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The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) fell within the parameters for condonation laid down by the Supreme Court in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. MST Katiji and others. The Tribunal emphasized that procedural rules are subservient to substantial justice and that the assessee stood to gain nothing from the late filing. Therefore, the delay should have been condoned. On merits, the Tribunal, considering the assessee's undertaking to furnish substantiating details and in the interest of justice, restored the matter to the file of the AO for de novo adjudication. The AO was directed to consider the details to be filed by the assessee. The penalty appeals under Sections 270A and 271AAC were also restored to the AO as consequential to the quantum additions. The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and allowed the grounds for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 427 days in filing the appeal before it, finding that the assessee had demonstrated a sufficient cause. The Tribunal was satisfied that there was no malafide intention on the part of the assessee. It relied on the principles from Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (167 ITR 471), emphasizing that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations, especially when the delay is not deliberate. The Tribunal also referred to the Madras High Court's decision in CIT vs. K.S.P. Shanmugavel Nadai and Ors. (153 ITR 596), which condoned a delay of nearly 21 years, making the 427-day delay appear less inordinate. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal due to a delay of 209 days for similar reasons. Consequently, the Tribunal admitted the appeal for adjudication on merits and remitted the entire issues in dispute back to the file of the CIT(A) to decide afresh, granting the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment orders and the consequent additions were unsustainable. The Tribunal found that the survey report from the Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation) merely stated that certain persons appeared to have made donations and requested verification. It did not conclude that the assessee had made the donations, that the amounts were unaccounted for, or that additions could be made without verification. The Tribunal noted that neither the alleged donor (assessee) nor the recipient (trust) confirmed the transactions. The trust's denial was rejected by the Assessing Officer solely because the assessee was the trust's vice-president, a reasoning the Tribunal found insufficient. The Tribunal also noted that no statement from the trust's treasurer admitting receipt of unaccounted cash donations was recorded or sought. In the absence of evidence establishing the date, mode of payment, or receipt of the alleged donations, the Tribunal reversed the orders of the lower authorities and directed the deletion of the additions of ₹10,00,000 for both assessment years. The ratio decidendi is that additions based on investigation reports suggesting potential transactions require concrete evidence of the transaction itself and its unaccounted nature, and a denial by the recipient, coupled with the assessee's position in the recipient entity, is not sufficient to disregard the denial without further corroboration.
The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) fell within the parameters for condonation laid down by the Supreme Court in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. MST Katiji and others. The Tribunal emphasized that procedural rules are subservient to substantial justice and that the assessee stood to gain nothing from the late filing. Therefore, the delay should have been condoned. On merits, the Tribunal, considering the assessee's undertaking to furnish substantiating details and in the interest of justice, restored the matter to the file of the AO for de novo adjudication. The AO was directed to consider the details to be filed by the assessee. The penalty appeals under Sections 270A and 271AAC were also restored to the AO as consequential to the quantum additions. The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and allowed the grounds for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the delay of 328 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was to be condoned. The Tribunal noted the assessee's limited education, rural background, and lack of familiarity with tax procedures and electronic communication. While acknowledging that the law of limitation cannot be ignored, the Tribunal distinguished the present case from the Supreme Court's ruling in H. Guruswamy, which dealt with a much longer delay and repeated defaults. The Tribunal found the assessee's explanation for the delay to be bona fide, considering her circumstances and reliance on a tax practitioner. Therefore, the appeal was to be decided on merits. Regarding the addition, the Tribunal deleted the addition of Rs. 15,00,000/- which was based on a declaration furnished under Rule 114B, stating it could not be treated as a separate unexplained cash deposit. The Tribunal also deleted the addition of Rs. 15,45,000/- representing cash deposits, finding that the assessee had reasonably explained the source through prior cash withdrawals from the bank and by producing evidence of agricultural land holding and sale of agricultural produce. The Tribunal concluded that the entire addition of Rs. 30,45,000/- was unsustainable.
The Tribunal accepted the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning was based on the explicit submission made by the assessee's Authorized Representative, supported by a written request, indicating a clear intention to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No other issues were decided, and no specific relief was granted beyond the dismissal of the appeal. The ratio decidendi is that an assessee has the right to withdraw an appeal filed before the Tribunal, provided a proper request is made.
