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The High Court held that the writ petition fails and is dismissed. The Court found that the Assessing Officer had sufficient reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. The 'reasons to believe' were based on tangible material discovered during scrutiny, specifically cash transactions exceeding Rs. 87 Lakhs where individual payments were over Rs. 20,000 in a day, which are impermissible under Section 40A(iii) of the Act. The Court noted that the phrase 'reasons to believe' does not require the AO to have ascertained facts by legal evidence; rather, it requires prima facie material to form a belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in *Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd.*, emphasizing that under the substituted Section 147, the existence of the first condition (reason to believe that income has escaped assessment) suffices for jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the proceedings initiated under Section 147 were with sufficient material on record, showing income chargeable to tax that had escaped assessment, and therefore, the action was not bad in law. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the reassessment proceedings were not barred by limitation. The Court referred to Section 151(1) of the Act, stating that initiating proceedings beyond four years requires the satisfaction of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner based on the AO's recorded reasons. The Court emphasized that the phrase 'Reasons to Believe' does not require the AO to have ascertained facts by legal evidence; prima facie material is sufficient. The Court found that the AO had sufficient reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment, particularly concerning the cash transactions exceeding Rs. 2.53 Crores, which came to light during scrutiny. The Court cited Supreme Court judgments, including Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd., to support the principle that the AO's belief is based on subjective satisfaction and that the existence of tangible material is sufficient for initiating reassessment, not conclusive proof of escapement. The Court also noted that the final assessment order under Section 147 is appealable, providing the assessee with a further recourse. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court held that the phrase "Reasons to Believe" does not require the Assessing Officer (AO) to have ascertained facts by legal evidence. It only requires some material on the basis of which the AO can prima facie believe that certain income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The Court found that the AO had sufficient tangible material, including cash transactions exceeding Rs. 1.26 Crores, alleged bribe payments, and unrecorded payments to 'Mahila Patrakar Sangh', which indicated that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. These findings were noted as having come to the department's notice during scrutiny. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. (2008), emphasizing that at the initiation stage, the AO needs 'reason to believe' and not established fact. The Court also noted that a similar issue was previously dismissed by a Single Bench and affirmed by a Division Bench of the same High Court. Therefore, the proceedings initiated under Section 147 were held to be with sufficient material and not bad in law.
The High Court noted that the revenue had passed a final assessment order on 17.12.2019, during the pendency of the writ petition. The Court observed that the challenge in the writ petition was limited to the notice under Section 148 and the rejection of objections. Given the subsequent development of the final assessment order being passed, the Court found that the present writ petition had become infructuous. The Court reasoned that allowing the writ petition would not automatically quash the subsequent final assessment order dated 17.12.2019, as that order would need to be challenged separately. Therefore, the issues raised in the writ petition were deemed to be of academic interest and were left open to be considered in an appropriate case or agitated by the petitioner while challenging the final assessment order. The writ petition was dismissed as having become infructuous.
The High Court acknowledged its authority to entertain a writ petition even when a statutory alternative remedy exists, citing a series of Supreme Court decisions. However, it emphasized that such judicial review should not be exercised routinely. The Court noted that the Supreme Court has consistently held that assessees should not abandon the statutory mechanism for assessment/reassessment and appeal provided by the Act to invoke writ jurisdiction, referencing Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors. Vs. Chhabil Dass Agrawal, Bellary Steels & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Dy. Commissioner, Commercial Taxes (Assessments) and Others, and Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat Vs. Vijaybhai N. Chandrani. Crucially, the Court observed that the subsequent assessment order dated 04.12.2019, passed pursuant to the Section 148 notice, was not under challenge in the present writ petition. Without the subsequent order being independently challenged or the present petition being amended to challenge it, the Court would not examine its veracity. Therefore, in light of the subsequent assessment order, the writ petition was deemed to have become infructuous.
