Punjab & Haryana High Court Judgments — 2022

The High Court held that the instant appeal is dismissed in terms of the Division Bench judgment of the Court in Mahavir Spinning Mills Limited (Supra). The reasoning is that the Revenue's counsel conceded that the issue involved in the present appeal is squarely covered against the Revenue by the Division Bench judgment dated 07.02.2008 in ITA-601-2007, which involved the same assessee and a similar issue. This prior judgment was further affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court's dismissal of the Special Leave Petition. Therefore, the High Court found no reason to deviate from the established precedent. No specific issue was left undecided; the appeal was disposed of based on the concession and prior judicial pronouncements.

The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. Liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the appeal if circumstances warranted, and the legal issue was left open for future adjudication.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition. It noted that the respondent-employee had taken voluntary retirement, rendering the litigation infructuous. The Court observed that the department's actions appeared to be designed to deprive the employee of his right to promotion, describing the litigation as unbecoming of a department. While the Tribunal's order was initially innocuous, the intervening circumstance of the employee's voluntary retirement made the writ petition moot. The Court did not wish to comment further on how the employee was prejudiced by his own officers. The operative direction was the dismissal of the writ petition, upholding the Tribunal's order implicitly by not interfering with it.

The High Court accepted the statement made by the counsel for the respondent that the appeal filed by the petitioner on December 22, 2019, under Section 246-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, would be decided on merits and in accordance with law within a period of six weeks from the date of the order. Furthermore, the Court accepted the statement that the petitioner's application dated October 19, 2020, filed before the Commissioner of Income Tax, Rohtak, pertaining to the recovery and direct transfer of funds from the petitioner's bank account, would be treated as an application for review of the orders/actions passed by the assessing authority and would be dealt with on merits within a period of four weeks. The Court clarified that it had not examined the issues on merits. No further directions were required, and the writ petition was disposed of.

The High Court held that the writ jurisdiction is discretionary and should not be exercised when an alternative statutory remedy has been availed. The Court noted that the petitioner had already filed a statutory appeal in April 2022, which was pending. Therefore, it was open for the petitioner to raise all its pleas before the Appellate Authority. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in The State of Maharashtra and others vs. Greatship (India) Limited, which emphasized that judicial prudence demands refraining from exercising writ jurisdiction when an alternate remedy is available. The High Court found that the petitioner could not be permitted to pursue both writ proceedings and the statutory appeal simultaneously. Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed, with the petitioner relegated to avail the statutory remedy of appeal.

The High Court noted the statement made by the counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sidhant Suri, that he had instructions not to pursue the instant appeal. Consequently, the Court disposed of the appeal as being not pressed. No decision was made on the merits of the case. Any pending applications related to the appeal were also disposed of as a consequence. The principle derived from this judgment is that an appeal can be dismissed as not pressed upon the appellant's counsel making a statement to that effect.

The High Court disposed of the appeal as not pressed. The reasoning provided is that the appellant's counsel, at the very outset, submitted that due to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, recalling its order in ITA No. 434/ASR/2016 concerning the assessment year 2009-10, he had instructions not to pursue the instant appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on this procedural ground without any decision on the merits of the substantive issues. No specific findings were made on any of the underlying tax disputes.

The High Court held that in view of the conceded factual premise that the company's appeal against the assessment order and the director's appeal before the CIT Appeals are both pending before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal for the same assessment year, there was no basis for interference by the High Court in the present writ petition. The Court did not delve into the merits of the controversy. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition as withdrawn, without deciding the substantive issues.

The High Court held that in view of the admitted factual premise that the company's appeal against the assessment order and the director's own appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal are pending, there is no basis for interference in the instant writ petition. The court did not delve into the merits of the controversy. The writ petition was disposed of as withdrawn, without expressing any opinion on the merits. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition as withdrawn.

The High Court held that the appeal is disposed of as withdrawn with liberty as prayed for. The reasoning is based on the submission and prayer made by the Revenue's counsel. The counsel sought withdrawal with liberty to file the appeal afresh on the same cause of action but before the jurisdictional High Court, and this prayer was supported by reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court. The ratio decidendi is that when the Revenue seeks to withdraw an appeal with liberty to refile before the correct jurisdictional High Court, and supports this with a Supreme Court precedent, the High Court will grant such liberty. The operative direction is that the appeal is disposed of as withdrawn with liberty to file afresh.

