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The High Court held that the six assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings under Section 153C, are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these six years is the search/requisition, not the issuance of the notice under Section 153C. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 04.09.2013 (previous year 2013-14, assessment year 2014-15), the relevant six assessment years are 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 04.12.2014 and 13.03.2015 respectively (previous year 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16), the relevant six assessment years are 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. The Court did not delve into the merits of individual satisfaction notes, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect of Section 153C.
The High Court held that the six assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings under Section 153C, are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these six years is the search/requisition, not the issuance of the notice under Section 153C. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 04.09.2013 (previous year 2013-14, assessment year 2014-15), the relevant six assessment years are 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 04.12.2014 and 13.03.2015 respectively (previous year 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16), the relevant six assessment years are 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. The Court did not delve into the merits of individual satisfaction notes, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect of Section 153C.
The High Court held that the six assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings under Section 153C, are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these six years is the search/requisition, not the issuance of the notice under Section 153C. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 04.09.2013 (previous year 2013-14, assessment year 2014-15), the relevant six assessment years are 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 04.12.2014 and 13.03.2015 respectively (previous year 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16), the relevant six assessment years are 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. The Court did not delve into the merits of individual satisfaction notes, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect of Section 153C.
The High Court held that the six assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings under Section 153C, are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these six years is the search/requisition, not the issuance of the notice under Section 153C. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 04.09.2013 (previous year 2013-14, assessment year 2014-15), the relevant six assessment years are 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 04.12.2014 and 13.03.2015 respectively (previous year 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16), the relevant six assessment years are 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. The Court did not delve into the merits of individual satisfaction notes, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect of Section 153C.
The High Court held that the six assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings under Section 153C, are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these six years is the search/requisition, not the issuance of the notice under Section 153C. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 04.09.2013 (previous year 2013-14, assessment year 2014-15), the relevant six assessment years are 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 04.12.2014 and 13.03.2015 respectively (previous year 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16), the relevant six assessment years are 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. The Court did not delve into the merits of individual satisfaction notes, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect of Section 153C.
The High Court held that the six assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings under Section 153C, are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these six years is the search/requisition, not the issuance of the notice under Section 153C. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 04.09.2013 (previous year 2013-14, assessment year 2014-15), the relevant six assessment years are 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 04.12.2014 and 13.03.2015 respectively (previous year 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16), the relevant six assessment years are 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. The Court did not delve into the merits of individual satisfaction notes, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect of Section 153C.
The High Court held that the six assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings under Section 153C, are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these six years is the search/requisition, not the issuance of the notice under Section 153C. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 04.09.2013 (previous year 2013-14, assessment year 2014-15), the relevant six assessment years are 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 04.12.2014 and 13.03.2015 respectively (previous year 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16), the relevant six assessment years are 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. The Court did not delve into the merits of individual satisfaction notes, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect of Section 153C.
The High Court held that the six assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings under Section 153C, are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these six years is the search/requisition, not the issuance of the notice under Section 153C. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 04.09.2013 (previous year 2013-14, assessment year 2014-15), the relevant six assessment years are 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 04.12.2014 and 13.03.2015 respectively (previous year 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16), the relevant six assessment years are 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. The Court did not delve into the merits of individual satisfaction notes, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect of Section 153C.
The High Court held that the six assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings under Section 153C, are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these six years is the search/requisition, not the issuance of the notice under Section 153C. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 04.09.2013 (previous year 2013-14, assessment year 2014-15), the relevant six assessment years are 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 04.12.2014 and 13.03.2015 respectively (previous year 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16), the relevant six assessment years are 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. The Court did not delve into the merits of individual satisfaction notes, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect of Section 153C.
The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Act, for the purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015, the relevant previous year was 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16, and the six preceding years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, all impugned notices and assessment orders challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction were quashed and set aside. The court did not examine individual satisfaction notes.
The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Act, for the purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015, the relevant previous year was 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16, and the six preceding years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, all impugned notices and assessment orders challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction were quashed and set aside. The court did not examine individual satisfaction notes.
