ITAT Ahmedabad Judgments — August 2025

The Tribunal noted that the primary adjudication of the grounds of appeal was not done by the CIT(A). In the interest of justice, the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for a de-novo assessment, with a direction for the assessee to submit all relevant documents and comply with notices.

The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: 1. On the validity of assessment orders without digital signatures, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding that the absence of a digital signature is a curable defect under section 292B of the Act and does not render the order invalid, especially when authenticated by printed name and designation and served via the ITBA portal. This ground was rejected. 2. Regarding the disallowance of life insurance premiums under section 37(1), the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention that the policies were procured to mitigate business risk associated with key personnel. However, it noted that the allowability hinges on whether the policy remained unassigned throughout its term. The Tribunal observed that if a policy is assigned to the insured director, the beneficial interest transfers, and the employer cannot claim deduction. It also noted that if the benefit is taxed as a perquisite in the director's hands, the deduction might be admissible. Consequently, the Tribunal restored this issue to the Assessing Officer for verification of assignment and its effect on deductibility, allowing the ground for statistical purposes. 3. The issue of additions under section 69A was not explicitly addressed in the provided excerpt of the judgment. The Tribunal's decision on this matter is not recorded in the given text.

The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: 1. On the validity of assessment orders without digital signatures, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding that the absence of a digital signature is a curable defect under section 292B of the Act and does not render the order invalid, especially when authenticated by printed name and designation and served via the ITBA portal. This ground was rejected. 2. Regarding the disallowance of life insurance premiums under section 37(1), the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention that the policies were procured to mitigate business risk associated with key personnel. However, it noted that the allowability hinges on whether the policy remained unassigned throughout its term. The Tribunal observed that if a policy is assigned to the insured director, the beneficial interest transfers, and the employer cannot claim deduction. It also noted that if the benefit is taxed as a perquisite in the director's hands, the deduction might be admissible. Consequently, the Tribunal restored this issue to the Assessing Officer for verification of assignment and its effect on deductibility, allowing the ground for statistical purposes. 3. The issue of additions under section 69A was not explicitly addressed in the provided excerpt of the judgment. The Tribunal's decision on this matter is not recorded in the given text.

The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: 1. On the validity of assessment orders without digital signatures, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding that the absence of a digital signature is a curable defect under section 292B of the Act and does not render the order invalid, especially when authenticated by printed name and designation and served via the ITBA portal. This ground was rejected. 2. Regarding the disallowance of life insurance premiums under section 37(1), the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention that the policies were procured to mitigate business risk associated with key personnel. However, it noted that the allowability hinges on whether the policy remained unassigned throughout its term. The Tribunal observed that if a policy is assigned to the insured director, the beneficial interest transfers, and the employer cannot claim deduction. It also noted that if the benefit is taxed as a perquisite in the director's hands, the deduction might be admissible. Consequently, the Tribunal restored this issue to the Assessing Officer for verification of assignment and its effect on deductibility, allowing the ground for statistical purposes. 3. The issue of additions under section 69A was not explicitly addressed in the provided excerpt of the judgment. The Tribunal's decision on this matter is not recorded in the given text.

The Tribunal held that the matter should be remanded to the CIT(A) for a de novo assessment, allowing the assessee an opportunity to provide all necessary documents and clarifications.

The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to provide necessary documents and explanations for cash deposits. However, considering the interest of justice, the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for a de-novo assessment.

The tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to comply with the specific directions issued in the earlier round, such as allowing cross-examination and recording the bank officer's statement. The CIT(A)'s order was a mechanical reproduction of earlier reasoning and failed to adhere to principles of natural justice.

