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The High Court held that it should not interfere at this premature stage of proceedings initiated by the statutory authority. The court reasoned that the Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment/reassessment of tax and for obtaining relief against improper orders. The petitioner has adequate remedies available under the Act, such as an appeal. The court cited various precedents, including 'Lachhman Das Nayar and others vs. Hans Raj Puri', 'Rasulji Buxji Kathawala vs. Income Tax Commissioner', 'Sumit Passi vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax', 'CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal', 'Gulmuhar Silk Pvt. Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer', and 'Raymond Woollen Mills Limited vs. Income Tax Officer', to support the view that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked when statutory remedies are available and proceedings are incomplete. The court found no reason to quash the notice or the order rejecting objections at this intermediate stage. The correctness of the order under Section 148A(d) was challenged on a factual premise, and the court distinguished between jurisdictional error and error of law/fact within jurisdiction, stating that statutory remedies are provided for the latter. The writ petition was dismissed, with the court explicitly stating that its observations were not an opinion on the merits of the case.
The High Court held that at the stage of a notice under Section 148, a writ court should not interfere. The court relied on a consistent line of judicial pronouncements, including decisions from the Punjab and Haryana High Court (Lachhman Das Nayar, Sumit Passi), Rajasthan High Court (Rasulji Buxji Kathawala), Delhi High Court (Gulmuhar Silk Pvt. Ltd.), and the Supreme Court (Raymond Woollen Mills Limited, Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Chhabil Das Agarwal). The principle established is that the Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment/reassessment, and assessees are not permitted to abandon this machinery and invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The court found no reason to interfere at this intermediate stage, as the proceedings were yet to be concluded by the statutory authority. The challenge to the order under Section 148A(d) was based on a factual premise, and the distinction between a jurisdictional error and an error of law/fact within jurisdiction was noted, with statutory remedies available for the latter. The writ petition was dismissed, with the court explicitly stating that its observations were not on the merits of the case.
The High Court held that at the stage of a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, a writ court should not interfere when the Assessing Officer has not yet concluded the assessment or reassessment proceedings. The Court relied on a consistent line of judicial pronouncements, including decisions from the Punjab and Haryana High Court (Lachhman Das Nayar, Sumit Passi), Rajasthan High Court (Rasulji Buxji Kathawala), Delhi High Court (Gulmuhar Silk Pvt. Ltd.), and the Supreme Court (CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, Raymond Woollen Mills Limited). The reasoning was that the Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment and reassessment, and assessees should not abandon this statutory remedy to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The Court distinguished between jurisdictional errors and errors of law or fact within jurisdiction, stating that the latter are rectifiable through statutory remedies. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed as premature, and the Court explicitly stated that its observations were not on the merits of the case. The Review Application was allowed, leading to the recall of the earlier order and restoration of the writ petition.
The High Court held that the appeal did not raise any substantial question of law. The Tribunal's finding that the assessment year in question (2013-14) was distinguishable from subsequent years (2014-15 and 2015-16) based on evidence was a pure finding of fact.
The High Court held that the petitioner-company ought to avail of the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 246-A of the Income Tax Act. The Court referred to Supreme Court judgments in Munshi Ram vs. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, (1979) 3 SCC 83, Union of India vs. Guwahati Carbon Limited 2012 (11) SCC 651, and Commissioner of Income Tax and another vs. Chhabil Dass Aggarwal and another 2014(1) SCC 603, which emphasize that where a revenue statute provides a specific remedy, it must be sought in that forum and manner. While acknowledging that writ jurisdiction can be exercised in extraordinary circumstances and in cases of blatant violation of natural justice, the Court found that the assertion of violation of principles of natural justice in this case raises a question of fact. Such an issue should be raised in the appeal itself. The Court quoted from Magadh Sugar's case, stating that resort must be had to the statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226. Therefore, the writ petition was disposed of by granting liberty to the petitioner to avail the statutory remedy of appeal.