The High Court held that the issue raised in the instant appeal is covered by a common judgment dated 10.12.2019 passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of the same Court in ITA-8535-2018 (Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax, Faridabad vs. M/s Knorr-Bremse India Pvt. Ltd.). Consequently, the High Court dismissed the instant appeal in terms of the aforementioned judgment. The reasoning is that the present appeal addresses the same issue that was decided in a prior, similar case by a coordinate bench of the same court. The ratio decidendi is that if an issue has been authoritatively decided by a coordinate bench of the same High Court, subsequent appeals raising the same issue can be disposed of based on that precedent. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh disposed of the appeal as withdrawn. The Court was informed by the Senior Standing Counsel for the appellant (Revenue) that the assessee had already availed of the Vivad Se Vishwas Act/Scheme. Based on this information, the Revenue had instructions not to pursue the instant appeal. Therefore, the Court did not decide the merits of the appeal. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as withdrawn. No issues were expressly left undecided as the appeal itself was withdrawn.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh disposed of the appeal as withdrawn. The decision was based on the submission made by the revenue's counsel that the assessee had opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Act/Scheme. As a result, the revenue had received instructions not to proceed with the appeal. No decision was made on the merits of the case. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as withdrawn.

The High Court did not decide any substantive issues related to the income tax assessment. Based on the submission by the revenue's counsel that the assessee had opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Act/Scheme, the Court was informed that the revenue did not wish to pursue the appeal. Therefore, the appeal was disposed of as withdrawn. No finding was reached on any specific issue of law or fact concerning the assessee's tax liability. The principle that can be derived is that appeals will be withdrawn if the assessee avails of a settlement scheme and the revenue consents to withdrawal.

The High Court held that the issue raised in the instant appeal is covered by a common judgment dated December 10, 2019, previously passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of the same Court. This prior judgment dealt with a batch of Income Tax Appeals (ITAs), including ITA-8535-2018, which also involved the Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax, Faridabad, and M/s Knorr-Bremse India Pvt. Ltd. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the instant appeal in terms of the aforementioned judgment dated December 10, 2019. The reasoning is based on judicial precedent and the principle of consistency, where a coordinate bench's decision on a similar issue is applied. No specific finding on the merits of the ITAT's order was made, as the appeal was disposed of based on the binding precedent.

The High Court noted the submission by the revenue's counsel that the assessee had opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Act/Scheme. Consequently, the revenue had no instructions to pursue the appeal. The Court, therefore, disposed of the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the original dispute.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh held that the present appeal is covered by a common judgment dated 10.12.2019 passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of the same Court in a bunch of appeals, including ITA-8535-2018 (Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax, Faridabad vs. M/s Knorr-Bremse India Pvt. Ltd.). Consequently, the High Court dismissed the instant appeal in terms of the aforementioned judgment. The reasoning is based on the principle of judicial precedent, where a coordinate bench's decision on a similar issue involving the same parties and assessment year is binding. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The High Court held that the notice under Section 158BC was not invalid. The assessee, having participated in multiple hearings and filed returns in the status of a firm, could not claim to be misled. Any defect in the notice was curable under Section 292B, and the plea of invalidity was not raised before the AO. Regarding the GP rate, the High Court noted that the AO did not provide a basis for the 33.64% rate. The ITAT, however, found that the assessee's own GP rate for Assessment Year 1997-98 was 25.54%. Since the block period included Assessment Year 1997-98 and the immediately preceding period, the ITAT directed the AO to apply the GP rate of 25.54% on the stock found short amounting to Rs. 3,64,163. The court found no merit in the appeal and no substantial question of law arose. The ITAT's order was deemed well-reasoned and not requiring interference.

The High Court noted that the counsel for the appellant, Mr. Amit Parsad, representing Mr. Sanjay Bansal, Sr. Advocate, made a statement that he had instructions from the appellant not to pursue the instant appeal. Consequently, based on the statement made by the appellant's counsel, the High Court disposed of the appeal as 'not pressed'. Any pending applications related to the appeal were also disposed of. No decision on the merits of the case was made.

The High Court held that the appeal filed by the Revenue was not pressed. The reasoning was based on the statement made by the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Revenue, citing Circular No.17/2019 and the tax effect being below Rs.1.00 crore. The Tribunal's decision was to dispose of the appeal as not pressed. The ratio decidendi is that appeals with a tax effect below the prescribed threshold, as per departmental circulars, may not be pursued. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as not pressed, with a clarification that this order would not affect the rights and contentions of the parties in other appropriate proceedings. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The ITAT restored the issue of net profit rate to the AO for verification of depreciation allowance. It also deleted the addition for unexplained expenditure, holding that applying a gross profit rate accounts for all expenses.

