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The Tribunal held that the Foreign Tax Credit (FTC) of Rs. 3,20,415/- cannot be denied merely because Form No. 67 was filed after the prescribed due date. The Tribunal noted that the assessee filed the return of income and Form No. 67 on 12.01.2021, which was only two days after the extended due date of 10.01.2021. The denial of FTC was solely based on this delay. The Tribunal relied on the decision of a Coordinate Bench in Deepak Shimoga Padmaraju v. ADIT/ITO, which followed Vinodkumar Lakshmipathi v. CIT(A), NFAC, Delhi. These decisions held that Rule 128(9) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, does not mandate disallowance of FTC for delay in filing Form No. 67, and that such filing is a directory requirement, not fatal to the claim. The Tribunal reasoned that FTC is a substantive claim available to the assessee, and a procedural delay in filing the form, when the form has been subsequently filed and the claim is otherwise eligible, should not lead to denial. Accordingly, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the Assessing Officer was directed to allow the FTC of Rs. 3,20,415/-, subject to verification of the claim and the filed Form No. 67. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the dispute concerned the disallowance of business expenses of Rs. 10,77,700. The AO made the disallowance primarily due to a lack of complete supporting evidence. The assessee claimed to have furnished detailed submissions and documents to the Ld. CIT(A), but the Ld. CIT(A) proceeded on the premise that no such submissions were filed. The Tribunal observed that the Ld. CIT(A)'s order itself recorded that the assessee made a submission on 27.08.2025. The assessee also filed a paper book before the Tribunal containing supporting documents. Therefore, the Tribunal found that the assessee's claim required examination based on supporting evidence, which had not been considered or verified by the lower authorities. In the interest of justice and fair play, and considering that both the Ld. AR and Ld. DR agreed to restore the issue to the AO for verification, the Tribunal set aside the issue to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication. The AO was directed to consider the submissions and supporting evidence, examine the allowability of expenses, and provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The order of the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside, and Ground No. 4 was allowed for statistical purposes. Other grounds were dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had obtained registration under Section 12AA of the Act. It was undisputed that the return of income was filed belatedly on March 31, 2019, and the audit report in Form 10B was filed on December 10, 2019, when the appeal was pending before the CIT(A)/NFAC. The Tribunal observed that the Form 10B was dated June 30, 2018, and uploaded on December 10, 2019. The Tribunal, respectfully following the decisions of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in Sarvodaya Charitable Trust Vs. ITO and Commissioner of Income-tax – IV v. Xavier Kelavani Mandal (P.) Ltd., and other High Courts, held that the provision regarding furnishing of the audit report along with the return is procedural and directory in nature, and substantial compliance would suffice. The Tribunal found that the audit was completed well before the due date, and the delay in filing was a procedural lapse. Therefore, the exemption under Section 11 was directed to be granted to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's explanations for both additions were not accepted by the lower authorities primarily due to a lack of proper supporting evidence. Specifically, for the Rs. 50,00,000/- addition, the assessee failed to provide confirmations from donors, evidence of their sources, and cash availability. For the Rs. 4,00,020/- addition, documentary evidence linking bank transactions to payments was missing. Before the Tribunal, the assessee explicitly undertook to furnish the required confirmations and documentary evidence. In the interest of substantial justice and to provide one more opportunity to the assessee, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and restored both issues to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The assessee is directed to furnish the necessary evidence, and the Ld. CIT(A) is to decide the issues afresh after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that it has the power to condone the delay in filing the application for approval under Section 80G(5) of the Act, specifically Form No. 10AB. The Tribunal found that the delay in filing the application was procedural and that the assessee had demonstrated a reasonable and bonafide cause for the delay, stemming from confusion regarding the expiry dates of its various approvals. The Tribunal emphasized that procedural lapses should not defeat the substantive rights of charitable trusts. Relying on the coordinate bench decision in Vananchal Kelavani Trust and the Hon'ble Delhi High Court judgment in DCIT (Exemption) vs. Vishwa Jagriti Mission, the Tribunal condoned the delay. The matter was remitted back to the CIT (Exemptions) to decide the application on its merits, with a direction to grant a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause. It then remitted the entire issues back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision, granting the assessee an opportunity to present its case.
