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638 orders from the Chhattisgarh High Court.
Most recent orders on record, from 2026.
The High Court held that the appellant has an efficacious statutory remedy under Section 246A of the Income Tax Act to file an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) within 30 days from the date of the assessment order. The Court noted that the appellant had not taken any ground in the writ petition stating that the grounds raised could not be adjudicated by the appellate authority. The Court further observed that a huge tax liability cannot be a ground to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution when an efficacious statutory remedy is available. Therefore, the learned Single Judge rightly refused to exercise discretion and dismissed the writ petition. Consequently, the writ appeal was found to have no merit and was dismissed.
The High Court held that the reopening of the assessment under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid and without jurisdiction. The Tribunal's view that the reopening was based on a mere change of opinion by the successor AO on the same set of facts considered during the original assessment was found to be correct and justified. The Court noted that the original AO had applied his mind to the specific queries regarding depreciation on DAM, additional depreciation, Section 14A disallowance, and pre-production income, and had made a conscious decision to allow these deductions after receiving replies and evidence from the assessee. The reasons recorded for reopening did not indicate any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material facts, nor did they rely on any new tangible material that came to light after the original assessment. The Court emphasized that reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated merely due to a mistake committed by the AO in the original assessment or solely based on a successor AO's opinion after examining the disclosed material. Such actions fall within the purview of impermissible change of opinion. Therefore, the "reasons to believe" were unfounded and not bonafide, rendering the initiation of reassessment proceedings patently invalid.
The High Court held that the impugned order rejecting the immunity from imposition of penalty was not in conformity with fair play and principles of natural justice. While the court acknowledged that the Assessing Officer must wait until the expiry of the prescribed appellate period before deciding on immunity, it found that the timeline provided to the petitioners to appear and present their case was inadequate. Notices were issued on 28th July 2026, requiring appearance on 29th July 2026, and the order was passed on 30th July 2026. This short period did not grant sufficient opportunity to the petitioners to substantiate their claims for immunity. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside. The court directed the petitioners to appear before the Assessing Authorities on 25th September 2026, submit their contentions, and the authorities were directed to pass an order considering the submissions and material in accordance with principles of natural justice and the Income-tax Act, 1961. The period prescribed under the Act for filing appeals was noted to expire on 30th September 2026.
The High Court held that while the Assessing Officer's action of waiting until the expiry of the appellate period before deciding the immunity issue was not faulty, the manner in which the immunity application was rejected violated the principles of natural justice. The court noted that notices were issued on July 28, 2026, requiring appearance on July 29, 2026, and the rejection order was passed on July 30, 2026. This short timeframe did not provide sufficient opportunity for the petitioners to present their case and substantiate their claims for immunity. Therefore, the impugned order rejecting the immunity application was set aside. The court directed the petitioners to appear before the Assessing Authorities on September 25, 2026, with all relevant records, to submit their contentions. The Assessing Authorities were then directed to consider the matter and pass an order in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The operative direction was to set aside the impugned order and grant an opportunity for a fresh hearing.
The High Court held that while the Assessing Officer's action of waiting until the expiry of the appellate period before deciding the immunity issue was not faulty, the manner in which the immunity application was rejected violated the principles of natural justice. The court noted that notices were issued on July 28, 2026, requiring appearance on July 29, 2026, and the rejection order was passed on July 30, 2026. This short timeframe did not provide sufficient opportunity for the petitioners to present their case and substantiate their claims for immunity. Therefore, the impugned order rejecting the immunity application was set aside. The court directed the petitioners to appear before the Assessing Authorities on September 25, 2026, with all relevant records, to submit their contentions. The Assessing Authorities were then directed to consider the matter and pass an order in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The operative direction was to set aside the impugned order and grant an opportunity for a fresh hearing.
The High Court held that the Assessing Officer would be at liberty to conduct the enquiry manually, provided it is done in accordance with the provisions of Section 148A(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court considered the facts and the previous direction issued in WPT No.79 of 2024. The reasoning appears to be that while the mechanism for online enquiry might be defunct due to the deletion of the specific provision, the underlying requirement for an enquiry under that section, as directed, can still be fulfilled through manual means, adhering to the spirit of the provision. The MCC was disposed of with this liberty granted.
