Gujarat High Court Judgments — 2019

The High Court held that the Fee Regulatory Committee (FRC) must verify fee proposals based on documentary evidence and verification processes, including spot verification, as per Rule 7(1)(c) of the Rules, 2017. The Court found that impugned orders showed ad-hoc disallowances of expenditure without proper reasoning or justification. The FRC is required to provide cogent reasons based on inquiry and evidence for any disallowance, ensuring consistency across different FRCs. The Court emphasized that FRCs should not sit in the management's chair to determine fees, as each school has a unique method of imparting education. If expenditure is not for imparting education, verification must be undertaken with reasons to justify the fee proposal and ensure it does not result in profiteering or charging exorbitant fees, applying principles of "profiteering" as defined in Section 2(r) of the Act. The FRC must verify if any cash or kind is received in excess of determined fees and if associated trusts/companies profit from school activities. It must also verify if proposed fees include more than a reasonable surplus for development, expansion, and other educational activities. The Court quashed and set aside the impugned orders, remanding the matters back to the FRC for fresh determination of fee proposals, allowing schools to present their cases de novo. Schools were permitted to charge existing fees until the FRC completes the determination within 12 weeks. The State Government was also advised to frame a policy with guidelines for a uniform approach by FRCs.

The High Court held that the Fee Regulatory Committee (FRC) must exercise its powers under Section 8 of the Gujarat Self Financed Schools (Regulation of Fees) Act, 2017, in its true perspective. The FRC is required to verify fee proposals by examining documentary evidence and conducting necessary verification, including spot verification of documents and school buildings, as per Rule 7(1)(c) of the Rules, 2017. The Court found that impugned orders often involved ad-hoc disallowances of expenditure without proper reasoning or justification. The FRC must provide cogent reasons based on inquiry and evidence for any disallowance, ensuring consistency across different zones. The FRC should not dictate standardized fee structures but should consider the unique methods of education and allow for reasonable surplus for development, future expansion, and other activities, while preventing profiteering and capitation fees. The Court quashed and set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matters back to the FRC for fresh determination of fee proposals, directing the FRC to complete the process within 12 weeks and permitting schools to charge existing fees in the interim.

The High Court held that the writ petition was maintainable. It found that the DCIT's conduct, particularly the hasty recovery of Rs. 8,27,80,220/- by adjusting the refund on the very next day of passing the impugned order, and not waiting for the stipulated three days or for the review application to be heard, compelled the petitioner to invoke writ jurisdiction. The court also found that the DCIT's order was bereft of reasons and failed to meet the requirements of a speaking order as per CBDT Instruction No. 1914, indicating a failure to apply his mind. Therefore, the impugned order dated 25.10.2018 was quashed and set aside. The application for stay under section 220(6) was allowed, granting stay against further recovery pursuant to the penalty order dated 27.9.2018 until the final disposal of the appeal by the CIT(A). The petitioner was directed to furnish a corporate guarantee for the balance disputed amount, which would subsist until the final disposal of the appeal.

The High Court held that the Fee Regulatory Committee (FRC) must verify fee proposals by scrutinizing documentary evidence and conducting spot verification as per Rule 7(1)(c) of the Rules, 2017. The Court found that impugned orders showed ad-hoc disallowances of expenditure without proper reasons or justification. The FRC is required to provide cogent reasons based on inquiry and evidence for any disallowance, and there should be consistency among different FRCs. The FRC should consider the fundamental right of self-financed schools under Article 19(1)(g) and not dictate standardized fee structures, as each school has a unique method of imparting education. If expenditure is not for education, the FRC must verify and assign reasons. The FRC needs to verify if schools receive cash or kind in excess of determined fees or if associated trusts/companies profit from school activities. It must also ascertain if proposed fees include more than a reasonable surplus for development. The FRC is directed to exercise its powers under Section 8 of the Act in its true perspective, ensuring fees do not result in profiteering or capitation fees, and include only a reasonable surplus considering asset replacement, future development, expansion, and inflation. The State Government may also frame policy guidelines for uniform approach by FRCs.