The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Act, for the purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015, the relevant previous year was 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16, and the six preceding years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, all impugned notices and assessment orders challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction were quashed and set aside. The court did not examine individual satisfaction notes.
The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Act, for the purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015, the relevant previous year was 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16, and the six preceding years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, all impugned notices and assessment orders challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction were quashed and set aside. The court did not examine individual satisfaction notes.
The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Act, for the purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015, the relevant previous year was 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16, and the six preceding years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, all impugned notices and assessment orders challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction were quashed and set aside. The court did not examine individual satisfaction notes.
The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Act, for the purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015, the relevant previous year was 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16, and the six preceding years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, all impugned notices and assessment orders challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction were quashed and set aside. The court did not examine individual satisfaction notes.
The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Act, for the purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015, the relevant previous year was 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16, and the six preceding years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, all impugned notices and assessment orders challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction were quashed and set aside. The court did not examine individual satisfaction notes.
The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Act, for the purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015, the relevant previous year was 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16, and the six preceding years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, all impugned notices and assessment orders challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction were quashed and set aside. The court did not examine individual satisfaction notes.
The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Act, for the purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015, the relevant previous year was 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16, and the six preceding years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, all impugned notices and assessment orders challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction were quashed and set aside. The court did not examine individual satisfaction notes.
The High Court held that the trigger point for issuing a notice under Section 153A (and consequently 153C) is the search or requisition. The six assessment years to be considered are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. For the HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015 respectively, meant the previous year was 2014-15 and the assessment year was 2015-16, making the six preceding assessment years 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, the impugned notices and assessment orders were quashed and set aside.
The High Court held that the trigger point for issuing a notice under Section 153A (and consequently 153C) is the search or requisition. The six assessment years to be considered are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. For the HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015 respectively, meant the previous year was 2014-15 and the assessment year was 2015-16, making the six preceding assessment years 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, the impugned notices and assessment orders were quashed and set aside.
The High Court held that the trigger point for issuing a notice under Section 153A (and consequently 153C) is the search or requisition. The six assessment years to be considered are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. For the HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015 respectively, meant the previous year was 2014-15 and the assessment year was 2015-16, making the six preceding assessment years 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, the impugned notices and assessment orders were quashed and set aside.
The High Court held that the trigger point for issuing a notice under Section 153A (and consequently Section 153C) is a search under Section 132 or requisition under Section 132A. The assessment years for which income is to be assessed or reassessed are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The Court clarified that for HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015 respectively, meant the relevant previous year was 2014-15 and assessment year 2015-16, making the six preceding assessment years 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. The Court did not delve into the merits of individual satisfaction notes, focusing on the jurisdictional issue.
The High Court held that the six assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are to be computed based on the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these six years is the assessment year immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year of the search. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015 respectively, meant the relevant previous year was 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16, and the six preceding years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. The court did not delve into individual satisfaction notes or other issues raised in the petitions, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect.
The High Court granted the permission as prayed for by the petitioner. The petition was disposed of as withdrawn. The notice was discharged with no order as to costs. The court clarified that it had not gone into the merits of the assessment order. Furthermore, it was clarified that the period during which the petitioner had been prosecuting the present proceedings before the High Court would be excluded when considering any application for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal. The court also directed that if the petitioner moves an application for stay of the assessment order, the Assessing Officer shall decide the same expeditiously within a period of one week from the date of receipt thereof.
The Division Bench held that the learned Single Judge did not commit a jurisdictional error or a serious miscarriage of justice by relegating the petitioners to the statutory remedy of filing proceedings under Section 11 of the Act. The Court emphasized that an intra-Court appeal is an appeal on principle, examining the legality and validity of the Single Judge's judgment. It stated that a Single Judge's decision should be set aside only if there is a patent error on the face of the record or if the judgment is against established principles of law. If two views are possible and the Single Judge adopted a reasonable and logical view, that view should prevail. The Division Bench found no material error of fact or law in the learned Single Judge's decision. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the petitions were disposed of by directing the petitioners to approach the Tribunal under Section 11 of the Act, with interim relief granted by the High Court to continue until August 16, 2022, for them to avail the alternative remedy. The Tribunal was asked to decide the case on merits, including interim relief, expeditiously.