The High Court, considering the limited prayer made by the petitioner, disposed of the writ petition. The Court directed Respondent No. 1 (Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax) to decide the application for grant of stay, moved by the petitioner along with the memo of appeal, expeditiously. The Court specified that the decision should preferably be made within a period of 60 days from the date of the order. The Court did not make any specific findings on the merits of the appeal or the stay application itself, nor did it grant any interim relief regarding coercive measures. The operative direction was solely for the expeditious disposal of the pending stay application by the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal held that the notices issued under Section 148A(d) and Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for assessment year 2015-16, dated 25.06.2021, are liable to be quashed. This decision is based on the concessions made by the revenue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal and Deepak Steel and Power Limited vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes & Ors. The Supreme Court, in these judgments, acknowledged that for assessment year 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion within the period prescribed under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. Therefore, taking into consideration these observations, the reassessment proceedings initiated by the revenue through the impugned order and notice were quashed. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions.
The High Court noted that the appellant's counsel conceded that the order dated 08.05.2025, passed in the application under proviso to Rule 24 of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963, was not appealable and that a writ petition would be the appropriate remedy. Consequently, the appellant sought permission to withdraw the present appeal with liberty to file appropriate proceedings challenging the order on the Rule 24 application. The respondent did not oppose this request. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn with the liberty as prayed for. The substantive issues regarding the dismissal of the application under Rule 24 and the ITAT's finding on merits were not decided on their merits.
The High Court, considering the limited prayer made by the petitioner, disposed of the writ petition. The Court directed the CIT(Appeals) to decide the application for grant of stay, moved by the petitioner along with the memo of appeal, expeditiously, preferably within a period of 60 days from the date of the order. The Court did not decide on the merits of the stay application or the appeal itself, but only issued a procedural direction for its timely disposal. No specific finding was given on the validity of the demand or the grounds for stay, as the primary issue was the delay in deciding the application. The operative direction was to the CIT(Appeals) to decide the stay application.
The High Court held that the impugned demands are well within the statutory authority of the respondent-State and are fully supported by the legislative framework of the Chhattisgarh Irrigation Act, 1931, and the Rules, 1974. The Court found that the constitutional foundation for the levy is sound, with Entry 17 of List II of the Seventh Schedule granting the State Legislature competence over water and water supplies, and the Act of 1931 being valid law. The Public Trust Doctrine further reinforces the State's obligation to regulate natural water resources. The Court clarified that Section 26 of the Act vests rights in all natural water resources, including underground water, in the State Government. Section 40, read with Rule 71-A of the Rules, expressly governs industrial utilization of water from natural and own sources, with Entry No. 2 of Rule 71-A specifically covering groundwater extraction. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the Act is confined to canal water, stating it would render Rule 71-A ineffective. Judicial precedents, including decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and this Court affirmed by the Supreme Court, conclusively settle the applicability of the Act and Rule 71-A to industrial users extracting groundwater. The CGWA NOC was held to be subject to all applicable laws and does not grant exemption from water charges. The Court found the quantity of water extracted disproportionate to domestic/greenbelt use and noted inconsistent positions by the petitioner. The argument of discrimination under Article 14 was dismissed, as the State's obligation to enforce the law cannot be waived due to selective enforcement. The revised rates and consequential demand were also held valid, as Section 92 of the Act empowers retrospective effect to rules. Consequently, both writ petitions were dismissed.
The High Court held that the impugned demands are well within the statutory authority of the respondent-State and are fully supported by the legislative framework of the Chhattisgarh Irrigation Act, 1931, and the Rules, 1974, as judicially interpreted. The Court found no constitutional infirmity under Articles 14 or 265 of the Constitution of India. The constitutional foundation for the levy is Entry 17 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, granting the State Legislature competence over water. The Public Trust Doctrine reinforces the State's obligation to regulate natural water resources. Section 26 of the Act of 1931 vests rights in all natural water resources, including underground water, in the State Government. Section 40, read with Rule 71-A of the Rules of 1974, expressly governs charges for industrial utilization of water from natural and own sources, with Entry No. 2 of Rule 71-A specifically covering groundwater extracted from own sources. The Court noted that the validity of Rule 71-A was not challenged. Judicial precedent, including decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and this Court (affirmed by the Supreme Court), conclusively settles the applicability of the Act and Rule 71-A to industrial users extracting groundwater. The CGWA NOC is subject to all applicable laws and does not grant exemption from water charges. The petitioner's claim of exclusive domestic/drinking/greenbelt use was rejected due to the disproportionate quantity extracted and inconsistent positions taken. The argument of discrimination under Article 14 failed, as the State's obligation to enforce the law cannot be waived due to selective enforcement elsewhere. The revised rates and demand were also held valid, as Section 92 of the Act empowers the State Government to give retrospective effect to rules. Consequently, both writ petitions were dismissed, and the petitioner was directed to comply with the impugned demand.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court noted that the petitioner had challenged the notice under Section 148 dated March 11, 2015. However, during the pendency of the petition, a reassessment order was passed on March 23, 2016, and the petitioner subsequently filed a statutory appeal against this order on April 12, 2016. The Senior Counsel for the petitioner did not dispute the pendency of this appeal or that the reassessment order was not challenged in the present petition. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in *Satya Pal Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, which held that a party with multiple remedies must elect one and cannot indulge in multiplicity of proceedings, the Court found no reason for interference. The Court emphasized that the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is extraordinary and discretionary, and the High Court should not overlook the conduct of the party invoking it, especially when an alternative and efficacious statutory remedy has been resorted to. Therefore, the petition was dismissed as devoid of merit.
