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3,242 tribunal orders from the Amritsar bench.
Counted from the judgments of this bench on BharatTax. The figure is how many of them cite each decision.
In a search assessment under Section 153A, additions can only be made for completed or non-abated assessment years if incriminating material relevant to those years is found during the search, although notice under Section 153A(1) is mandatorily issued for six assessment years preceding the search.
Appellate authorities can consider new claims and additional grounds if the relevant facts are already on record. The purpose of assessment is to correctly determine tax liability, allowing both parties to raise issues.
In Section 153A proceedings, the scope of assessment extends to abated proceedings, enabling an assessee to raise fresh legal claims that could have been made in regular assessment proceedings.
An assessment under section 153A is without jurisdiction if there is an absence of incriminating material for an unabated assessment year.
When two equally plausible interpretations of a taxing provision are possible, or when conflicting views exist from non-jurisdictional High Courts, the interpretation that favors the assessee must be adopted.
For assessments under Section 153C, a notice is legally unsustainable if there is no incriminating material correlated to the specific assessment years for which reassessment is sought.
A penalty notice issued under section 274 read with section 271(1)(c) is invalid if it fails to specify whether the penalty proceedings are initiated for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. This non-specification vitiates the penalty proceedings.
In search assessments under Section 153A, additions to income are permissible only if incriminating material is found during the search; in the absence of such material, completed assessments cannot be disturbed. A statement recorded under Section 132(4) and later retracted may not, on its own, constitute sufficient incriminating evidence for making additions.
Employees' contributions to welfare funds, such as provident fund, are not allowable as a deduction under section 36(1)(va) if deposited beyond the due date prescribed under the respective welfare statutes, even by a single day. Such delayed deposits are not cured even if made before the income-tax return filing due date.
The Punjab & Haryana High Court held that employees' contributions to provident fund (PF) and Employees' State Insurance (ESI), deposited after the due date under the respective special Acts but before the due date for filing the income tax return, are allowable as a deduction under Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 43B of the Income-tax Act.
The CBDT's guidelines issued under Section 119 of the Income Tax Act are binding on the revenue department.
Section 153A can be invoked to reassess income for all years under consideration prior to a search, even if returns for those years were processed under Section 143(1)(a). The Assessing Officer has the power to reassess total income in such cases without fetters.
Employee contributions to Provident Fund (PF) and Employee State Insurance (ESI) are deductible under the Income Tax Act if deposited by the assessee before the due date for filing the return of income, even if such deposits are made after the specific due dates prescribed under the respective PF and ESI Acts.
Belated remittance of employees' contribution to ESI and PF, even if deposited before the due date for filing the return of income under Section 139(1), is not allowed as a deduction. This disallowance falls under Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 2(24)(x), as Section 43B applies only to employer's contributions.
The amendment to the second proviso of Section 43B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2003, is curative in nature and applies retrospectively. This means employee contributions to welfare funds like ESI and PF are deductible if paid before the due date for filing the income tax return, even if paid beyond the statutory due date.
Employee contributions to welfare funds, such as provident fund or ESI, are deductible under section 36(1)(va) of the Income-tax Act if paid before the due date for filing the return of income, even if paid after the due date specified in the respective welfare fund statute.
Employee contributions towards ESI and PF are allowable as a deduction if paid by the due date for filing the income tax return, even if paid after the statutory due dates prescribed under the respective ESI/PF Acts.
Employee contributions to provident fund or ESI are deductible if deposited with the authorities before the due date for filing the income tax return under Section 139(1), even if deposited after the due date prescribed by the respective fund's Act.
Approval granted by a superior authority under Section 153D in a mechanical or perfunctory manner, without proper application of mind, lacks legal sanctity and renders the subsequent assessment order null and void.
The validity of approval is a fundamental issue that can be raised at any time, and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear such issues even if they did not originate from the orders of the CIT(A).
