ITAT Amritsar Judgments — September 2026

The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay in filing appeals before the First Appellate Authority (NFAC) appeared reasonable, considering the substantial demands and interest imposed, which would create a heavy burden. The Tribunal believed the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeals in time. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the assessee's contention that entire credit entries in bank statements cannot be treated as income without considering withdrawals merits consideration. The claim that cheque deposits represent transfers from other bank accounts also requires factual verification. Since the assessee's case on merits was not examined at the first appellate stage due to the in limine dismissal, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the NFAC and restored the issues for fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer, providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions made by the AO.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 564 days in filing the appeal, finding the reasons provided by the assessee to be satisfactory, especially in light of a Coordinate Bench's decision to condone a significantly larger delay on identical grounds. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal held that the impugned order of the First Appellate Authority, which was passed in consequence of a revision order under Section 263 of the Act, could not have independent existence because the said Section 263 order had been set aside by a Coordinate Bench. The Tribunal reasoned that once the foundation (the Section 263 order) is removed, the consequential order (the impugned order) loses its validity. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the First Appellate Authority as well as the assessment order. The Assessing Officer was directed to await the decision of the revisionary authority in the set-aside proceedings and, if warranted, pass a fresh assessment order after the completion of those proceedings. The issue of the amount in dispute was not decided on merits.

The Tribunal held that since the expenditure was genuine and only a timing difference in claiming the deduction, there was no furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. It was considered a judgmental error or a genuine mistake.

The Tribunal held that the first appellate authority violated principles of natural justice by not considering the documentary evidence submitted by the assessee. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after considering the evidence and providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs.12,98,250/- made by the AO was not sustainable. The Tribunal noted that the AO's basis for the addition was an assumption about human behavior, specifically questioning why a retired bank official would hold significant cash rather than earning interest. The AO considered the cash flow chart constructed by the assessee to justify deposits and found the reflected household expenses to be unrealistically low. However, the Tribunal found that the assessee, a 73-year-old retired senior citizen, had personal needs for security, medical requirements, and contingencies. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee had demonstrated the factual availability of cash in hand as an opening balance. Once this opening balance was taken into account, it explained the source of the deposits that led to the addition. Therefore, the addition was deleted. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding the explanation provided by the assessee in respect of the delay to be appropriate. Regarding the rejection of the application for registration under Section 12AB(1)(b)(ii), the Tribunal held that the rejection was principally for non-compliance and procedural deficiencies. Since the assessee undertook to furnish all requisite documents and details, the Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the matter deserved to be examined afresh by the CIT(E). Accordingly, the impugned order was set aside, and the application for registration was restored to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh consideration and adjudication in accordance with law. The Tribunal clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the assessee's eligibility for registration. Consequently, the second appeal concerning the rejection of the application for approval under Section 80G(5) also met the same fate, as it was consequential to the rejection of the Section 12AB registration. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding the explanation provided by the assessee in respect of the delay to be appropriate. Regarding the rejection of the application for registration under Section 12AB(1)(b)(ii), the Tribunal held that the rejection was principally for non-compliance and procedural deficiencies. Since the assessee undertook to furnish all requisite documents and details, the Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the matter deserved to be examined afresh by the CIT(E). Accordingly, the impugned order was set aside, and the application for registration was restored to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh consideration and adjudication in accordance with law. The Tribunal clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the assessee's eligibility for registration. Consequently, the second appeal concerning the rejection of the application for approval under Section 80G(5) also met the same fate, as it was consequential to the rejection of the Section 12AB registration. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the imposition of a single consolidated penalty order for seven separate failures under Section 272A(1)(d) is bad in law. The Tribunal reasoned that the provision, particularly the phrase "each such default or failure," implies that each instance of non-compliance is distinct and independent. Therefore, the AO should have considered the reasons for each failure separately, issuing separate show-cause notices and passing separate penalty orders. The Tribunal found that the consolidated order was not sustainable. Accordingly, the penalty of Rs. 70,000 imposed by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was deleted. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for registration under Section 12AB was primarily due to non-compliance and procedural deficiencies, specifically the failure to furnish requisite documents and details despite being pointed out. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's submission that it was not afforded adequate and effective opportunity due to the short notice period. Considering the assessee's undertaking to furnish all required documents and cooperate with the proceedings, the Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the matter deserved to be examined afresh by the CIT(E). Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the application for registration to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh consideration and adjudication in accordance with law. The CIT(E) was directed to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard and decide the application on merits after considering the furnished material. The Tribunal explicitly clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the assessee's eligibility for registration. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay in filing appeals before the First Appellate Authority (NFAC) appeared reasonable, considering the substantial demands and interest imposed, which would create a heavy burden. The Tribunal believed the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeals in time. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the assessee's contention that entire credit entries in bank statements cannot be treated as income without considering withdrawals merits consideration. The claim that cheque deposits represent transfers from other bank accounts also requires factual verification. Since the assessee's case on merits was not examined at the first appellate stage due to the in limine dismissal, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the NFAC and restored the issues for fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer, providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions made by the AO.

