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The High Court held that the Tribunal's finding that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue was correct and did not warrant interference. The Court clarified that there is no bar for a Principal Commissioner to invoke Section 263 powers. However, regarding the AO's inquiry, the Court found that the AO had examined the books of accounts, vouchers, and other documents during the re-assessment proceedings initiated under Section 148. While the AO's order might not have been detailed, it indicated that due inquiry was conducted. The Court relied on precedents (CIT v. Sunbeam Auto Limited and ITO v. DG Housing Projects Limited) stating that an AO's assessment, even if inadequately written, cannot be branded as erroneous merely because the revisional authority has a different opinion, provided some inquiry was made. The Court noted that the AO's office note revealed verification of documents and application of mind to the issue of bogus purchases. Since the AO concluded no income had escaped assessment based on the available material, and the Revenue could not produce contrary material, the assessment order could not be held prejudicial to the interest of revenue. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that there was no substantial question of law involved in the present appeal. This was because the Revenue's counsel could not dispute the finality of the ITAT's earlier order dated 16.07.2018, which dealt with a similar issue for AY 2008-09 in the assessee's own case. The ITAT had, in its order dated 04.12.2018, relied on this prior decision to dismiss the Revenue's appeal for AY 2012-13. The reasoning was that since the earlier decision had attained finality and covered the present issue, the Revenue's appeal lacked merit. The High Court affirmed the ITAT's dismissal of the Revenue's appeal. No issue was left undecided.
The High Court observed that the Commissioner's finding of fabricated sale purchase figures and the direction to recompute income tax was a correct order. The court noted that a fresh order had already been passed by the Assessing Officer, and any appeal against that would consider documentary evidence.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that it was not maintainable due to the availability of an alternative efficacious remedy of appeal. The Court observed that the petitioner had not been able to demonstrate any violation of the principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, or procedural irregularities in the passing of the impugned order. Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in *Greatship India Ltd.* and *Chhabil Dass Aggarwal*, the Court emphasized that when a statutory remedy of appeal is available, the High Court ought to relegate the assessee to avail that remedy rather than exercising its writ jurisdiction. The Court noted that the petitioner's claim that it was a newly incorporated company and thus unable to provide prior financial statements was a matter to be addressed within the appellate process. The Court did not decide on the merits of the application for the lower tax deduction certificate. The petitioner was relegated to approach the appropriate authority to avail the alternative remedy, with a direction to the concerned authority to dispose of the proceedings after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing.
The High Court held that the re-assessment proceedings were not time-barred. The Court found that the proviso to Section 147 of the Act was applicable, meaning the notice issued after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was not without jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the information received during the assessment of M/s NSE, including Sh. Avinash's statement and bank records, provided a reasonable basis for the Assessing Officer to believe that income had escaped assessment. The Court noted that Sh. Avinash's statement, corroborated by bank debits immediately following credits, indicated that the transactions with M/s NSE were bogus accommodation entries. The Court rejected the argument that the petitioner had disclosed true and full facts, stating that the disclosure of bogus transactions did not amount to disclosing true facts. Regarding the cross-examination, the Court observed that no specific prayer was made by the petitioner to cross-examine Sh. Avinash during the proceedings. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Assessing Officer had jurisdiction to re-open the assessment, no palpable injustice was caused, and no principles of natural justice were violated. The petition was dismissed.
The Court noted that the respondents' counsel had presented communications dated 02.02.2021 and 25.03.2021, confirming that the requisite registration as Valuer of Immovable Property had already been granted to petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.2, respectively. The respondents argued that this rendered the present writ petition infructuous. While the petitioners' counsel did not dispute the fact of registration, they submitted that the order granting registration gave rise to a fresh grievance. The Court, acknowledging this, granted the petitioners liberty to impugn the said order/communication in accordance with law by way of an appropriate petition. The writ petition was disposed of with this liberty.
The High Court noted that the counsel for the petitioner stated that the amount in dispute has already been refunded or released to the petitioner. In view of this development, the Court was of the opinion that no further orders were required to be passed in the writ petition. The petition was accordingly disposed of. The principle here is that if the underlying grievance leading to a writ petition for direction is rendered infructuous by subsequent events, the court may not proceed to issue directions. No specific issue regarding the merits of the rectification application was decided, nor was the rectification application itself decided by the Tribunal. The issue of whether the rectification application should be disposed of was rendered moot by the refund.