Most recent orders on record, from 2026.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal on the additional ground raised by the assessee concerning the validity of the assessment order. The Tribunal noted that the assessee filed a belated return in response to a notice under section 142(1), and the AO treated this return as invalid, subsequently proceeding under section 144 without issuing a notice under section 143(2). The Tribunal, respectfully following the decision in Kamlesh Pramod Gandhi vs. ITO and other coordinate bench decisions, held that the non-issuance of a notice under section 143(2) after a belated return is filed in response to a notice under section 142(1) (or section 148 in the cited cases) makes the assessment order invalid and without jurisdiction. The Tribunal found the facts in the present case identical to those decided by the coordinate benches. Therefore, the assessment order dated December 18, 2019, was set aside and quashed as bad in law. Consequently, the other grounds raised by the assessee challenging the additions on merit became infructuous and were not adjudicated.
The Tribunal held that the notice dated 30.07.2022, issued under Section 148 of the amended Income Tax Act, 1961, was barred by limitation as per Section 149(1)(b) of the Act, following the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal. The Tribunal calculated the surviving time limit for issuing the notice. The original notice under Section 148 was deemed to have been issued on 29.06.2021. The extended limitation as per the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020, was up to 30.06.2021. This left only one day of surviving time. Considering the proviso to Section 149(1)(b), an additional seven days were allowed, extending the time limit to 16.06.2022. However, the order under Section 148A(d) was passed on 29.07.2022, and the fresh notice under Section 148 was issued on 30.07.2022, which was significantly beyond the permissible time limit. The Tribunal relied on the Delhi High Court's decision in Ram Balram Buildhome (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO and the Bombay High Court's decision in Hitesh Ramniklal Shah vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, which followed similar reasoning. Consequently, the notice under Section 148 was declared void ab initio and quashed. The entire reassessment proceedings and the assessment order dated 03.05.2023 were also quashed. The alternative ground raised by the assessee was allowed, rendering the remaining grounds infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the issue for consideration was the estimation of the Net Profit rate on suppressed gross receipts. It acknowledged that the assessee had suppressed receipts and claimed unproven expenses. The CIT(A) had applied a Net Profit rate of 25% on unaccounted sales turnover, relying on various judicial precedents that only the profit element embedded in suppressed receipts is taxable, not the entire receipts. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had declared a Net Profit rate of 19% in its books, which increased to 21.85% after offering additional income. Considering the assessee's contention regarding Section 44AD and the benchmark rates, and finding the CIT(A)'s 25% rate to be high, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to apply a Net Profit rate of 23% on the unaccounted sales turnover. The Revenue's grounds of appeal were dismissed, and the assessee's cross-objections were partly allowed. The issue of telescoping was dismissed as infructuous. The decision for the husband applied mutatis mutandis to the wife.
The Tribunal held that the expenses amounting to Rs. 83,47,183/-, comprising advisory fees and event and execution charges, were incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transaction of sale of unlisted equity shares and are therefore allowable under Section 48(i) of the Act. The Tribunal observed that the genuineness of the sale transaction was not in dispute. It noted that the assessee, along with other shareholders, had engaged 7i Advisors LLP as a consultant to find a buyer and secure the best price for their shares in M/s. Lilac Medicare Pvt. Ltd. The Tribunal found that the advisory fees and event and execution expenses were necessary for finding buyers, preparing documents, conducting due diligence, and finalizing the deal with Tosoh Corporation and Tosoh Asis Pte Ltd. Japan. The Tribunal's view was fortified by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court's decision in Kausalya Devi Vs. CIT, which allows expenses inextricably linked to the transfer of a capital asset. Consequently, the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer was deleted, and the grounds of appeal raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the issue for consideration was the estimation of the Net Profit rate on suppressed gross receipts. It acknowledged that the assessee had suppressed receipts and claimed unproven expenses. The CIT(A) had applied a Net Profit rate of 25% on unaccounted sales turnover, relying on various judicial precedents that only the profit element embedded in suppressed receipts is taxable, not the entire receipts. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had declared a Net Profit rate of 19% in its books, which increased to 21.85% after offering additional income. Considering the assessee's contention regarding Section 44AD and the benchmark rates, and finding the CIT(A)'s 25% rate to be high, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to apply a Net Profit rate of 23% on the unaccounted sales turnover. The Revenue's grounds of appeal were dismissed, and the assessee's cross-objections were partly allowed. The issue of telescoping was dismissed as infructuous. The decision for the husband applied mutatis mutandis to the wife.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had successfully demonstrated the submission of requisite documents. The CIT(Exemption) had rejected the application for registration without considering these documents. Therefore, the Tribunal found it appropriate to provide the assessee with an opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order passed by the CIT(Exemption) and allowed the grounds of appeal raised by the assessee for statistical purposes. The CIT(Exemption) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee, consider all filed documents, and pass a speaking order in accordance with the law. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it was not commenting on the merits of the case.