The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay in filing appeals before the First Appellate Authority (NFAC) appeared reasonable, considering the substantial demands and interest imposed, which would create a heavy burden. The Tribunal believed the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeals in time. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the assessee's contention that entire credit entries in bank statements cannot be treated as income without considering withdrawals merits consideration. The claim that cheque deposits represent transfers from other bank accounts also requires factual verification. Since the assessee's case on merits was not examined at the first appellate stage due to the in limine dismissal, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the NFAC and restored the issues for fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer, providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions made by the AO.

The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay in filing appeals before the First Appellate Authority (NFAC) appeared reasonable, considering the substantial demands and interest imposed, which would create a heavy burden. The Tribunal believed the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeals in time. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the assessee's contention that entire credit entries in bank statements cannot be treated as income without considering withdrawals merits consideration. The claim that cheque deposits represent transfers from other bank accounts also requires factual verification. Since the assessee's case on merits was not examined at the first appellate stage due to the in limine dismissal, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the NFAC and restored the issues for fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer, providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions made by the AO.

The Tribunal held that the assessees were indeed searched persons, as confirmed by the Assessing Officer's categorical statements in the impugned assessment orders that both assessees were covered under the search and seizure operation carried out on 29.10.2020. Consequently, the Assessing Officer should have assumed jurisdiction under Section 153A of the Act, not Section 153C. The Tribunal noted that the only addition made by the Assessing Officer pertained to jewellery found during the search conducted at the assessees' premises, meaning the material was found as a result of a search on the assessees themselves, not a third party. Therefore, proceeding under Section 153C was erroneous and against the statutory mandate, rendering the assumption of jurisdiction invalid. The Tribunal relied on a coordinate bench's decision in a similar case ('Shri Pawan Kumar vs. DCIT'). Accordingly, the Tribunal upheld the decision of the learned First Appellate Authority, dismissing the Department's appeals.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 564 days in filing the appeal, finding the reasons provided by the assessee to be satisfactory, especially in light of a Coordinate Bench's decision to condone a significantly larger delay on identical grounds. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal held that the impugned order of the First Appellate Authority, which was passed in consequence of a revision order under Section 263 of the Act, could not have independent existence because the said Section 263 order had been set aside by a Coordinate Bench. The Tribunal reasoned that once the foundation (the Section 263 order) is removed, the consequential order (the impugned order) loses its validity. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the First Appellate Authority as well as the assessment order. The Assessing Officer was directed to await the decision of the revisionary authority in the set-aside proceedings and, if warranted, pass a fresh assessment order after the completion of those proceedings. The issue of the amount in dispute was not decided on merits.

The Tribunal found the assessee's reasons for non-compliance acceptable. For the assessment proceedings, the Tribunal was convinced that the prevailing COVID-19 situation contributed to the non-compliance. Regarding the first appellate proceedings, the explanation that notices were sent to the accountant's email and overlooked was also deemed acceptable. The Tribunal held that, for whatever reason, the assessee did not get an opportunity to present their case before the Assessing Officer and the First Appellate Authority. Therefore, the assessee deserved an opportunity to represent their case. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the learned First Appellate Authority and restored the issues to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication, with a direction to provide the assessee with due and reasonable opportunity of being heard. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that both the Assessing Officer and the First Appellate Authority (NFAC) failed to properly apply their minds to the submissions and evidence furnished by the assessee. The AO made the addition under Section 69A without discussing the nature and acceptability of the assessee's reply and documentary evidence. The NFAC, despite noting that the assessee had furnished submissions and documentary evidence on specific dates, erroneously concluded that no submissions or evidence were filed. The Tribunal found that the departmental authorities mechanically made the addition. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the NFAC and restored the issues to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication, with a direction to provide the assessee with a due and reasonable opportunity of being heard. As a result, there is no surviving demand against the assessee, rendering the stay application infructuous.