The High Court held that the issue raised in the instant appeal had already been dealt with by a Coordinate Bench of the Court. The Revenue's counsel made a statement to this effect, referencing specific prior judgments (ITA-361-2019, ITA-362-2019, and ITA-324-2019) decided on December 16, 2019. In light of this statement, the High Court dismissed the instant appeal. The reasoning for dismissal was based on the principle of judicial precedent, where a matter already decided by a coordinate bench is applied to avoid re-litigation and ensure consistency. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal. No specific issues were left undecided; rather, the appeal itself was disposed of based on the prior adjudication.

The tribunal held that the assessee was merely a collection agency for the electricity duty, with the primary liability resting on the consumers. Therefore, Section 43B, which applies to sums payable by the assessee, was not attracted.

The High Court disposed of the appeal as not pressed. The Court noted that the Assessee had availed of the Vivad-se-Vishwas Act. Consequently, the counsel for the appellant (Revenue) stated they had instructions not to pursue the appeal. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as not pressed. Importantly, the Court explicitly left the question of law raised in the appeal open, meaning no decision was made on the merits of the legal issue. Any pending applications were also disposed of.

The High Court disposed of the appeal as not pressed. The reasoning was based on the statement made by the Revenue's counsel, who indicated that the Assessee had availed of the Vivad-se-Vishwas Act and, consequently, the Revenue had instructions not to pursue the appeal. The High Court noted this development and accepted the submission. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as not pressed. However, the Court explicitly left the question of law raised in the appeal open. No specific relief was granted or denied on the merits of the original dispute.

The High Court disposed of the appeal as 'not pressed'. The reasoning was based on the statement made by the Revenue's counsel that the Assessee had availed of the Vivad-se-Vishwas Act, leading to instructions not to pursue the appeal. The Court noted that the question of law raised in the appeal was left open. No specific finding was given on the merits of the appeal. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as not pressed, with the question of law remaining undecided.

The High Court allowed the revenue's request to withdraw the appeal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The court granted liberty to the appellant-revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal, should circumstances warrant it. The court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal would not be considered an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue that the appellant-revenue intended to raise was expressly left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate future case. Any pending applications were also disposed of as a consequence of the main appeal being withdrawn.

The High Court held that the issue raised in the appeal was covered against the revenue by its previous judgments. Specifically, the revenue's counsel conceded that the appeal would be decided against the revenue in light of the Division Bench judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Gurgaon Vs. M/s Carrier Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Ltd. (ITA No.5 of 2016), which was further relied upon in The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Gurgaon Vs. M/s Mitsubishi Electric Automotive India Pvt. Ltd., Manesar, Gurgaon (ITA No.78 of 2019). Consequently, the High Court dismissed the instant appeal in terms of its judgment dated 16.05.2019 in ITA No.78 of 2019. No specific amount in dispute was mentioned. No issues were left undecided.

The High Court dismissed the appeal. The reasoning was based on the concession made by the revenue's counsel. The counsel admitted that the issue in the present appeal was squarely covered by the Division Bench judgment of the same court in ITA No. 5 of 2016, which was subsequently followed in ITA No. 78 of 2019. Therefore, in light of these binding precedents, the appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed. No specific relief was granted or denied to the assessee as the appeal was dismissed on the ground of being covered by earlier judgments. The ITAT's order itself was not adjudicated upon merits.

The Tribunal's finding of rash and negligent driving was upheld. However, the court modified the compensation awarded by adjusting future prospects, tax deduction, and adding amounts for loss of consortium, funeral expenses, and loss of estate.

The High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable. The Court noted that the petitioner had filed a reply to the show cause notice and subsequently filed the writ petition before any order was passed by the revisional authority. Crucially, the revisional authority had passed a final order during the pendency of the writ petition, which the petitioner failed to challenge or bring to the Court's notice. The Court emphasized that in the absence of a challenge to the final order passed pursuant to the show cause notice, and with an alternate remedy available to the petitioner to challenge that final order, the writ petition would not be maintainable. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat vs. Vijaybhai N. Chandrani (2013) 14 SCC 661, which held that aggrieved parties must exhaust alternate remedies before approaching the writ court, and that writ petitions should not be entertained against show cause notices when statutory remedies are available. The Court also distinguished the cases cited by the petitioner, stating that they did not address the issue of the availability of an alternate remedy. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed.

The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court relied on its previous judgment dated 24.09.2019 in ITA No. 212 of 2019 (Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Panchkula vs. M/s Haryana Agro Industries Corporation Ltd.). In that prior decision, the Court had held that poly covers and wooden crates, which live out their lives within 3 to 4 years as claimed by the assessee, cannot be treated as a capital asset for the purpose of depreciation, nor can they be accepted as such. The ratio decidendi is that assets with a short lifespan, consumed within a few years, do not qualify as capital assets for depreciation purposes. The operative direction was the dismissal of the Revenue's appeal.