The High Court held that the writ petition filed by the Revenue fails and is hereby dismissed. The Court reasoned that the ITAT's order was passed on August 14, 2018, at which time CBDT Circular No. 03/2018 dated July 11, 2018, was in existence. The subsequent CBDT Circular No. 5/2024 dated March 15, 2024, was issued after the ITAT's order. The Court agreed with the respondent's submission that the circular dated March 15, 2024, cannot be given retrospective effect. Therefore, the circular prevailing on the date the ITAT passed its order would govern the situation. The Court found no merit in the Revenue's attempt to rely on a later circular to justify the competence of their appeal before the ITAT.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a specific direction. The Court noted that the order dated March 30, 2022, indicated that the reply to the show-cause notice was not accepted due to the absence of relevant books of account and documents. However, the petitioner's counsel informed the Court that such documents were subsequently placed before Respondent No. 3 in response to the notice issued under Sections 148A and 148B. Therefore, the Court directed Respondent No. 3 to consider the reply along with the documents submitted by the petitioner while taking a decision in the matter. The interim order previously granted was vacated. The Court did not explicitly decide on the legality of the impugned order or notice but rather remanded the consideration of the petitioner's submissions to the authority.
The High Court held that the Value Added Tax (VAT) payable by the respondent-assessee could not be brought within the disallowances contemplated under Section 40(a)(iib) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court drew a clear distinction between a 'tax' and a 'fee' or 'charge', as established by the Supreme Court in the case of Kerala State Beverages (Manufacturing & Marketing) Corporation Ltd. vs ACIT. The Court reasoned that VAT, as defined in the relevant Act, is a tax on the sale or purchase of goods. Since the Supreme Court held that a tax cannot be brought within the expression 'fee or charge' employed in Section 40(a)(iib), the VAT paid by the assessee is a discharge of statutory tax liability and not an appropriation or fee/charge covered by the said section. The Court found no material on record to establish that the State Government appropriated any amount belonging to the assessee independently of the VAT liability. Therefore, the first question of law was answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee. The second question of law was not pressed by the Revenue. The Tribunal's order setting aside the Commissioner's disallowance of VAT deduction was affirmed.
The High Court held that the impugned order of the ITAT was not sustainable. The Court noted that Section 253(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, mandates that the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Tribunal is two months from the end of the month in which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the assessee. The ITAT had failed to consider the appellant's specific pleading that the CIT(A) order was not served upon him and that he only came to know about it upon receiving a recovery notice. The Court relied on Supreme Court decisions emphasizing that the starting point for limitation is the date of communication or knowledge of the order. In the absence of proof that the order was communicated to the assessee, and considering the appellant's claim of non-receipt and subsequent discovery of the order, the ITAT's conclusion that sufficient cause was not shown for condoning the delay was erroneous. The Court found that the appeal was filed within the prescribed period from the date of receipt of the copy of the order, as the appellant obtained knowledge of the order on 25.11.2022 and filed the appeal thereafter. Therefore, the ITAT's order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the ITAT for deciding the appeal on merits.
The High Court held that the Value Added Tax (VAT) paid by the respondent-assessee is a tax on the sale of goods, as defined under the relevant Act. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Kerala State Beverages (Manufacturing & Marketing) Corporation Ltd. vs. ACIT, the Court reiterated the clear distinction drawn between a 'tax' and a 'fee' or 'charge' within the scope of Section 40(a)(iib) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that 'VAT' cannot be brought within the expression 'fee or charge' employed in Section 40(a)(iib). Furthermore, there was no material on record to establish that the State Government appropriated any amount belonging to the assessee independently of the VAT liability. Therefore, the payment of VAT was considered a discharge of statutory tax liability, not an appropriation within the meaning of Section 40(a)(iib)(B). Consequently, the VAT payable by the assessee could not be disallowed under Section 40(a)(iib). The first question of law was answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee. The second question of law was not pressed by the Revenue. The Tribunal's order setting aside the Commissioner of Appeals' disallowance of VAT deduction was affirmed.
