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275 orders · Page 5 of 6
The Tribunal held that the transaction's effective date for considering the sale value under Section 50C should be the date of the agreement (banakhat), not the date of the registered sale deed. As the sale consideration was higher than the jantri value on the agreement date, Section 50C was not applicable.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to produce substantial documents before the Ld. CIT(A) and that the CIT(E) rejected the application on this ground. The Tribunal remanded the matter back to the Ld. CIT(E) to consider the application afresh, taking into account the submissions and explanations provided by the assessee.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to provide crucial details and evidence for the cash deposits. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for a de-novo assessment.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to the assessee's affidavit detailing his age, health, and issues with communication. The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order and directed the Assessing Officer to re-work the sale consideration after giving the assessee an opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the application was filed beyond the prescribed time limit and was not maintainable. The Tribunal noted that the previous application was also rejected, and the provisional registration was cancelled.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 239 days in filing the appeal, considering the genuine cause due to the consultant's ill health. Since both the AO and CIT(A) orders were ex parte, the Tribunal restored the issue back to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal solely on the ground of delay without providing an opportunity for explanation and hearing. The case was remanded to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits after affording an opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that a mere mention of running a temple in one of the trust's 36 objectives, especially when no religious expenses were incurred, does not render the trust wholly religious. It noted that Section 80G(5B) permits up to 5% expenditure on religious activities. The matter was set-aside and remanded to the CIT(E) to ascertain if religious expenditure exceeded the permissible limit and, if not, to grant the 80G(5) approval.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee was granted provisional registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(vi) and should have applied for regular registration under the same sub-clause. It set aside the matter to the CIT(E) to examine whether an assessee provisionally registered under one sub-clause can apply for final registration under a different one, and to allow the assessee to rectify the application if permissible. The Section 80G(5) approval will be decided after the Section 12A registration is finalized.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's original application for registration contained an incorrect section code due to a mistake made during the provisional registration application. The Tribunal set aside the matter to the CIT(E) to examine the issue and allow the assessee an opportunity to rectify the application.
The Tribunal condoned the 31-day delay, imposing a cost of Rs. 5,000/- on the assessee. The ex parte order passed by the Ld. CIT(E) was set aside, and the matter was remanded for a fresh hearing to determine the grant of registration under Section 80G(v) in accordance with the law.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's trust was not to be considered a religious trust merely because one of its 36 objectives mentioned the maintenance/running of a temple. The Tribunal noted that the trust's primary activities included setting up schools, colleges, hospitals, and dispensaries. It reasoned that a temple can be a common feature in healthcare facilities and that a mere mention of running a temple in objectives does not make the trust's purpose wholly or substantially religious, as per Explanation 3 to Section 80G. The Tribunal also referred to Section 80G(5)(ii), which requires the instrument not to contain provisions for transferring income or assets for non-charitable purposes, and Section 80G(5B), which permits up to 5% expenditure on religious activities. Since the CIT(E) had not examined whether the assessee incurred expenditure beyond the permissible 5% on religious activities, the Tribunal set aside the matter to the CIT(E) for this examination. If no excess expenditure was incurred, and other conditions of Section 80G(5) were met, approval should be granted. The assessee was to be given an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee was granted provisional registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(vi) and should have applied for regular registration under the same sub-clause. It set aside the matter to the CIT(E) to examine whether an assessee provisionally registered under one sub-clause can apply for final registration under a different one, and to allow the assessee to rectify the application if permissible. The Section 80G(5) approval will be decided after the Section 12A registration is finalized.
The Tribunal held that the assessee company failed to discharge its burden under Section 68 of the Act. The investors lacked financial capacity, the pattern of fund inflow and diversion was contrived, and there was no business rationale. The Tribunal rejected the conduit theory and restored the Assessing Officer's order.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution without proper opportunity, especially since the assessee had opted for physical notice and not email. The matter was set aside to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal noted that the mistake in quoting the section code likely occurred during the application for provisional registration and not the regular registration. It observed that if provisional registration was granted under one sub-clause, it is questionable whether the application for final registration could be made under a different sub-clause.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the assessee's charitable activities. While finding the assessee not vigilant in its compliance, the Tribunal imposed a cost of Rs. 5,000/- and directed the Ld. CIT(E) to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to furnish the necessary documents, after which the application should be re-adjudicated.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution without proper opportunity, especially since the assessee had opted for physical notice and not email. The matter was set aside to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal noted that the amount was not claimed in earlier years and was paid and debited in the current year (AY 2010-11) as it had crystallized. Consequently, the Tribunal found no reason to disallow the expense.