The Tribunal held that if the quantum appeal is set aside, the penalty proceedings based on that assessment cannot sustain. Therefore, the penalty proceedings are also set aside for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee an opportunity to be heard and present its case. A token cost was imposed on the assessee for negligence.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s refusal to admit additional evidence without a proper application was legally justified. However, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for verification of donor details for the disputed amount.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee may not be eligible for exemption under Section 11 due to non-compliance, the entire gross receipts cannot be taxed. Revenue expenditures incurred to earn such income, along with depreciation, must be allowed as deductions.
The Tribunal held that the requirement of filing Form 67 within the prescribed time is directory, not mandatory. A substantive claim for FTC cannot be denied solely due to the delay in filing the form, especially when the form is subsequently furnished.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not the owner of the property, and the activity involved commercial exploitation of leased rights along with ancillary services. Therefore, the income is assessable under 'Profits and gains of business or profession'.
The Tribunal held that while the exemption under Section 11 might be denied due to non-filing of Form 10B, the entire gross receipts cannot be taxed. Allowable revenue expenditures incurred to earn the income must be considered.
The Tribunal held that the addition under Section 69A was not sustainable because the source of the money was explained as business receipts of a partnership firm. The mere fact that Specified Bank Notes were received after a certain date does not automatically make the money unexplained.
The Tribunal held that the denial of exemption was incorrect because the assessee had obtained final registration under Section 12AB before the return was processed under Section 143(1). The proviso to Section 12A(2)(b) allows the exemption to relate back to the provisional registration period.
The Tribunal held that a fresh assessment order passed by the AO, even if pursuant to directions from the CIT(A), is not directly appealable before the Tribunal. The assessee's statutory remedy is to first appeal to the appropriate appellate authority.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing Form 67 is a technical violation and should not result in the denial of substantive Foreign Tax Credit. The issue is covered by a coordinate bench decision in the assessee's own case.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was bona fide and reasonable, as the assessee realized the correct legal position after tribunal pronouncements. Consequently, the assessee is entitled to full exemption for VRS compensation and leave encashment.
The Tribunal held that the CIT erred in rejecting the application solely on the lack of financial expenditure, especially when activities were claimed to be free. The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided some evidence like photographs and confirmation letters from teachers.
The Tribunal held that the Income Tax Act does not prohibit filing a fresh application for registration if an earlier one was rejected, nor does it require an appeal against a prior rejection. Each application must be considered independently on its merits.
The Tribunal admitted additional evidence and found that the CIT(Exemptions) may not have considered all submissions. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(Exemptions) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal admitted additional evidence and found that the CIT(Exemptions) may not have considered all submissions. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(Exemptions) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was bona fide and reasonable, as the assessee realized the correct legal position after tribunal pronouncements. Consequently, the assessee is entitled to full exemption for VRS compensation and leave encashment.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was bona fide and reasonable, as the assessee realized the correct legal position after tribunal pronouncements. Consequently, the assessee is entitled to full exemption for VRS compensation and leave encashment.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was bona fide and reasonable, as the assessee realized the correct legal position after tribunal pronouncements. Consequently, the assessee is entitled to full exemption for VRS compensation and leave encashment.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was bona fide and reasonable, as the assessee realized the correct legal position after tribunal pronouncements. Consequently, the assessee is entitled to full exemption for VRS compensation and leave encashment.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was bona fide and reasonable, as the assessee realized the correct legal position after tribunal pronouncements. Consequently, the assessee is entitled to full exemption for VRS compensation and leave encashment.
The Tribunal decided both issues in favour of the assessee. Firstly, regarding the delay in filing the appeal, the Tribunal found that the reasons provided by the assessee for the 150-day delay were sufficient and fell within the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. MST Katiji and others. The Tribunal emphasized that procedural rules are meant to aid justice and that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations. Therefore, the delay was condoned. Secondly, concerning the addition of Rs. 9,99,000/- under section 69A, the Tribunal considered the documentary evidence placed on record by the assessee, including the sale deed of the father's property and the gift deed between the assessee and his father. The Tribunal noted that all events occurred in close proximity in time and found merit in the assessee's contention that the cash deposit was duly substantiated as a gift. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 9,99,000/- made under section 69A was deleted. The ratio decidendi is that when a taxpayer provides documentary evidence like sale deeds and gift deeds, and the transactions are proximate in time, the source of cash deposits can be considered explained, even if initially there was a failure to furnish evidence.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received under the VRS was eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) as retrenchment compensation. It found that the assessee had mistakenly claimed exemption under the wrong section and that the appellate authorities have the power to grant relief under the correct provision.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the cooperative society on its deposits is attributable to its business of providing credit facilities to its members. Therefore, it is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act.
