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The High Court allowed the Writ Petition. Regarding territorial jurisdiction, the Court noted that while the original assessment orders might have been passed by an officer in Delhi, the recovery notice under Section 220 was issued to the Petitioner in Pune, and the Pune officer was also involved in the transfer of jurisdiction and records. The Court found that the Petitioner's cause of action arose partly in Pune, justifying its jurisdiction. On the substantive issue, the Court held that the impugned demands are unsustainable. The Revenue failed to produce any material on record to substantiate the existence of valid orders giving rise to the demands, despite repeated opportunities and directions. The failure of the Delhi officer to respond and the Pune officer's inability to locate records led the Court to draw an adverse inference against the Revenue. The Court relied on its previous decision in Udayan Bhaskaran Nair V/S DCIT, stating that recovery of non-existent demands cannot be made in the absence of valid intimations or orders. Consequently, the Court quashed and set aside the demands and the recovery notice, directing the removal of the demands from the Income Tax Portal.
The High Court noted that the Revenue had placed a communication dated March 17, 2026, informing the assessee that the notice under Section 148 dated March 30, 2025, was withdrawn. Based on this communication and the contention stated therein, the Court was of the opinion that the other notice under Section 148A(d) dated March 28, 2025, must also stand dropped. Consequently, both notices were considered dropped. The Court stated that it would be open for the Revenue to take such proceedings as are contemplated under law. The contentions of the parties with regard to the subject matter of the petition were left open. The petition was disposed of.
The High Court disposed of the Writ Petition by directing the petitioner to pursue the appeal already filed before the CIT (A) against the impugned notice issued under Section 148 and the impugned Assessment Order. All contentions challenging the impugned notice and the Assessment Order, on all grounds available to the petitioner, including those raised in the writ petition, were kept open to be agitated before the CIT (A). The Court further ordered that until the appeal before the CIT (A) is decided, the impugned Assessment Order and any consequential notices emanating therefrom shall not be acted upon. The High Court clarified that all contentions of all parties are expressly kept open to be agitated before the CIT (A) and will be decided by the CIT (A) on its own merits and in accordance with law. No order as to costs was made.
The High Court held that the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) could not be made. The court concurred with the ITAT and CIT(A) that the cross charges paid by the assessee to M/s. Pfizer Ltd. were purely in the nature of reimbursement of expenses incurred under a cost-sharing agreement, without any markup or profit component. The court emphasized that the payee (M/s. Pfizer Ltd.) had furnished its return of income, included the relevant income, and paid the due taxes, as evidenced by a Chartered Accountant's certificate. This factual position was undisputed. The court further relied on the principle that the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) and the first proviso to Section 201(1) are beneficial and curative, creating a legal fiction that if the payee has filed its return and paid taxes, the payer shall not be deemed an assessee in default. Therefore, the assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default. The court found no substantial question of law involved and dismissed the appeal.
The High Court held that the assessee is eligible for deduction under Section 80-IA(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court agreed with the ITAT's findings. Regarding the Revenue's contention that the assessee was merely a contractor, the Court noted that the assessee had undertaken financial risk and exposure, deploying significant machinery, including newly purchased equipment, for the projects. The Court relied on the Gujarat High Court's decision in PCIT v. Montecarlo Construction Ltd., which distinguished between a contractor and a developer, stating that a developer undertakes overall responsibility, managerial and financial obligations, and exercises control, even if land ownership remains with the Government. The Court also cited CIT v. ABG Heavy Industries Ltd. to support the view that an assessee need not develop the entire infrastructure facility to qualify. Concerning the 'transfer' of infrastructure, the Court held that handing over possession of the developed facility to the State Government after completion constitutes a transfer within the meaning of Section 80-IA(4). The Court concluded that the appeals lacked merit and dismissed them, answering the substantial question of law in favour of the assessee.
The High Court held that in light of the petitioner's statement and instructions to withdraw the Writ Petition, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The court explicitly clarified that it had not examined the merits of the matter, and any contentions raised in the Writ Petition would be considered by the ITAT when the petitioner files their appeal. The Interim Application filed in the Writ Petition was also disposed of as nothing survived in it due to the withdrawal of the main petition. No order as to costs was made.
