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288 orders · Page 6 of 6
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) ought to have condoned the delays and entertained the appeals on merits. It further ruled that the retrenchment compensation is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) and the entire leave encashment is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10AA), following various coordinate bench decisions.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) ought to have condoned the delays and entertained the appeals on merits. It further ruled that the retrenchment compensation is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) and the entire leave encashment is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10AA), following various coordinate bench decisions.
The Tribunal held that the conditions for claiming deduction under Section 80IB are to be examined only in the initial assessment year. Since the claim was allowed in the initial year and attained finality, it cannot be disturbed in subsequent years without a change in facts or law.
The Tribunal held that GST payable, not routed through the P&L account, is not disallowable under Section 43B. However, the addition for reimbursement of expenses was sustained due to lack of documentary evidence.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the penalty appeal before the CIT(A), noting that the quantum appeal had already been remitted. The penalty appeal was also remitted to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication along with the quantum appeal.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication on merits. The AO was directed to examine bank transactions considering both debits and credits, identify the nature of transactions, and tax only the profit element if related to business, ensuring no double taxation.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication on merits. The AO was directed to examine bank transactions considering both debits and credits, identify the nature of transactions, and tax only the profit element if related to business, ensuring no double taxation.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided documentary evidence to explain the sources of cash deposits, including sale of vehicles and funds belonging to his uncle which were immediately transferred. The AO's computation of cash deposits was also found to be factually incorrect.
The Tribunal found that the assessee did submit documents, albeit after the due date, and the CIT(E)'s order was not well-considered. The order of the CIT(E) was set aside for reconsideration.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication, providing one final opportunity to the assessee. The ground challenging the notice issued by the Jurisdictional AO instead of Faceless AO was dismissed as not pressed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had established the source of cash deposits, considering the mother's income from rental receipts and the HUF's rental income. Therefore, the addition made by the AO and sustained by the CIT(A) was not justified.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were bad in law. Regarding the first issue, the Tribunal noted that for sanction under section 148 and 148A, if more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, the approval must be from the Principal Chief Commissioner/Principal Director General or Chief Commissioner/Director General. In this case, the approval from PCIT was obtained on 24.06.2022, which was invalid as per section 151(ii) of the Act. The Tribunal also considered section 149(1)(b), which allows issuance of notice under section 148 beyond three years only if the escaped income is Rs. 50 lakhs or more. Since the alleged escaped income was Rs. 27,39,078/-, which is less than Rs. 50 lakhs, the notice under section 148 could not be issued after three years. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India Vs. Rajeev Bansal. Consequently, the order passed under section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under section 148, both dated 24.06.2022, were quashed and set aside. The reassessment order dated 06.04.2023 was also set aside. As a legal ground was decided in favour of the assessee, other grounds became academic. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that the CIT(A) failed to consider the submitted documents and written submissions. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that the CIT(A) failed to consider the submitted documents and written submissions. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that in the interest of substantial justice, the assessee should be given another opportunity to present evidence before the AO. The case was remanded back to the AO for fresh assessment.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that the CIT(A) failed to consider the submitted documents and written submissions. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee's claim for fair market value as of 01/04/2001 was supported by a valuer's report, it was not placed before the lower authorities. Therefore, the issue was remitted back to the AO for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal condoned the 81-day delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding sufficient cause. The Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to decide the appeal on merits, providing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that assessment orders passed in the name of a non-existent entity are void ab initio and not curable under Section 292B of the Income Tax Act, following the Supreme Court's decision in Maruti Suzuki India Ltd.
The Tribunal held that the conditions of the first proviso to Section 201(1) were satisfied, as the payee filed its return and no tax was due. Therefore, the assessee cannot be deemed an 'assessee in default' and the disallowance under Section 40(a)(i) was deleted.
The Tribunal held that assessment orders passed in the name of a non-existent entity are void ab initio and not curable under Section 292B of the Income Tax Act, following the Supreme Court's decision in Maruti Suzuki India Ltd.
The Tribunal held that assessment orders passed in the name of a non-existent entity are void ab initio and not curable under Section 292B of the Income Tax Act, following the Supreme Court's decision in Maruti Suzuki India Ltd.
The Tribunal held that assessment orders passed in the name of a non-existent entity are void ab initio and not curable under Section 292B of the Income Tax Act, following the Supreme Court's decision in Maruti Suzuki India Ltd.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that the CIT(A) failed to consider the submitted documents and written submissions. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of Section 80P deduction due to the delayed filing of the return without condonation. However, it remanded the issue of deductions under Section 57 to the AO for verification, if the income was assessed under Section 56.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding the assessee's reasons for non-appearance to be valid. The matter was set aside and remitted to the AO for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the approval for issuing the notice under Section 148A(b) and the order under Section 148A(d), as well as the notice under Section 148, were obtained from an incompetent authority (PCIT instead of PCCIT) as the proceedings were initiated after three years from the end of the assessment year. Therefore, the entire reassessment proceedings were invalid.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, finding sufficient cause explained by the assessee. They also noted the assessee's contention of double taxation, which had not been considered by the lower authorities due to the dismissal on limitation grounds.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the society on its investments is attributable to its business of providing credit facilities to its members. Therefore, the deduction claimed under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) is allowable.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the genuine reasons for non-appearance and non-furnishing of documents due to the company's defunct status and lack of staff. The matter was remitted back to the AO for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under section 148 of the Act was barred by limitation as the conditions for invoking the extended period of limitation were not satisfied. Consequently, the assessment order and related notices were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's explanation for the cash deposits, supported by earlier bank withdrawals and cash book entries, could not be rejected solely on the basis of doubts about how long cash is ordinarily kept. There was no evidence that the withdrawn cash was utilized elsewhere before redeposit.
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 270A was not leviable as the assessee had a genuine belief for claiming the deduction, which was also accepted by the AO in earlier assessments. The Tribunal also noted that the penalty order lacked specificity regarding the sub-clause of Section 270A invoked.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the society on its investments is attributable to its business of providing credit facilities to its members. Therefore, the deduction claimed under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) is allowable.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, subject to a cost, and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment. The assessee was to be provided with an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not decided all grounds of appeal while passing an ex parte order. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal condoned the one-month delay in filing the first appeal, citing a liberal approach for substantial justice. The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment.
The Tribunal allowed grounds 2 to 12, holding that the ₹81,25,385 received for headquarters support services is not chargeable to tax in India as fees for technical services. The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer failed to establish that the 'make available' test under Article 12(5)(b) of the India-Netherlands DTAA was satisfied. The knowledge or skills of the service provider were not imparted to and absorbed by the Indian entity in a manner that would enable it to apply similar knowledge or skills independently in the future without further assistance. The Tribunal also allowed grounds 13 to 20, holding that the IT recharge costs of ₹28,64,39,055 represent a cost-to-cost reimbursement and cannot be taxed as royalty. Regarding grounds 21 and 22 concerning interest income of ₹2,26,158, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to verify the matter from the payer by applying the provisions of the Act, including making inquiry under section 133(6), and to examine Form 26AS. The AO is to decide the issue afresh after confronting the Assessee with the material and providing an opportunity of being heard. The ratio for the FTS issue is that the 'make available' test requires the recipient to be able to apply the knowledge or skills independently, with an enduring benefit, which was not demonstrated in this case. For IT recharges, the ratio is that cost-to-cost reimbursements are not royalty.