The Tribunal held that the assessees were indeed searched persons, as confirmed by the Assessing Officer's categorical statements in the impugned assessment orders that both assessees were covered under the search and seizure operation carried out on 29.10.2020. Consequently, the Assessing Officer should have assumed jurisdiction under Section 153A of the Act, not Section 153C. The Tribunal noted that the only addition made by the Assessing Officer pertained to jewellery found during the search conducted at the assessees' premises, meaning the material was found as a result of a search on the assessees themselves, not a third party. Therefore, proceeding under Section 153C was erroneous and against the statutory mandate, rendering the assumption of jurisdiction invalid. The Tribunal relied on a coordinate bench's decision in a similar case ('Shri Pawan Kumar vs. DCIT'). Accordingly, the Tribunal upheld the decision of the learned First Appellate Authority, dismissing the Department's appeals.

The Tribunal found the assessee's reasons for non-compliance acceptable. For the assessment proceedings, the Tribunal was convinced that the prevailing COVID-19 situation contributed to the non-compliance. Regarding the first appellate proceedings, the explanation that notices were sent to the accountant's email and overlooked was also deemed acceptable. The Tribunal held that, for whatever reason, the assessee did not get an opportunity to present their case before the Assessing Officer and the First Appellate Authority. Therefore, the assessee deserved an opportunity to represent their case. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the learned First Appellate Authority and restored the issues to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication, with a direction to provide the assessee with due and reasonable opportunity of being heard. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the order passed by the National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC) was mechanical and arbitrary. The Tribunal observed that while the assessment was completed ex-parte, the assessee had furnished written submissions before the First Appellate Authority, which were reproduced in the appellate order. Despite these submissions being described as exhaustive by the Tribunal, the NFAC's order confirmed the additions without adverting to them and lacked proper reasoning. The NFAC's observation that the appellant made 'partial submissions' and did not submit supporting documents for cash deposits, leading to the confirmation of additions of Rs. 12,23,250/- (cash deposits) and Rs. 11,10,626/- (business income), was deemed insufficient reasoning. The Tribunal found the NFAC's conclusion to be bereft of any reasoning and clearly non-speaking. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the NFAC's order and restored the issues to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, with a direction to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the matter should be restored to the file of the CIT(E) for a fresh examination. The reasoning was that subsequent to the rejection order, the CIT(E) had granted registration to the assessee under Section 12AB of the Act after examining the requisite documents. Therefore, the observations in the impugned order regarding the genuineness of the assessee's activities needed reconsideration in light of the Section 12AB registration. The Tribunal also noted that the objection regarding the absence of a dissolution clause required fresh examination, as the assessee stated the trust deed was amended to incorporate such a clause. These subsequent developments directly impacted the grounds for declining 80G approval. The CIT(E) was directed to examine the application afresh, considering the Section 12AB registration and the amended trust deed, and also to examine the objection regarding alleged benefit to another person/entity. The assessee was to be given an opportunity to furnish the amended trust deed and other required documents. The operative direction was to set aside the impugned order and restore the application to the CIT(E). No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E)'s conclusion that the assessee is a religious entity was based solely on an inadvertent error in filing Form 10AB, which described the activities as 'religious cum charitable'. The Tribunal found that the assessee's actual conduct of activities, as supported by audited financial details demonstrating the running of an educational institution, clearly indicated charitable and educational activities. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted a violation of the principles of natural justice, as no notice was issued to the assessee, nor was it given an opportunity to explain its case before its status was changed. The Tribunal observed that the assessee had previously been granted registration under section 12A and approval under section 80G as a charitable trust. The appeal against the rejection of the section 80G approval was consequential to the outcome of the section 12AB registration. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(E) and directed him to grant the registration sought by the assessee under section 12AB and the approval under section 80G. The ratio decidendi is that an inadvertent clerical error in a form, if demonstrably contradicted by actual activities and financial records, should not lead to the rejection of registration or approval, especially when principles of natural justice are violated.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E)'s conclusion that the assessee is a religious entity was based solely on an inadvertent error in filing Form 10AB, which described the activities as 'religious cum charitable'. The Tribunal found that the assessee's actual conduct of activities, as supported by audited financial details demonstrating the running of an educational institution, clearly indicated charitable and educational activities. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted a violation of the principles of natural justice, as no notice was issued to the assessee, nor was it given an opportunity to explain its case before its status was changed. The Tribunal observed that the assessee had previously been granted registration under section 12A and approval under section 80G as a charitable trust. The appeal against the rejection of the section 80G approval was consequential to the outcome of the section 12AB registration. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(E) and directed him to grant the registration sought by the assessee under section 12AB and the approval under section 80G. The ratio decidendi is that an inadvertent clerical error in a form, if demonstrably contradicted by actual activities and financial records, should not lead to the rejection of registration or approval, especially when principles of natural justice are violated.