The Tribunal held that under the statutory procedure for registration of a charitable trust, the CIT(Exemptions) must provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard before refusing registration. The assessee stated that the notice dated March 13, 2026, fixing the hearing for March 18, 2026, was not received. In these circumstances, the assessee was not afforded an effective opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders. The ratio decidendi is that an ex-parte order of rejection for registration or approval under Section 12AA or Section 80G(5) is unsustainable if the assessee was not provided with a proper and effective opportunity to be heard. The Tribunal directed the CIT(Exemptions) to issue a fresh notice and reconsider both applications after granting a proper hearing. The assessee is to comply with the notices and furnish all required information. The CIT(Exemptions) may conduct further inquiries. Both appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that in the interest of justice, equity, and fair play, and considering the assessee's submission that it could not represent its case before the authorities below, it was fit and proper to remit the entire issues in dispute to the file of the AO for a fresh decision in accordance with law. The Tribunal directed that the assessee be granted a reasonable opportunity of being heard and must produce all relevant documents, records, information, and evidence. The Tribunal made it clear that in case of further default, the assessee would not be entitled to any leniency. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the additions made by the AO.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 233 days in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause based on the assessee's explanation regarding the unavailability of digital credentials. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (167 ITR 471) and the Chennai Tribunal in People Education & Economic Development Society Vs/ ITO (100 ITD 87), emphasizing that substantial justice should be preferred over technicalities. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)/NFAC had dismissed the appeal ex-parte without adjudicating on merits, solely on the ground that the assessee did not file submissions or evidence. In the interest of justice, equity, and fair play, the Tribunal decided to remit the entire issues in dispute back to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh adjudication in accordance with the law. The assessee was directed to provide all relevant documents and was warned against further default. The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity to represent his case on merits and furnish all details in respect of the additions made by the AO. The matter was restored to the file of the AO for de novo adjudication. The Tribunal directed the assessee to furnish all relevant details and documents and to fully cooperate in the assessment proceedings. The assessee was also directed to furnish any other details sought by the AO. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. The principle is that procedural delays, especially for individuals claiming to be agriculturists and not properly advised, can be condoned to allow for a decision on merits, ensuring fairness.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment orders and the consequent additions were unsustainable. The Tribunal found that the survey report from the Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation) merely stated that certain persons appeared to have made donations and requested verification. It did not conclude that the assessee had made the donations, that the amounts were unaccounted for, or that additions could be made without verification. The Tribunal noted that neither the alleged donor (assessee) nor the recipient (trust) confirmed the transactions. The trust's denial was rejected by the Assessing Officer solely because the assessee was the trust's vice-president, a reasoning the Tribunal found insufficient. The Tribunal also noted that no statement from the trust's treasurer admitting receipt of unaccounted cash donations was recorded or sought. In the absence of evidence establishing the date, mode of payment, or receipt of the alleged donations, the Tribunal reversed the orders of the lower authorities and directed the deletion of the additions of ₹10,00,000 for both assessment years. The ratio decidendi is that additions based on investigation reports suggesting potential transactions require concrete evidence of the transaction itself and its unaccounted nature, and a denial by the recipient, coupled with the assessee's position in the recipient entity, is not sufficient to disregard the denial without further corroboration.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 728 days in filing the appeal. It reasoned that the assessee's explanation for the delay, including issues with email communication and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, fell within the parameters for condonation laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. MST Katiji and others. The Tribunal emphasized that procedural rules are subservient to substantial justice and that the assessee did not stand to benefit from the late filing. Therefore, the delay was condoned, and the appeal was proceeded with. The judgment does not record any specific findings or decisions on the substantive grounds of appeal (issues 2 and 3) as it focuses solely on the condonation of delay. The operative direction is to proceed with deciding the appeal on merits, implying that the substantive issues are yet to be adjudicated by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal admitted the additional grounds of appeal, noting they were purely legal and critical for fair adjudication, with all facts already on record. The Tribunal condoned the delay of 111 days in filing the appeal before the NFAC, finding the explanation offered by the assessee to be plausible and a sufficient cause for the delay. The Tribunal reasoned that the assessee society's limited education and unawareness of tax provisions constituted a practical problem preventing timely filing. Having condoned the delay, the Tribunal deemed it fit to remit the entire issue in dispute back to the Assessing Officer (AO) for a fresh decision in accordance with law. The assessee was directed to produce all necessary documents and evidence, and granted a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the addition under Section 69A or the procedural issues related to the assessment proceedings, as these were to be addressed by the AO upon remand.