The High Court held that the Value Added Tax (VAT) payable by the respondent-assessee could not be brought within the disallowances contemplated under Section 40(a)(iib) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court drew a clear distinction between a 'tax' and a 'fee' or 'charge', as established by the Supreme Court in Kerala State Beverages (Manufacturing & Marketing) Corporation Ltd. vs ACIT. The judgment clarified that Section 40(a)(iib) specifically refers to fees and charges, not taxes. Since VAT is defined as a tax on the sale of goods, it falls outside the purview of Section 40(a)(iib). The Court found no material on record to establish that the State Government independently appropriated any amount belonging to the assessee, apart from the VAT liability. Therefore, the payment was considered a discharge of statutory tax liability. The first question of law was answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee. The second question of law was not pressed by the revenue. The Tribunal's order setting aside the Commissioner of Appeals' disallowance of VAT deduction was affirmed.
The High Court held that the Value Added Tax (VAT) payable by the respondent-assessee could not be brought within the disallowances contemplated under Section 40(a)(iib) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court drew a clear distinction between a 'tax' and a 'fee' or 'charge', as established by the Supreme Court in Kerala State Beverages (Manufacturing & Marketing) Corporation Ltd. vs ACIT. The judgment clarified that Section 40(a)(iib) specifically refers to fees and charges, not taxes. Since VAT is defined as a tax on the sale of goods, it falls outside the purview of Section 40(a)(iib). The Court found no material on record to establish that the State Government independently appropriated any amount belonging to the assessee, apart from the VAT liability. Therefore, the payment was considered a discharge of statutory tax liability. The first question of law was answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee. The second question of law was not pressed by the revenue. The Tribunal's order setting aside the Commissioner of Appeals' disallowance of VAT deduction was affirmed.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition based on the submissions made by both parties and a letter dated 17.08.2026 issued by the Central Circle 1, Bilaspur. The Court directed the competent authority, who issued the letter dated 17.08.2026, to take an appropriate decision pursuant to that letter expeditiously and strictly in accordance with law. The judgment does not explicitly detail the findings on the specific claims for refunds and interest, but rather remits the matter for expeditious decision by the authority. No specific issue was left undecided, as the petition was disposed of with a direction for action.
The High Court held that an efficacious alternative remedy was available to the petitioners by way of an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) under Section 246A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ petitions as withdrawn. The Court granted the petitioner 30 days to prefer an appeal before the appellate authority. If an appeal is filed, the appellate authority was directed to decide it expeditiously after affording due opportunity of hearing to the parties. No specific finding was made on the merits of the original dispute, as the petitions were withdrawn.
The High Court held that an efficacious alternative remedy was available to the petitioners by way of an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) under Section 246A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ petitions as withdrawn. The Court granted the petitioner 30 days to prefer an appeal before the appellate authority. If an appeal is filed, the appellate authority was directed to decide it expeditiously after affording due opportunity of hearing to the parties. No specific finding was made on the merits of the original dispute, as the petitions were withdrawn.
The High Court held that the petitioners are entitled to interest on the refund amount from the date of payment of tax until June 1, 2016. The court noted that interest for the period from June 1, 2016, to July 30, 2018, had already been paid. The reasoning was based on the interpretation of Section 244A of the Act, particularly clause (b) which, in 'any other case,' allows interest from the date of payment of tax when the payment is not pursuant to a notice of demand under Section 156. The court relied on Supreme Court and Karnataka High Court precedents (though not explicitly named in the provided text, the principles align with established jurisprudence on Section 244A) which held that interest on refunds arising from excess self-assessment tax should be paid from the date of payment of such tax. The operative direction was for the respondents to determine the interest accordingly and make the payment within 60 days.
The High Court held that the petitioners are entitled to interest on the refund amount from the date of payment of tax until June 1, 2016. The court noted that interest for the period from June 1, 2016, to July 30, 2018, had already been paid. The reasoning was based on the interpretation of Section 244A of the Act, particularly clause (b) which, in 'any other case,' allows interest from the date of payment of tax when the payment is not pursuant to a notice of demand under Section 156. The court relied on Supreme Court and Karnataka High Court precedents (though not explicitly named in the provided text, the principles align with established jurisprudence on Section 244A) which held that interest on refunds arising from excess self-assessment tax should be paid from the date of payment of such tax. The operative direction was for the respondents to determine the interest accordingly and make the payment within 60 days.