The Tribunal held that the order of the learned CIT(E) rejecting the assessee's applications for registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G should be set aside. The Tribunal found that the CIT(E)'s approach of changing the assessee's status to a religious entity was not based on cogent material, but solely on an inadvertent error in filing Form 10AB. The assessee's claim that its activities are exclusively charitable, particularly in running medical relief services through Baba Balwant Singh Ji Memorial Charitable Hospital, was corroborated by its previous registrations as a charitable trust. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had reported 'NIL' expenditure on religious activities in the relevant Form 10AB. Since the appeal against the rejection of the Section 80G approval is consequential to the outcome of the Section 12AB registration, it would meet the same fate. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to grant the registration and approval sought by the assessee for both applications.

The Tribunal held that the order of the learned CIT(E) rejecting the assessee's applications for registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G should be set aside. The Tribunal found that the CIT(E)'s approach of changing the assessee's status to a religious entity was not based on cogent material, but solely on an inadvertent error in filing Form 10AB. The assessee's claim that its activities are exclusively charitable, particularly in running medical relief services through Baba Balwant Singh Ji Memorial Charitable Hospital, was corroborated by its previous registrations as a charitable trust. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had reported 'NIL' expenditure on religious activities in the relevant Form 10AB. Since the appeal against the rejection of the Section 80G approval is consequential to the outcome of the Section 12AB registration, it would meet the same fate. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to grant the registration and approval sought by the assessee for both applications.

The Tribunal held that the rejection of the rectified application by the CIT(E) treating it as time-barred defeats the substantive eligibility of the trust for tax exemptions. The Tribunal found that the application for approval under Section 80G(5) was rejected due to filing under an incorrect clause, which was subsequently rectified by filing under the correct clause. In the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to reconsider the rectified application, taking into account the subsequent filing. The CIT(E) was also directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and dispose of the application as per the provisions of law. The assessee was directed to furnish all documentary evidence and plead its case. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had made detailed submissions with corroborative documentary evidence and reconciliation to explain the differences that led to the additions. However, these submissions were not considered or examined by the authorities below before arriving at adverse conclusions. The Tribunal found it appropriate to accept the assessee's prayer to remit the matter back to the Assessing Officer (AO) for de novo adjudication. The AO is directed to consider all the materials placed on record and adjudicate the matter afresh. The assessee will be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to make further submissions. The grounds taken by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. The operative direction is to set aside the orders of the authorities below and restore the matter to the AO for fresh consideration.

The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(ii) was principally due to non-compliance and procedural deficiencies, rather than any adverse findings on the charitable objects or genuineness of activities. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided audited financial statements and a previous registration certificate. It acknowledged that the non-compliance occurred due to the death of a member responsible for compliances, which brought the assessee's affairs to a standstill. The Tribunal considered this fact not to have been properly appreciated by the CIT (E). Therefore, in the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the application to the file of the CIT (E) for fresh consideration and adjudication on merits. The assessee was directed to furnish all requisite documents and cooperate with the proceedings. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the assessee's eligibility for registration. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for registration under Section 12AB(1)(b)(ii) was principally due to the non-furnishing of requisite documents and details, constituting procedural deficiencies. The Tribunal noted the assessee's undertaking to furnish a complete application with supporting documents and to comply with further requirements. In the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the application for registration to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh consideration and adjudication. The assessee was directed to furnish the complete Form No. 10AB and all required documents, and to cooperate in the proceedings. The CIT(E) was instructed to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to decide the application afresh on merits. The Tribunal clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the assessee's eligibility for registration. Consequently, the appeal related to Section 80G approval, being consequential, also met the same fate. The ratio is that procedural deficiencies, if rectified by the assessee with an undertaking to comply, should not lead to outright rejection without a fresh opportunity, especially when the merits of the application are not yet examined.