The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: 1. On the validity of assessment orders without digital signatures, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding that the absence of a digital signature is a curable defect under section 292B of the Act and does not render the order invalid, especially when authenticated by printed name and designation and served via the ITBA portal. This ground was rejected. 2. Regarding the disallowance of life insurance premiums under section 37(1), the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention that the policies were procured to mitigate business risk associated with key personnel. However, it noted that the allowability hinges on whether the policy remained unassigned throughout its term. The Tribunal observed that if a policy is assigned to the insured director, the beneficial interest transfers, and the employer cannot claim deduction. It also noted that if the benefit is taxed as a perquisite in the director's hands, the deduction might be admissible. Consequently, the Tribunal restored this issue to the Assessing Officer for verification of assignment and its effect on deductibility, allowing the ground for statistical purposes. 3. The issue of additions under section 69A was not explicitly addressed in the provided excerpt of the judgment. The Tribunal's decision on this matter is not recorded in the given text.

The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: 1. On the validity of assessment orders without digital signatures, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding that the absence of a digital signature is a curable defect under section 292B of the Act and does not render the order invalid, especially when authenticated by printed name and designation and served via the ITBA portal. This ground was rejected. 2. Regarding the disallowance of life insurance premiums under section 37(1), the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention that the policies were procured to mitigate business risk associated with key personnel. However, it noted that the allowability hinges on whether the policy remained unassigned throughout its term. The Tribunal observed that if a policy is assigned to the insured director, the beneficial interest transfers, and the employer cannot claim deduction. It also noted that if the benefit is taxed as a perquisite in the director's hands, the deduction might be admissible. Consequently, the Tribunal restored this issue to the Assessing Officer for verification of assignment and its effect on deductibility, allowing the ground for statistical purposes. 3. The issue of additions under section 69A was not explicitly addressed in the provided excerpt of the judgment. The Tribunal's decision on this matter is not recorded in the given text.

The Tribunal, considering the facts and circumstances, granted one more opportunity to the assessee to present their case. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment.

The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of insurance premiums as not being for business purposes, finding the policies to be personal endowment plans. It also confirmed the disallowance of delayed employee PF contributions, relying on High Court precedent.

The Tribunal held that the cash deposits were substantiated by the assessee's books of accounts, sales register, and stock records, which were not rejected by the AO. The Tribunal found that taxing these sale proceeds again as unexplained cash would amount to double taxation.

The Tribunal held that the appeals of the Revenue are allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal found that the factual foundation for the impugned addition was not adequately established or verified by the lower authorities. Key material facts, such as the mode, date, confirmation, and reflection of the alleged cash payment in the books of either party, remained unverified. The retirement deed was silent on the cash component, the firm's audited financials did not record such an outflow, and there was no statement under section 132(4). The AO proceeded on assumptions, and the CIT(A) granted relief without proper factual reconciliation. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the AO and CIT(A) and restored the matters to the file of the AO for de novo assessment. The AO is directed to undertake necessary factual inquiries to determine whether the cash receipt took place, its nature and source, and its tax implications. The issue of taxability in the hands of the firm versus the individual partner will be open for consideration after the AO's findings.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's non-cooperative attitude and failure to intimate the dissolution of the partnership or appear before authorities. Consequently, the ex-parte assessment and penalty orders were set aside upon payment of a cost of Rs. 20,000/-, and the Assessing Officer was directed to grant one more opportunity for a hearing on merits.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's non-cooperative attitude and failure to intimate the dissolution of the partnership or appear before authorities. Consequently, the ex-parte assessment and penalty orders were set aside upon payment of a cost of Rs. 20,000/-, and the Assessing Officer was directed to grant one more opportunity for a hearing on merits.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition as the cash payment was covered by the income declared under IDS, 2016. The appeal by the Revenue and the cross-objection by the assessee were dismissed.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's non-cooperative attitude and failure to intimate the dissolution of the partnership or appear before authorities. Consequently, the ex-parte assessment and penalty orders were set aside upon payment of a cost of Rs. 20,000/-, and the Assessing Officer was directed to grant one more opportunity for a hearing on merits.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's non-cooperative attitude and failure to intimate the dissolution of the partnership or appear before authorities. Consequently, the ex-parte assessment and penalty orders were set aside upon payment of a cost of Rs. 20,000/-, and the Assessing Officer was directed to grant one more opportunity for a hearing on merits.