The High Court held that the assessee was eligible for deduction under Section 80-IA(4). The Court agreed with the ITAT's findings. Regarding the 'developer' status, the Court, relying on precedents like PCIT v. Montecarlo Construction Ltd., distinguished between a contractor and a developer, noting that a developer undertakes overall responsibility, managerial and financial obligations, and exercises control, even if land ownership remains with the government. The Court also cited CIT v. ABG Heavy Industries Ltd. to establish that an assessee need not develop the entire infrastructure facility to qualify. Concerning the 'transfer' requirement, the Court interpreted 'transfer' in the factual context, considering that the land was handed over to the assessee for development and subsequently handed back to the State Government upon completion. This handing over of possession was deemed a transfer within the meaning of Section 80-IA(4) 1B. The Court concluded that the assessee had developed the infrastructure facility and transferred it by handing over possession as per the agreement, aligning with a 'build and transfer' model. The substantial question of law was answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The appeals were dismissed.
The High Court allowed the Writ Petition. The Court noted the fair stand taken by the Revenue and accepted its concession that the penalty order could not have been passed in the given facts. The Court reasoned that the ITAT had deleted the quantum addition on March 17, 2025, rendering the under-reported income to be nil. Consequently, the penalty levied under Section 270A on March 18, 2025, was not leviable. The Court quashed and set aside the penalty order dated March 18, 2025, and the demand notice dated March 18, 2025. The Income Tax Department was directed to ensure that the demand is no longer reflected in their system within two weeks. The rule was made absolute.
The High Court held that the MPID Act has an overriding effect over the PMLA and the provisions of the Income Tax Act under which the money was seized. The Court agreed with the trial court's finding that the subject money was received from NSEL, a fact not disputed by the Appellant. Citing the case of National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Union of India, the Court reasoned that while SARFAESI Act and RDB Act, enacted under List-I, cannot override the MPID Act (enacted under List-II), allowing such an override would denude the State of its legislative power and offend the federal structure. Therefore, the MPID Act's overriding effect is affirmed. The Court found the trial court's decision to release the money justifiable, especially since the settlement agreement stipulated that any released money would be credited to NSEL's Escrow Account for transfer to investors. The Court noted that the settlement agreement was held lawful by the Supreme Court and that Respondent No. 5 had no objection to the release. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that a public charitable trust is deemed irrevocable by operation of law unless the trust instrument expressly provides for revocation. The absence of an explicit irrevocability clause is not a valid ground for rejecting an application for registration or renewal under Section 12AB of the Act. The Court found that the Commissioner's action was contrary to the plain language of the statute and binding judicial precedents. Furthermore, the Court held that compelling applicants to answer "Yes" to the irrevocability question in Form 10AB, when the trust deed is silent, does not constitute "false or incorrect information" or a "specified violation." The Court reasoned that the trusts, acting under a bonafide belief, submitted their position, and this belief was correct given the legal position. The Court quashed the impugned rejection orders and directed the respondents to refrain from rejecting applications solely on these grounds, to amend the utility of Form 10AB to allow correct declarations, and to reconsider the applications afresh within six weeks. The Court also directed that consequential orders denying registration under Section 80G based on the Section 12AB rejection be set aside.
The High Court of Judicature at Bombay dismissed the writ petition for non-prosecution. The court observed that no steps had been taken by the petitioner or her advocate to circulate the petition after February 11, 2015, indicating a lack of interest in pursuing the matter. Consequently, the petition was not decided on its merits. No specific relief was granted or denied on the substantive issues, as the dismissal was procedural.
The High Court held that the impugned order of the ITAT was not infirm. Section 201(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, stipulates that no order under Section 201(1) can be made after the expiry of two years from the end of the financial year in which the TDS statement is filed. The commencement of limitation is linked to the filing of the TDS Return. Since TDS statements are mandatorily filed quarterly under Rule 31A, the computation of limitation must operate quarter-wise. For the first three quarters, TDS Returns were filed in Financial Year 2008-09. The order dated March 15, 2012, was passed after the expiry of two years from the end of that financial year, making it time-barred. Therefore, the ITAT was justified in directing the deletion of the demand for these quarters. For the fourth quarter, the TDS Return was filed in Financial Year 2009-10, and the order dated March 15, 2012, was within two years from the end of that financial year, so the demand was rightly sustained. The court rejected the revenue's contention for cumulative or annual computation of limitation, stating it was contrary to the statutory framework where each quarter is a separate compliance period.