The Tribunal held that there is no dispute that the entire suppressed sales cannot be brought to tax, and only the profit attributable to unrecorded sales should be taxed. Considering the totality of facts and in the interest of justice, to cover all leakages including disallowance under Section 40A(3), the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restrict the addition by estimating the Gross Profit at 25% of the unrecorded sales. This is after giving the benefit of income already disclosed by the assessee in the return filed in response to the notice under Section 153A. The Assessing Officer is directed to recompute the income for all three assessment years accordingly. The impugned orders of the CIT(A) are set aside, and the grounds of appeal are partly allowed. The issue of whether cash payments were covered under Rule 6DD was implicitly addressed by the Tribunal's decision to estimate gross profit on suppressed sales, thereby factoring in all potential disallowances.
The Tribunal held that there is no dispute that the entire suppressed sales cannot be brought to tax, and only the profit attributable to unrecorded sales should be taxed. Considering the totality of facts and in the interest of justice, to cover all leakages including disallowance under Section 40A(3), the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restrict the addition by estimating the Gross Profit at 25% of the unrecorded sales. This is after giving the benefit of income already disclosed by the assessee in the return filed in response to the notice under Section 153A. The Assessing Officer is directed to recompute the income for all three assessment years accordingly. The impugned orders of the CIT(A) are set aside, and the grounds of appeal are partly allowed. The issue of whether cash payments were covered under Rule 6DD was implicitly addressed by the Tribunal's decision to estimate gross profit on suppressed sales, thereby factoring in all potential disallowances.
The Tribunal held that there is no dispute that the entire suppressed sales cannot be brought to tax, and only the profit attributable to unrecorded sales should be taxed. Considering the totality of facts and in the interest of justice, to cover all leakages including disallowance under Section 40A(3), the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restrict the addition by estimating the Gross Profit at 25% of the unrecorded sales. This is after giving the benefit of income already disclosed by the assessee in the return filed in response to the notice under Section 153A. The Assessing Officer is directed to recompute the income for all three assessment years accordingly. The impugned orders of the CIT(A) are set aside, and the grounds of appeal are partly allowed. The issue of whether cash payments were covered under Rule 6DD was implicitly addressed by the Tribunal's decision to estimate gross profit on suppressed sales, thereby factoring in all potential disallowances.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Tribunal observed that the Assessing Officer made the addition based on information from the Investigation Wing regarding alleged accommodation entry providers, Shri Surendra Kumar Jain and Shri Virendra Kumar Jain. However, no specific information was received directly linking the assessee to taking accommodation entries. The assessee, a Limited Company, had furnished a complete chain of documents, including share application forms, board resolutions, share receipt letters, confirmations, PAN details of applicants, bank statements, and annual reports, to explain the nature and source of the share application money. The Assessing Officer made the addition relying solely on the Investigation Wing's report without providing a copy of this information to the assessee. The CIT(A) had also considered these documents and concluded that the assessee had discharged its primary onus under Section 68, and the Assessing Officer failed to bring any corroborative material to prove the transactions were bogus. The Tribunal found no discrepancy in the documents furnished by the assessee and agreed with the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 23 days in filing the appeal, relying on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, finding that a reasonable cause prevented the assessee from filing within the stipulated time and that the delay was neither deliberate nor intentional. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal, considering the prayer of the assessee and in the interest of justice, decided to afford one more opportunity to the assessee. Without dwelling on the merits, the Tribunal restored all issues raised in the appeal, including additional grounds, to the file of the CIT(A) for necessary adjudication after providing the assessee with a due opportunity. The assessee was directed to provide updated contact details and remain vigilant. The effective grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay in filing appeals before the First Appellate Authority (NFAC) appeared reasonable, considering the substantial demands and interest imposed, which would create a heavy burden. The Tribunal believed the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeals in time. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the assessee's contention that entire credit entries in bank statements cannot be treated as income without considering withdrawals merits consideration. The claim that cheque deposits represent transfers from other bank accounts also requires factual verification. Since the assessee's case on merits was not examined at the first appellate stage due to the in limine dismissal, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the NFAC and restored the issues for fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer, providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions made by the AO.