The Tribunal held that interest earned from Bank of Baroda (Rs. 1,83,277) is not eligible for deduction under Section 80P. However, interest earned from Ahmedabad District Cooperative Bank (Rs. 2,88,943) is eligible for deduction as it is a cooperative society.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in not examining the alternate claim of exemption. Appellate authorities are empowered to consider alternate pleas even if not made in the original return. The order of CIT(A) was set aside and the matter restored to the AO to examine the alternate exemption claims.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to counsel's non-communication. The Tribunal noted the assessee's failure to comply with lower authorities despite multiple opportunities and imposed a cost of Rs. 5,000/- on the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, remanding the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after providing an opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the appeals of the Revenue are allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal found that the factual foundation for the impugned addition was not adequately established or verified by the lower authorities. Key material facts, such as the mode, date, confirmation, and reflection of the alleged cash payment in the books of either party, remained unverified. The retirement deed was silent on the cash component, the firm's audited financials did not record such an outflow, and there was no statement under section 132(4). The AO proceeded on assumptions, and the CIT(A) granted relief without proper factual reconciliation. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the AO and CIT(A) and restored the matters to the file of the AO for de novo assessment. The AO is directed to undertake necessary factual inquiries to determine whether the cash receipt took place, its nature and source, and its tax implications. The issue of taxability in the hands of the firm versus the individual partner will be open for consideration after the AO's findings.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's non-cooperative attitude and failure to intimate the dissolution of the partnership or appear before authorities. Consequently, the ex-parte assessment and penalty orders were set aside upon payment of a cost of Rs. 20,000/-, and the Assessing Officer was directed to grant one more opportunity for a hearing on merits.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's non-cooperative attitude and failure to intimate the dissolution of the partnership or appear before authorities. Consequently, the ex-parte assessment and penalty orders were set aside upon payment of a cost of Rs. 20,000/-, and the Assessing Officer was directed to grant one more opportunity for a hearing on merits.

The Tribunal held that CSR expenditure, if fulfilling the conditions of section 80G, retains its nature as a donation, and that the assessee's claim was not barred by opting for taxation under section 115BAA for AY 2020-21. The PCIT's assumption of jurisdiction under section 263 was not warranted.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was not correct in denying the exemption under Section 11 and 12 of the Act by invoking provisions of Section 13(1)(c). The Tribunal reasoned that Section 13(1)(c) requires the income or property of the trust to be used or applied directly or indirectly for the benefit of persons specified in Section 13(3). Citing Gujarat High Court judgments in Shree Kamdar Education Trust and Insaniyat Trust, the Tribunal noted that Section 13(1)(c) does not prohibit normal transactions and that the Revenue must relate the transaction to specific clauses (a) to (h) of Section 13(2). As the assessee's case was not covered by any of these clauses, Section 13(1)(c) could not be invoked. Furthermore, referencing the Sera Foundation case, the Tribunal stated that the conversion of corpus donation of shares into cash, where the original corpus donation remained, and the sale proceeds were not used for the trustee's benefit, does not constitute a colourable device. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order on this issue was quashed, and the assessee's grounds were allowed. The ground pertaining to penalty proceedings under Section 270A was dismissed as consequential. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal and partly allowed the Assessee's appeal.

The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of Section 54F deduction, stating that owning more than one residential property disqualifies the assessee. However, it directed that the capital gain on the gold bar sale should be taxed, deleting the addition for unexplained investment.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 109 days in filing the appeal, finding that the cause of delay was an inadvertent technical lapse (failure to update email address) and not deliberate or contumacious. The Tribunal held that the assessee was prevented by a sufficient cause as envisaged under section 253(5) of the Act. The Tribunal also noted that the delay did not cause undue prejudice to the Revenue and that a liberal construction of 'sufficient cause' is warranted to advance substantial justice. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned ex parte order of the CIT(A) which had dismissed the appeal for want of compliance. The matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) with a direction to decide the appeal afresh on merits after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was directed to cooperate in the proceedings and not seek undue adjournments. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, implying that the merits of the additions made by the AO were not adjudicated by the ITAT.