The High Court held that the impugned assessment order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Court noted that section 144B of the Act, 1961, mandates a faceless assessment procedure, which includes providing a draft assessment order and an opportunity for hearing to the assessee. It was observed that the petitioner was not provided with a draft assessment order along with a show-cause notice as required by section 144B(1) and section 144B(7), which would have enabled the petitioner to give explanations for the proposed additions during a hearing before the National Faceless Assessment Centre. The Court found that the procedure laid down in section 144B for faceless assessment, including the provision for personal hearing through video conferencing, was not followed. Therefore, the assessment order was quashed and set aside. The Revenue was granted liberty to proceed with the assessment under section 144B after issuing a show-cause notice-cum-draft assessment order and providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The Court explicitly stated that it had not examined the merits of the case. The assessment proceedings were to be completed within 12 weeks from the receipt of the order.
The High Court held that the compensation awarded in all three claim petitions was just, adequate, and proper, and no modification was required. Regarding the multiplier issue in MACP no.1843/97, even if the multiplier was 16 instead of 17, the claimants would be entitled to more compensation due to consortium benefits (Rs.40,000/- each) as per National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors. ((2017) 16 SCC 680) and other cited cases. However, since the claimants did not file cross-objections, this enhancement could not be granted. Thus, the awarded amount was considered just and proper. In MACP no.1844/97 and MACP no.1878/97, even if the deduction for personal expenses was one-half instead of one-third, and if a higher multiplier was applied in MACP no.1878/97, the compensation would be enhanced considerably. Therefore, the Tribunal's awards were deemed just and adequate. The appeals were found to be bereft of merit and were dismissed. No order as to costs was made.
The High Court held that a notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to a deceased person is a jurisdictional notice and is invalid. The Court found that in the present case, the legal representative (the petitioner) had raised an objection to the validity of the notice upon receiving it and had not complied with it. Therefore, the legal representative had not waived the requirement of a valid notice under Section 148 nor submitted to the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction pursuant to the impugned notice. Consequently, the provisions of Section 292B of the Act were not attracted. The Court reasoned that in the absence of a valid notice, the Assessing Officer lacks the authority to assume jurisdiction under Section 147, rendering the continuation of proceedings invalid. The Court also noted that the department was aware of the deceased's death prior to the issuance of the notice, as indicated by the intimation provided on March 13, 2018. The contention that an active PAN implies the assessee is alive was rejected. The Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice and all further proceedings.
The High Court, in an intra-Court appeal, upheld the learned Single Judge's decision to dismiss the writ petitions. The Division Bench found no error of law or fact in the Single Judge's order. The Court observed that the learned Single Judge had relegated the petitioners to the statutory remedy of filing proceedings under Section 11 of the relevant Act. The interim relief granted by the High Court was continued until August 16, 2022, to allow the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy. The Tribunal, upon receiving the applications, was directed to consider the case on merits, including the question of interim relief. The Court expressed hope that the Tribunal would decide the matter expeditiously, considering the age and long service of the petitioners. The appeal was dismissed, and connected civil applications were disposed of.
The High Court held that the impugned notice for reopening the assessment under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could not be sustained. The Court found that the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer for reopening were not based on any further material that came to his knowledge after the original assessment order was passed. Specifically, regarding the share premium, the Court noted from Form-5 filed before the Registrar of Companies that 52,50,000 shares were issued at par to 16 persons, and Shri Dalal's name did not appear among them. Only 15,75,000 shares were issued at a premium to Shri Dalal. This indicated that the AO's reasons were recorded without application of mind and were not germane to the material on record. Furthermore, the issue of pre-operative expenses had already been considered by the AO during the original assessment proceedings, making the reopening on this ground a mere change of opinion. The Court concluded that there was no failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. Consequently, the proviso to Section 147 of the Act was applicable, as the notice was issued after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The petition was allowed, and the impugned notice and consequential actions were quashed.