The High Court held that since the appellant had settled the matter with the respondent-authorities and consequently did not wish to pursue the appeal, the appeal could be disposed of on this basis. The court accepted the statement made by the appellant's counsel. There was no decision on the merits of the original dispute. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as withdrawn. No issues were left undecided, as the appeal itself was withdrawn.
The High Court allowed the revenue's application to withdraw the appeal. The withdrawal was not to be considered an affirmation of the Tribunal's order on merits, and the legal issue was left open.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. It clarified that the withdrawal does not affirm the Tribunal's order on merits and leaves the legal issue open for future adjudication.
The High Court allowed the application for withdrawal of the appeal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty granted to the appellant-revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal, as prayed for. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate future case. Any pending Civil Miscellaneous Applications were also disposed of as a consequence of the main appeal being dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. Liberty was granted to the revenue to revive the appeal if necessary, and the legal issue was left open for future adjudication.
The High Court allowed the application for withdrawal of the appeal. The court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn with the liberty granted to the appellant-revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal, should something survive therein. The court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be construed as an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue, as claimed by the appellant-revenue, was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate future case. Any pending Civil Miscellaneous applications were also disposed of as the main case was dismissed.
The High Court held that the instant appeal is to be dismissed. This decision was based on the concession made by the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the appellant (Revenue). The concession was that the issue in the present appeal is covered against the Revenue by the Division Bench judgment of the same High Court in the case of M/s Vardhman Chemtech Private Limited. Therefore, the principle applied is that a consistent view of the High Court on a particular issue binds subsequent benches of the same court, and the revenue should not pursue appeals on settled issues. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court held that the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not be exercised in this case, as an effective alternate statutory remedy is available. The Court noted that the petitioner was provided with reasons for issuing the notice under Section 148-A(b) but failed to respond adequately. The petitioner's request for documents was made after the impugned order was passed, and there was no prayer in the petition seeking those documents. The Court observed that the communication dated March 28, 2022, though titled as a request, did not contain the objections now raised in the petition. The Court emphasized that if the proceedings culminate in an order of assessment under Section 147, the same will be appealable, and all pleas raised in the writ petition can be raised in that statutory appeal. The Court cited numerous Supreme Court judgments, including C.A. Abraham, Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat vs. VijayBhai N. Chandrani, Bellary Steels & Alloys Ltd. v. CCT, Indo Asahi Glass Co. Ltd. v. ITO, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, and Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, to underscore the principle that writ jurisdiction should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is available, unless specific exceptions apply (like violation of principles of natural justice or wholly without jurisdiction), which were not found to be met in this instance. The petitioner was granted liberty to raise all pleas before the statutory authority in appeal.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue. The dismissal was based on the concession made by the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the appellant (revenue). The counsel fairly conceded that the issue involved in the instant appeal is covered against the revenue in light of the Division Bench judgment of the High Court in ITA-322-2016, titled 'Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Chandigarh vs. M/s Vardhman Chemtech Private Limited, Chandigarh', decided on August 28, 2018. Therefore, in light of this stand taken by the revenue, the appeal was dismissed. The ratio decidendi is that if the revenue concedes that an issue is covered by a binding precedent, the appeal will be dismissed on that ground. No issue was left undecided.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the liberty prayed for by the appellant-revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue claimed by the appellant-revenue was expressly left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. Any pending Civil Miscellaneous Application, if any, was also disposed of as the main case was dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The court granted liberty to the appellant-revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal, as prayed for. It was clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the appellant-revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the Tribunal's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue, as claimed by the appellant-revenue, was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. Any pending C.M. Application, if any, was also disposed of as the main case was dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The court granted liberty to the appellant-revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal, as prayed. It was clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue claimed by the appellant-revenue was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. Any pending C.M. Application, if any, was also disposed of as the main case was dismissed.
