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The High Court held that the issue in the present appeal is covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Shimla Versus M/s Aarham Softronics; 2019 (2) TMI, 1285. Since the revenue did not dispute this submission, the Court disposed of the present appeal on the same terms as the Supreme Court's judgment. The specific findings or directions from the Supreme Court's judgment are not detailed in this High Court order, but the operative direction is to dispose of the appeal in accordance with that precedent. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The revenue's counsel stated that due to the tax effect being below the monetary limits specified in the relevant CBDT circulars, they had instructions to withdraw the appeal. The court granted the liberty to the appellant-revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal in case something survives therein. The reasoning is based solely on the revenue's submission regarding the tax effect and their instruction to withdraw. The ratio decidendi is that appeals can be withdrawn by the revenue when the tax effect falls below prescribed monetary limits, with liberty to seek revival under certain circumstances. Any pending civil miscellaneous applications were disposed of as the main case was dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The reasoning provided is that the appellant-revenue, citing the monetary limits prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 3 of 2018 and Circular No. 17 of 2019, had instructions to withdraw the appeal. The Court granted the liberty sought by the revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal in case circumstances warranted it. The ratio decidendi is that appeals can be withdrawn by the revenue based on prescribed monetary limits, with a possibility of revival under specific conditions. No issue was left undecided, as the appeal was disposed of on the procedural ground of withdrawal.
The High Court held that the ITAT's rejection of the rectification application was rightly decided. The Court noted that while question (iii) might have been raised as a ground of appeal, it was not argued before the Tribunal. Consequently, the High Court had dismissed the Revenue's earlier appeal (ITA No. 26 of 2017) on the basis that the ITAT's findings were pure findings of fact, and no substantial question of law arose. The Court stated that if the Tribunal had not addressed the question, this argument should have been raised before the High Court during the hearing of ITA No. 26 of 2017. Once the High Court dismissed the appeal, it was not open for the appellant (Revenue) to go back to the Tribunal with that argument. The ITAT had correctly dismissed the rectification application as it was barred by limitation and the Revenue was attempting to re-agitate a debatable issue. Therefore, the High Court found no reason to interfere with the ITAT's order. The appeal before the High Court was dismissed.
The High Court held that the finding of the ITAT was a pure finding of fact and that the assessee's counsel had failed to demonstrate that this finding was based on a perverse reading of the evidence. Consequently, the Court concluded that no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's order. The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the ITAT's decision was a factual determination not amenable to appeal as a question of law. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The court granted the appellant-revenue the liberty to file an application for revival of the appeal, as prayed for. The reasoning for dismissal was based on the revenue's submission regarding the tax effect falling below the prescribed monetary limits, which is a common ground for withdrawal of appeals by the revenue under CBDT instructions. The judgment does not delve into the merits of the original dispute. Any pending applications related to the main appeal were also disposed of as a consequence of the dismissal.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The revenue's counsel informed the court that due to the tax effect being below the monetary limits prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 3 of 2018, as amended and clarified by subsequent circulars and letters, they had instructions to withdraw the appeal. The court granted liberty to the appellant-revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal if circumstances warranted it. The reasoning for the dismissal is solely based on the revenue's decision to withdraw the appeal in light of the CBDT's monetary limits for filing appeals. No decision on the merits of the case was made.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue. This was based on previous decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court that covered the issue in favour of the assessee.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. Regarding the first substantial question of law, the Court noted that the issue was covered by its own previous judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Ludhiana Central Co-op. Bank Ltd., reported as 2019 410 ITR 72 (P&H), which was against the appellant (Revenue). Concerning the second substantial question of law, the Court observed that the tax effect involved was nominal and much less than the monetary limit prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 3 of 2018, as amended by Circular No. 17 of 2019 and Letter No. F.No.279/Misc/M-93/2018-ITJ dated 20.08.2019. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on these grounds.
The High Court held that the petitioner is entitled to interest under Section 244A of the Act for the period from 22.1.2014 till the date of payment. The Court disagreed with the Madhya Pradesh High Court's view in Manohar Lal's case. It reasoned that Section 132B(4) of the Act deals with interest for the period from seizure until the completion of assessment. However, if there is a delay in refunding the amount after the assessment is completed, Section 244A of the Act, which deals with interest on refunds becoming due to the assessee, becomes applicable. Specifically, clause (b) of Section 244A covers 'any other case' where interest is payable from the date of payment to the date of refund. The Court found that the refund became due after the finalization of assessment on 21.1.2014, and the delay in refund until 4.7.2017 falls under Section 244A(1)(b). The Court also noted that depriving a person of property without legal authority violates Article 300A of the Constitution. The writ petition was allowed, granting interest under Section 244A.