The High Court allowed the application for withdrawal of the writ petition. The court noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the assessment order dated May 30, 2023, had accepted the petitioner's return without any modifications. In view of this submission, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The court did not decide on the merits of the assessment order itself, but rather on the petitioner's request to withdraw the challenge to it. The operative direction was the dismissal of the writ petition as withdrawn.
The High Court held that the rejection of the petitioner's application for registration under Section 80G(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was not sustainable. The Court found that the delay in filing Form 10AB was only one day. The Court observed that this minimal delay, in itself, should not be a ground to reject the petitioner's application. The Court relied on the fact that the petitioner had filed their application on October 1, 2022, which was just one day after the last date of September 30, 2022. The Court set aside the order dated April 28, 2023, and remanded the matter back to the competent authority. The competent authority was directed to pass a fresh order without considering the delay in filing Form 10AB. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The High Court held that while a protective assessment is permissible, a protective recovery is not. Recovery can only be effected after a substantive assessment is done. The Court noted that the Tribunal's observation that a protective assessment may become substantive did not amount to declaring the impugned assessment as substantive or directing the authorities to frame one. In the present case, no substantive assessment was made in the hands of the petitioner before effecting recovery. Therefore, the demand notice and recovery certificate were set aside. However, to protect the interest of the revenue, the case was remitted to the assessing officer to consider making a substantive assessment against the proper assessee within three months. If no substantive assessment is made within this period, the revenue must refund the recovered amount.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. It set aside the orders dated 24.01.2022 and 01.02.2022. The matter was remanded back to the Income Tax Officer (respondent No. 1) to decide the application for stay. The Court directed that the stay application be decided after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing, without insisting on the pre-deposit of 20% of the total disputed tax demand. The reasoning was based on the precedents from the Delhi High Court in Tata Teleservices Limited and M/s. Dabur India Limited. The ratio decidendi is that a stay application should not be rejected solely on the ground of non-compliance with the pre-deposit requirement if other factors warrant consideration, and an opportunity of hearing should be provided.
The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal, holding that no addition can be made under Section 153A in the case of a completed assessment if no incriminating material is found during the search.
The Tribunal partly allowed the revenue's appeal, directing the disallowance under Section 14A to be worked out on a reasonable basis for the assessment year prior to 2008-09. The Tribunal found no fault with the deletion of interest on partners' debit balances.
The High Court held that since the revenue conceded that the petitioner's reply/objections dated 24.03.2022 were not considered while passing the impugned order dated 31.03.2022, there was no necessity to seek a reply from the respondents. The Court found merit in the petitioner's grievance regarding the non-consideration of their submissions. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 31.03.2022 and the notice dated 02.04.2022 were set aside. The matter was remanded to the Income Tax Officer, Ward 1 (1), Amritsar, to pass a fresh order after duly considering the petitioner's reply dated 24.03.2022, in accordance with the law. No specific amount in dispute was recorded.
The Tribunal held that the appeal is not maintainable. The reasoning is based on Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, which sets enhanced monetary limits for filing appeals. Since the tax effect in this appeal is lower than Rs. 1 Crore, and the appellant has failed to file an affidavit to justify its maintainability despite a specific direction, the appeal is disposed of as not maintainable. The Tribunal granted liberty to the appellant to seek revival of the appeal if it falls within the exceptions of the circular dated 20.08.2018. No specific issue was left undecided; the appeal was decided on the preliminary ground of maintainability.
The High Court disposed of the appeal as not maintainable. The reasoning was based on Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, which sets enhanced monetary limits for filing appeals. The Court noted that if one appeal arising from the same order had already been withdrawn, and the tax effect in the present appeal was lower than Rs. 1 Crore, it would be disposed of as not maintainable as per the said circular. The Court granted liberty to the appellant (Revenue) to get the appeal revived if it falls within the exceptions of Circular dated 20.08.2018. No specific finding was given on the merits of the original assessment order.
The High Court held that the appeal is not maintainable. The reasoning is based on Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, which sets enhanced monetary limits for filing appeals. Since the tax effect in this appeal is lower than Rs. 1 Crore and the Revenue failed to file an affidavit to justify its maintainability or demonstrate that it falls within any exceptions, the appeal is disposed of as not maintainable. The Court also took into account that another appeal arising from the same order had been withdrawn. The ratio decidendi is that appeals not meeting the prescribed monetary limits under the relevant circulars, without justification or exception, are not maintainable. Liberty was granted to the appellant (Revenue) to get the appeal revived if it falls within the exceptions of circular dated 20.08.2018.