The High Court held that the Revenue failed to discharge its burden of proof to establish any tax liability strictly within statutory parameters, citing the principle *ei qui affirmat incumbit probatio*. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in *Parimisetti Seetharamamma Vs. CIT Hyderabad* which states the onus rests upon the Revenue to bring a receipt to tax. The CIT(A) had also discussed the issue of double taxation, referencing rulings like *Joti Prasad Agarwal* and *Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kanpur Coal Syndicate*, which imply that the same income cannot be taxed twice. The Court found no fault with the CIT(A)'s and ITAT's findings that the addition should not sustain and be deleted. The Court concluded that no substantial question of law arose for consideration and dismissed the appeal.
The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in its Civil Appellate Jurisdiction, considered the statement made by the petitioner's advocate. The Court noted that the advocate had instructions to withdraw the Writ Petition due to the correct jurisdiction lying with the Nagpur Bench. Consequently, the Court dismissed the Writ Petition as withdrawn. The Court also granted the petitioner the liberty to file the petition afresh before the Nagpur Bench, as prayed. No order as to costs was made. The specific findings on the merits of the original challenge are not applicable as the petition was withdrawn.
The Bombay High Court allowed the Writ Petition. Regarding the first reason for reopening, which cited a clerical mistake in the change in inventory leading to an underassessment of Rs.35,752/-, the Court found that this reason no longer survived. This was because the entire addition related to the transfer of TDR, which was the subject of this calculation, had been deleted by the ITAT. The Court noted that the Revenue did not dispute this fact. Concerning the second reason for reopening, which questioned cash deposits totaling Rs.5,11,47,000/-, the Court observed that this issue had been specifically examined during the original scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3). The Petitioner had provided a detailed explanation, including the cash book, which was accepted by the AO, who made no addition on this count. The Court held that the AO could not have concluded a failure on the part of the Petitioner to disclose material facts when the issue was already considered and accepted. It concluded that the reopening was based on a mere change of opinion, which is not a valid ground for reopening an assessment. Therefore, the notice under Section 148 and the order disposing of objections were quashed.
The High Court noted that the learned advocate for the petitioner had stated that she had received instructions to unconditionally withdraw the Writ Petition. In view of this statement, the Court dismissed the Writ Petition as withdrawn. There was no order as to costs. The judgment does not record any specific reasoning beyond accepting the petitioner's counsel's statement regarding withdrawal.
The High Court disposed of the Writ Petition by directing the Petitioner to pursue its pending appeal before the CIT Appeals against both the Notice issued under Section 148 and the Assessment Order. The Court explicitly kept open all contentions challenging the impugned Notice and Assessment Order, including those raised in the Writ Petition, to be agitated before the CIT Appeals. Furthermore, the Court ordered that the impugned Assessment Order shall not be acted upon until the appeal before the CIT Appeals is decided. The Court clarified that all contentions of all parties are expressly kept open to be decided by the CIT Appeals on its own merits and in accordance with law. No decision was made on the merits of the case.
The High Court noted that the petitioner had already filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) challenging the impugned Assessment Order, and this appeal was pending. The revenue's counsel did not dispute this fact. Citing the precedent in Shantilal Prabhudas & Co. vs. Income-tax Officer, the Court disposed of the Writ Petition with specific directions. The Petitioner was directed to pursue its pending appeal before the CIT (Appeals). All contentions challenging the Notice and the Assessment Order, including those raised in the Writ Petition, were kept open to be agitated before the CIT (Appeals). The Court further directed that the impugned Assessment Order shall not be acted upon until the appeal is decided by the CIT (Appeals). The Court clarified that all contentions of all parties are expressly kept open for the CIT (Appeals) to decide on merits.
The High Court disposed of the Writ Petition by directing the Petitioner to pursue its pending appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) against both the Notice issued under Section 148 and the Assessment Order. The Court kept open all contentions challenging the impugned Notice and Assessment Order, including those raised in the Writ Petition, to be agitated before the CIT (Appeals). Crucially, the Court ordered that until the appeal is decided by the CIT (Appeals), the impugned Assessment Order shall not be acted upon. The Court clarified that all contentions of all parties are expressly kept open for the CIT (Appeals) to decide on merits. No specific finding was given on the legality of the notice or assessment order, as the matter was relegated to the appellate authority.