The High Court held that further investigation into FIR I-C.R. No. 187/2017 was required. The Court found that the details provided in the petition, particularly concerning the search under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, the seizure of trust documents, the withdrawal of cash from trust accounts by an employee who allegedly handed it over to the accused, and the affidavit of the Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax regarding suppressed income of Rs. 47.40 lakh, indicated that vital aspects were left out during the initial investigation. The Court referenced the Supreme Court's judgment in 'Vinay Tyagi vs. Irshad Ali Alias Deepak and Others' (2013) 5 SCC 762, which outlines the criteria for further investigation as a continuation of the previous investigation to discover further oral or documentary evidence, aimed at bringing true facts before the court. The Court concluded that with the current state of evidence, the prosecution was likely to fail in proving various aspects. Consequently, the petition was allowed, directing further investigation to be carried out by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, supervised by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, within eight weeks, including the time for filing a supplementary charge-sheet if any. The accused had already been bailed out, and no cognizance had been taken so far.

The Gujarat High Court held that the personal residential property of the first petitioner, who is a Director of the second petitioner company, cannot be attached for the alleged sales tax dues of the company. The Court relied on its previous decisions in M. R. Chokshi v. State of Gujarat and C. V. Cherian v. C. A. Patel. It was reiterated that there is no provision in the Sales Tax Act that fastens the liability of a company's sales tax dues onto its directors. Consequently, the impugned attachment notice dated 22.12.2017, which entered a charge on the first petitioner's residential property, was quashed and set aside. The Court found the controversy squarely covered by the settled legal position and did not go into other contentions raised by the parties.

The High Court held that the contentions raised on behalf of the respondent were without merit. The court reiterated its previous decisions in M.R. Choksi v. State of Gujarat and other related cases, stating that there is no statutory provision in the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, or the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003, that empowers the sales tax authorities to fasten the liability of a company on its Director for the payment of sales tax dues. Consequently, if it is not permissible to proceed against the Director, it is also not permissible to recover such dues from the property belonging to the Director's wife. The impugned action of the respondent was found to be without any authority of law and not backed by any statutory provision. Therefore, the impugned attachment notice and order could not be sustained. The petition was allowed, and the impugned notice and order were quashed and set aside.

The High Court held that the Assessing Officer (AO) could not issue a notice under Section 148 to reopen a concluded assessment under Section 143(3) beyond a period of four years in the absence of tangible material outside the existing record or a failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The Court observed that the reasons recorded by the AO for reopening were based solely on the material already on record, specifically the tax audit report and the computation of income. The petitioner had disclosed the belated payment of EPF contribution and claimed deduction based on available judicial precedents. The Court found that no new facts were brought on record by the AO, and there was no failure by the petitioner to disclose material facts. Therefore, the AO lacked jurisdiction to reopen the assessment as per the First Proviso to Section 147 of the Act. The Court also noted that the reopening appeared to be based on a mere change of opinion, which is not permissible. Consequently, the impugned notice and subsequent proceedings were quashed.

The High Court noted that it is an admitted position that the tax effect in the appeal is less than Rs. 50,00,000/-. In light of Circular No. 3/2018, which stipulates that no appeal with a tax effect not exceeding Rs. 50,00,000/- shall be filed before the High Court and is retrospectively applicable to pending appeals, the learned senior standing counsel for the appellant stated that the appeal is not pressed. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as not pressed. The Court also provided a liberty to the appellant to seek revival of the appeal if there is any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the circular is not applicable for any reason.