The High Court disposed of the appeal as not maintainable. The reasoning is based on Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, which sets enhanced monetary limits for filing appeals. Since the tax effect in the present appeal is lower than Rs. 1 Crore, and in identical matters, one appeal has already been withdrawn, the court deemed it appropriate to dismiss this appeal on grounds of maintainability as per the circular. The court granted liberty to the appellant to get the appeal revived if it falls within the exceptions of the circular dated 20.08.2018. No specific finding was given on the merits of the original assessment order.
The High Court held that the appeal is not maintainable. The court noted that an affidavit regarding maintainability in light of Circular No. 17 of 2019, dated 08.08.2019, had not been filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax despite a specific direction. Furthermore, the court observed that if one appeal arising from the same order had already been withdrawn, and the tax effect in the present appeal was lower than Rs. 1 Crore, the appeal should be disposed of as not maintainable as per the said circular. Liberty was granted to the appellant (Revenue) to seek revival of the appeal if it falls within the exceptions of Circular dated 20.08.2018. The operative direction is to dispose of the appeal as not maintainable.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court noted that it was not disputed by the respondents that the impugned order dated 02.04.2022 was passed without considering the petitioner's reply filed on 29.03.2022, which contained correct clarification and was already on the income tax portal. Consequently, the Court set aside the order dated 02.04.2022 and the notices dated 02.04.2022 and 30.03.2023. However, liberty was granted to the respondents to initiate fresh proceedings against the petitioner after considering her reply, in accordance with law. The principle derived is that administrative actions, including tax orders, must consider all relevant material placed on record by the assessee.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) had rightly allowed the appeals of the assessee. The reasoning was that the mere fact that a business group and directors of a company were members of the society did not dilute the nature of the society being a trust. The assessee, M/s Shri Rani Sati (Mangliwala), Trust So. City, Hisar, was therefore entitled to be granted registration under Section 12AA of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The impugned order of the ITAT dated 30.11.2018 was found to be free from any illegality and had been examined in detail. The Court found no merits in the appeals filed by the revenue. The operative direction was the dismissal of the revenue's appeals.
The High Court dismissed the petition. The court found no merit in the petitioner's plea to quash the impugned order and notice. The reasoning was primarily based on the respondents' submission that the petitioner had an alternative and efficacious remedy available under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The court relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax and others vs. Chhabil Das Agarwal (2014) 1 SCC 603, which emphasizes that the Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment and reassessment, and assessees are generally expected to exhaust these remedies before approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The court noted that the respondents had filed a reply detailing the petitioner's alleged use of the surrendered PAN for significant financial transactions and non-declaration of bank accounts, suggesting undisclosed income. Given the availability of the statutory remedy and the Supreme Court's precedent, the High Court declined to interfere at this stage.
The High Court allowed the writ petition, directing the respondent to refund the income tax paid by the petitioner for the relevant years along with interest at 9% per annum within one month. The Court reasoned that the petitioner's disability pension, granted retrospectively, should be treated as tax-exempt in line with CBDT Circular dated 02.07.2001 and the judgments of the Delhi and Madhya Pradesh High Courts. The Court found that the respondent's reliance on Circular No. 13/2019 was misplaced, especially since this circular was subject to a status quo order by the Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Mathur. The Court emphasized that the petitioner's disability pension falls under the exemption criteria as per earlier circulars and judicial pronouncements. The Court also clarified that if the payment is not made within the stipulated period, interest at 18% per annum would be applicable from the date of entitlement until actual payment, referencing the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment. Costs of Rs. 1 lac were also awarded to the petitioner. The Court did not explicitly leave any issue undecided.
The High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned notice dated 31.03.2021 and the order dated 23.11.2021. The Court found that for AY 2015-16, the assessment proceedings had been completed, and no adverse order was passed concerning the investment made as per the sale deed. The Court noted that the income tax for AY 2015-16 had undergone revision, and the assessee's claim regarding the investment in the property had been accepted. Therefore, no case was made out to reopen the assessment for AY 2014-15 on the same ground. The Court concluded that there was no concealment of income by the assessee relating to the investment in the property at Panchsheel Park, New Delhi, for AY 2014-15. The reasoning was that the property was acquired and fully paid for in AY 2015-16, and the original assessment for AY 2014-15 had been completed without any adverse findings on this aspect, with all relevant disclosures made.