The Tribunal held that under the statutory procedure for registration of a charitable trust, the CIT(Exemptions) must provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard before refusing registration. The assessee stated that the notice dated March 13, 2026, fixing the hearing for March 18, 2026, was not received. In these circumstances, the assessee was not afforded an effective opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders. The ratio decidendi is that an ex-parte order of rejection for registration or approval under Section 12AA or Section 80G(5) is unsustainable if the assessee was not provided with a proper and effective opportunity to be heard. The Tribunal directed the CIT(Exemptions) to issue a fresh notice and reconsider both applications after granting a proper hearing. The assessee is to comply with the notices and furnish all required information. The CIT(Exemptions) may conduct further inquiries. Both appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that Grounds No. 1 and 2, relating to the validity of reassessment and faceless assessment, were dismissed as not pressed, as no submissions were made by the assessee on these points. Regarding Grounds No. 3-10, concerning the disallowance of deduction under section 80-GGC, the Tribunal found no merit in the assessee's submissions. It noted that the issue was not merely about the payment being routed through banking channels or the receipt being acknowledged, but about the genuineness of the transaction. The Tribunal agreed with the revenue that the RUPPs, including SVPP, existed to provide accommodation entries through bogus donations. The categorical admission by SVPP office bearers regarding the bogus donation scam, coupled with documentary evidence and bank account analysis showing circuitous transactions, cast serious doubt on the assessee's claim. The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to discharge the burden of proving the genuineness of the donation by producing credible evidence. The reliance on human probabilities, surrounding circumstances, and preponderance of probabilities, as supported by Supreme Court judgments, was deemed appropriate. The Tribunal concluded that the AO and CIT(A) rightly denied the deduction. Ground No. 11, pertaining to penalty proceedings under section 270A, was dismissed as premature. The appeal was dismissed in its entirety.
The Tribunal condoned the 81-day delay in filing the appeal, finding it to be unintentional, bona fide, and supported by sufficient cause, as the assessee had entrusted the matter to an accountant who failed to act. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal held that the assessee had provided adequate evidence to explain the cash deposits of ₹3,22,000. The assessee furnished the names and complete addresses of the payers, copies of their Aadhaar cards, proof of their land ownership, and confirmation letters detailing the payments received for cleaning agricultural land. The Tribunal found no basis for sustaining the addition because the assessee had established both the nature of the receipts as his income and the persons from whom they were received. Therefore, grounds 3 and 4 were allowed, and the Assessing Officer was directed to delete the addition of ₹3,22,000. Ground 2 was not pressed and thus dismissed. The Tribunal did not explicitly decide ground 1.
The Tribunal accepted the assessee's explanation for ₹11,65,500 of the deposit, comprising ₹8,65,500 from property sale and ₹3,00,000 from earlier bank withdrawals. However, for the balance amount, the assessee provided no evidence for the claimed sale of wife's jewellery or loans from friends and relatives. The Tribunal noted that while the cash-flow statement showed opening cash on hand of ₹15,57,500, a satisfactory source for this substantial balance was not established. Consequently, the issue concerning the balance deposit, over and above ₹11,65,500, was restored to the Assessing Officer for verification. The assessee was directed to provide names and addresses of lenders, dates and amounts of cash loans, and supporting evidence for jewellery sale within 90 days. The AO was to verify this evidence and decide the issue afresh. Ground no. 2 was partly allowed. Regarding ground no. 8, the Tribunal directed the AO not to invoke section 115BBE for AY 2011-12 as it was not in force or applicable. Other grounds were dismissed as not argued or pressed.
The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) fell within the parameters for condonation laid down by the Supreme Court in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. MST Katiji and others. The Tribunal emphasized that procedural rules are subservient to substantial justice and that the assessee stood to gain nothing from the late filing. Therefore, the delay should have been condoned. On merits, the Tribunal, considering the assessee's undertaking to furnish substantiating details and in the interest of justice, restored the matter to the file of the AO for de novo adjudication. The AO was directed to consider the details to be filed by the assessee. The penalty appeals under Sections 270A and 271AAC were also restored to the AO as consequential to the quantum additions. The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and allowed the grounds for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had passed an ex parte order due to the assessee's non-appearance. Since the assessee was now represented and wished to pursue the appeal on merits, the Tribunal, in the interest of justice, set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A). The matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication on merits, allowing the assessee to file all details and submissions. The assessee was also permitted to raise jurisdictional grounds, which were to be considered as per law. The Tribunal directed the assessee to appear before the CIT(A) on all hearing dates. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the time limit for filing Form No. 10 under section 11(2)(a) is prescribed by the Act itself and cannot be treated as discretionary or merely directory. Ignoring such a statutory time limit would render all limitation periods under the Income-tax Act directory, which is not permissible. The Tribunal acknowledged that the legislature has empowered competent authorities to condone delays under section 119(2) of the Act to advance substantial justice, and CBDT Circular No. 7/2018 permits condonation of such delays. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the assessee to file an application before the CBDT seeking condonation of the delay in filing Form No. 10 within 90 days from the receipt of the order. The assessing officer is to consider this application and, if condonation is permitted, grant the assessee the benefit of Form No. 10. The Tribunal found no error in the CIT(A)'s conclusion that the time limit is not directory but emphasized that the power to condone delay should be exercised after duly considering the assessee's explanation.