The Tribunal held that the failure to furnish foreign tax returns and TRC is not a valid reason to tax income earned by a non-resident in a foreign country. The NRE account and passport entries establish the assessee's non-resident status.
The Tribunal held that fairness requires remitting the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The legal heir should produce evidence of agricultural activities and the source of cash deposits, and the Assessing Officer must establish proper service of notices.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the co-operative society was attributable to its business of providing banking and credit facilities to its members and was therefore deductible under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). Disallowances of provisions were considered tax-neutral.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal before the NFAC should be condoned. The Tribunal noted that the disallowance of expenses by the AO was an ad-hoc one and that the assessee had undertaken to produce the necessary details before the NFAC. Therefore, the Tribunal was inclined to condone the delay and directed the NFAC to decide the issue on merits after granting the assessee an opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal also directed the assessee to pay a cost of Rs. 5,000/- to the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund within four weeks. The issue regarding the disallowance of expenses was not decided on merits by the Tribunal, as the NFAC had dismissed the appeal on limitation.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the rebate under Section 87A of the Act in respect of the tax payable on long-term capital gains taxable under Section 112 of the Act, as the assessee's total income did not exceed Rs. 7,00,000/- for the assessment year 2024-25. The Tribunal followed the decision of a Coordinate Bench in Shevgoor Namratha Kamath vs ITO and the Ahmedabad Bench in Jayshreeben Jayantibhai Palsana. The reasoning was that there is no express statutory bar in Section 87A or Section 112 for the assessment year 2024-25 that denies the rebate when the total income includes long-term capital gains. The amendment brought by the Finance Act, 2025, which restricts the rebate for income taxable at special rates, was held to be prospective and not applicable retrospectively. The Tribunal found that the restriction cannot be read into the statute by implication. Accordingly, the impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the Assessing Officer/CPC was directed to allow the rebate under Section 87A and delete the consequential demand. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the application in Form 10AB solely on the technical ground of selecting the wrong section code was not justified. Citing decisions from the Ahmedabad and Kolkata Benches of the Tribunal (Modasa Ekda Visha Khadayata Kovadia Kelavani Mandal, Aatman Foundation, Gandhinagar Ayyapa Pooja Samiti, Rotary Charity Trust, and Nitdaa Foundation), the Tribunal reasoned that such applications should not be rejected for inadvertent incorrect clause selection. The principle established is that technical defects in form filing, when the substance of the application is otherwise valid, should not lead to outright rejection. For ITA 1590/Bang/2026, the Tribunal set aside the Ld. CIT(E)'s order and restored the matter to the Ld. CIT(E)'s file, directing that the application be treated as filed under the correct clause (clause (iii) to the second proviso to section 80G(5)) and decided on merits. Regarding the delay in filing the application, the Tribunal noted the absence of a condonation provision in Section 80G and directed the assessee to approach the CBDT for condonation of the 46-day delay. Once condoned, the Ld. CIT(E) is to reconsider the application on merits. For ITA 1589/Bang/2026, the appeal was dismissed as infructuous because the adjudication in the first appeal rendered the subsequent order moot.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the application in Form 10AB solely on the technical ground of selecting the wrong section code was not justified. Citing decisions from the Ahmedabad and Kolkata Benches of the Tribunal (Modasa Ekda Visha Khadayata Kovadia Kelavani Mandal, Aatman Foundation, Gandhinagar Ayyapa Pooja Samiti, Rotary Charity Trust, and Nitdaa Foundation), the Tribunal reasoned that such applications should not be rejected for inadvertent incorrect clause selection. The principle established is that technical defects in form filing, when the substance of the application is otherwise valid, should not lead to outright rejection. For ITA 1590/Bang/2026, the Tribunal set aside the Ld. CIT(E)'s order and restored the matter to the Ld. CIT(E)'s file, directing that the application be treated as filed under the correct clause (clause (iii) to the second proviso to section 80G(5)) and decided on merits. Regarding the delay in filing the application, the Tribunal noted the absence of a condonation provision in Section 80G and directed the assessee to approach the CBDT for condonation of the 46-day delay. Once condoned, the Ld. CIT(E) is to reconsider the application on merits. For ITA 1589/Bang/2026, the appeal was dismissed as infructuous because the adjudication in the first appeal rendered the subsequent order moot.