The High Court dismissed the petition. The Court noted that the petitioner had not approached the court with clean hands, having suppressed material facts and attempted to mislead the court. The judgment extensively discussed the principles governing writ jurisdiction, emphasizing the need for candor, truthfulness, and full disclosure of material facts by petitioners. The Court found that the petitioner had not projected whether the plots had been sold, a fact that came to light through a letter to the RERA authority, not from the petitioner. Furthermore, the petitioner did not dispute the consistent practice of VUDA and other authorities in demanding advance payments and handing over cheques from similarly situated developers for development permissions. The Court concluded that exercising extraordinary jurisdiction in such a case would encourage foul play upon the authority. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the legal issues raised, the petition was dismissed on the grounds of the petitioner's conduct and suppression of facts.
The High Court held that the respondent authority did not commit any error in rejecting the petitioner's request for renewal. The Court found that the power of attorney executed in favour of Patni Noormohammad Kalu, as per Rule 37(1) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, constituted a transfer of the petitioner's right and interest in the lease without the previous written consent of the State Government, especially since the petitioner was not carrying out mining activities. The Court also found no error in considering the land as Gauchar land, as confirmed by the Gram Panchayat, and relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Samatha v. State of A.P. Regarding the delegation of powers under Section 26 of the Act, the Court was satisfied that the rules of business assigned the power to grant or refuse leases to the Industries and Mines Department, and the impugned order was passed in the name of the Governor, State of Gujarat. Therefore, no interference was warranted under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The High Court directed the respondent state authorities to forthwith communicate with the concerned income tax department, citing the case law of Movaliya Bhikubhai Balabhai (supra), to seek a refund of the TDS amount deducted contrary to the law. This entire exercise was to be completed within three weeks from the receipt of the order. Specifically, within one week, the state authorities were to address the communication to the Income Tax Department for claiming the refund. Within two weeks thereafter, the Income Tax authorities were to refund the TDS amount to the concerned Land Acquisition Officer, who would then disburse it to the claimants. If, for any reason, the Income Tax department did not refund the amount, the State Government would be liable to disburse it to the petitioners within four weeks thereafter. The petition was disposed of with these directions.
The High Court found that the evidence presented to establish the deceased's income was not trustworthy. Witnesses were unwilling to produce account books and receipts, suggesting an attempt to inflate the deceased's income. The Court determined that the deceased's maximum salary could be considered Rs. 2,000/- per month. Considering the prospective income, the Court revised the deceased's monthly income to Rs. 3,000/-. Applying a multiplier of 15 (based on the deceased's age and the principle in Sarla Verma & Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr.), and deducting 1/4th for personal expenses, the total compensation was calculated at Rs. 4,05,000/-. Adding Rs. 70,000/- for conventional compensation, the total amount payable was Rs. 4,75,000/-. The Tribunal's award of Rs. 11,87,000/- was therefore modified. The appellant is liable for Rs. 4,75,000/- with interest at 7.5% per annum. The excess amount deposited by the appellant is to be refunded.
The High Court partly allowed the appeal. It held that the Tribunal erred in deducting Rs. 11,000/- paid as a monthly loan installment from the deceased's income. Citing Shyamwati Sharma & Ors. and National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi, the Court determined the gross income of the deceased at Rs. 17,000/- per month. After deducting income tax and surcharge (Rs. 68,320/-), the net yearly income was Rs. 1,35,680/-. Following Pranay Sethi, 25% was added for prospective income, making the yearly income Rs. 1,69,600/-. Considering six dependents, 1/5th was deducted for personal expenses, resulting in Rs. 1,35,680/-. Applying a multiplier of 13 (as per Sarla Verma (Smt) & Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr.) for the deceased's age of 46, the total dependency loss was calculated at Rs. 17,63,840/-. An additional Rs. 70,000/- was awarded under conventional heads, as per Pranay Sethi. The total compensation thus amounted to Rs. 18,33,840/-. The appellants were awarded an additional Rs. 7,21,840/- with 9% interest. The insurance companies were directed to deposit this additional amount within four months.