The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue. This decision was based on the concession made by the revenue's counsel, Ms. Urvashi Dhugga, Senior Standing Counsel. She acknowledged that the question of law involved in the instant appeal was already decided against the revenue by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its common judgment dated 06.04.2021 in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and another Vs. M/s Pepsi Foods Ltd. (Civil Appeal No.1106 of 2021). The High Court found the revenue's stand to be fair and, in light of the Apex Court's judgment, proceeded to dismiss the appeal. No specific issue was left undecided; the appeal was disposed of based on the precedent.

The High Court held that the revenue is not entitled to retain the amount deposited by the petitioner after the time limit for passing the fresh assessment order has expired. The Court relied on its previous decisions in Deep Chand Jain vs. ITO and Bharti Engineering Corporation vs. Union of India. The reasoning was that until and unless the quantum of tax is determined in accordance with the procedure laid down by law, the revenue has no right to collect tax. Since no assessment order could be passed due to the statutory bar under Section 153(1)(a)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, the amount collected was without the authority of law and its retention violated Article 265 of the Constitution of India. The Court directed the respondents to refund the excess amount deposited by the petitioner, after deducting the tax liability on the admitted depreciation disallowance of INR 33,91,637, within 30 days. The petitioner was also held entitled to statutory interest on the refunded amount from 01.04.2017 till the date of actual payment.

The High Court dismissed the appeal. The revenue's counsel conceded that the issue in the present appeal was covered against the revenue by the Division Bench judgment dated 25.04.2016 in ITA No.5 of 2016, titled Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Gurgaon Vs. M/s Carrier Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Ltd. This earlier judgment was further relied upon by another Division Bench judgment dated 16.05.2019 in ITA No.78 of 2019, titled The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Gurgaon Vs. M/s Mitsubishi Electric Automotive India Pvt. Ltd., Manesar, Gurgaon. In view of this concession and the binding precedent, the High Court found no reason to interfere with the ITAT's order and accordingly dismissed the appeal. No specific issue was left undecided; the appeal was disposed of based on the concession.

The High Court held that it should not intervene at the premature stage of a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, when the proceedings have not been concluded by the statutory authority. The court reasoned that the Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment/reassessment and for obtaining relief from improper orders, and assessees cannot abandon this machinery to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The court cited several precedents, including 'Lachhman Das Nayar', 'Rasulji Buxji Kathawala', 'Sumit Passi', 'CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal', and 'Raymond Woollen Mills Limited', which emphasize that the writ court should not delve into the merits of the case or the sufficiency of material at this stage. It is not a case where the authority has clearly acted without jurisdiction. The ratio is that statutory remedies are available and should be pursued before approaching the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, especially when the assessment proceedings are ongoing. The writ petition was dismissed, with the court explicitly stating that its observations were not an opinion on the merits of the case.

The High Court held that at the stage of a notice under Section 148, a writ court should not interfere with the proceedings, especially when the assessment/reassessment is yet to be concluded by the statutory authority. The court relied on several precedents, including 'Lachhman Das Nayar and others vs. Hans Raj Puri', 'Rasulji Buxji Kathawala vs. Income Tax Commissioner', 'Sumit Passi vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax', 'Gulmuhar Silk Pvt. Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer', and 'Raymond Woollen Mills Limited vs. Income Tax Officer'. The consistent view cited was that the Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment/reassessment, and assessees are not permitted to abandon this machinery and invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The court found no reason to interfere at this intermediate stage, as it was not a case where the authority had clearly acted without jurisdiction. The correctness of the order under Section 148A(d) was challenged on factual premises, which falls under errors of law/fact within jurisdiction, for which statutory remedies are available. The writ petition was dismissed, with the court explicitly stating that its observations were not on the merits of the case.

The High Court held that the writ court should not interfere at the premature stage of a notice under Section 148, especially when the proceedings have not yet been concluded by the statutory authority. The court relied on a consistent line of judgments from various High Courts and the Supreme Court, including 'Lachhman Das Nayar and others vs. Hans Raj Puri', 'Rasulji Buxji Kathawala vs. Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi', 'Sumit Passi vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax', 'Gulmuhar Silk Pvt. Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer Ward 10(3) Delhi', and 'Raymond Woollen Mills Limited vs. Income Tax Officer'. The principle established is that the Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment/reassessment, and the assessee cannot abandon this machinery to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when adequate alternative remedies are available. The court found no reason to interfere as it was not a case where the authority had clearly acted without jurisdiction. The writ petition was dismissed, leaving the merits of the case open for the assessing authority to decide.