The High Court held that it did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. This conclusion was based on the submission made by the respondent's counsel, which was not disputed by the appellant's counsel, that the assessment order was passed by the Assessing Officer at Delhi. The High Court relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. ABC Papers Ltd. (2022) 447 ITR 1 SC, which clarifies the territorial jurisdiction for entertaining appeals under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the appellant sought and was granted permission to withdraw the appeal with liberty to file it before the competent jurisdiction. No decision was made on the merits of the case.
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana did not decide the merits of the appeal. The respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the appeal, citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. ABC Papers Ltd. This judgment clarified the territorial jurisdiction for filing appeals under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The appellant's counsel conceded that they could not dispute the jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the appellant sought permission to withdraw the appeal with liberty to file it before the competent jurisdiction. The Court granted this request and dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the appeal. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana noted that the respondent's counsel raised a preliminary objection regarding the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the appeal, citing the Supreme Court judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. ABC Papers Ltd. The appellant's counsel conceded that this fact could not be disputed. Consequently, the appellant sought and was granted permission to withdraw the appeal with liberty to file it before the competent jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with no decision on the substantive issues of the assessment.
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that it did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. This finding was based on the submission made by the respondent's counsel, which was not disputed by the appellant's counsel. The respondent relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. ABC Papers Ltd. (2022) 447 ITR 1 SC, which clarified the jurisdiction for filing appeals under Section 260A. The reasoning was that the assessment order was passed by an Assessing Officer in Delhi, and therefore, the appeal should lie before the Delhi High Court. Consequently, the appellant sought permission to withdraw the appeal with liberty to file it before the competent jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the appeal. The High Court noted that the respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the appeal, citing the Supreme Court judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. ABC Papers Ltd. The appellant's counsel conceded that they could not dispute this jurisdictional aspect. Consequently, the appellant sought permission to withdraw the appeal with liberty to file it before the competent jurisdiction. The High Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, without making any findings on the substantive issues of the assessment.
The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the case. The respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court to hear the appeal, citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. ABC Papers Ltd. This judgment establishes that appeals under Section 260A lie before the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Assessing Officer who passed the order is situated. Since the assessment order was passed by an Assessing Officer at Delhi, the appeal should have been filed before the Delhi High Court. The appellant's counsel conceded this point and sought permission to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty granted to the appellant to file it before the competent jurisdiction.
The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the appeal. The respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana to entertain the appeal, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. ABC Papers Ltd. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal under Section 260A lies with the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order is situated. Since the assessment order was passed by the Assessing Officer at Delhi, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was not the competent court. The appellant's counsel conceded this point and sought permission to withdraw the appeal to file it before the appropriate jurisdiction. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the receipt of consideration for transfer of goodwill/trademarks is a capital receipt. It bifurcated Rs. 15 lakhs out of Rs. 55 lakhs towards goodwill/trademarks and the rest towards the surrender of manufacturing rights, based on previous similar cases.
The High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the initiation of reassessment proceedings. The Court found that the notice under Section 148 was issued on 30.03.2019, more than four years after the original assessment order dated 05.03.2015. The Court held that the expenditure on computer and software purchases, including the amounts to be capitalized after depreciation, was disclosed during the original assessment. The Assessing Officer had accepted these expenditures as revenue expenditure at that time. The reassessment was sought to be initiated on the ground that only a portion of the expenditure should be capitalized, which constituted a mere change of opinion. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Principal Commissioner of Income-tax-2 vs. L & T Ltd. and other cited judgments, which held that reassessment proceedings initiated after four years solely on the basis of a change of opinion are liable to be set aside. The Court also noted that the assessee had made a full and true disclosure of primary facts, and it was for the Assessing Officer to draw inferences. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings were set aside on both counts: delay and merits.
The Tribunal noted that the learned counsel for the applicant/respondent (assessee) stated that the disputed tax liability has already been discharged in terms of the Direct Tax Vivad Se Viswas Scheme, 2020, and nothing survives in the case. In light of this submission, the learned counsel for the appellant (revenue) wished to withdraw the instant appeal. The Tribunal, therefore, dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No specific findings on the merits of the original dispute were made, as the appeal was withdrawn by the revenue.