The High Court noted that the assessee's counsel fairly conceded that the matter had been concluded against the assessee in view of the judgment passed in ITA No. 170 of 2017 dated 6.11.2017, titled M/s Punjab Agro Ind. Corp. Ltd. vs. D.C.I.T, Circle 4 (1), Chandigarh. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the present appeal in terms of the decision in ITA No. 170-2017. The reasoning is based on the precedent set by the earlier judgment, which the assessee acknowledged as binding. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court noted that the assessee's counsel conceded that the matter was concluded against the assessee by a prior judgment of the same court in ITA No. 170 of 2017 dated 6.11.2017. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the present appeal in terms of the decision in ITA No. 170-2017. The court found no illegality in the orders passed by the lower authorities and the ITAT, nor any reason to set aside the impugned orders or to find fault with the Tribunal's application of previous judgments. The ratio decidendi is that if a matter is concluded by a prior judgment of a higher court, a subsequent appeal on similar grounds will be dismissed. Any pending applications were also disposed of as the main case was decided.
The High Court noted that the present appeal was concluded by its earlier judgment in ITA No. 170 of 2017. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal. However, based on the concession of the counsel, the appeal was dismissed as it was concluded by a prior judgment.
The High Court held as follows: Regarding Question (i) (Rent receipts for Section 80HHC): The Tribunal erred in holding that gross rent receipts from employees should be excluded. The Court, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Acg Associated Capsules P. Ltd. v. C.I.T., Mumbai, held that Explanation (baa) to Section 80HHC requires the deduction of 90% of receipts like rent included in profits. Depreciation is not a similar nature receipt. The Court found no merit in the assessee's ground of appeal on this issue, dismissing it. Regarding Question (ii) and (iii) (Turnover and profits of other eligible units for Section 80HHC): The Court held that profits of units eligible for deduction under Section 10B or 80-IB are to be excluded while calculating eligible profits for deduction under Section 80HHC. This aligns with the Tribunal's view and is upheld. Regarding Question (iv) and (vi) (Interest on delayed payments for Section 10B): The Court upheld the Tribunal's decision to allow interest on delayed payments relatable to export sales under Section 10B. However, the direction for verification was modified to ensure the Assessing Officer assesses the interest received on delayed payments as per Section 10B(4) of the Act. This question is answered in favour of the assessee. Regarding Question (v) (Apportionment of Head Office expenses): The Court held that the apportionment of Head Office expenses among eligible and non-eligible units is justified. This is based on Section 10B(7) read with Section 80-IA(10), which empowers the Assessing Officer to consider reasonable profits in cases of close connection or arranged business transactions that produce more than ordinary profits. The question is answered against the assessee. The operative direction is that the appeal is disposed of in light of these findings.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the order of the ITAT. The Tribunal had confirmed the finding of the CIT(A), who had meticulously examined the evidence presented by the assessee. This evidence, including certification from the Ministry of Tourism, customer lists, and banking transactions, successfully demonstrated that the hotel was functional and operational. The ITAT, after considering this entire evidence, agreed with the CIT(A) that the assessee had proven its eligibility for the deduction under Section 80ID. Consequently, the High Court found no error in the ITAT's decision to delete the addition made by the AO. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal rightly concluded that the surrendered amount was for unexplained investment in stock, representing unaccounted transactions, not profit. The GP rate applied by the Assessing Officer was not excessive or arbitrary.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the facts of the case were covered by a previous decision of the same court in a similar matter involving the same respondent. Therefore, the appeal was disposed of in terms of that prior ruling.
The High Court held that nothing would survive in the case at this stage. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The court granted liberty to the parties to file an application for revival of the appeal if something survives therein. The reasoning appears to be based on the considerable delay since the admission of the appeal in 2000 and the fact that the grievance was against a remand order, suggesting that the original dispute might have been resolved or become infructuous over time. No specific issue was decided on merits.