The Tribunal held that the lower authorities erred in disallowing depreciation on purchased goodwill. The AO failed to rebut the valuation report supporting the goodwill's value and did not obtain the necessary approval to determine the actual cost.

The Tribunal held that the invocation of Section 68 was incorrect as the sale of shares was a genuine transaction, supported by documentary evidence and publicly acknowledged. The creditworthiness of the buyer was also established through a detailed fund flow chart.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was not sustainable as the AO had conducted a proper inquiry and taken a considered view. The PCIT failed to provide a justifiable rationale for enhancing the disallowance, and proceedings under Section 263 cannot be used merely to substitute the PCIT's opinion for the AO's.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was unsustainable. The interest amount of Rs. 98,791/- was already disallowed by the assessee. Regarding the Section 80G deduction, the restriction under Section 115BAA(2) was applicable from AY 2021-22, not AY 2020-21.

The Tribunal held that since the quantum proceedings were set aside and restored to the Assessing Officer for de-novo consideration, there could be no basis for sustaining the penalty relating to those additions. Therefore, the penalty proceedings were also directed to be restored.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was not sustainable as the AO had conducted a proper inquiry and taken a considered view. The PCIT failed to provide a justifiable rationale for enhancing the disallowance, and proceedings under Section 263 cannot be used merely to substitute the PCIT's opinion for the AO's.

The Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw the appeal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The delay in filing the appeal was condoned.

The Tribunal held that the diary jottings seized from the assessee were merely rough notes and did not conclusively prove any transaction, receipt, payment, or its nature and amount. The Tribunal characterized the diary as a 'dumb' document, lacking evidence of who made the jottings, when, and for what purpose. It could not be conclusively proven that these jottings pertained solely to the assessee. Citing judicial authorities, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions amounting to Rs. 1,50,00,000/-, Rs. 1,55,00,000/-, and Rs. 37,00,000/- for AY 2010-11, AY 2011-12, and AY 2012-13, made on account of alleged unaccounted cash payments to Partner Shri K.L. Sharma. Similarly, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions of Rs. 1,65,00,000/-, Rs. 1,50,00,000/-, and Rs. 1,00,00,000/- for AY 2010-11, AY 2011-12, and AY 2012-13, made on account of alleged unaccounted cash payments to Partners Smt. Sunita Maheshwari and Shri Suresh Kumar Maheshwari. The ratio decidendi is that additions cannot be made solely on the basis of 'dumb' documents like rough jottings without corroborative evidence or independent verification. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's grounds of appeal concerning these additions.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders for AYs 2005-06 and 2007-08 were passed beyond the statutory time limit and were therefore invalid. The Tribunal reasoned that the second search conducted by the department caused all pending proceedings, including those stayed by the High Court, to abate under Section 153A. Consequently, the limitation period for completing these assessments should be reckoned from the date of the second search. The Tribunal found that the AO issued a fresh notice under Section 153A for AYs 2004-05 to 2007-08 after the second search, acknowledging the abatement of earlier proceedings. The Tribunal also noted that the third proviso to Explanation to Section 153B, inserted by the Finance Act, 2017, was not applicable to the assessment proceedings in question. The Tribunal concluded that the time limit for making the assessment under Section 143(3) read with Section 153A for AYs 2005-06 and 2007-08 expired on May 9, 2017, whereas the assessment orders were made on March 9, 2018, and November 30, 2018, respectively, making them beyond the statutory time limit. The Tribunal quashed the assessment orders as being passed without jurisdiction and therefore null and void. As a consequence, the other grounds of appeal and cross-objections were dismissed as infructuous. The ratio decidendi is that assessments made beyond the prescribed time limit under Section 153A, especially after abatement due to a subsequent search, are invalid and liable to be quashed.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders for AYs 2005-06 and 2007-08 were passed beyond the statutory time limit and were therefore invalid. The Tribunal reasoned that the second search conducted by the department caused all pending proceedings, including those stayed by the High Court, to abate under Section 153A. Consequently, the limitation period for completing these assessments should be reckoned from the date of the second search. The Tribunal found that the AO issued a fresh notice under Section 153A for AYs 2004-05 to 2007-08 after the second search, acknowledging the abatement of earlier proceedings. The Tribunal also noted that the third proviso to Explanation to Section 153B, inserted by the Finance Act, 2017, was not applicable to the assessment proceedings in question. The Tribunal concluded that the time limit for making the assessment under Section 143(3) read with Section 153A for AYs 2005-06 and 2007-08 expired on May 9, 2017, whereas the assessment orders were made on March 9, 2018, and November 30, 2018, respectively, making them beyond the statutory time limit. The Tribunal quashed the assessment orders as being passed without jurisdiction and therefore null and void. As a consequence, the other grounds of appeal and cross-objections were dismissed as infructuous. The ratio decidendi is that assessments made beyond the prescribed time limit under Section 153A, especially after abatement due to a subsequent search, are invalid and liable to be quashed.