The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for registration under Section 12AB(1)(b)(ii) was principally due to the non-furnishing of requisite documents and details, constituting procedural deficiencies. The Tribunal noted the assessee's undertaking to furnish a complete application with supporting documents and to comply with further requirements. In the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the application for registration to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh consideration and adjudication. The assessee was directed to furnish the complete Form No. 10AB and all required documents, and to cooperate in the proceedings. The CIT(E) was instructed to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to decide the application afresh on merits. The Tribunal clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the assessee's eligibility for registration. Consequently, the appeal related to Section 80G approval, being consequential, also met the same fate. The ratio is that procedural deficiencies, if rectified by the assessee with an undertaking to comply, should not lead to outright rejection without a fresh opportunity, especially when the merits of the application are not yet examined.

The Tribunal held that the rejection of the application for registration under Section 12AB was principally for the reason that requisite documents/details were not furnished, despite the deficiency having been pointed out. The rejection was essentially founded upon non-compliance and procedural deficiencies. The Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the matter deserved to be examined afresh by the CIT(E), rather than the assessee being foreclosed from consideration of its claim for registration merely on account of these deficiencies. Accordingly, in the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the application for registration to the file of the CIT(E) for consideration and adjudication afresh in accordance with law. The assessee was directed to furnish all requisite documents, information, and explanations. The CIT(E) was directed to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard and decide the application afresh on merits. The Tribunal clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the assessee’s eligibility for registration. The second appeal regarding the rejection of the application for approval under Section 80G(5) was consequential to the rejection of registration under Section 12AB. Since the matter relating to registration was restored, the appeal relating to Section 80G also met the same fate.

The Tribunal considered the application filed by the assessee seeking permission to withdraw the appeals. The Revenue did not raise any objection to this request. In light of the no-objection from the Revenue and the assessee's explicit request, the Tribunal granted permission to the assessee to withdraw the appeals. The ratio decidendi is that an assessee has the right to withdraw an appeal, provided the revenue does not object. The operative direction is that both appeals are dismissed as withdrawn. No issues were expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal considered the application filed by the assessee seeking permission to withdraw the appeals. The Revenue did not raise any objection to this request. In light of the no-objection from the Revenue and the assessee's explicit request, the Tribunal granted permission to the assessee to withdraw the appeals. The ratio decidendi is that an assessee has the right to withdraw an appeal, provided the revenue does not object. The operative direction is that both appeals are dismissed as withdrawn. No issues were expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the assessee's application for renewal of registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(ii) was rightly rejected. The Tribunal found that the assessee's note on its charitable activities corroborated the CIT(E)'s observations. The Tribunal noted that the assessee runs a Hanafee madrasa teaching specific Islamic branches of learning (Fiqah and Hadith) to 270 students, with courses like Hafiz, Maulviyat, and Mufti, funded by religious offerings. It found no evidence of secular subjects or other charitable activities like relief of the poor or general public utility. The Tribunal relied on Section 13(1)(b), which denies exemption to trusts established for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste, and noted that the assessee was established after the Act's commencement. The Tribunal distinguished the case from CIT v. Dawoodi Bohara Jamat by stating that the objects of spread of education of Fiqah and Hadith are faith-specific and the note confirms this in practice. The Tribunal also referred to CIT v. Palghat Shadi Mahal Trust, where the Supreme Court held Section 13(1)(b) attracted if the object confined benefits to one community. The Tribunal dismissed the grounds raised by the assessee, finding no reason to interfere with the CIT(E)'s findings.