The Tribunal held that the explanation offered by the assessee for the delay of 41 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A)/NFAC was plausible and constituted a sufficient cause. Accordingly, the delay was condoned, and the appeal was admitted for adjudication on merits. Having condoned the delay, the Tribunal deemed it fit and proper to remit the entire issues in dispute to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The CIT(A)/NFAC was directed to grant a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The principle that can be cited is that a short delay in filing an appeal, if supported by a reasonable cause, should be condoned to allow for adjudication on merits. The operative direction is to remit the matter to the CIT(A)/NFAC.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee submitted a reconciliation statement for rental receipts net of GST and provided details of gross and net amounts. However, the assessee failed to produce the partnership deed to substantiate its claim of being in the business of renting out commercial premises. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the AO was justified in treating the income as income from house property. Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the Tribunal granted the assessee one more opportunity to furnish the partnership deed before the CIT(A). The Tribunal also agreed with the assessee's contention that the taxable rental income should be Rs. 22,96,389/-, excluding the GST portion. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for re-determination of total income based on these directions. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 68 days in filing the appeal, finding the explanation offered in the condonation application to be plausible and sufficient. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal noted the assessee's submission that they could not represent their case before the CIT(A) because all communications were sent to an email ID, despite the assessee having explicitly stated 'No' to email communication in Form No. 35. In the interest of justice, equity, and fair play, the Tribunal deemed it fit and proper to remit the entire issues in dispute back to the file of the CIT(A) to decide afresh in accordance with law. The CIT(A) was directed to grant a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and the assessee was directed to produce all relevant documents, records, information, and evidence. The Tribunal made it clear that in case of further default, the assessee would not be entitled to any leniency. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the penalty levied under Section 270A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was not sustainable. The Tribunal found that the AO had not disputed the existence of the improvement work itself, such as the construction of a compound wall. The assessee, not being primarily engaged in construction, could not be expected to provide contractor-level documentation for incidental capital expenditure. The AO's insistence on strict documentation standards for expenditures incurred with local vendors and unregistered dealers, where formal bills are not typically issued, was considered unreasonable. The Tribunal concluded that there was no misrepresentation or suppression of facts, as the cost of improvement was noticed from the return and other details filed by the assessee. Therefore, the penalty was quashed.
The Tribunal noted that both parties conceded that the assessee could not represent his case before the CIT(A)/NFAC despite receiving four notices. The assessee's authorized representative stated that the assessee sought an adjournment to compile and submit documents, but the CIT(A)/NFAC dismissed the appeal ex-parte for non-prosecution, noting the absence of submissions and reliance only on the assessment order and Form-35. The Tribunal also observed that the CIT(A)/NFAC dismissed the appeal as the assessee failed to provide cogent evidence to rebut the Assessing Officer's findings. In the interest of justice, equity, and fair play, and as requested by the assessee's representative, the Tribunal decided to remit the entire issues in dispute back to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The assessee was directed to be granted a reasonable opportunity of being heard and was also instructed to produce all relevant documents, records, information, and evidence. The Tribunal made it clear that no leniency would be granted in case of further default. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the transactions constituted an adventure in the nature of trade and were taxable under the head 'business / profession'. The assessee purchased land on 03.03.2017 and 05.07.2017 and entered into a construction agreement on 10.11.2017 for 20 flats. The flats were sold during FY 2019-20. Although the assessee claimed the development was for investment purposes and sold due to financial constraints, the Tribunal found that the assessee commercially exploited the properties sequentially with the intention of developing and selling them. This sequential commercial exploitation indicated an intention to develop and sell, thus constituting an adventure in the nature of trade. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order and dismissed the assessee's grounds of appeal. The addition made by the AO was upheld.