The Tribunal held that the adjustment made by the CPC under Section 143(1)(a) was procedurally defective and legally unsustainable due to the non-issuance of prior intimation or notice to the assessee as mandated by the first proviso to Section 143(1)(a). Following judicial precedent, the Tribunal quashed the intimation to the extent of the adjustment of Rs.6,00,501/- and set aside the CIT(A)'s order on procedural grounds, without adjudicating the merits of the exemption claim.

The Tribunal held that the diary jottings seized from the assessee were merely rough notes and did not conclusively prove any transaction, receipt, payment, or its nature and amount. The Tribunal characterized the diary as a 'dumb' document, lacking evidence of who made the jottings, when, and for what purpose. It could not be conclusively proven that these jottings pertained solely to the assessee. Citing judicial authorities, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions amounting to Rs. 1,50,00,000/-, Rs. 1,55,00,000/-, and Rs. 37,00,000/- for AY 2010-11, AY 2011-12, and AY 2012-13, made on account of alleged unaccounted cash payments to Partner Shri K.L. Sharma. Similarly, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions of Rs. 1,65,00,000/-, Rs. 1,50,00,000/-, and Rs. 1,00,00,000/- for AY 2010-11, AY 2011-12, and AY 2012-13, made on account of alleged unaccounted cash payments to Partners Smt. Sunita Maheshwari and Shri Suresh Kumar Maheshwari. The ratio decidendi is that additions cannot be made solely on the basis of 'dumb' documents like rough jottings without corroborative evidence or independent verification. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's grounds of appeal concerning these additions.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal, affirming the CIT(A)'s decision. The Tribunal concluded that the transaction lacked genuineness, bearing the hallmarks of an accommodation entry scheme designed to generate tax-exempt LTCG, due to suspicious time gaps, cash mode of acquisition, lack of prior trading history, the scrip's tainted profile, and implausible price appreciation. The Tribunal found factual parity with similar cases involving the same scrip, distinguishing the assessee's cited case law.

The Tribunal held that the diary jottings seized from the assessee were merely rough notes and did not conclusively prove any transaction, receipt, payment, or its nature and amount. The Tribunal characterized the diary as a 'dumb' document, lacking evidence of who made the jottings, when, and for what purpose. It could not be conclusively proven that these jottings pertained solely to the assessee. Citing judicial authorities, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions amounting to Rs. 1,50,00,000/-, Rs. 1,55,00,000/-, and Rs. 37,00,000/- for AY 2010-11, AY 2011-12, and AY 2012-13, made on account of alleged unaccounted cash payments to Partner Shri K.L. Sharma. Similarly, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions of Rs. 1,65,00,000/-, Rs. 1,50,00,000/-, and Rs. 1,00,00,000/- for AY 2010-11, AY 2011-12, and AY 2012-13, made on account of alleged unaccounted cash payments to Partners Smt. Sunita Maheshwari and Shri Suresh Kumar Maheshwari. The ratio decidendi is that additions cannot be made solely on the basis of 'dumb' documents like rough jottings without corroborative evidence or independent verification. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's grounds of appeal concerning these additions.