The High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh held that the appeal stands dismissed in terms of its previous decision in ITA No.403 of 2016. The reasoning is based on the concession made by the Revenue's counsel, who fairly accepted that the issue in the present appeal is covered by the cited precedent. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. No specific issue was left undecided, as the appeal was disposed of based on the binding precedent and the acceptance thereof by the appellant. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court disposed of the writ petitions with a direction that no recovery shall be made from the petitioners until the disposal of their appeals by the Commissioner. This decision was based on the concession made by the Revenue's counsel, who acknowledged that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) had deleted penalties in similar cases for similarly situated assessees. The Revenue also agreed that the appeals would be decided on merits. The Court did not delve into the merits of the pre-deposit demand itself but provided interim relief by staying recovery pending the final decision on the appeals. The principle established is that where the Revenue concedes that a higher appellate authority has ruled in favour of assessees on a similar issue, and agrees to decide appeals on merits, interim recovery can be stayed.
The High Court allowed the petition. It quashed the impugned order passed by the Commissioner under Section 264 of the Act. The Court directed the Commissioner of Income Tax to decide the application under Section 264 of the Act on merits, as per law. The reasoning was based on the precedent set by the High Court in the case of Kewal Krishan Jain, which the revenue could not distinguish or deny the applicability of. The principle is that if a High Court has set aside a similar order, the same principle should apply. The issue of whether the Commissioner *should* have entertained the Section 264 application was decided in favor of the petitioner, leading to a remand for decision on merits.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's order and therefore, no interference was called for. Regarding the first issue, the Court implicitly disagreed with the Revenue's contention that the ITAT could not directly order registration, as it found no error in the ITAT's direction. The Court reasoned that the purchase of school buses was in furtherance of the society's object to provide quality education, especially in rural areas, and that transportation is essential for running schools. It held that this did not amount to amassing assets. The Court also found that lower salaries paid to teachers did not demonstrate a compromise with educational quality and that this alone could not be a ground for refusing registration. The Court further stated that the society's prior registration under Section 10(23C) was not an adverse ground for seeking registration under Section 12AA, as it was the society's prerogative to choose the most beneficial section. The Court found the CIT's denial to be based on surmises and conjectures, and that the objects of the society were not doubted. The Court affirmed the ITAT's order directing the grant of registration, while noting the Revenue's liberty to initiate action under Section 12AA(3) if activities were found to be non-charitable subsequently. The Court dismissed the appeal.
The High Court held that the objection regarding the society's ownership of the property could not be sustained. Section 12AA of the Act requires the CIT to be satisfied with the genuineness of the trust's activities and compliance with other laws. Section 11 of the Act, concerning income from property held for charitable or religious purposes, does not mandate ownership by the trust; the requirement is 'held for charitable purpose.' In this case, although the land belonged to the government, the construction on it was held under trust and used for charitable and religious purposes. Section 12 of the Act provides a deeming fiction for voluntary contributions received by charitable trusts. The court found no dispute that the society's work was for the general public, including construction on government land for the community's charitable and religious benefit. Various welfare activities were organized, and the community hall was utilized by social, charitable, and religious organizations. The explanation regarding the discharge of liability was accepted, with the understanding that any account discrepancies could be addressed during assessment under Section 11. Therefore, no interference with the ITAT's order was warranted, and no substantial question of law arose. The appeal was dismissed, with liberty to the revenue to initiate action under Section 12AA(3) if it later concluded the activities were not charitable.
The Tribunal correctly allowed the appeal, finding no evidence that the society's funds were not utilized for its aims and objects. The accumulation of funds in FDRs was considered a cushion for daily needs, and the ratio of milking to non-milking cows did not indicate commercial activity.
The High Court found that no substantial question of law arose regarding the disallowance of travel expenses. However, for the other issues, the court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for a fresh decision.
The High Court allowed the assessee's applications to withdraw their references. The revenue's appeals were also dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to revive.
The High Court found the ITAT's dismissal of the appeal solely on the issue of delay to be inappropriate. It set aside the ITAT's order declining condonation of delay and directed the ITAT to decide the appeal on merits.
The High Court noted that the assessee's counsel submitted that the issue involved in the present appeal is covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Shimla Versus M/s Aarham Softronics; 2019 (2) TMI, 1285. The counsel for the respondent (revenue) did not dispute this submission. Consequently, the High Court disposed of the present appeal on the same terms and conditions as the Supreme Court's judgment in M/s Aarham Softronics. The specific findings or reasoning of the ITAT are not discussed as the appeal was decided based on the precedent.