The Tribunal held that the imposition of a single consolidated penalty order for seven separate failures under Section 272A(1)(d) is bad in law. The Tribunal reasoned that the provision, particularly the phrase "each such default or failure," implies that each instance of non-compliance is distinct and independent. Therefore, the AO should have considered the reasons for each failure separately, issuing separate show-cause notices and passing separate penalty orders. The Tribunal found that the consolidated order was not sustainable. Accordingly, the penalty of Rs. 70,000 imposed by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was deleted. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay in filing appeals before the First Appellate Authority (NFAC) appeared reasonable, considering the substantial demands and interest imposed, which would create a heavy burden. The Tribunal believed the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeals in time. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the assessee's contention that entire credit entries in bank statements cannot be treated as income without considering withdrawals merits consideration. The claim that cheque deposits represent transfers from other bank accounts also requires factual verification. Since the assessee's case on merits was not examined at the first appellate stage due to the in limine dismissal, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the NFAC and restored the issues for fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer, providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions made by the AO.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding the explanation provided by the assessee in respect of the delay to be appropriate. Regarding the rejection of the application for registration under Section 12AB(1)(b)(ii), the Tribunal held that the rejection was principally for non-compliance and procedural deficiencies. Since the assessee undertook to furnish all requisite documents and details, the Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the matter deserved to be examined afresh by the CIT(E). Accordingly, the impugned order was set aside, and the application for registration was restored to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh consideration and adjudication in accordance with law. The Tribunal clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the assessee's eligibility for registration. Consequently, the second appeal concerning the rejection of the application for approval under Section 80G(5) also met the same fate, as it was consequential to the rejection of the Section 12AB registration. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding the explanation provided by the assessee in respect of the delay to be appropriate. Regarding the rejection of the application for registration under Section 12AB(1)(b)(ii), the Tribunal held that the rejection was principally for non-compliance and procedural deficiencies. Since the assessee undertook to furnish all requisite documents and details, the Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the matter deserved to be examined afresh by the CIT(E). Accordingly, the impugned order was set aside, and the application for registration was restored to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh consideration and adjudication in accordance with law. The Tribunal clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the assessee's eligibility for registration. Consequently, the second appeal concerning the rejection of the application for approval under Section 80G(5) also met the same fate, as it was consequential to the rejection of the Section 12AB registration. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for registration under Section 12AB was primarily due to non-compliance and procedural deficiencies, specifically the failure to furnish requisite documents and details despite being pointed out. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's submission that it was not afforded adequate and effective opportunity due to the short notice period. Considering the assessee's undertaking to furnish all required documents and cooperate with the proceedings, the Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the matter deserved to be examined afresh by the CIT(E). Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the application for registration to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh consideration and adjudication in accordance with law. The CIT(E) was directed to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard and decide the application on merits after considering the furnished material. The Tribunal explicitly clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the assessee's eligibility for registration. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessees were indeed searched persons, as confirmed by the Assessing Officer's categorical statements in the impugned assessment orders that both assessees were covered under the search and seizure operation carried out on 29.10.2020. Consequently, the Assessing Officer should have assumed jurisdiction under Section 153A of the Act, not Section 153C. The Tribunal noted that the only addition made by the Assessing Officer pertained to jewellery found during the search conducted at the assessees' premises, meaning the material was found as a result of a search on the assessees themselves, not a third party. Therefore, proceeding under Section 153C was erroneous and against the statutory mandate, rendering the assumption of jurisdiction invalid. The Tribunal relied on a coordinate bench's decision in a similar case ('Shri Pawan Kumar vs. DCIT'). Accordingly, the Tribunal upheld the decision of the learned First Appellate Authority, dismissing the Department's appeals.