The High Court modified the distribution order of the MACT. While acknowledging the greater liability on the widow (respondent no. 1) to maintain her minor daughter (respondent no. 2), the Court also recognized the dependency and ailments of the petitioners (parents), aged 72 and 68, particularly the mother's health issues. The Court found that the MACT's distribution of 15% to the petitioners and 85% to respondents no. 1 and 2 needed modification. The High Court held that the petitioners should be entitled to 30% of the compensation, and the remaining 70% should go to respondents no. 1 and 2. The Court directed that an additional amount of Rs. 3,81,877 (representing the increased share for the petitioners) should be withdrawn from the fixed deposit held in the name of respondent no. 1 and placed in a fixed deposit in the joint names of the petitioners for five years with accrued interest. The MACT was ordered to disburse this amount within one month.
The High Court held that the tax effect involved in the appeal is less than Rs. 50,00,000/-. In light of CBDT Circular No. 3/2018 dated 11th July, 2018, which stipulates that no appeal with a tax effect not exceeding Rs. 50,00,000/- shall be filed before the High Court and has retrospective applicability to pending appeals, the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the appellant (Revenue) did not press the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as not pressed. The Court also noted that if there was any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the circular was not applicable for any reason, the appellant would be at liberty to seek revival of the appeal.
The High Court held that since it is an admitted position between the parties that the tax effect involved in the appeal is less than Rs. 50,00,000/-, and in light of Circular No. 3/2018 dated 11th July, 2018, which provides that no appeal wherein the tax effect does not exceed the monetary limit of Rs. 50,00,000/- shall be filed before the High Court and has been made retrospectively applicable to pending appeals, the learned senior standing counsel for the appellant (Revenue) does not press the present appeal. Consequently, the appeal is disposed of as not pressed. The court noted that if there is any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the circular is not applicable for any reason, the appellant would be at liberty to seek revival of the appeal. No other issues were decided on merits.
The High Court held that since the tax effect involved in the appeal was less than Rs. 50,00,000/-, and in light of Circular No. 3/2018 which provides that no appeal with such a tax effect shall be filed before the High Court and has retrospective applicability, the learned senior standing counsel for the appellant did not press the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as not pressed. The court also noted that if there was any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the circular was not applicable for any reason, the appellant would be at liberty to seek revival of the appeal. No specific legal principle was established as the appeal was withdrawn on a procedural ground.
The High Court held that it is an admitted position between the parties that the tax effect involved in the appeal is less than Rs. 50,00,000/-. In light of Circular No. 3/2018, which provides that no appeal with a tax effect not exceeding Rs. 50,00,000/- shall be filed before the High Court and has retrospective applicability to pending appeals, the learned senior standing counsel for the appellant did not press the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as not pressed. The court also noted that if there is any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the circular is not applicable for any reason, the appellant would be at liberty to seek revival of the appeal. The ratio decidendi is that appeals with a tax effect below the prescribed monetary limit, as per CBDT circulars, are not to be pressed by the revenue.
The High Court held that the impugned order dated 12.12.2017 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Tax was to be quashed and set aside. Consequently, the certificate of entitlement was ordered to be restored. The Court directed the respondents to forthwith work out the amount of refund that the petitioners would be entitled to until 1.6.2016 (the date of cancellation of their registration certificate) and the amount outstanding payable by the petitioners, and to adjust the same towards the outstanding dues. The Court reasoned that the officers managing government offices should adopt a humane approach, balancing tax recovery with the continuation of business, as a short-sighted approach could lead to a loss of revenue for the State. The Court noted that the petitioners were entitled to a refund of approximately Rs. 5 crore, while their outstanding dues worked out to approximately Rs. 2,75,26,130/-, suggesting that adjusting these amounts would largely resolve the controversy. The principle established is that in cases of industrial policy incentives, implementing notifications should be read liberally to achieve the policy's objectives, rather than strictly as in tax exemptions under taxing statutes.