The High Court held that the provision for diminution in the value of investment of Rs.13,85,00,000/- was duly reflected in the Profit and Loss account and was routed through it. The court found that this amount was reduced from the asset side of the balance sheet, effectively constituting a write-off. Therefore, it could not be added back to the book profit under section 115JB(2)(i) of the Act. The court found the Commissioner (Appeals)'s finding of a lack of details to be contrary to the record, as the balance sheet contained the necessary information. The Tribunal had correctly appreciated the material on record and applied the netting principle as per the decision in CIT v. Vodafone Essar Gujarat Ltd. The appeal was answered in favour of the assessee.

The High Court held that the appeal fails and is summarily dismissed. The court noted that Section 50C of the Act provides a deeming fiction for the full value of consideration in cases of transfer of capital assets, substituting the consideration received with the stamp duty valuation for the purpose of Section 48. However, this deeming fiction applies only to the seller. In the present case, the assessee is the purchaser, not the seller. Therefore, the stamp duty valuation could not be the basis for concluding unexplained investment under Section 69B. Furthermore, as observed by the CIT(A), the AO did not bring any material on record to prove that the assessee had actually made investments over and above what was recorded in the books. Thus, the Tribunal's order did not suffer from any legal infirmity giving rise to a substantial question of law.

The High Court upheld the Tribunal's order deleting the penalty. Regarding the additions of Rs. 1,30,869/- and Rs. 1,01,956/-, the Tribunal found that the assessee accepted these as inadvertent mistakes and that the explanations were reasonable, especially considering the returned income of Rs. 35.37 crores. The Court agreed that errors of this magnitude could not be deemed deliberate. For the addition on account of exchange rate fluctuation (Rs. 42,40,790/-), the Assessing Officer acknowledged that income was booked on capital account by mistake due to wrong posting. The Tribunal found the assessee's explanation plausible and reasonable, a view the High Court concurred with. The Court distinguished the Delhi High Court's decision in CIT v. Zoom Communication P. Ltd., stating it was not applicable as the Tribunal had factually found that the assessee did not deliberately furnish inaccurate particulars. Therefore, the Court found no legal infirmity in the Tribunal's order and dismissed the appeal.

The High Court held that the Assessing Officer (AO) had invalidly assumed jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. The Court found that the reasons recorded by the AO for reopening, stating that the cash seized was not reflected in the books of account and that the assessee failed to disclose unaccounted cash, were contrary to the record. The petitioner had clearly shown the amount of Rs.46,00,000/- seized by the Dhule Police in its books of account, as evidenced by the schedule forming part of the accounts for the year ended 31.3.2011 and the notices issued by the AO during the scrutiny assessment. Furthermore, the AO had previously applied his mind to this aspect during the scrutiny assessment and had not made any addition after considering the petitioner's explanation. Therefore, the reopening was based on a mere change of opinion. Since the reopening was sought beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, and there was no failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts, the assumption of jurisdiction by the AO was invalid and without authority of law. Consequently, the impugned notice and all proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed and set aside.

The High Court condoned the delay of 108 days in filing Tax Appeal No. 11068 of 2019. The Court found that the delay was occasioned solely due to technical reasons and inadvertence, stemming from the applicant's attempt to file a consolidated appeal instead of two separate appeals, whereas the original appeals had been filed within the prescribed period of limitation. The Court reasoned that since the initial filing was within time, the subsequent delay caused by procedural oversight should be excused. The application for condonation of delay was allowed, and the Tax Appeal was permitted to be filed. The Court did not decide on the merits of the Tax Appeal itself, as the application was solely for condonation of delay.

The High Court held that the Fee Regulatory Committee (FRC) must verify fee proposals by scrutinizing documentary evidence and conducting spot verification as per Rule 7(1)(c) of the Rules, 2017. The Court found that impugned orders showed ad-hoc disallowances of expenditure without proper reasons or justification. The FRC is required to provide cogent reasons based on inquiry and evidence for any disallowance, and there should be consistency among different FRCs. The FRC should consider the fundamental right of self-financed schools under Article 19(1)(g) and not dictate standardized fee structures, as each school has a unique method of imparting education. If expenditure is not for education, the FRC must verify and assign reasons. The FRC needs to verify if schools receive cash or kind in excess of determined fees or if associated trusts/companies profit from school activities. It must also ascertain if proposed fees include more than a reasonable surplus for development. The FRC is directed to exercise its powers under Section 8 of the Act in its true perspective, ensuring fees do not result in profiteering or capitation fees, and include only a reasonable surplus considering asset replacement, future development, expansion, and inflation. The State Government may also frame policy guidelines for uniform approach by FRCs.