The High Court disposed of the Writ Petition by directing the Petitioner to pursue its appeal already filed before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) against the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 and the impugned Assessment Order. The Court explicitly kept open all contentions challenging the Notice and the Assessment Order, including those raised in the Writ Petition, to be agitated before the CIT (Appeals). The Court further directed that until the Appeal before the CIT (Appeals) is decided, the impugned Assessment Order shall not be acted upon. It was clarified that all contentions of all parties are expressly kept open to be agitated before the CIT (Appeals) and will be decided by the CIT (Appeals) on its own merits and in accordance with law. No order as to costs was made.
The High Court disposed of the Writ Petition by directing the Petitioner to pursue its pending appeal before the CIT Appeals against both the Section 148 notice and the Assessment Order. The Court explicitly kept open all contentions challenging the notice and the assessment order, including those raised in the Writ Petition, to be agitated before the CIT Appeals. Furthermore, the Court ordered that the impugned Assessment Order shall not be acted upon until the appeal before the CIT Appeals is decided. The Court clarified that all contentions of all parties are expressly kept open for the CIT Appeals to decide on its merits and in accordance with law. The Writ Petition was disposed of in these terms, with no order as to costs.
The High Court disposed of the Writ Petition by directing the Petitioner to pursue its appeal already filed before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) against the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 and the impugned Assessment Order. The Court explicitly kept open all contentions challenging the notice and the assessment order, on all grounds available to the Petitioner, including those raised in the Writ Petition, to be agitated before the CIT Appeals. Furthermore, the Court ordered that until the appeal before the CIT Appeals is decided, the impugned Assessment Order shall not be acted upon. The Court clarified that all contentions of all parties are expressly kept open to be agitated before the CIT Appeals, and these will be decided by the CIT Appeals on their own merits and in accordance with law. No order as to costs was made.
The High Court granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the Writ Petition. The Court noted the statement made by the petitioner's counsel that another petition on the same cause of action had already been filed. Based on this submission, the Court dismissed the Writ Petition as withdrawn. No order as to costs was made. The judgment does not address any substantive issues related to income tax law or the merits of the case.
The High Court held that the petitioners have an alternate and equally efficacious remedy before the Central Administrative Tribunal. This finding was based on the statement made by the petitioners' counsel that similarly situated employees have already filed applications before the CAT. Consequently, the court granted permission to withdraw the present writ petitions with liberty to file applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal is directed to decide these applications on their merits within six months of filing, and any delay in filing the applications will be considered by the Tribunal for condonation if filed within four weeks. All issues are kept open.
The High Court granted permission to the petitioners to withdraw the present writ petitions. This decision was based on the statement made by the petitioners' counsel that an alternate and equally efficacious remedy was available before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), citing the precedent of similarly situated employees who had already approached the CAT. The Court directed that the writ petitions be disposed of as withdrawn, with liberty granted to the petitioners to file applications before the CAT within four weeks from the date of the order. The CAT was further directed to decide these applications on their merits within six months of their filing. Any delay in filing the applications before the CAT would be considered by the Tribunal during the condonation of delay application, provided the applications were filed within the stipulated four-week period. All issues were kept open.
The High Court disposed of the Writ Petition by directing the Petitioner to pursue the appeal already filed before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) against the impugned Notice under Section 148 and the impugned Assessment Order. All contentions challenging the Notice and the Assessment Order, including those raised in the Writ Petition, were kept open to be agitated before the CIT (Appeals). The Court further directed that until the appeal is decided, the impugned Assessment shall not be acted upon. The Court clarified that all contentions of the parties are expressly kept open for the CIT (Appeals) to decide on merits and in accordance with law. No specific finding was given on the merits of the challenge to the Notice or the Assessment Order, as the matter was remitted to the appellate authority.
The Bombay High Court disposed of the Writ Petition by directing the petitioner to pursue the appeal already filed before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The Court kept open all contentions challenging the impugned Notice and Assessment Order, on all grounds available to the petitioner, including those raised in the Writ Petition, to be agitated before the CIT (Appeals). The Court further directed that until the appeal is decided, the impugned assessment shall not be acted upon. All contentions of the parties were expressly kept open to be decided by the CIT (Appeals) on its own merits and in accordance with law. No issue was expressly left undecided; the Court deferred the decision to the appellate authority.