The High Court held that the rejection of the petitioner's objection to the initiation of reassessment proceedings under Section 147 was legal and justified. The court found that there was sufficient material available with the Assessing Officer, which led him to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. The court referenced Section 147, emphasizing that if the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, it confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. The court also cited Supreme Court judgments in *Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd.* and *ITO v. Selected Dalurband Coal Co. Pvt. Ltd.*, which state that at the initiation stage, the existence of relevant material upon which a reasonable person could form the requisite belief is sufficient, and the final outcome of the proceeding is not relevant. The court noted that the respondents had new, cogent, and tangible material regarding a Rs. 1.53 crore deposit that had escaped assessment, justifying the reassessment. The court explicitly stated it was not expressing an opinion on the merits of the case, which remained to be agitated before the Assessing Officer. The writ petition was rejected.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The reasoning was based solely on the submission by the Revenue's counsel regarding the change in litigation policy and the amount in dispute falling below the prescribed minimum threshold. No decision was made on the merits of the original ITAT order. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The learned standing counsel for the Revenue submitted that due to a change in litigation policy, as notified by Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, the amount in dispute did not meet the minimum benchmark for filing such appeals. Consequently, the Revenue sought to withdraw the appeal. The Court accepted this submission and dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the case.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The Court's decision was based on the submission made by the learned standing counsel for the Revenue, citing the change in litigation policy as per Circular No. 17 of 2019. The circular indicated that the amount in dispute did not cross the minimum benchmark required for pursuing the appeal. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the ITAT's order or the substantial questions of law that were initially raised. The principle derived is that appeals can be withdrawn if they no longer meet the criteria set by the prevailing litigation policy.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning provided is based on the Revenue's submission that the appeal was being withdrawn due to a change in litigation policy, as notified by the Government in Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019. The Revenue stated that the amount in dispute did not meet the minimum benchmark for filing such appeals. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the substantial questions of law that were initially raised. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The Court's decision was based on the submission made by the learned standing counsel for the Revenue, citing the change in litigation policy as per Circular No. 17 of 2019. The Revenue contended that the amount in dispute did not cross the minimum benchmark stipulated in the circular. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the original ITAT order. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The Court noted the submission made by the learned standing counsel for the Appellant (Revenue) regarding the change in litigation policy and the amount in dispute not crossing the minimum benchmark. Based on this submission, the High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the original ITAT order. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The Court noted the submission made by the learned standing counsel for the Appellant (Revenue) that by virtue of the change of litigation policy notified by the Government as per Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, the amount in dispute did not cross the minimum benchmark. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the substantial questions of law that were initially raised.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. This decision was based on a submission made by the learned standing counsel for the Appellant (Revenue). The submission stated that due to a change in litigation policy, as notified by the Government Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, the amount in dispute did not meet the minimum benchmark for filing such appeals. Consequently, the Revenue sought to withdraw the appeal. The High Court, in light of this submission, dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the original ITAT order.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The Court noted that the learned standing counsel for the Appellant (Revenue) submitted that by virtue of the change in litigation policy notified by the Government as per Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, the amount in dispute did not cross the minimum benchmark. Consequently, the appeal was sought to be withdrawn. The Court, in its operative directions, dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No specific findings were made on the merits of the ITAT's order, as the appeal was disposed of on procedural grounds of withdrawal.
The High Court, per Chief Justice P. R. Ramachandra Menon and Justice Parth Prateem Sahu, granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The Court noted the submission made by the learned standing counsel for the Appellant (Revenue) regarding the change in litigation policy and the amount in dispute not crossing the minimum benchmark. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the ITAT's order. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court granted permission to withdraw the appeal. The Revenue sought to withdraw the appeal based on the change of litigation policy notified by the Government vide Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, stating that the amount in dispute did not cross the minimum benchmark set by the policy. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the original ITAT order.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The Court noted the submission made by the learned standing counsel for the Appellant (Revenue) that as per the change of litigation policy notified by the Government vide Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, the amount in dispute did not cross the minimum benchmark. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the substantial questions of law originally raised.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The Court noted that the learned standing counsel for the appellant (Revenue) submitted that by virtue of the change of litigation policy notified by the Government vide Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, the amount in dispute did not cross the minimum benchmark. Therefore, the Revenue sought to withdraw the appeal. The High Court, in light of this submission, dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the ITAT's order. The principle derived is that appeals can be withdrawn by the Revenue if they no longer meet the criteria set by the litigation policy.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The Court noted the submission made by the learned standing counsel for the Appellant (Revenue) that the amount in dispute did not cross the minimum benchmark as per the Government's litigation policy circular dated 08.08.2019. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the case was made.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning provided is based on the change in the litigation policy of the Government, as notified by Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019. The Revenue contended that the amount in dispute in this particular appeal did not cross the minimum monetary threshold stipulated in the revised policy. Therefore, the Revenue was no longer inclined to pursue the appeal. The High Court, accepting this submission, dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No findings were made on the merits of the ITAT's order or the substantial questions of law that were initially raised. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeals. The Court noted the submission made by the learned standing counsel for the Appellant (Revenue) regarding the change in litigation policy as per Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated August 8, 2019. The Revenue stated that the amount in dispute did not cross the minimum benchmark set by this circular, and therefore, the appeals were sought to be withdrawn. The High Court accepted this submission and accordingly dismissed the appeals as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the original ITAT orders.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeals. The Court noted the submission made by the learned standing counsel for the Appellant (Revenue) that due to the change in litigation policy notified by the Government vide Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated August 8, 2019, the amount in dispute did not meet the minimum benchmark. Consequently, the Revenue sought to withdraw the appeals. The Court, in light of this submission, dismissed the appeals as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the substantial questions of law was made.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeals. The Court noted the submission made by the learned standing counsel for the Appellant (Revenue) regarding the change in litigation policy as per Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated August 8, 2019. The Revenue stated that the amount in dispute did not meet the minimum benchmark set by this circular, and therefore, the appeals were sought to be withdrawn. The Court accepted this submission and accordingly dismissed the appeals as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the substantial questions of law initially raised.