The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the ITAT. The Court found the reasoning of the Commissioner (Appeals) to be more logical. The Court held that once the closing balance and the final books of accounts for the year were accepted by the revenue, it implicitly meant that all goods produced during the year were sold and accounted for. Therefore, any discrepancies observed on specific dates within the year, as reflected in the hypothecation register, would not be determinative of unaccounted sales, especially when the final stock and sales figures were accepted. The ratio decidendi is that accepted final accounts override interim stock discrepancies when the overall sales and stock are reconciled and accepted by the revenue. The Court did not explicitly leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal upheld the findings of the CIT (Appeals). Regarding the first issue, the Tribunal found that the funds used for the purchase of land and construction of the godown were interest-free funds and not those obtained as loans from the bank. This finding of fact was upheld. The Tribunal relied on the judgments in S.A. Builders Limited Versus CIT (Appeals) and Bright Enterprises (P) Ltd. Versus Commissioner of Income Tax. Consequently, the first question was answered in the negative. For the second issue, the Tribunal noted that on the AO's asking, not only the financers but also the directors of the company were produced. Furthermore, the returns of those investors had been accepted by the Revenue. In these circumstances, the Tribunal held that the share money investment could not be deemed to be a paper transaction or an accommodation entry. Therefore, the second question was also answered in the negative. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that no interference was called for in the present appeal. The reasoning was based on the fact that the Department had withdrawn ITA-80-2019 with liberty to raise the issue before the Tribunal. Since the present appeal was consequential to ITA-80-2019, and the underlying issue was to be pursued before the ITAT, the High Court dismissed the appeal. The ratio decidendi is that a consequential appeal will not be entertained when the primary appeal has been withdrawn with liberty to pursue the matter before the lower appellate authority. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The revenue was granted liberty to file an application for revival of the appeal if something survives therein. The court noted that the tax effect was below the prescribed monetary limit for filing appeals as per CBDT Circulars. Since the main case was dismissed, any pending Civil Miscellaneous Application was also disposed of. The ratio decidendi is that appeals can be withdrawn by the revenue based on monetary limits specified in CBDT circulars, with liberty to revive under certain conditions.
The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, stating that the issue of disallowing interest deduction under Section 36(1)(iii) is covered by previous judgments. The court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's order.
The High Court held that there was no dispute that the computation of disallowance under Section 14A and Rule 8D would be only with regard to the amount of exempt income. The Court noted that it had held in several cases that the disallowance under Section 14A is to be restricted to the amount of exempt income only. The Supreme Court in Maxopp Investment Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, 2018(402) ITR 640, was also cited, which clarified that disallowance is to be restricted to exempt income. Therefore, the direction of the Tribunal to compute disallowance on investments yielding exempt income was considered to be a remand to the AO to compute disallowance as per the applicable law and rules for the relevant year, and thus called for no interference. The Court did not explicitly decide on the applicability of the amended Rule 8D for the assessment year, as the Tribunal had already ruled it prospective.
The High Court held that the first issue was not well-founded. It reasoned that the CIT(A) had directed the AO to re-compute the deduction at 20% of the profits for units 'A' and 'B' without considering the actual allowable amount. While re-computing, the AO erroneously included profits from non-industrial activities and failed to deduct unabsorbed brought forward losses. The invocation of Section 154 was to correct this mistake apparent on the record. The Court found no perversity in the ITAT's order, stating that the issue dealt with by the CIT(A) was not the subject matter of the Section 154 proceedings, which focused on the correct calculation of deduction based on industrial profits. For the second issue, the Tribunal, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Distributors (Baroda) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and others, upheld the AO's action of reducing unabsorbed brought forward losses from current year profits for Section 80-HH computation. The assessee failed to demonstrate the inapplicability of the Supreme Court's decision. Therefore, both questions were answered against the assessee.
The Tribunal upheld the addition of Rs. 2,72,787/- as the assessee failed to prove the source of the unexplained difference in the partners' accounts. The High Court found no fault with this finding of fact.
The High Court held that the assessee's object of social and intellectual upliftment of women was intrinsically linked to its educational purpose. The court found no merit in the Revenue's contentions and upheld the ITAT's decision.
The High Court held that the contentions raised by the Revenue were not well-founded. Regarding the salary paid to Smt. Sunita and Smt. Sangeeta, the Tribunal's finding that they possessed qualifications for teaching and were paid less than the government-fixed salary for PGT Teachers was not controverted. The Court found no violation of Section 13(1)(c) as the salary paid was less than the prevailing rate, and there was no direct or indirect benefit to the members; rather, they were paid consideration for services rendered. The Court agreed with the Tribunal that the scope at the time of processing an application under Section 12AA is to satisfy oneself about the objects and genuineness of activities. Since the CIT had not recorded dissatisfaction with the objects or genuineness of activities, apart from the salary issue, the Tribunal rightly concluded that issues concerning Section 40A(3) and the nature of donations could be considered during the assessment. The Court added that if the Revenue is subsequently satisfied that the activities are not for charitable purposes, it can initiate action for cancellation of registration under Section 12AA(3). Therefore, no interference was warranted in the Tribunal's order, and no substantial question of law arose.