The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for approval under Section 80G was arbitrary and contradictory. This was because the CIT(E) had, on March 5, 2026, granted registration to the assessee under Section 12AB(1)(b) after examining its charitable objects and the genuineness of its activities. The Tribunal reasoned that the CIT(E)'s observations regarding the genuineness of the assessee's activities in the impugned order should be reconsidered in light of the Section 12AB registration. Furthermore, the assessee had received prior approvals under Section 80G based on the same Memorandum of Association and objects, with no material changes. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the application for approval under Section 80G to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh examination in light of the Section 12AB registration, with a direction to grant approval if statutory requirements were met after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity to present its case. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the rejection of the application for registration under Section 12AB was principally for the reason that requisite documents/details were not furnished, despite the deficiency having been pointed out. The rejection was essentially founded upon non-compliance and procedural deficiencies. The Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the matter deserved to be examined afresh by the CIT(E), rather than the assessee being foreclosed from consideration of its claim for registration merely on account of these deficiencies. Accordingly, in the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the application for registration to the file of the CIT(E) for consideration and adjudication afresh in accordance with law. The assessee was directed to furnish all requisite documents, information, and explanations. The CIT(E) was directed to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard and decide the application afresh on merits. The Tribunal clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the assessee’s eligibility for registration. The second appeal regarding the rejection of the application for approval under Section 80G(5) was consequential to the rejection of registration under Section 12AB. Since the matter relating to registration was restored, the appeal relating to Section 80G also met the same fate.

The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) was primarily due to non-compliance and procedural deficiencies, as the requisite documents and details were not furnished despite being pointed out by the CIT (E). The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's undertaking to furnish a complete application with all supporting documents and to comply with future requirements. Therefore, in the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the application to the file of the CIT (E) for fresh consideration and adjudication. The assessee was directed to furnish the complete Form No. 10AB and all required information, and the CIT (E) was instructed to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard and decide the application afresh on merits. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the assessee's eligibility for registration. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under Section 147 of the Act is invalid. The reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer clearly stated cash deposits of Rs. 35,81,500/- and Rs. 33,95,000/-. However, information obtained from the bank under Section 133(6) indicated cash deposits of Rs. 40,40,000/-. This significant difference, coupled with the absence of account numbers in the reasons recorded, indicated that the reopening was based on erroneous and unverified facts without preliminary inquiry. The Tribunal found that this misinformation vitiated the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147. For completeness, the Tribunal also addressed the merits. It held that the addition of Rs. 39,00,000/- under Section 68 could not be sustained. Since the assessee did not maintain any books of account, the addition based solely on bank statements/passbooks, as per the ratio of cited decisions of coordinate benches, is impermissible. The Assessing Officer is directed to delete the addition. The appeal is allowed.

The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 10,00,000/- made by the Assessing Officer under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was unsustainable. The Tribunal noted that the entire addition was based on information from a search in the case of M/s Angels Immigration and Educational Consultants Pvt. Ltd., and the Assessing Officer had no independent corroborative evidence to prove that the assessee paid Rs. 20,00,000/-. The Assessing Officer himself acknowledged in the assessment order that no material was received to corroborate the higher payment, despite communicating with the jurisdictional AO of M/s Angels Immigration. The Tribunal also observed that the fundamental condition for invoking Section 68, which requires the amount to be found credited in the assessee's books of account, was not satisfied. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to delete the addition of Rs. 10,00,000/-.

The Tribunal held that the assessee's explanation for the delay in filing the appeal before the First Appellate Authority (NFAC) was reasonable and could be accepted. The Tribunal considered the affidavit filed by the assessee, which detailed the extraordinary circumstances faced, including the communication blackout in Jammu & Kashmir following the abrogation of Article 370, the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns, technical issues with the new income tax portal, and the delayed service of the assessment order. While the NFAC had partially accepted some reasons but ultimately dismissed the appeal without condoning the delay, the ITAT found that the assessee could be given the benefit of the doubt. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the NFAC and restored the issue back to the First Appellate Authority with a direction to condone the delay and adjudicate the appeal on its merits after providing a due and reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the First Appellate Authority's dismissal of the assessee's appeal in limine on the ground of delay was unjustified. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had explained the delay by stating that the assessment order was not received despite repeated requests. The Tribunal found that the First Appellate Authority should have undertaken a factual verification of this claim before dismissing the appeal. The Tribunal considered the delay of 220 days not to be inordinate. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the First Appellate Authority, directed the condonation of the delay, and remanded the appeal to the First Appellate Authority for adjudication on merits after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The issue of the addition of Rs.2,21,605/- and the applicability of Section 80P(2)(d) were not decided on merits.