The Tribunal held that since the repairs were undertaken to obtain and maintain NABL accreditation, which is subject to periodic inspection rather than being a permanent asset enhancement, the expenditure should be treated as revenue and not capital in nature. Consequently, the appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had not submitted details to the lower authorities, and the CIT(A) had confirmed the addition. However, granting an opportunity to the assessee, the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for de-novo assessment.
The Tribunal ruled that the Revenue Authorities erred in treating most of the disputed amounts as income, specifically allowing the appeal for receipts from the share broker, bank interest, dividend income, ETF refund, and unsecured family loans. It also allowed the appeal regarding the cash deposits, acknowledging the mother's affidavit and the explanation for the source of funds.
The Tribunal held that interest received u/s. 244A on an income tax refund is income of the assessee, taxable under "income from other sources," irrespective of whether it was adjusted against outstanding demands. The ownership of the interest lay with the assessee, and the issue of taxability is debatable, thus not constituting a 'mistake apparent from record' for rectification u/s. 154. The assessee should have filed a regular appeal against the assessment order.
The Tribunal acknowledged the specific facts of the case, including a flood during the period which led to a loss of grains and books of accounts. Considering these circumstances, the Tribunal held that Rs. 10,00,000/- could be fairly treated as the net profit earned by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that cooperative banks are to be treated as cooperative societies for the purpose of Section 80P(2)(d). Therefore, interest earned by the assessee from investments in a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The revisional powers invoked by the Principal Commissioner were not justified.
The Tribunal held that the donation was not allowable under Section 35(1)(ii) because the recipient institute was not approved for receiving such donations during the relevant assessment years. The claim was based on forged documents and the intention behind the claim, whether bona fide or not, was immaterial.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer made additions based on surmises without conducting proper inquiry or bringing material evidence on record. The Tribunal found that no satisfactory evidence regarding the agricultural activity and crop details was furnished by the assessee, but also noted the lack of inquiry by the AO.
The Tribunal held that while the cash receipts submitted for the remaining amount were not dated prior to the deposit, the assessee's agricultural income was not disputed by the Revenue. Considering the facts and circumstances, a disallowance of Rs. 25,000/- was deemed sufficient.
The Tribunal held that the donation was not allowable under Section 35(1)(ii) because the recipient institute was not approved for receiving such donations during the relevant assessment years. The claim was based on forged documents and the intention behind the claim, whether bona fide or not, was immaterial.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 793 days in filing the appeal, noting the assessee's explanation for not accessing the email and becoming aware of the rejection. However, the Tribunal found the assessee's explanation for non-compliance before the CIT(E) to be unreasonable, citing laxity in checking email. A cost of Rs. 5,000 was imposed on the assessee, payable to the Prime Minister National Relief Fund. Regarding the core issue, the Tribunal observed that Form No. 10AB contained contradictory information, with the assessee denying incurring religious expenditure at Sr. No. 27a but providing details of such expenditure at Sr. No. 27b, which constituted 99.8%, 99.67%, and 99.17% of total income for the respective financial years. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the matter to the file of the CIT(E) with a direction to allow one more opportunity to the assessee to rectify the mistake in Form No. 10AB and provide necessary documents, subject to the payment of costs. The assessee was also directed to cooperate fully with the CIT(E).
The Tribunal held that the issue of disallowance of 'other expenses' had been decided in favor of the assessee in its own case by the Ahmedabad Tribunal in previous assessment years. Therefore, the disallowance was deleted.
The Tribunal noted that an identical issue involving the same creditors was decided in the assessee's favor for Assessment Year 2013-14. The assessee had provided ample evidence including confirmations, bank statements, ITRs, and ledger accounts, establishing the genuineness, identity, and creditworthiness of the creditors for both AY 2013-14 and 2014-15. Therefore, the additions under Section 68 and the interest disallowance were not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the amount received by the assessee as a confirming party in a property sale was indeed capital gain and not income from other sources. The Assessing Officer and CIT(A) were therefore incorrect in their treatment of the income.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's failure to file compulsory GST and VAT returns, making it impossible to verify the claim that cash deposits were from sales. While acknowledging the additions were partially justified, the Tribunal deemed the 8% estimation on gross deposits excessive for a retail mobile business and reduced this addition from 8% to 4% of the cash deposits. The addition for share sales proceeds was implicitly upheld.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) on the gross income earned from investments in other cooperative societies, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision. The Tribunal also noted that similar issues for previous assessment years were decided in favor of the assessee.