The Tribunal held that the diary jottings seized from the assessee were merely rough notes and did not conclusively prove any transaction, receipt, payment, or its nature and amount. The Tribunal characterized the diary as a 'dumb' document, lacking evidence of who made the jottings, when, and for what purpose. It could not be conclusively proven that these jottings pertained solely to the assessee. Citing judicial authorities, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions amounting to Rs. 1,50,00,000/-, Rs. 1,55,00,000/-, and Rs. 37,00,000/- for AY 2010-11, AY 2011-12, and AY 2012-13, made on account of alleged unaccounted cash payments to Partner Shri K.L. Sharma. Similarly, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions of Rs. 1,65,00,000/-, Rs. 1,50,00,000/-, and Rs. 1,00,00,000/- for AY 2010-11, AY 2011-12, and AY 2012-13, made on account of alleged unaccounted cash payments to Partners Smt. Sunita Maheshwari and Shri Suresh Kumar Maheshwari. The ratio decidendi is that additions cannot be made solely on the basis of 'dumb' documents like rough jottings without corroborative evidence or independent verification. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's grounds of appeal concerning these additions.

The Tribunal held that the diary jottings seized from the assessee were merely rough notes and did not conclusively prove any transaction, receipt, payment, or its nature and amount. The Tribunal characterized the diary as a 'dumb' document, lacking evidence of who made the jottings, when, and for what purpose. It could not be conclusively proven that these jottings pertained solely to the assessee. Citing judicial authorities, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions amounting to Rs. 1,50,00,000/-, Rs. 1,55,00,000/-, and Rs. 37,00,000/- for AY 2010-11, AY 2011-12, and AY 2012-13, made on account of alleged unaccounted cash payments to Partner Shri K.L. Sharma. Similarly, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions of Rs. 1,65,00,000/-, Rs. 1,50,00,000/-, and Rs. 1,00,00,000/- for AY 2010-11, AY 2011-12, and AY 2012-13, made on account of alleged unaccounted cash payments to Partners Smt. Sunita Maheshwari and Shri Suresh Kumar Maheshwari. The ratio decidendi is that additions cannot be made solely on the basis of 'dumb' documents like rough jottings without corroborative evidence or independent verification. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's grounds of appeal concerning these additions.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders for AYs 2005-06 and 2007-08 were passed beyond the statutory time limit and were therefore invalid. The Tribunal reasoned that the second search conducted by the department caused all pending proceedings, including those stayed by the High Court, to abate under Section 153A. Consequently, the limitation period for completing these assessments should be reckoned from the date of the second search. The Tribunal found that the AO issued a fresh notice under Section 153A for AYs 2004-05 to 2007-08 after the second search, acknowledging the abatement of earlier proceedings. The Tribunal also noted that the third proviso to Explanation to Section 153B, inserted by the Finance Act, 2017, was not applicable to the assessment proceedings in question. The Tribunal concluded that the time limit for making the assessment under Section 143(3) read with Section 153A for AYs 2005-06 and 2007-08 expired on May 9, 2017, whereas the assessment orders were made on March 9, 2018, and November 30, 2018, respectively, making them beyond the statutory time limit. The Tribunal quashed the assessment orders as being passed without jurisdiction and therefore null and void. As a consequence, the other grounds of appeal and cross-objections were dismissed as infructuous. The ratio decidendi is that assessments made beyond the prescribed time limit under Section 153A, especially after abatement due to a subsequent search, are invalid and liable to be quashed.