The High Court held that the Fee Regulatory Committee (FRC) must verify fee proposals by scrutinizing documentary evidence and conducting spot verification as per Rule 7(1)(c) of the Rules, 2017. The Court found that impugned orders showed ad-hoc disallowances of expenditure without proper reasons or justification. The FRC is required to provide cogent reasons based on inquiry and evidence for any disallowance, and there should be consistency among different FRCs. The FRC should consider the fundamental right of self-financed schools under Article 19(1)(g) and not dictate standardized fee structures, as each school has a unique method of imparting education. If expenditure is not for education, the FRC must verify and assign reasons. The FRC needs to verify if schools receive cash or kind in excess of determined fees or if associated trusts/companies profit from school activities. It must also ascertain if proposed fees include more than a reasonable surplus for development. The FRC is directed to exercise its powers under Section 8 of the Act in its true perspective, ensuring fees do not result in profiteering or capitation fees, and include only a reasonable surplus considering asset replacement, future development, expansion, and inflation. The State Government may also frame policy guidelines for uniform approach by FRCs.

The High Court held that the Fee Regulatory Committee (FRC) must exercise its powers under Section 8 of the Gujarat Self Financed Schools (Regulation of Fees) Act, 2017, in its true perspective. The FRC is required to verify fee proposals by examining documentary evidence and conducting necessary verification, including spot verification of documents and school buildings, as per Rule 7(1)(c) of the Rules, 2017. The Court found that impugned orders often involved ad-hoc disallowances of expenditure without proper reasoning or justification. The FRC must provide cogent reasons based on inquiry and evidence for any disallowance, ensuring consistency across different zones. The FRC should not dictate standardized fee structures but should consider the unique methods of education and allow for reasonable surplus for development, future expansion, and other activities, while preventing profiteering and capitation fees. The Court quashed and set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matters back to the FRC for fresh determination of fee proposals, directing the FRC to complete the process within 12 weeks and permitting schools to charge existing fees in the interim.

The High Court held that the Fee Regulatory Committee (FRC) must verify fee proposals by scrutinizing documentary evidence and conducting spot verification as per Rule 7(1)(c) of the Rules, 2017. The Court found that impugned orders showed ad-hoc disallowances of expenditure without proper reasons or justification. The FRC is required to provide cogent reasons based on inquiry and evidence for any disallowance, and there should be consistency among different FRCs. The FRC should consider the fundamental right of self-financed schools under Article 19(1)(g) and not dictate standardized fee structures, as each school has a unique method of imparting education. If expenditure is not for education, the FRC must verify and assign reasons. The FRC needs to verify if schools receive cash or kind in excess of determined fees or if associated trusts/companies profit from school activities. It must also ascertain if proposed fees include more than a reasonable surplus for development. The FRC is directed to exercise its powers under Section 8 of the Act in its true perspective, ensuring fees do not result in profiteering or capitation fees, and include only a reasonable surplus considering asset replacement, future development, expansion, and inflation. The State Government may also frame policy guidelines for uniform approach by FRCs.

The High Court held that the trigger point for issuing a notice under Section 153A (and consequently 153C) is the search or requisition. The six assessment years to be considered are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. For the HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015 respectively, meant the previous year was 2014-15 and the assessment year was 2015-16, making the six preceding assessment years 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, the impugned notices and assessment orders were quashed and set aside.