The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the impugned warrant of authorisation. The Court found that the circumstances envisaged under clauses (a), (b), or (c) of sub-section (1) of section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not met. Specifically, regarding clause (c), the Court noted that the loan transaction was fully disclosed in the petitioner's books of account and tax returns, and there was no material to suggest the petitioner was in possession of undisclosed money, bullion, jewellery, or other valuable articles. The Court also observed that the genuineness of the mortgage deed provided as security for the loan was not disputed. The Court concluded that no reasonable person could have formed the belief that action under section 132(1) was called for, and the resort to section 132 appeared to be an attempt to circumvent jurisdictional limitations. Consequently, the warrant of authorisation and all actions taken pursuant thereto were rendered invalid.
The High Court held that the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal had recorded concurrent findings of fact. The seized document did not contain any signature or date, and the word 'cash' was not mentioned. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in C.B.I. v. V.C. Shukla, the Tribunal had held that undisclosed income cannot be assessed arbitrarily without other evidence, and loose sheets are not conclusive evidence for additions. The High Court found nothing on record to connect the assessee with the contents of the seized documents, which were not seized from the assessee's premises. The Court concluded that no conclusion could be drawn that the notations made by a third party pertained to the assessee, especially when the documents did not refer to the assessee. The Court found no infirmity in the concurrent findings of fact by the Tribunal and held that no substantial question of law arose, warranting interference. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the appeal did not give rise to any question of law, much less a substantial question of law, warranting interference. The court noted that the controversy involved in the present appeal was concluded by the High Court's earlier decision dated 14.8.2018 in Tax Appeal No. 984 of 2018, which had dismissed the revenue's appeal against the ITAT's order in the assessee's own case for assessment year 2006-07. For the reasons recorded in that earlier order, the present appeal was summarily dismissed. The specific reasoning of the ITAT regarding the deletion of the disallowance was not detailed in this judgment, as the appeal was dismissed on the ground that no substantial question of law arose.
The High Court modified the award. Regarding negligence, the Tribunal's finding of 80% negligence on the truck driver and 20% on the deceased was revised. The Court found the deceased's negligence to be 25% and the truck driver's negligence to be 75%, considering the place of accident and panchnama. On income assessment, the Tribunal's calculation of Rs. 55,000/- average income plus Rs. 15,000/- family trust income was found to be an error, as the family trust income was already incorporated in the individual income tax returns. The Court recalculated the average individual income and HUF income, arriving at a total of Rs. 73,133/- per annum. Applying a 40% prospective rise as per Pranay Sethi, and deducting 1/4th for personal expenses, the future loss was calculated. After applying the 25% negligence of the deceased, the compensation amount was determined to be Rs. 9,16,500/-. The rate of interest was reduced from 12% to 9% per annum, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi. The appeal and cross-objection were partly allowed.
The High Court held that the appeals do not give rise to any substantial question of law. Regarding the first issue, the Court noted the assessee's contention that the additional evidence was produced at the instance of the CIT(A) under Rule 46A(4), which allows the appellate authority to direct production of documents for substantial cause. The Court did not delve into a detailed analysis of Rule 46A but implicitly accepted this reasoning by not finding fault with the Tribunal's upholding of the CIT(A)'s order. Regarding the second issue, the Court agreed with the Tribunal that the income paid to non-resident overseas agents for services rendered abroad was not chargeable to tax in India. The Court reasoned that the source of income is where the transaction yielding income takes place, which was abroad, not the place of payment. Therefore, since the commission was not income chargeable to tax in India, the assessee was not obligated to deduct tax at source under section 195, and consequently, section 40(a)(ia) was not attracted. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court decision in GE Technology Centre Private Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax to support the view that an application under section 195(2) is not required if the payment is not chargeable to tax in India.