The High Court did not decide the merits of the questions referred. It noted that similar issues were pending before a Larger Bench of the Apex Court in the case of M/s Dynamic Orthopedics Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court found it appropriate to close the reference matters, stating that the Apex Court's verdict would govern these cases. The Court clarified that if any point remained unanswered after the Apex Court's decision, either party could file an interlocutory application to reopen these cases. Therefore, no specific finding was given on the allowability of prior period expenditure, the interpretation of 'loss' under Section 115J, or the liability for advance tax interest.
The High Court did not decide the merits of the questions referred. It noted that similar issues were pending before a Larger Bench of the Apex Court in the case of M/s Dynamic Orthopedics Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court found it appropriate to close the reference matters, stating that the Apex Court's verdict would govern these cases. The Court clarified that if any point remained unanswered after the Apex Court's decision, either party could file an interlocutory application to reopen these cases. Therefore, no specific finding was given on the allowability of prior period expenditure, the interpretation of 'loss' under Section 115J, or the liability for advance tax interest.
The High Court noted that similar questions were pending before a Larger Bench of the Apex Court in M/s Dynamic Orthopedics Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Cochin, Kerala. The Court observed that the Apex Court's final verdict would govern these issues. Therefore, the Court decided to close these reference matters, recording that the legal questions would be answered by the Apex Court's decision. The Court clarified that if any question remained unanswered requiring the High Court's interference, either the Revenue or the Assessee could file an interlocutory application to re-open these cases. The reference applications were closed subject to this condition.
The High Court held that the matter involved a fact-finding exercise that could be effectively pursued before the competent statutory authority. Therefore, it was not a matter for discussion and finalization under the discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court found no irregularity or illegality in the learned Single Judge's order. The appeal was dismissed, with a clarification that the Court had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. The appellant was free to establish the merits before the statutory authority. It was further clarified that the specific contention of the appellant regarding double taxation, due to having already satisfied the tax, would be considered and specifically answered by the competent authority during the reassessment proceedings.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that no substantial question of law was raised. The Court noted that the issue had already been considered and decided by a coordinate bench of the same High Court in Tax Case No. 30 of 2016, decided on 25.04.2017, where interference was declined in a similar appeal preferred by the Department. The ITAT had finalized the matter by referring to this jurisdictional High Court verdict. Therefore, the High Court found no reason to disagree with the ITAT's decision, which was based on the prior ruling of a coordinate bench. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision to treat the subsidy as 'revenue subsidy' was per se wrong and unsustainable. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the scheme, as evident from Annexure A/2 Rules, was explicitly to promote the construction of new cinema theaters. The Tribunal, while acknowledging the Supreme Court's emphasis on the 'purpose test' and the irrelevance of the 'point of time' of payment, 'source', or 'form', appeared to have contradicted itself by ultimately classifying the subsidy as 'revenue subsidy'. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd. (supra), particularly paragraph 15, which distinguished between subsidies for setting up a new unit or completing a project (capital purpose) and subsidies for assisting in carrying out business operations after commencement (trade purpose). In this case, the scheme's clear objective was the construction of cinema halls, thus falling under the 'capital purpose'. The Court also cited CIT v. Ponni Sugar & Chemicals Ltd. and CIT v. Chaphalkar Brothers, Pune, reinforcing the importance of the 'purpose test' and the classification of such subsidies as 'capital subsidies' to be excluded from assessment. Consequently, the impugned order of the Tribunal was set aside, and the appeals were allowed.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision to treat the subsidy as 'revenue subsidy' was per se wrong and unsustainable. The Tribunal, while acknowledging the Supreme Court's emphasis on the 'purpose test' and that the nature of the receipt depends on the purpose of the subsidy (capital vs. revenue), ultimately failed to apply this principle correctly. The Court found that the scheme, as evident from Annexure A/2 Rules, was explicitly for promoting the construction of new cinema theaters, not for promoting the running business. The Court reiterated that the nature and purpose of the subsidy are the conspicuous aspects to be looked into, as per the Supreme Court's pronouncements in *Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd.*, *CIT v. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd.*, and *CIT-1, Kolhapur v. M/s. Chaphalkar Brothers, Pune*. Therefore, the subsidy constituted a 'capital subsidy' and was to be excluded from assessment. The orders of the Tribunal were set aside.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision to treat the subsidy as 'revenue subsidy' was per se wrong and unsustainable. The Tribunal, while acknowledging the Supreme Court's emphasis on the 'purpose test' (nature and purpose of the subsidy being paramount, not the timing or source), appears to have contradicted itself by ultimately classifying the subsidy as revenue. The Court found that the scheme, as evident from Annexure A/2 and its Rules, was explicitly for promoting the construction of new cinema theatres. The quantification of the subsidy with reference to entertainment tax under Rule 5(k) did not negate the primary purpose of promoting construction. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd. (supra) and CIT v. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. (2008), and more recently in CIT-1, Kolhapur v. M/s. Chaphalkar Brothers, Pune (2018), which categorically declared that subsidies given for construction constitute 'capital subsidy' and are to be excluded from assessment. Therefore, the Tribunal's finding was not supported by reasoning and was contrary to established law. The appeals were allowed, and the impugned order of the Tribunal was set aside.
The High Court held that the prosecution for offences under Sections 276-C and 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, cannot be sustained once the penalty imposed under Section 271(1)(c) for concealment of income has been deleted by the appellate authorities. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in K.C. Builders and Another Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, which held that if the finding of concealment and the consequent penalty are struck down by the Tribunal, there is no concealment in the eyes of law, and therefore, the prosecution cannot proceed. The Court noted that the deletion of penalty by the CIT(Appeals) was upheld by the ITAT, and the Revenue did not pursue the matter further, making the ITAT's order final. Consequently, continuing the criminal trial would be an empty formality. The Court exercised its inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings.
The High Court granted the appellant's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court noted that the appellant had approached the High Court within the statutory time limit. Consequently, liberty was granted to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial questions of law, within a further period of one month. Subject to this liberty, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The Registry was directed to return the certified copies of the Tribunal's orders and service certificates to the learned standing counsel for further steps. No decision was made on the merits of the substantial questions of law.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law was involved in the appeal. The Court noted the submission made by the learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue that the issue was covered by the Apex Court's decision in Common Cause (A Registered Society) & Others Vs. Union of India & Others. The Apex Court had ruled that 'diary entries' and 'loose sheets' recovered from the assessee's premises cannot be the basis for finalizing the assessment, treating them as evidence. In light of this precedent, the High Court found that the issue stood covered against the Revenue and in favour of the Assessee. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as devoid of merits. No specific amount in dispute was recorded.
The High Court held that it found it difficult to agree with the Revenue's proposition. The Court noted that the CIT(A) had made a threadbare analysis of the facts and figures, as reproduced in the judgment. The CIT(A) found that the AO had not brought any evidence to prove that the Assessee earned more than returned or to substantiate the impugned additions made on estimations and suspicions. The CIT(A) held that ad-hoc disallowances made on estimations and presumptions were unsustainable as the declared results were accepted based on audited books of accounts, with no suppression in sales or inflation in purchases detected. The Tribunal, in its order, also found that the AO had not pointed out any inconsistency/discrepancy in the books of accounts, bills/vouchers, or disputed the fact of payment and TDS. The Tribunal considered the NP rate declared by the Assessee at 10.10% to be reasonable for civil construction business and that rejection of books of accounts was not warranted. The High Court concluded that the interference by the CIT(A) was based on factual aspects and evidence produced by the Assessee, over which satisfaction was recorded by the Tribunal. Therefore, it could not be a matter for re-appreciation of evidence under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found no substantial question of law and dismissed the appeal.
The High Court granted the Revenue's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court acknowledged that the Revenue had approached the Court within the statutory time limit and found it appropriate to grant liberty to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial questions of law, within a further period of one month. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The Registry was directed to return the certified copies of the Tribunal's orders and the service certificate to the learned standing counsel for the Revenue to proceed with further steps. No decision was made on the merits of the substantial questions of law.