The Tribunal held that the assessees were indeed searched persons, as confirmed by the Assessing Officer's categorical statements in the impugned assessment orders that both assessees were covered under the search and seizure operation carried out on 29.10.2020. Consequently, the Assessing Officer should have assumed jurisdiction under Section 153A of the Act, not Section 153C. The Tribunal noted that the only addition made by the Assessing Officer pertained to jewellery found during the search conducted at the assessees' premises, meaning the material was found as a result of a search on the assessees themselves, not a third party. Therefore, proceeding under Section 153C was erroneous and against the statutory mandate, rendering the assumption of jurisdiction invalid. The Tribunal relied on a coordinate bench's decision in a similar case ('Shri Pawan Kumar vs. DCIT'). Accordingly, the Tribunal upheld the decision of the learned First Appellate Authority, dismissing the Department's appeals.
The Tribunal held that the first appellate authority violated principles of natural justice by not considering the documentary evidence submitted by the assessee. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after considering the evidence and providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal found the assessee's reasons for non-compliance acceptable. For the assessment proceedings, the Tribunal was convinced that the prevailing COVID-19 situation contributed to the non-compliance. Regarding the first appellate proceedings, the explanation that notices were sent to the accountant's email and overlooked was also deemed acceptable. The Tribunal held that, for whatever reason, the assessee did not get an opportunity to present their case before the Assessing Officer and the First Appellate Authority. Therefore, the assessee deserved an opportunity to represent their case. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the learned First Appellate Authority and restored the issues to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication, with a direction to provide the assessee with due and reasonable opportunity of being heard. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 564 days in filing the appeal, finding the reasons provided by the assessee to be satisfactory, especially in light of a Coordinate Bench's decision to condone a significantly larger delay on identical grounds. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal held that the impugned order of the First Appellate Authority, which was passed in consequence of a revision order under Section 263 of the Act, could not have independent existence because the said Section 263 order had been set aside by a Coordinate Bench. The Tribunal reasoned that once the foundation (the Section 263 order) is removed, the consequential order (the impugned order) loses its validity. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the First Appellate Authority as well as the assessment order. The Assessing Officer was directed to await the decision of the revisionary authority in the set-aside proceedings and, if warranted, pass a fresh assessment order after the completion of those proceedings. The issue of the amount in dispute was not decided on merits.
The Tribunal held that both the Assessing Officer and the First Appellate Authority (NFAC) failed to properly apply their minds to the submissions and evidence furnished by the assessee. The AO made the addition under Section 69A without discussing the nature and acceptability of the assessee's reply and documentary evidence. The NFAC, despite noting that the assessee had furnished submissions and documentary evidence on specific dates, erroneously concluded that no submissions or evidence were filed. The Tribunal found that the departmental authorities mechanically made the addition. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the NFAC and restored the issues to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication, with a direction to provide the assessee with a due and reasonable opportunity of being heard. As a result, there is no surviving demand against the assessee, rendering the stay application infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay in filing appeals before the First Appellate Authority (NFAC) appeared reasonable, considering the substantial demands and interest imposed, which would create a heavy burden. The Tribunal believed the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeals in time. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the assessee's contention that entire credit entries in bank statements cannot be treated as income without considering withdrawals merits consideration. The claim that cheque deposits represent transfers from other bank accounts also requires factual verification. Since the assessee's case on merits was not examined at the first appellate stage due to the in limine dismissal, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the NFAC and restored the issues for fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer, providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions made by the AO.
The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay in filing appeals before the First Appellate Authority (NFAC) appeared reasonable, considering the substantial demands and interest imposed, which would create a heavy burden. The Tribunal believed the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeals in time. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the assessee's contention that entire credit entries in bank statements cannot be treated as income without considering withdrawals merits consideration. The claim that cheque deposits represent transfers from other bank accounts also requires factual verification. Since the assessee's case on merits was not examined at the first appellate stage due to the in limine dismissal, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the NFAC and restored the issues for fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer, providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions made by the AO.