order under Section 263 was set aside, and the AO's assessment order was restored.
The Tribunal accepted the prayer of the Learned Authorized Representative (AR) for remand. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had applied for registration under section 12A in 2003, which was initially rejected. However, significant subsequent developments occurred, including the grant of provisional and permanent registration under the new regime (Forms 10AC and 10AB) for AY 2022-23 onwards, and exemption under section 10(46A). Crucially, the Hon'ble P&H High Court, in the assessee's own case, had set aside previous orders and remanded the matter to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision on the section 12AA application, considering Supreme Court judgments. The Tribunal acknowledged that these developments, including the retrospective effect of the section 12AB registration, had a direct bearing on the appeals. The Learned CIT-DR also conceded that these subsequent developments were material. Therefore, the Tribunal held that it would be appropriate for these issues to be first examined by the lower authorities. Accordingly, all four impugned orders were set aside, and the assessments for all four years were restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment, taking into account the subsequent developments and the directions of the Hon'ble Court. All issues were kept open, and the assessee was directed to plead its case forthwith. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the addition made on account of alleged unaccounted purchases, based solely on ledger entries extracted from the SAP-based JSK server found at third-party premises, is legally unsustainable. The Tribunal found that these documents could not be treated as incriminating material against the assessee unless corroborated with cogent evidence. The onus was on the AO to establish a nexus between the ledger entries and the assessee, which was not done. The Tribunal noted that the documents lacked details and were inadequate to fasten liability. Citing its own decision in Kuldeep Rai vs. DCIT and other similar judgments, the Tribunal reiterated that additions founded solely upon third-party seized material and statements, without independent corroborative evidence linking the assessee to the alleged unaccounted transactions, are unsustainable. In the present case, the addition rested solely on third-party seized material without any corroborative evidence connecting it to the assessee's actual undisclosed purchases. Therefore, the impugned addition was deleted for both assessment years. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal accepted the assessee's prayer for remand. The primary reasoning was based on the principles of natural justice and consideration of the assessee's background. The Tribunal found it appropriate to restore the matter to the file of the learned CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication (de novo). The assessee was directed to present its case and provide evidence forthwith. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. No specific issue was left undecided, as the Tribunal decided to remand the matter for a complete hearing.