The High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the order dated 07.05.2008. The Court held that the interest on enhanced compensation was received by the assessee on 10.11.2000 and 06.11.2001. The Court reasoned that if these amounts were considered income for the assessment years 1995-96 to 2000-01, then no interest could be charged under Sections 234B and 234C as this income was not in the hands of the assessee during those specific years. The Court's reasoning implies that the accrual basis of taxation for interest on enhanced compensation, as laid down in cited precedents, should be applied correctly to the assessment years in which the income was actually received or became taxable, and that the initial assessment's failure to charge interest was not necessarily an error if the income was not yet taxable in those years. The operative direction was to set aside the impugned order.
The Tribunal held that since additions made in the hands of the seller (Kulwinder Singh) for the same land purchase were deleted and confirmed by the High Court, no additions could be sustained in the hands of the purchaser (assessee). The revenue could not cite any contrary judgment.
The High Court held that the appeal was dismissed. The Tribunal had dismissed the assessee's appeal against the CIT(A)'s order allowing the withdrawal of the assessee's earlier appeal. The primary reason for dismissal by the Tribunal was the significant delay of 196 days in filing the appeal against the CIT(A)'s order, for which the assessee provided no satisfactory explanation. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had consciously withdrawn the initial appeal before the CIT(A) to pursue a writ petition in the High Court, which was also subsequently withdrawn. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order allowing the withdrawal of the appeal. The High Court further observed that the assessee had not been able to point out any infirmity in the Tribunal's order. The High Court also noted that the appeal was admitted on a substantial question of law concerning Section 253(5) but concluded that no substantial question of law arose for consideration as the appeal was dismissed on grounds of delay and lack of merit, and no interim stay was granted. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the mistake in mentioning the wrong section (273(2)(a) instead of 273(2)(aa)) in the assessment order and the first notice was merely of a clerical nature and was subsequently rectified. The Tribunal observed that the Assessing Officer had issued a subsequent notice under Section 273(2)(aa) which was duly served on the assessee, and the assessee had filed a reply with reference to the default under Section 273(2)(aa). Therefore, the assessee was fully aware of the actual charge. The Tribunal further noted that the penalty was imposed after allowing a proper opportunity to the assessee with respect to the specific default under Section 273(2)(aa) and after due application of mind. The initial notice under Section 273(2)(a) could not be a ground for quashing the penalty levied under Section 273(2)(aa). The CIT(A) had rightly set aside the earlier order and directed the AO to recompute the penalty at 10% of the difference in tax, taking the assessed income as Rs. 2,82,16,541/-. The High Court found no substantial question of law arising and dismissed the appeal.
The High Court, in its order dated 29.03.2023, allowed the applications for condonation of delay (CM-9781-CII of 2021 and CM-9783-CII-2021). The delay of 285 days in filing and 119 days in refiling the appeal was condoned. The court directed that the order for ITA No.55 of 2021 would be found in the detailed order of even date passed in ITA No.127 of 2021. Consequently, the appeal was admitted for hearing, subject to the merits decided in the related case. No specific findings on the substantive tax issues were recorded in this excerpt.
The High Court dismissed the appeal both on the ground of inordinate delay and on merits. The court found no substantial question of law arising from the Tribunal's order upholding the penalty.
The High Court held that the Tribunal had rightly dismissed the assessee's appeals. Regarding the first issue, the Court found that the assessee had not produced any document to show that the closing stock of Rs. 14,62,636/- was ever shown before the AO. Furthermore, the Tribunal correctly held that the income from the sanitary business of Hindustan Sanitary Plaza was not derived from manufacturing activity, which is a prerequisite for deduction under Section 80JJA. Therefore, the claim for deduction under Section 80JJA was not tenable. Regarding the second issue, the Tribunal had rightly upheld the disallowance of Rs. 4,70,000/- as 1/10th of the expenses claimed were not substantiated by the assessee, with no vouchers produced for a significant portion of the expenditure. The Court concluded that the assessee had not led any cogent evidence and no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal rightly quashed the notice and assessment as the CBDT instructions for selecting cases for scrutiny were not complied with. The revenue failed to provide cogent evidence to support its case.
The Tribunal rightly added Rs. 1 lac as income from an undisclosed source, as the assessee failed to explain the source and genuineness of the NRE gift. The High Court found no substantial question of law to entertain the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the expenditure was revenue in nature, especially since similar claims were allowed in past assessment years and the revenue had not filed appeals. The High Court agreed that there was no valid reason to reopen the assessment.