The Tribunal noted that the registration certificate considered by the learned Addl./Joint CIT(A) was issued under Section 12A(1)(ac)(i), which is applicable only when the assessee already held a registration under Section 12A. The Tribunal observed that the learned CIT(A) failed to appreciate this aspect and did not call for the earlier certificate granting registration under Section 12A. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to grant the assessee one more opportunity to furnish the earlier registration certificate issued under Section 12A of the Act. The matter was restored to the file of the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication after considering the earlier registration certificate. The impugned order was set aside, and the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 1,09,900/- (referred to as Rs. 9,01,900/- in the facts but clarified as Rs. 1,09,900/- in the discussion of the issue) on account of cash deposits was unjustified. The Tribunal reasoned that when the source of cash deposits was explained as withdrawals from the assessee's own bank account held as a reserve, the onus shifted to the Revenue to prove that the withdrawn amounts were spent elsewhere or were unavailable for redeposit. Since the Revenue failed to place any material to demonstrate that the earlier cash withdrawals were spent or invested or otherwise unavailable, the addition made by the AO was based on surmises and assumptions without incriminating material. The Tribunal also considered the affidavit from the friend regarding the deposit of Rs. 1,90,000/-. Therefore, the addition was quashed, and the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The ITAT condoned the delay in filing the appeal before it, accepting the reason of the authorized representative's illness. The tribunal then restored the entire appeal to the Assessing Officer to re-examine the foreign tax credit claim, directing the assessee to substantiate it with relevant documents including Form 67.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 73 days in filing the appeal, accepting the assessee's submission that the delay was due to an incorrect email ID on record and lack of knowledge about the CIT(A)'s order. The Tribunal found that the assessee was prevented from filing the appeal within the due date with sufficient cause. However, upon adjudicating the merits of the appeal, the Tribunal noted the assessee's consistent non-compliance with notices from the AO and CIT(A), and failure to cooperate even after the previous remand by the Tribunal. The Tribunal observed that the assessee had remained unresponsive and had not furnished any documents. Consequently, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the assessee's appeal, upholding the addition made by the revenue authorities.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 207 days in filing the appeal. While acknowledging the Supreme Court's observation in Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. v. Ved Prakash regarding litigant vigilance, the Tribunal found the assessee to be an innocent litigant. The payment of appeal fee within the period, the society's remote location, dependence on the consultant, and prompt action upon discovery of non-filing distinguished it from the cited case. The Tribunal applied the principle of liberal construction of 'sufficient cause' from Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and the recognition of innocent litigants in Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd. to grant relief in the interest of substantial justice. Regarding the substantive appeal, the Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 30,50,500/- sustained by the Ld. CIT(A) could not be upheld. Following the decisions in Sri Shivakumara Swamy Credit Co-operative Society Ltd. and Anantpur Kalpana v. ITO, the Tribunal ruled that the cash deposits, representing amounts received from members towards loan repayments and savings account deposits, which were duly recorded in the books and explained, could not be treated as unexplained cash credit under section 68 of the Act merely because they were in the form of Specified Bank Notes (SBNs) during demonetisation. The AO was directed to delete the addition. The ground of appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was passed in violation of Section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) had directed the exclusion of certain comparable companies, granting relief to the assessee. However, the Assessing Officer (AO) in the final assessment order stated that the DRP had rejected all objections and upheld the transfer pricing adjustment in its entirety, which was contrary to the DRP's directions. The AO did not refer the matter back to the Transfer Pricing Officer to give effect to the DRP's directions and instead ignored them. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in Flextronics Technologies (India) Private Limited, which held that an assessment order not in conformity with DRP directions is liable to be quashed. Therefore, the Tribunal quashed the assessment order. Consequently, ground No. 3 of the assessee's appeal was allowed, and the remaining grounds were dismissed as infructuous. The Tribunal directed that the assessment order be quashed.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had sufficient cash withdrawals and other income sources to explain the Rs. 1,75,000 deposit. Therefore, the addition was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a non-resident individual, was an "eligible assessee" within the meaning of Section 144C(15)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as amended by the Finance Act, 2020, which became effective from April 1, 2020. The impugned assessment order was passed on March 16, 2022, after this amendment. The Tribunal found that the AO made a variation prejudicial to the assessee's interest and was therefore mandatorily required to first forward a draft assessment order to the assessee as per Section 144C(1). The failure to pass a draft assessment order deprived the assessee of her statutory right to file objections before the DRP. The Tribunal reasoned that this failure is not a mere procedural irregularity but goes to the root of the validity of the final assessment order, rendering it without jurisdiction. Citing decisions in Zuari Cement Ltd. v. ACIT and International Air Transport Association v. DCIT (Bom.), the Tribunal quashed the impugned assessment order. The remaining grounds of appeal were left undecided as the assessment order itself was invalidated.