The High Court held that the petitioners have an alternate and equally efficacious remedy by filing applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal. This was based on the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, acknowledging that similarly situated employees had already approached the Central Administrative Tribunal. Consequently, the Court granted permission to withdraw the present writ petitions with liberty to file applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal is directed to decide these applications on their merits within six months of filing, and to consider the delay caused in prosecuting the writ petitions when considering any application for condonation of delay, provided the applications are filed within four weeks from the date of the order. All issues were kept open.
The High Court noted the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding the availability of an alternate and equally efficacious remedy before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) due to similar matters being filed there. Consequently, the court granted permission to withdraw the present writ petitions. The petitions were disposed of as withdrawn, with liberty granted to the petitioners to file applications before the CAT within four weeks. The CAT was directed to decide these applications on their merits within six months of filing, taking into consideration any delay caused by the present petitions. All issues were kept open, and pending civil applications were also disposed of.
The High Court granted permission to the petitioners to withdraw the present writ petitions. The Court accepted the statement made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that an alternate and equally efficacious remedy was available before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), as some similarly situated employees had already approached the CAT. Consequently, the writ petitions were disposed of as withdrawn. The Court directed that the petitioners could file applications before the CAT within four weeks from the date of the order. If filed within this period, the CAT was directed to decide the applications on their own merits within six months thereafter. The Court also clarified that any delay caused in prosecuting the writ petitions would be considered by the CAT while deciding any application for condonation of delay. All issues were kept open, and pending civil applications were also disposed of.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the Income Tax Authorities to provide the Petitioner with copies of the Assessment Order passed under Section 144 read with Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, the order passed under Section 154 of the Act, and the copy of the notice of demand for A.Y. 2009-10. The Court further directed that the recovery of the tax demand of Rs. 26,92,310/- shall remain stayed until these documents are furnished to the Petitioner and for a period of four weeks thereafter. The Court did not decide on the merits of the tax demand itself but provided procedural relief to the Petitioner. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the petitioners have an alternate and equally efficacious remedy before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT). Based on the statement made by the petitioners' counsel, the court granted permission to withdraw the present writ petitions. The petitions were disposed of as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioners to file applications before the CAT within four weeks from the date of the order. The CAT was directed to decide these applications on their merits within six months thereafter, taking into consideration any delay caused in prosecuting the writ petitions. All issues were kept open, and pending civil applications were also disposed of.
The High Court noted the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that an alternate and equally efficacious remedy was available before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), as some similarly situated employees had already approached it. Consequently, the Court granted permission to withdraw the present writ petitions. The petitions were disposed of as withdrawn, with liberty granted to the petitioners to file applications before the CAT within four weeks from the date of the order. The CAT was directed to decide these applications on their merits within six months thereafter. The Court also stipulated that any delay in filing the applications before the CAT, caused by prosecuting the writ petitions, would be considered by the CAT while deciding any application for condonation of delay. All issues were kept open.
The High Court held that the Notice issued under Section 148 by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer instead of the Faceless Assessing Officer is a fatal defect. The Court found no merit in the Revenue's argument that the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. (supra) was not applicable to central charges, citing another Division Bench judgment in Abhin Anilkumar Shah v/s Income-tax Officer, International Taxation [2024] 166 taxmann.com.679 (Bombay). This latter judgment clearly opined that even in cases of central charges and international taxation, the Notice must be issued under the faceless procedure. The Court found the present case squarely covered by both judgments. Accordingly, the impugned Notice under Section 148 and all consequential proceedings/orders were set aside. However, liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the Writ Petition if the Supreme Court sets aside the Hexaware Technologies Ltd. decision. If revived, the Notice would be stayed until further orders. If the SLP challenging Hexaware is dismissed, there would be no revival. The Court also noted that if revived, the petition would be decided on its merits, considering other raised issues.
The High Court held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer instead of the Faceless Assessing Officer is a fatal defect. The Court found no merit in the Revenue's argument that the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. would not apply to central charges. It relied on another Division Bench judgment of the same Court in Abhin Anilkumar Shah v/s Income-tax Officer, International Taxation [2024] 166 taxmann.com.679 (Bombay), which clearly opined that even in cases of central charges and international taxation, the notice must be issued under the faceless procedure. The Court cited paragraph 17 of Abhin Shah, stating that the mandatory faceless procedure would not exclude central and international taxation charges from the faceless mechanism. Consequently, the impugned notice and all proceedings emanating therefrom were set aside. The Court granted liberty to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. is set aside by the Supreme Court, and made the rule absolute.