The High Court held that the Tribunal did not commit any error in upholding the order of the CIT(A). Regarding the first issue, the Court noted that Rule 46A(4) empowers the Commissioner (Appeals) to direct the production of documents for disposal of the appeal or for any substantial cause. The Assessee's contention that the evidence was produced at the instance of the Commissioner (Appeals) was accepted, implying the discretion was validly exercised. Regarding the second issue, the Court found that the income paid to non-resident overseas agents for services rendered abroad was not income that accrued or arose in India as contemplated by Section 9 of the Act. The source of income is where the transaction yielding income takes place, which was abroad. Therefore, the payment was not chargeable to tax in India under Section 5. Consequently, there was no obligation on the assessee to deduct tax at source under Section 195, and thus, Section 40(a)(ia) was not attracted. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in GE Technology Centre Private Ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax, which clarified that an application under Section 195(2) is not required if the payment is not chargeable to tax in India. No substantial question of law arose.
The High Court modified the Tribunal's award. Regarding negligence, the Court found that while the truck driver was primarily negligent (75%), the deceased driver of the Maruti car also contributed to the accident to the extent of 25%. On the issue of income, the Tribunal erred by assessing the average income at Rs. 55,000/- per annum and additionally Rs. 15,000/- from a family trust. The Court recalculated the average income based on income tax returns, including family trust income, for the last few years prior to the accident, arriving at a figure of Rs. 32,071/- per annum. Considering a 40% prospective rise in income (as per Pranay Sethi), the annual loss of income was calculated at Rs. 1,02,386/-. After deducting personal expenses and applying a multiplier of 15, the future loss amounted to Rs. 11,52,000/-. Adding Rs. 70,000/- for conventional heads, the total compensation was Rs. 12,22,000/-. Deducting 25% for the deceased's negligence, the claimants were entitled to Rs. 9,16,500/-. The rate of interest was reduced from 12% to 9% per annum, citing Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi. The appeal and cross-objection were partly allowed.
The High Court held that the Tribunal erred in determining the deceased's income by considering only basic pay and dearness allowance. Relying on Supreme Court judgments in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Indira Srivastava, Sunil Sharma, and National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Shethi, the Court determined the deceased's monthly income at Rs. 14,443/- (gross pay of Rs. 14,443/- less 10% income tax, resulting in a net income of Rs. 1,55,984/- annually). Applying the ratio from Sarla Verma and Pranay Shethi, a 50% prospective rise was granted. Considering the dependents (7 in total, including a senior citizen father), 1/5th was deducted for personal expenses. The Court found the Tribunal erred in applying a multiplier of 11 and, following Sarla Verma, applied a multiplier of 15, leading to a loss of dependency compensation of Rs. 28,07,715/-. An additional Rs. 70,000/- was awarded under conventional heads, totaling Rs. 28,77,715/-. Regarding negligence, the Court re-appreciated the FIR and panchnama (Exh. 35) and found that the accident occurred on a highway, with the deceased suddenly dashing the tanker before the driver could brake. Thus, the Tribunal's finding of 10% negligence on the deceased was upheld. After deducting 10% negligence (Rs. 2,87,772/-), the total compensation was determined at Rs. 25,89,943/-. The appellants were entitled to an additional Rs. 18,29,083/-. Interest at 9% per annum was awarded on the original amount (Rs. 7,60,860/-), and 7.5% interest on the enhanced amount (Rs. 18,29,083/-) from the date of the appeal.
The High Court dismissed all the petitions. The Court acknowledged the preliminary objections raised by respondent No. 5 regarding maintainability and locus standi. While not delving deeply into the factual aspects due to pending appeals, the Court found substance in the argument that the notification dated 27.11.2018 was not issued in accordance with the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, as it invoked provisions of the repealed Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961. The Court noted that even if the District Panchayats were divested of powers, it would only change the forum for applications. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa Vs. Dhadi Sahu, stating that a law changing the forum does not affect pending actions unless clearly intended. The Court expressed concern over the lack of due diligence by government departments in legal matters, leading to litigation. The appeals pending before respondent No. 2 were directed to be decided on merits.