The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: 1. Regarding the disallowance of 10% of 'other expenses' (Ground No. 1 of Assessee's AY 2011-12 appeal), the Tribunal noted that this issue had been decided in favour of the assessee by a coordinate bench in assessee's own case (ITA No. 1772/Ahd/2015). Therefore, the disallowance was deleted, and the appeal was allowed on this ground. 2. Regarding the disallowance of brokerage expenses (Ground No. 3 of Department's AY 2011-12 appeal), the Tribunal, in light of its observations made in the preceding part of its judgment (details not fully provided in the excerpt), allowed this ground of the Department's appeal. 3. Regarding the rejection of FMV as on 01.04.1981 for LTCG (Ground No. 2 of Assessee's AY 2012-13 appeal), the Tribunal held that the issue required re-examination. It noted that the assessee had submitted a valuation report and raised the issue before the AO, which was not considered. The Tribunal observed that the ITAT in the assessee's own case for AY 2009-10 had accepted FMV at Rs. 980/- per square meter. In the interest of justice, the issue was set aside to the file of the AO for de-novo consideration, directing the AO to consider the valuation report and obtain the opinion of the DVO. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes on this ground.
The Tribunal decided on several issues. For AY 2011-12, regarding the disallowance of 10% of 'other expenses', the Tribunal followed its own prior decision in the assessee's own case, allowing the assessee's appeal on this ground. For the disallowance of brokerage expenses, the Tribunal allowed the Department's appeal, reversing the CIT(A)'s decision. Regarding disallowance under Section 14A, the Tribunal dismissed the Department's appeal, holding that no disallowance was warranted as the assessee earned no exempt income. For AY 2012-13, concerning salaries and wages of the packart press division, the Tribunal set aside the issue to the Assessing Officer (AO) for de-novo consideration, allowing the assessee's appeal for statistical purposes. On the issue of FMV for LTCG, the Tribunal set aside the matter to the AO for re-examination, directing the AO to consider the assessee's valuation report and obtain the Department Valuation Officer's opinion, thereby allowing the assessee's appeal for statistical purposes. The ratio for the 'other expenses' issue is that prior ITAT decisions in the assessee's own case on similar facts should be followed. For the FMV issue, the principle is that where a valuation report is submitted and the issue is raised, the AO should obtain expert opinion or refer to the DVO for a fair determination.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) on the gross income earned, following previous ITAT decisions. The disallowance under Section 14A was also deleted based on favorable case law.
The Tribunal held that the issue of disallowance of 'other expenses' had been decided in favor of the assessee in its own case by the Ahmedabad Tribunal in previous assessment years. Therefore, the disallowance was deleted.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) mechanically set aside the case to the AO under the proviso to Section 251(1) without deciding on merits or the legal grounds raised by the assessee. Since the assessee had already complied and made submissions during assessment, and the proviso is discretionary, the CIT(A) should have adjudicated the legal challenge to the reopening of assessment under Section 148 and the addition on merits first. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for re-adjudication of the legal ground and then the addition on merits.
The tribunal observed that the assessee had submitted evidence of commenced activities to the CIT(E), which were overlooked or not taken into consideration. Recognizing this omission, the tribunal decided to restore both matters (Section 12A registration and Section 80G approval) to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) for de-novo consideration on merits.
The tribunal observed that the assessee had submitted evidence of commenced activities to the CIT(E), which were overlooked or not taken into consideration. Recognizing this omission, the tribunal decided to restore both matters (Section 12A registration and Section 80G approval) to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) for de-novo consideration on merits.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was invalid as it was based on information already known to the revenue and considered in the original assessment, constituting a change of opinion. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 263 was unsustainable. The assessment order was not erroneous as the AO had conducted detailed inquiries and allowed set-off only to the eligible extent, and the PCIT's premise was factually incorrect.
The tribunal held that depreciation on goodwill arising from an amalgamation is allowable if the consideration paid exceeds the net assets acquired, following the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Smifs Securities Ltd. However, a separate ground regarding late payment of employee contributions to PF/ESI was allowed against the assessee.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the reopening of assessment for AY 2013-14 was not in accordance with the law due to lack of proper approval and tangible material. For AY 2014-15, the Tribunal found no cogent evidence to treat the short-term capital loss as bogus, as transactions were through recognized exchanges and supported by documentation.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's action under Section 263 was not justified as the AO had conducted necessary verification and inquiries. The PCIT's disagreement with the AO's conclusion did not amount to an erroneous order prejudicial to revenue.
The Tribunal directed the Competent Authority to consider and decide the assessee's Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme applications within six weeks. The appeals are dismissed as withdrawn, with the liberty granted to the assessee to restore them by filing a fresh application if the VSVS applications are rejected by the Competent Authority.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, concluding that the cash sales represented a regular business practice of the assessee, backed by proper stock, and no exact discrepancy in the cash book was definitively established. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not justified in treating the cash sales as bogus.