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions. Cash of ₹12 lakh was found at the assessee's residence during the search. The assessee had provided inconsistent explanations for its source. Before the Tribunal, the assessee produced invoices for the sale of gold and photographs of his wife engaged in tailoring work. The lower authorities had made the addition due to the lack of substantiation. Since jewellery-sale invoices were now produced, the Tribunal directed the assessee to submit them to the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer was instructed to verify the bills, examine the issuing parties, and investigate how cash of that magnitude was paid. After this inquiry, the Assessing Officer is to decide the addition in accordance with the law. The grounds concerning the validity of assessment proceedings and approval under section 153D were not pressed and were dismissed. Therefore, ground number 5, relating to the addition of cash, was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration. The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal considered the rival contentions and the orders of the lower authorities. The assessee had applied for the admission of additional evidence, including affidavits from his mother and spouse detailing their contributions from savings, and bank account records showing cash withdrawals. The assessee argued that if these sources were considered, the addition would be explained. The Tribunal noted that these details were not produced before the Assessing Officer. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the entire issue to the Assessing Officer. The assessee is directed to substantiate the sources of funds used for the property purchase, and the Assessing Officer is to examine the evidence and decide the issue afresh. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes, indicating that a final decision on merits has not been reached by the Tribunal itself but is being remitted for re-adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 2,00,000 made by the Assessing Officer was unwarranted. The assessee had consistently maintained that the deposit represented sales proceeds and had furnished the complete cash book of Royal Traders for the period preceding demonetisation, supported by monthly and daily sales registers. The Tribunal noted that Royal Traders had a total turnover of Rs. 53,68,170 and average monthly sales of approximately Rs. 4,47,000. In these circumstances, singling out the Rs. 2,00,000 cash deposit made during the demonetisation period and treating it as unexplained was considered inappropriate. The Tribunal also found that the CIT(A) had required unusual particulars, such as the Permanent Account Number of each customer, without considering that the concern's turnover had been taxed under section 44AD. Therefore, the Tribunal reversed the orders of the lower authorities and allowed ground no. 2 of the assessee's appeal, directing the deletion of the addition. The ratio decidendi is that where a business has a substantial turnover and a history of regular cash deposits, a specific cash deposit during a period of cash crunch, if explained by business collections and supported by sales records, should not be treated as unexplained income under section 68, especially when the assessee is covered by presumptive taxation provisions like section 44AD.
The Tribunal held that the penalty levied under section 270A of the Income-tax Act was not sustainable. The Tribunal noted that the issue of deduction under section 80P(2)(d) for interest earned from cooperative banks was highly debatable, especially given conflicting decisions of the Karnataka High Court and pronouncements from other High Courts. The Tribunal found that the Karnataka High Court's decision dated June 16, 2017, which was relied upon by the lower authorities, was not considered in an earlier favorable decision of the same High Court dated January 5, 2017. Furthermore, this decision was pending before the Supreme Court. The Tribunal also observed that the penalty notice alleged only under-reporting of income, but the penalty order imposed it for under-reporting arising from misreporting, making the charge imprecise. Crucially, the Tribunal found that the assessee's claim did not fall within any of the six categories of misreporting specified in section 270A(9). The Tribunal concluded that a debatable claim, even if later found to be legally untenable, does not constitute misreporting. Moreover, even if income was under-reported, the penalty could not be imposed as the bona fide claim fell within the exclusion in section 270A(6)(a). Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the deletion of the penalty.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 509 days in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause based on the assessee's ill-health, reliance on a tax consultant, and the discovery of jurisdictional defects. The Tribunal cited principles from Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. and People Education & Economic Development Society Vs/ ITO to emphasize preferring substantial justice over technicalities. The Tribunal noted that the assessee could not adequately represent their case before the lower authorities. In the interest of justice, equity, and fair play, the Tribunal decided to remit the entire issues in dispute back to the Assessing Officer (AO) for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The assessee was directed to provide all relevant documents and evidence. The AO was instructed to grant a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The Tribunal made it clear that no leniency would be granted for future defaults. The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's circumstances, including her age, illiteracy, and reliance on others for business and compliance matters, warranted a sensitive approach. The failure to comply with notices before the Assessing Officer and the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) were considered understandable given her situation. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) erred in refusing to condone the delay. Consequently, for ITA No. 1267/Bang/2026, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer to reassess the income after the assessee furnishes necessary details, allowing the appeal for statistical purposes. For ITA No. 1268/Bang/2026, concerning the penalty under section 271B, the Tribunal also restored the appeal to the Assessing Officer, who would reconsider the penalty after reassessing the income, allowing this appeal for statistical purposes as well. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the assessment or penalty, only on the procedural issue of condoning the delay.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activities, as reflected in its Memorandum of Association, included managing the temporal affairs of the Oblates of St. Francis de Sales and promoting their spiritual, educational, and other interests. The Tribunal noted that the assessee also received significant foreign contributions and undertook religious activities alongside operating schools. Therefore, the Tribunal found that the assessee's registration as solely a charitable trust required modification to reflect its religious-cum-charitable nature. The Tribunal directed the learned CIT(E) to examine the matter further and, if the legal requirements were met, grant registration as a religious-cum-charitable trust. The ratio decidendi is that an entity's registration status must accurately reflect its declared and evidenced objects and activities, including both religious and charitable components, for the correct application of relevant Income Tax Act provisions.