The High Court held that it should not interfere at the premature stage of a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, when the assessment or reassessment proceedings have not yet been concluded by the statutory authority. The court cited several precedents, including 'Lachhman Das Nayar and others vs. Hans Raj Puri', 'Rasulji Buxji Kathawala vs. Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi and another', 'Sumit Passi vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax', 'CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal', 'Gulmuhar Silk Pvt. Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer Ward 10(3) Delhi', and 'Raymond Woollen Mills Limited vs. Income Tax Officer, Centre XI, Range Bombay and others'. These judgments consistently held that the Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment/reassessment and that assessees cannot abandon this machinery to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court when adequate remedies are available. The court found no reason to interfere under Article 226/227 of the Constitution at this intermediate stage, as it was not a case where the authority had patently lacked jurisdiction. The correctness of the order under Section 148A(d) was challenged on a factual premise, distinguishing it from a jurisdictional error. The court explicitly stated that its observations were not an opinion on the merits of the case.

The High Court held that a writ court should not interfere at the premature stage of a notice under Section 148A when the proceedings have not yet been concluded by the statutory authority. The Court relied on several precedents, including Lachhman Das Nayar, Rasulji Buxji Kathawala, Sumit Passi, Gulmuhar Silk Pvt. Ltd., and Raymond Woollen Mills Limited. The Court found that the present case was not one where the authority had patently lacked jurisdiction. The challenge to the correctness of the order under Section 148A(d) was based on a factual premise, and the distinction between a jurisdictional error and an error of law/fact within jurisdiction was highlighted. The Court reiterated that statutory remedies are available for rectifying errors. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed as the High Court found no reason to interfere at this intermediate stage. The Court explicitly stated that its observations were not an opinion on the merits of the case.

The High Court held that at the stage of a notice under Section 148A, when proceedings have not been concluded by the statutory authority, the writ court should not interfere. The Court cited several precedents, including 'Lachhman Das Nayar and others vs. Hans Raj Puri', 'Rasulji Buxji Kathawala vs. Income Tax Commissioner', 'Sumit Passi vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax', 'Gulmuhar Silk Pvt. Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer', and 'Raymond Woollen Mills Limited vs. Income Tax Officer'. The consistent view is that the Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment/reassessment and for obtaining relief, and parties should exhaust these remedies. The Court found no reason to interfere under Article 226/227 of the Constitution at this intermediate stage, as the proceedings were yet to be concluded. The correctness of the order under Section 148A(d) was challenged on a factual premise, and the Court distinguished between jurisdictional error and error of law/fact within jurisdiction, for which statutory remedies exist. The writ petition was dismissed, with the observation that no opinion was expressed on the merits of the case.

The High Court held that at the stage of a notice under Section 148, a writ court should not interfere with the proceedings. The court reasoned that the Income Tax Act, 1961, provides a complete machinery for assessment and reassessment, and assessees are not permitted to abandon this machinery and invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The court cited several precedents, including 'Lachhman Das Nayar and others vs. Hans Raj Puri', 'Rasulji Buxji Kathawala vs. Income Tax Commissioner', 'Sumit Passi vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax', 'Gulmuhar Silk Pvt. Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer', and 'Raymond Woollen Mills Limited vs. Income Tax Officer'. The court emphasized that the correctness of the order under Section 148A(d) was challenged on a factual premise, and such errors within jurisdiction are to be rectified through statutory remedies. The court found no reason to interfere at this intermediate stage as the proceedings were yet to be concluded by the statutory authority. The writ petition was dismissed, with the court explicitly stating that its observations were not on the merits of the case.

The High Court held that a writ court should not interfere at such a premature stage when proceedings initiated by a statutory authority are yet to be concluded. The court reasoned that the Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment and reassessment, and assessees are not permitted to abandon this machinery and invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The court cited various precedents, including 'Lachhman Das Nayar and others vs. Hans Raj Puri', 'Rasulji Buxji Kathawala vs. Income Tax Commissioner', 'Sumit Passi vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax', 'Gulmuhar Silk Pvt. Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer', and 'Raymond Woollen Mills Limited vs. Income Tax Officer'. The court found no reason to warrant interference at this intermediate stage, as it was not a case where the authority had clearly acted without jurisdiction. The challenge was based on the alleged incorrect exercise of jurisdiction, for which statutory remedies are available. The court explicitly stated that its observations were not an opinion on the merits of the case. The writ petition was dismissed.