Chhattisgarh High Court Judgments — 2017

The High Court, after perusing the materials, was satisfied that the learned counsel for the Appellant-Revenue was justified in submitting that these appeals are covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sarkar Builders; (2015) 7 SCC 579. Consequently, the Court permitted the appeals to be withdrawn. The operative direction was that the appeals are dismissed as withdrawn. No specific issues were decided on merits; the decision was based on the concession by the Revenue regarding the applicability of the Supreme Court precedent.

The High Court disposed of the petition based on the undertaking given by the senior standing counsel for the Income Tax Department. The court held that until the petitioner's appeal pending before the ITAT is finally decided, the Income Tax Authorities shall not pass a final order in the assessment proceedings initiated against the petitioner as per the order dated 15/11/2016 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax. The court also expressed an expectation that the ITAT would make all efforts to decide the petitioner's appeal as early as possible. The specific findings on the merits of the assessment or penalty proceedings were not addressed as the matter was resolved through the undertaking and the pending ITAT appeal.

The High Court held that the question of whether a particular expenditure is excessive and unreasonable is essentially a question of fact and does not involve any issue of law. This finding is supported by the judgments in Upper India Publishing House (P) Vs Commissioner of Income Tax and Coronation Flour Mills Vs Asstt CIT. Consequently, the High Court found that no substantial question of law arises for decision in the appeal, as required by Section 260A of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Revenue fails. Any other issues arising on the facts and circumstances of the case were left open as they were considered academic in light of the primary finding. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal.

The High Court held that the CESTAT was not justified in dismissing the appeal on default. Citing the Supreme Court's judgments in Commissioner of Income Tax v. S. Chenniappa Mudaliar and Balaji Steel Re-Rolling Mills v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, the Court reiterated the principle that an appeal to which Section 35-C of the Central Excise Act applies cannot be decided by the CESTAT by dismissing it for default. The reasoning is that the Tribunal has the power to restore appeals dismissed for default under Rule 20 of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1982. Therefore, the impugned order of dismissal by the CESTAT was set aside. The appeal before the CESTAT was remitted back for decision on merits after hearing the parties. The parties were directed to appear before the Tribunal on 3rd October, 2017. No costs were awarded.

The High Court held that Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies to fresh assessment orders made pursuant to orders passed under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the Commissioner exercised revisionary jurisdiction in search and seizure cases or reopened old assessments. The Court disagreed with the Appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C would prevent the application of Section 153(2A). The reasoning was that if the Appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively delete Section 263 in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, preventing the Commissioner from exercising suo motu powers as the limitation period would have expired. The Court stated that when an order is passed under Section 263, it is a fresh order, and the limitation has to be reckoned from the date of that order. The Income Tax Act does not specifically exclude Section 263 in search and seizure cases, and its revisionary powers can be exercised in all cases where an assessment is made. Therefore, the provisions of Section 153(2A) would be applicable, providing a limitation of one year from the date of the Commissioner's order.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the limitation period for making a fresh assessment under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies even when the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Act, irrespective of whether the original assessment stemmed from search and seizure operations governed by Sections 153B and 153C. The Court disagreed with the appellants' submission that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C preclude the application of Section 153(2A) in such scenarios. The reasoning was that if the appellants' argument were accepted, it would effectively render Section 263 inoperative in cases of reassessment based on search and seizure, as the limitation period would likely expire before the Commissioner could exercise his suo motu powers. The Court emphasized that an order passed under Section 263 initiates a fresh assessment, and the limitation for this fresh assessment must be reckoned from the date of that order, as per Section 153(2A), which provides a one-year period from the date of the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the appeals were found to have no merit.

The High Court held that the Appellants' submission regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments by the Assessing Officer following search and seizure operations. However, once the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment pursuant to an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's suo motu powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period prescribed in Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' submission regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments by the Assessing Officer following search and seizure operations. However, once the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment pursuant to an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's suo motu powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period prescribed in Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' submission regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments by the Assessing Officer following search and seizure operations. However, once the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment pursuant to an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's suo motu powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period prescribed in Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' submission regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments by the Assessing Officer following search and seizure operations. However, once the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment pursuant to an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's suo motu powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period prescribed in Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' submission regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments by the Assessing Officer following search and seizure operations. However, once the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment pursuant to an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's suo motu powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period prescribed in Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' submission regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments by the Assessing Officer following search and seizure operations. However, once the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment pursuant to an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's suo motu powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period prescribed in Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' submission regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments by the Assessing Officer following search and seizure operations. However, once the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment pursuant to an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's suo motu powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period prescribed in Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' submission regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments by the Assessing Officer following search and seizure operations. However, once the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment pursuant to an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's suo motu powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period prescribed in Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' submission regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments by the Assessing Officer following search and seizure operations. However, once the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment pursuant to an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's suo motu powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period prescribed in Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' submission regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments by the Assessing Officer following search and seizure operations. However, once the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment pursuant to an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's suo motu powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period prescribed in Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' contention regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments and reassessments under Section 147. When the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period under Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders passed under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' contention regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments and reassessments under Section 147. When the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period under Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders passed under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' contention regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments and reassessments under Section 147. When the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period under Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders passed under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' contention regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments and reassessments under Section 147. When the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period under Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders passed under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Appellants' contention regarding the limitation period was without merit. The Court reasoned that the non-obstante clauses in Sections 153B and 153C primarily deal with extending the period for initial assessments and reassessments under Section 147. When the Commissioner exercises revisionary powers under Section 263, the provisions of Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act become applicable. This section stipulates that an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under Section 263 must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under Section 263 is passed. The Court found that accepting the Appellants' argument would effectively negate the Commissioner's powers under Section 263 in search and seizure cases, as the limitation period would likely expire before such powers could be exercised. Therefore, the limitation period under Section 153(2A) applies to all fresh assessments made pursuant to orders passed under Section 263, irrespective of whether the revisionary jurisdiction was exercised in search and seizure cases or in other reopened assessments. The appeals were dismissed.