The Tribunal admitted the additional grounds of appeal as they were purely legal, went to the root of the assessment proceedings, and could be adjudicated on the basis of existing records, citing National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. vs. CIT. The Tribunal found that the notice issued under section 148A(b) dated 22.03.2022, requiring a reply by 28.03.2022, violated the mandatory requirement of providing "not less than seven days" for furnishing a reply. The Tribunal clarified that "clear days" exclude both the date of issuance/service and the date fixed for compliance. Relying on Pawan Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, the Tribunal held that the assessee was not granted the requisite "clear days" and that the intervening holidays (Holi) further reduced the effective period. Consequently, the order passed under section 148A(d), the notice issued under section 148 dated 31.03.2022, and the assessment framed under section 147 r.w.s. 144 were quashed. The reassessment proceedings were set aside. The remaining grounds on merits were rendered academic and not adjudicated. The ratio is that a mandatory minimum period for response in a statutory notice must be strictly adhered to, calculated as "clear days", and any violation renders subsequent proceedings invalid.
The Tribunal decided to condone the delay of 36 days in filing the appeal, finding that the explanation provided by the assessee, supported by an affidavit, was reasonable and that the delay was neither deliberate nor intentional. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji & Others, emphasizing substantial justice over technical considerations. Regarding the foreign tax credit, the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the FTC of Rs. 3,17,536/-. It noted that Form No. 67 was initially filed on 31.08.2019 with a procedural defect (incorrect Article number of the DTAA), which was subsequently corrected. The Tribunal found that filing Form No. 67 is a procedural requirement for verification and that a minor defect or delay in filing does not deny the substantive right to FTC. The Tribunal followed the decisions of its coordinate benches in Deepak Shimoga Padmaraju and Vinodkumar Lakshmipathi, holding that Rule 128(9) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, does not provide for disallowance of FTC merely on account of delay in filing Form No. 67, and that such delay is not fatal. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the FTC, subject to verification of tax paid in Germany and the quantum allowable as per Section 90, Article 23 of the India-Germany DTAA, and Rule 128.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's non-cooperation with the revenue authorities during both assessment and first appellate proceedings. However, in the interest of substantial and natural justice, the Tribunal decided to provide the assessee with an opportunity to present documentary evidence supporting their grounds and return of income. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the issues were remanded back to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication (de novo). The assessee was directed to cooperate in the remand proceedings. If the assessee failed to cooperate, the CIT(A) was granted liberty to adjudicate the appeal based on the available material. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act on July 13, 2022, was barred by the limitation period specified under Section 149 of the Act, as calculated based on the Supreme Court's decisions in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal. The notice was found to be time-barred by 28 days. Consequently, the entire reassessment proceedings and the assessment order passed were quashed. The Tribunal also found merit in the assessee's argument regarding the validity of the jurisdiction assumed by the AO for issuing the notice under Section 148. For Assessment Year 2016-17, where the notice was issued on July 13, 2022 (more than three years from the end of the assessment year), the AO was statutorily obligated to obtain approval from the authorities specified under Section 151(ii) of the amended Act. However, the AO obtained approval from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore - 3, an authority not vested with jurisdiction under the amended Section 151. Therefore, the assessment was devoid of valid assumption of jurisdiction on this count as well. The other grounds raised by the assessee were rendered academic.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence, finding that it went to the root of the matter on which additions were made by the revenue authorities. Since these documents were not available before the revenue authorities, the Tribunal deemed it fit to restore the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO). The AO is directed to examine the additional evidence furnished by the assessee and decide the issue in accordance with the law, providing the assessee an opportunity of being heard. As the issue is remanded back to the AO, the other grounds raised by the assessee before the Tribunal were not adjudicated and were left open. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.