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dismissed the appeals filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-2, Chandigarh. The dismissal was based on the concession made by the Revenue's counsel that the question of law involved in the present appeals was covered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee by a prior Division Bench judgment of the same High Court. This judgment was in the case of Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Vardhman Chemtech P. Ltd. (2020) 423 ITR 241 (P&H), decided on 28.08.2018. The High Court found no reason to deviate from the established precedent and therefore disposed of the appeals in light of the Vardhman Chemtech P. Ltd. judgment. No specific issue was left undecided; the appeals were decided based on the conceded point.
The Tribunal held that a benefit arising from the remission or cessation of a trading liability under Section 41(1)(a) does not require specific accounting entries and is attracted when the assessee benefits from such cessation, regardless of the accounting method. The assessee's claim of liability was unproved.
The High Court noted that the appellant's counsel stated that the matter had been settled with the respondent authorities and that the appellant no longer wished to pursue the appeal. Consequently, the High Court disposed of the appeal as infructuous. No decision was made on the merits of the case. The ratio decidendi is that an appeal can be disposed of as infructuous if the appellant withdraws it due to settlement of the matter with the revenue authorities. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as infructuous.
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh held that the present appeal is infructuous. This decision was based on the statement made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the matter had been settled with the respondent authorities and the appellant no longer wished to pursue the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as infructuous. No other issues were decided on merits, and no specific operative directions were issued beyond disposing of the appeal.
The High Court disposed of the appeal as infructuous. The decision was based on the statement made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the matter had been settled with the respondent authorities and the appellant no longer wished to pursue the appeal. Consequently, no substantive legal or factual issues were adjudicated upon by the court. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as infructuous.
The High Court decided that the appeal was infructuous. The reasoning was based on the statement made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the matter had been settled with the respondent authorities. Consequently, the appellant no longer wished to pursue the appeal. The Tribunal did not delve into the merits of any substantive tax issue. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as infructuous. No issues were left undecided, as the appeal was withdrawn by the appellant's counsel.
The High Court directed the respondents (Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and others) to supply the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment, as well as the approval of the Commissioner of Income Tax, to the petitioner within a period of ten days. This direction was based on similar orders passed in two other writ petitions (CWP-1252-2022 and CWP-1189-2022) where the revenue had already complied with such directions. The Court noted that since the main case had been decided (by issuing this direction), any pending civil miscellaneous applications were also disposed of. The operative direction is the supply of documents, effectively pausing the immediate proceedings until the petitioner receives and can review them.
The Court disposed of the writ petition. It directed the respondents to supply a copy of the approval granted by the Commissioner of Income Tax to the petitioner within a period of ten days. Following the supply of this document, the petitioner would be at liberty to take its remedy in accordance with law. The Court noted that the reasons for reopening had already been supplied. Since the main case was decided, any pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of. The principle derived is that assessees are entitled to relevant documents, including the Commissioner's approval for reopening, to pursue their remedies effectively.
The High Court held that the petitioner is entitled to receive a copy of the approval granted by the Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court directed the respondents to supply this copy to the petitioner within a period of ten days. Following the receipt of this document, the petitioner would be at liberty to pursue their remedies in accordance with the law. The Court noted that the reasons for reopening had already been provided. The judgment did not decide on the merits of the reopening itself, but rather on the procedural aspect of providing the necessary documentation to the assessee. The pending civil miscellaneous application for stay was disposed of as the main case was decided.
The High Court held that the mandate of the statute, specifically concerning the fulfillment of requirements for issuing a notice under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was met. The Court found that the competent authority had considered relevant facts and other material based on information in its possession, leading to a reasonable belief that satisfied the requirements of Section 132. The Court, while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, was satisfied that the action was not maliciously taken or for a collateral purpose. Citing principles from Supreme Court decisions, the Court emphasized that it would not substitute its own opinion or comment on irregularities in the search and seizure process if the officer acted bona fide. The Court refrained from expressing opinions on the merits of the case beyond the fulfillment of the statutory requirements for the issuance of the notice under Section 132. Consequently, the Court found no fit case to interfere with the impugned notices and orders passed by the respondent in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. The writ petitions were dismissed with the observation that any opinion expressed would not be construed as an opinion on the merits of the case, except for the fulfillment of the requirement for issuing the notice under Section 132.