The High Court held that the question of law in the present appeal was not a substantial question of law. This finding was based on the concession made by the Revenue's counsel, who admitted that the issue was concluded by the High Court's own prior decision in ITA No.5 of 2016. In that earlier case, an identical question was determined not to be a substantial question of law. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the present appeal. The ratio decidendi is that an appeal under Section 260A of the Act can only be admitted if a substantial question of law arises, and if a prior judgment of the same court has already held an identical question not to be substantial, then a subsequent appeal on the same issue will be dismissed. The pending Civil Misc. Application, if any, was disposed of as a consequence of the main appeal being dismissed.
The High Court held that the questions raised were pure questions of fact and no substantial questions of law arose. The Court found the facts of the present case to be similar to those in New Kailash Cotton Factory Vs. Assessing Officer-cum-Income Tax Officer, Ward No.1, Mansa (Punjab), ITA No.510 of 2006, decided on 21.03.2007. In that case, the Court had noted that the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of transactions for diverting profits, lacked written or oral agreements, invested its own funds, did not maintain 'Sauda Bahi', and used its own infrastructure. The Court concluded that the findings were based on evidence and not perverse, and therefore, no substantial question of law was made out. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the appeal involved a factual dispute concerning the valuation of stock, specifically the yield of cotton and cotton seeds. The Court found no illegality or error in the order of the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority had considered that the assessee did not maintain a stock register and that the books of accounts were maintained on an estimation basis. After examining various comparable cases, the Appellate Authority determined that the claimed shortage of 3.05% was on the higher side and reduced it to 2.55%. The Court found no substantial question of law to interfere with the Appellate Authority's findings. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the revenue had not been able to show that the CUP method was more appropriate on facts. Furthermore, no reason was put forth to justify the departure from the TNMM method, which had been followed in previous years, nor was there any averment of a change in circumstances. The Court found no legal infirmity in the ITAT, as the final fact-finding authority, concluding that the invocation of the CUP method was not justified and no reason existed for departing from the past practice. Consequently, the appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed. The ITAT's direction to remand the matter to the TPO for fresh consideration after hearing the parties was upheld.
The High Court held that the issue was purely factual. The sole argument presented by the assessee was that the purchase and sale registers were not doubted. However, the revenue pointed out that records were also maintained on an estimation basis and crucially, no stock register was maintained by the assessee. The Appellate Authority had considered all the evidence, including comparables, and adopted a reasonable approach in the absence of reliable documentary evidence. Therefore, the High Court found no reason to interfere with the factual appreciation by the Appellate Authority, which had partly allowed the assessee's appeal. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The court granted the appellant-revenue the liberty to file an application for revival of the appeal, should something survive therein. The reasoning for the dismissal was based on the appellant-revenue's submission that the tax effect involved was less than the monetary limit prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 3 of 2018, as amended by Circular No. 17 of 2019 and Letter No. F.No.279/Misc/M-93/2018-ITJ dated 20.08.2019. The court also noted that any pending Civil Miscellaneous (C.M.) applications stood disposed of as a consequence of the main case being dismissed as withdrawn. No specific issue was left undecided, as the appeal was withdrawn by the appellant.
The High Court addressed the issue of a potential conflict of interest by noting that one of the members of the Bench had represented the appellant in unrelated sales tax matters. However, the appellant's counsel stated they had no objection to the Bench hearing the matter. Subsequently, the appellant's counsel prayed for permission to withdraw the present appeal with liberty to file a fresh appeal. The Court allowed this prayer. The main appeal was dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty granted. Any pending Civil Miscellaneous Application was also disposed of as a consequence.
The High Court allowed the application for condonation of delay. Subsequently, the revenue's counsel stated they had instructions to withdraw the appeal due to the tax effect being below the monetary limit prescribed by CBDT Circulars. The Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the revenue liberty to file an application for revival of the appeal if circumstances warranted it. The pending C.M. application was also disposed of as a consequence of the main case being dismissed.
The High Court allowed the application for condonation of delay. Subsequently, the revenue's counsel stated they had instructions to withdraw the appeal due to the tax effect being below the monetary limit prescribed by CBDT Circular No.3 of 2018, as amended. The Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn with liberty to the appellant-revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal, in case something survives therein. Any pending C.M. application was also disposed of as a consequence of the main case being dismissed.