The Tribunal noted that the learned PCIT(A) had passed the order ex parte due to the assessee's non-compliance with hearing notices. However, the assessee was now duly represented and wished to pursue the appeals on merits. The assessee's learned AR undertook to comply with all notices if the appeals were restored to the file of the First Appellate Authority. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity to present its case on merits before the learned PCIT(A)/CIT(A). Consequently, the common impugned order was set aside, and the matters were restored to the file of the learned PCIT(A)/CIT(A) for de novo adjudication. The Tribunal directed that no order should be passed without affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The assessee was also directed to furnish/update their email address for receiving hearing notices and to appear on all scheduled dates without default. As the matters were being restored for adjudication on merits, the other grievances raised by the assessee were not adjudicated at this stage. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the reasons stated by the assessee for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) fall within the parameters for condonation laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. MST Katiji and others. The Tribunal emphasized that procedural rules are subservient to substantial justice. The assessee, a senior citizen, suffered a severe spinal injury, leading to prolonged bed rest, which constituted a sufficient cause for the delay. Therefore, the delay of 168 days should have been condoned. On merits, acknowledging the assessee's submission that she would furnish details substantiating her bank deposits if given an opportunity, and considering the medical emergencies, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to grant one more opportunity. The matter was restored to the jurisdictional AO for de novo adjudication, with directions for the assessee to cooperate and furnish all necessary documents. The impugned order was set aside, and the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the order passed under section 148A(d) and the notice issued under section 148, both dated April 17, 2023, were bad in law. The reasoning was based on the fact that for Assessment Year 2019-20, more than three years had elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year by March 31, 2023. According to section 151(ii) of the Act, if more than three years have elapsed, the specified authority for granting approval to issue notice under section 148 and 148A must be the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner. In this case, the approval was granted by the Principal CIT, Bengaluru-3, which is only authorized under section 151(i) when three years or less have elapsed. The Tribunal found force in the assessee's argument that the approval was not accorded by the prescribed authority as per the law applicable at the time of issuing the notice. The Tribunal also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Chhugamal Rajpal (supra) emphasizing that satisfaction/approval must be applied with application of mind and not mechanically. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed and set aside the order dated April 17, 2023, passed under section 148A(d), the notice issued under section 148, and all consequential proceedings and orders emanating therefrom. The ratio decidendi is that the approval for reassessment proceedings under section 148/148A must be obtained from the authority prescribed under section 151, based on the time elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, and failure to do so renders the proceedings void ab initio.
The Tribunal noted that both parties conceded that the assessee society could not adequately represent its case before the Assessing Officer (AO), leading to an ex-parte order. The Revenue's ld. DR relied on the CIT(A)/NFAC's finding that no materials were produced at the appellate stage. However, the ld. A.R. of the assessee requested one more opportunity before the AO to substantiate its claims. In the interest of justice, equity, and fair play, the Tribunal deemed it fit and proper to remit the entire issues in dispute back to the file of the AO for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The assessee was directed to produce all relevant documents and records. The Tribunal made it clear that in case of further default, the assessee would not be entitled to any leniency. The operative direction was to decide afresh after granting a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The issue of whether Section 69A was correctly invoked and the nature of deposits and withdrawals were left to be decided by the AO upon fresh consideration.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A)/NFAC, finding the assessee's explanation for the delay plausible and sufficient cause. The Tribunal noted that the assessee also could not represent her case before the AO despite several notices. Considering the interest of justice, equity, and fair play, and as requested by the assessee's AR, the Tribunal decided to remit the entire issues in dispute back to the file of the AO for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The AO was directed to grant a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was also directed to produce all relevant documents. The Tribunal made it clear that no leniency would be granted in case of further default. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)/NFAC had dismissed the appeal in limine without condoning the delay, and the assessee had not been able to represent her case properly before the lower authorities.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's circumstances, including her age, illiteracy, and reliance on others for business and compliance matters, warranted a sensitive approach. The failure to comply with notices before the Assessing Officer and the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) were considered understandable given her situation. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) erred in refusing to condone the delay. Consequently, for ITA No. 1267/Bang/2026, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer to reassess the income after the assessee furnishes necessary details, allowing the appeal for statistical purposes. For ITA No. 1268/Bang/2026, concerning the penalty under section 271B, the Tribunal also restored the appeal to the Assessing Officer, who would reconsider the penalty after reassessing the income, allowing this appeal for statistical purposes as well. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the assessment or penalty, only on the procedural issue of condoning the delay.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the assessee cooperative society on funds temporarily deposited with banks is attributable to its business of providing credit facilities to its members and is therefore eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i). The Tribunal relied on the Karnataka High Court's decision in Tumkur Merchants Souharda Credit Co-operative Ltd. v. ITO, which held that interest earned on such deposits is attributable to the business and not a separate business. The Tribunal distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Ltd. v. ITO, noting that the funds were not payable back to members. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee made no specific claim under section 80P(2)(d), making that provision inapplicable. Regarding the provisions for expenses, the Tribunal held that they gave rise to a corresponding charge in the profit and loss account, were not contingent, and were related to the assessee's business. Even if disallowed, any disallowance would increase profits, leading to a corresponding deduction under section 80P. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to allow deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) for the assessee's entire income attributable to the business, including the interest income. Grounds related to section 80P(2)(d) were dismissed as no claim was made. The grounds concerning interest under sections 234B and 234C were dismissed as consequential. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC had erred in dismissing the appeal solely on the procedural ground of not filing an application under Rule 46A, especially when the assessee claimed the documents supported the existing grounds of appeal. The Tribunal noted that the assessee is a partner in M/s. Rajhans Enterprises, which received a duty drawback of Rs. 8,83,121/-. This amount was accounted for in the firm's books and offered to tax by the firm. The assessee contended that this amount should not be taxed again in his hands as a partner. The Tribunal observed that the AO had also noted the assessee's submission that the firm received the duty drawback and accounted for it. In the interest of justice, equity, and fair play, the Tribunal decided to remit the entire issues in dispute back to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh decision in accordance with law. The assessee was directed to produce all relevant documents and was assured a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal made it clear that further default by the assessee would not be met with leniency.
The Tribunal held that the addition of ₹75,42,374 made by the Assessing Officer was unjustified. The Tribunal examined the sale deed, which indicated that the assessee and his wife jointly purchased the property for ₹7,075,000 on 1 August 2015. The payment was made through the assessee's Federal Bank accounts. The assessee's balance sheet correctly reflected his 50% share of ₹3,771,187 as a fixed asset. The Tribunal noted that the AO was aware of the assessee declaring only his 50% share but still added the entire value. The NFAC confirmed the addition despite the assessee producing bank accounts and the sale deed. The Tribunal found that the consideration was paid from the assessee's bank accounts through his proprietary concern and that his share was reflected as a fixed asset, with the balance debited to his wife's account. Therefore, the addition could not be sustained in the assessee's hands. The Tribunal directed the AO to verify the entries in the assessee's Federal Bank statements and, if satisfied, to delete the addition.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence filed by the assessee, considering it crucial for deciding the issue on merits and noting that it was not verified by the lower authorities. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's submission that he could not represent his case before the CIT(A)/NFAC due to being in judicial custody, which prevented him from collecting necessary documents and effectively pursuing the appellate proceedings. The Tribunal found that the non-production of documents before the CIT(A)/NFAC was due to circumstances beyond the assessee's control. Therefore, in the interest of justice, equity, and fair play, the Tribunal decided to remit the entire issues in dispute back to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The assessee was directed to produce all relevant documents, records, information, and evidence in support of his claim, along with the additional evidence filed before the Tribunal, or any other documents/information as may be required by the CIT(A)/NFAC. The Tribunal also made it clear that in case of further default, the assessee would not be entitled to any leniency. The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 80 days in filing the appeal, accepting the assessee's explanation of a medical reason supported by a medical certificate. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's submission that he was engaged in the fish trading business and was suffering from a medical issue that prevented his appearance before the revenue authorities. Considering these circumstances and the assessee's claim of possessing supporting records for cash deposits, the Tribunal decided to grant one more additional opportunity of being heard. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the assessment order and the penalty order, remitting the issue to the file of the AO for denovo consideration. The AO was directed to await the outcome of the quantum appeal before deciding the penalty proceedings and to grant a personal hearing to the assessee. The assessee was also given liberty to produce necessary documents. The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the assessee cooperative society on funds temporarily deposited with banks is attributable to its business of providing credit facilities to its members and is therefore eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i). The Tribunal relied on the Karnataka High Court's decision in Tumkur Merchants Souharda Credit Co-operative Ltd. v. ITO, which held that interest earned on such deposits is attributable to the business and not a separate business. The Tribunal distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Ltd. v. ITO, noting that the funds were not payable back to members. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee made no specific claim under section 80P(2)(d), making that provision inapplicable. Regarding the provisions for expenses, the Tribunal held that they gave rise to a corresponding charge in the profit and loss account, were not contingent, and were related to the assessee's business. Even if disallowed, any disallowance would increase profits, leading to a corresponding deduction under section 80P. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to allow deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) for the assessee's entire income attributable to the business, including the interest income. Grounds related to section 80P(2)(d) were dismissed as no claim was made. The grounds concerning interest under sections 234B and 234C were dismissed as consequential. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal on a legal ground. The Tribunal noted that the AO initially proposed to add Rs. 33,60,000/- based on cash deposits and issued a notice under Section 148A(b) with proper approval. However, while completing the assessment, the AO made a new addition of Rs. 33,95,000/- representing loan repayments. This amount was neither mentioned in the Section 148A(b) notice nor in the order passed under Section 148A(d). Crucially, the AO did not obtain the necessary approval from the specified authority for treating this new amount as escaped income. The Tribunal emphasized that post-April 1, 2021, the procedure under Section 148A, including obtaining prior approval for enquiries and passing an order under Section 148A(d), is mandatory before issuing a notice under Section 148. Since the AO failed to follow this procedure for the Rs. 33,95,000/- addition, it was deemed unsustainable. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 33,95,000/- was set aside. The Tribunal did not adjudicate on the other grounds raised on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 80 days in filing the appeal, accepting the assessee's explanation of a medical reason supported by a medical certificate. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's submission that he was engaged in the fish trading business and was suffering from a medical issue that prevented his appearance before the revenue authorities. Considering these circumstances and the assessee's claim of possessing supporting records for cash deposits, the Tribunal decided to grant one more additional opportunity of being heard. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the assessment order and the penalty order, remitting the issue to the file of the AO for denovo consideration. The AO was directed to await the outcome of the quantum appeal before deciding the penalty proceedings and to grant a personal hearing to the assessee. The assessee was also given liberty to produce necessary documents. The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the three companies, Mindtree Ltd. (turnover Rs. 10,525.3 crores), LTI Mindtree Ltd. (turnover Rs. 14,406 crores), and Tata Consultancy Services (turnover Rs. 1,60,341 crores), should be excluded from the comparable set for the software development segment. The reasoning was that their massive turnovers, brand value, and scalability of operations and assets are not comparable to the assessee's FAR, which has a turnover of Rs. 55.6 crores. The Tribunal also directed the AO to adopt LIBOR + appropriate markup or any other suitable rate for benchmarking interest on receivables, acknowledging that the assessee raised invoices in USD and the TPO had noted that LIBOR + markup should be applied in such cases. The appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 55 days in filing the appeal, finding the explanation offered by the assessee to be plausible and sufficient cause. Both parties conceded that the assessee could not represent its case before the authorities below. The Tribunal observed that the AO passed an ex-parte order and the CIT(A)/NFAC upheld it due to the assessee's non-compliance. In the interest of justice, equity, and fair play, and as requested by the assessee's AR, the Tribunal deemed it fit and proper to remit the entire issues in dispute to the file of the AO for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The assessee was directed to be granted a reasonable opportunity of being heard and was instructed to produce all relevant documents and information. The Tribunal cautioned that further default would not entitle the assessee to any leniency. The substantive grounds regarding additions under Section 69A and interest income were not adjudicated on merits by the Tribunal, as the matter was remitted.
The Tribunal held that the Rs. 50 lakh threshold under section 149 must be examined at the time the notice under section 148 is issued. Subsequent outcomes, like lower additions, do not invalidate the reopening. Therefore, the argument that the alleged unexplained income was below the threshold was dismissed. Regarding limited versus complete scrutiny, the Tribunal stated that this distinction is not applicable to reassessment proceedings, which reopen the entire assessment. The assessee failed to produce evidence before the AO and CIT(A) to substantiate agricultural income, beyond proof of landholding. Ownership of land does not establish agricultural income or the source of bank deposits. The assessee must provide details of crops, sales, purchasers, and expenses. The Tribunal granted the assessee a further opportunity to produce evidence before the AO within 90 days to establish that the deposits arose from agricultural income. If not substantiated, the AO can restore the addition. Grounds 6-14 were allowed to the extent stated, concerning the determination of agricultural income and related unexplained cash deposits. The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.