The High Court allowed the writ appeal, setting aside the Single Judge's order. The Court held that once the assessment order was passed during the pendency of the writ petition, the assessee's primary remedy was to file an appeal against that order. The Court found that the writ petition was not maintainable in light of the availability of an alternative statutory remedy. Regarding the conditions for reassessment, the Court noted that the assessee herself submitted conflicting valuation reports, prompting the AO to call for the DVO's report under Section 55A. The Court concluded that the reasons recorded for reopening were based on application of mind and not merely a mechanical reference to the DVO's report, and that the DVO's report constituted material/information with a nexus to the subject, satisfying the "reason to believe" condition for Section 147. The Court also clarified that Section 263 is invoked when Section 147 conditions are not met, and in this case, the reopening was permissible. The assessee was relegated to file an appeal against the reassessment order within 30 days, with liberty to raise all factual and legal grounds, and the appellate authority was directed to decide the appeal on merits without raising objections regarding limitation.
The High Court granted the Revenue's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court acknowledged that the Revenue had approached the High Court within the statutory time limit and found it appropriate to grant liberty to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial questions of law, within a further period of one month. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeals as withdrawn. The Registry was directed to return the certified copies of the ITAT orders and service certificates to the learned standing counsel for the Revenue.
The High Court granted the Revenue's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court acknowledged that the Revenue had approached the High Court within the statutory time limit and found it appropriate to grant liberty to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial questions of law, within a further period of one month. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeals as withdrawn. The Registry was directed to return the certified copies of the ITAT orders and service certificates to the learned standing counsel for the Revenue.
The High Court granted the Revenue's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court acknowledged that the Revenue had approached the High Court within the statutory time limit and found it appropriate to grant liberty to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial questions of law, within a further period of one month. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeals as withdrawn. The Registry was directed to return the certified copies of the ITAT orders and service certificates to the learned standing counsel for the Revenue.
The High Court granted the Revenue's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court acknowledged that the Revenue had approached the High Court within the statutory time limit and found it appropriate to grant liberty to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial questions of law, within a further period of one month. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeals as withdrawn. The Registry was directed to return the certified copies of the ITAT orders and service certificates to the learned standing counsel for the Revenue.
The High Court granted the Revenue's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court acknowledged that the Revenue had approached the High Court within the statutory time limit and found it appropriate to grant liberty to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial questions of law, within a further period of one month. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeals as withdrawn. The Registry was directed to return the certified copies of the ITAT orders and service certificates to the learned standing counsel for the Revenue.
The High Court granted the appellant's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court noted that the appellant had approached the High Court within the statutory time limit. Therefore, liberty was granted to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial question of law, within a further period of one month from the date of the order. Subject to this liberty, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The registry was directed to return the certified copies of the Tribunal's orders and service certificates to the learned standing counsel.
The High Court granted the appellant's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court noted that the appellant had approached the High Court within the statutory time limit. Therefore, liberty was granted to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial question of law, within a further period of one month from the date of the order. Subject to this liberty, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The registry was directed to return the certified copies of the Tribunal's orders and service certificates to the learned standing counsel.
The High Court granted the appellant's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court noted that the appellant had approached the High Court within the statutory time limit. Therefore, liberty was granted to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial question of law, within a further period of one month from the date of the order. Subject to this liberty, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The registry was directed to return the certified copies of the Tribunal's orders and service certificates to the learned standing counsel.
The High Court granted the appellant's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court noted that the appellant had approached the High Court within the statutory time limit. Consequently, liberty was granted to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial questions of law, within a further period of one month. Subject to this liberty, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The Registry was directed to return the certified copies of the Tribunal's orders and service certificates to the learned standing counsel for further steps. No decision was made on the merits of the substantial questions of law.
The High Court granted the appellant's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court noted that the appellant had approached the High Court within the statutory time limit. Consequently, liberty was granted to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial questions of law, within a further period of one month. Subject to this liberty, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The Registry was directed to return the certified copies of the Tribunal's orders and service certificates to the learned standing counsel for further steps. No decision was made on the merits of the substantial questions of law.
The High Court granted the appellant's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court noted that the appellant had approached the High Court within the statutory time limit. Consequently, liberty was granted to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial questions of law, within a further period of one month. Subject to this liberty, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The Registry was directed to return the certified copies of the Tribunal's orders and service certificates to the learned standing counsel for further steps. No decision was made on the merits of the substantial questions of law.
The High Court granted the appellant's prayer to withdraw the appeals. The Court noted that the appellant had approached the High Court within the statutory time limit. Consequently, liberty was granted to the appellant to file fresh proceedings with corrected and modified pleadings and prayers, including the substantial questions of law, within a further period of one month. Subject to this liberty, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The Registry was directed to return the certified copies of the Tribunal's orders and service certificates to the learned standing counsel for further steps. No decision was made on the merits of the substantial questions of law.