The High Court held that the Tribunal was correct in holding the driver of the dumper as solely negligent. The court reasoned that the dumper was parked without any parking lights, signs, or reflectors on a dark night, making it difficult for the motorcycle driver to see it. The impact of the accident, as indicated by the panchnama, did not necessarily imply high speed by the motorcycle driver but rather the dumper's obstruction. The court found the Tribunal's assessment of the deceased's income at Rs. 4,000 per month to be contrary to the evidence on record, particularly the income tax returns which showed a higher net income. The court reassessed the deceased's income to be Rs. 20,000 per month, with 50% for prospective income, and applied a multiplier of 15, considering 1/4th deduction for personal expenses for 5 dependents. This resulted in a revised loss of dependency of Rs. 40,50,000. For conventional heads, the court applied the principles from N. Jayasree & Ors. and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Satinder Kaur @ Satwinder Kaur, awarding Rs. 2,64,000 for consortium (Rs. 44,000 each for six dependents), Rs. 16,500 for loss of estate, and Rs. 16,500 for funeral expenses. The total compensation was enhanced to Rs. 43,47,000.

The High Court held that the Tribunal's order was not infirm and did not give rise to any substantial question of law. The Tribunal had noted that during the assessment stage, the assessee had submitted all documents and confirmations, and each payee was a milk producer with a cattle farm. The Tribunal found that the AO had conducted inquiries and accepted the assessee's claim that the cash payments were made in exceptional circumstances covered by Rule 6DD(e)(ii). The Tribunal concluded that the AO's order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal's findings of fact and the settled legal position regarding the invocation of Section 263, finding no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Act, for the purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015, the relevant previous year was 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16, and the six preceding years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, all impugned notices and assessment orders challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction were quashed and set aside. The court did not examine individual satisfaction notes.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings initiated under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The trigger point for determining these years is the search itself. For instance, if a search was conducted on September 4, 2013, the relevant previous year is April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, making the relevant assessment year 2014-15. Consequently, the six preceding assessment years would be 2013-14, 2012-13, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, and 2008-09. Any notices issued for assessment years beyond this period are without jurisdiction. The court quashed the impugned notices and assessment orders on the ground that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was without jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the six assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for proceedings under Section 153C, are those immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these six years is the search/requisition, not the issuance of the notice under Section 153C. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 04.09.2013 (previous year 2013-14, assessment year 2014-15), the relevant six assessment years are 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 04.12.2014 and 13.03.2015 respectively (previous year 2014-15, assessment year 2015-16), the relevant six assessment years are 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these periods were held to be without jurisdiction. The Court did not delve into the merits of individual satisfaction notes, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect of Section 153C.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Act, for the purpose of proceedings under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these years is the search or requisition. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015 respectively, the relevant previous year was 2014-15, making the assessment year 2015-16. The six preceding assessment years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. The court did not delve into individual satisfaction notes or other issues raised, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect of the notices.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Act, for the purpose of proceedings under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these years is the search or requisition. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015 respectively, the relevant previous year was 2014-15, making the assessment year 2015-16. The six preceding assessment years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. The court did not delve into individual satisfaction notes or other issues raised, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect of the notices.

The High Court held that the relevant assessment years contemplated under Section 153A of the Act, for the purpose of proceedings under Section 153C, are the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was conducted. The trigger point for determining these years is the search or requisition. For HN Safal Group, where the search was on 4.9.2013, the relevant previous year was 2013-14, making the assessment year 2014-15. Thus, the six preceding assessment years were 2013-14 to 2008-09. For Barter Group and Venus Group, with searches on 4.12.2014 and 13.3.2015 respectively, the relevant previous year was 2014-15, making the assessment year 2015-16. The six preceding assessment years were 2014-15 to 2009-10. Notices issued for assessment years beyond these six years were held to be without jurisdiction. The court did not delve into individual satisfaction notes or other issues raised, focusing solely on the jurisdictional aspect of the notices.