The Tribunal condoned the 95-day delay in filing the appeal, finding reasonable cause. Regarding the primary issue, the Tribunal held that the First Appellate Authority's dismissal of the assessee's appeal in limine on a technical ground (non-payment of advance tax) without providing an opportunity to explain the non-liability was a violation of natural justice. The Tribunal reasoned that before dismissing the appeal ex-parte, the First Appellate Authority should have allowed the assessee to explain his position regarding advance tax payment. Therefore, the impugned order of the First Appellate Authority was set aside. The issues arising in the appeal were restored to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was directed to comply with statutory notices and cooperate in the assessment proceedings. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed under Section 153C read with Section 143(3) is a nullity and bad-in-law because the Assessing Officer failed to issue the mandatory notice under Section 143(2) after the assessee filed its return of income in response to the notice under Section 153C. The Tribunal relied on its prior decisions where it had quashed similar assessment orders for the same reason. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed. Since the assessee succeeded on this legal ground, the Tribunal deemed it unnecessary to adjudicate the other grounds challenging the additions on merits. Therefore, the appeals were allowed on this primary legal issue.

The Tribunal held that the assessee's purchase register, ledger accounts, bank statements, and transport details, when coupled with seized material, supplier statements, and the surrendered income of Rs. 2,71,50,000/-, did not conclusively prove the genuineness of purchases amounting to Rs. 2,33,65,186/-. The assessee failed to provide any material to contradict the AO's findings or explain the genuineness of these purchases, nor did it produce any supplier confirmations or produce suppliers for cross-examination. The CIT(A) did not provide a categorical finding that the purchases of Rs. 2,33,65,186/- were genuine. The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s application of 12.5% on the entire purchases, especially when the assessee had surrendered a significant portion of income, to be unjustified. Citing decisions from the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N.K. Proteins Ltd. and the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Kanak Impex and Shoreline Hotel (P.) Ltd., the Tribunal concluded that partial disallowance was not justified in cases of unproven purchases. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and restored the assessment order, allowing the Revenue's appeal. The issue of whether the surrendered income subsumed the addition was implicitly decided against the assessee by restoring the AO's order.

The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC, dismissing all grounds raised by the Revenue. Regarding the alleged bogus purchases (Issue 1), the Tribunal found that the assessee had furnished financial statements, VAT returns, ledgers, confirmations, invoices with vehicle details, and had duly paid VAT and deducted TDS. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition. Concerning the share application money (Issue 2), the Tribunal noted that the assessee had submitted all necessary documentary evidence to substantiate the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction. The Tribunal held that the assessee discharged its onus, and the AO failed to disprove the transaction. For the agricultural income (Issue 3), the Tribunal observed that the assessee provided details of land holdings, production, sales, and expenses, and the CIT(A) had found that the assessee grew and sold maize seed, not maize crop, justifying the higher price. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition, as no contrary material was brought forth by the Revenue. The assessee's legal grounds were dismissed as not pressed.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed under Section 153C read with Section 143(3) is a nullity and bad-in-law because the Assessing Officer failed to issue the mandatory notice under Section 143(2) after the assessee filed its return of income in response to the notice under Section 153C. The Tribunal relied on its prior decisions where it had quashed similar assessment orders for the same reason. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed. Since the assessee succeeded on this legal ground, the Tribunal deemed it unnecessary to adjudicate the other grounds challenging the additions on merits. Therefore, the appeals were allowed on this primary legal issue.

The Tribunal admitted the appeal, condoned the delay, and restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to plead and prove its case regarding the cash deposits.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. While acknowledging the AO's report, the Tribunal found that the assessee had provided supporting documents for their business claim and creditor confirmations. To balance justice, the Tribunal reduced the total addition to Rs. 5 Lacs, deleting the remaining Rs. 18.20 Lacs.

The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that the bank account belonged to an ex-partner and the deposits were accounted for. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside.

The Tribunal held that the assessee was not given an adequate opportunity of being heard due to unavoidable circumstances preventing email access. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the AO for a fresh decision.

The Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment. The assessee was directed to plead and prove its case, considering principles of natural justice.