The Tribunal decided that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after the faceless reassessment scheme was promulgated on March 29, 2022. This decision was based on the consistent view of the Bombay High Court, particularly its own judgment in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax Circle 15(1)(2). The Court found this precedent binding. The Revenue's reliance on the Delhi High Court's decision in T.K.S. Builders Pvt. Ltd. was noted but not followed, as the Bombay High Court maintained its established position. Consequently, the impugned notice under Section 148 and all consequential proceedings were set aside. Liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the Hexaware Technologies Ltd. decision is overturned by the Supreme Court. The petition was disposed of with these directions.
The High Court set aside the impugned notice issued under section 148 of the Income Tax Act and all consequential proceedings. The Court followed its consistent view, based on the judgment in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax Circle 15(1)(2), holding that only the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) has the jurisdiction to issue notices under section 148 after March 29, 2022, and not the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO). The Court acknowledged the Revenue's reliance on the Delhi High Court's decision but prioritized its own precedent. Liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. is set aside by the Supreme Court. The Court clarified that revival could be sought via a praecipe, and if revived, the petition would be decided on its merits, considering other issues raised. If the Supreme Court dismisses the SLP against Hexaware, there would be no revival.
The Tribunal held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after the faceless reassessment scheme was promulgated on March 29, 2022. This decision was based on the consistent view of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hexaware Technologies Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax. The Court found that, following this precedent, numerous writ petitions had been allowed. Accordingly, the impugned notice under Section 148 and all consequential proceedings were set aside. However, liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. is set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Court also clarified that if the petition is revived, it would be decided on its merits, considering other issues raised. The operative direction was to set aside the notice and proceedings, with a conditional liberty to revive.
The High Court has not decided the substantive issue of the validity of Section 147-A of the Income Tax Act. Instead, the Court has issued procedural directions based on a Supreme Court judgment. The Court has directed that all Writ Petitions challenging the validity of Section 147-A are to be identified by the respective advocates. These identified matters are to be transferred to the Principal Seat of the High Court for final hearing, as a similar group of cases is scheduled for hearing on 31.08.2026. Petitioners are granted one week to amend their petitions to incorporate the challenge to Section 147-A. If amendments are not carried out before transfer, they can be done within one week after the transfer to the Principal Seat. The Court also permits petitioners to file a Pursis if they do not wish for their matters to be transferred.
The High Court has not decided the substantive issue of the validity of Section 147-A of the Income Tax Act. Instead, the Court has issued procedural directions based on a Supreme Court judgment. The Court has directed that all Writ Petitions challenging the validity of Section 147-A are to be identified by the respective advocates. These identified matters are to be transferred to the Principal Seat of the High Court for final hearing, as a similar group of cases is scheduled for hearing on 31.08.2026. Petitioners are granted one week to amend their petitions to incorporate the challenge to Section 147-A. If amendments are not carried out before transfer, they can be done within one week after the transfer to the Principal Seat. The Court also permits petitioners to file a Pursis if they do not wish for their matters to be transferred.
The Tribunal held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after the faceless reassessment scheme was promulgated on March 29, 2022. This decision was based on the consistent view of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hexaware Technologies Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax Circle 15(1)(2), which held that only a Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) can issue such notices post the scheme's implementation. The Court proposed to pass a similar order, setting aside the impugned notice and all consequential proceedings. However, liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. is set aside by the Supreme Court. The Court clarified that revival could be sought via a praecipe, and if revived, the petition would be decided on its merits, considering other raised issues. If the Supreme Court dismisses the SLP challenging Hexaware Technologies Ltd., there would be no question of revival.
The Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench, held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after March 29, 2022, following the promulgation of the faceless reassessment scheme. This decision is based on the consistent view of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hexaware Technologies Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax Circle 15(1)(2). The Court set aside the impugned notice issued under Section 148 and all consequential proceedings. However, liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. is set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Court clarified that revival could be sought by a praecipe, and if revived, the petition would be decided on its merits, considering other issues raised. If the SLP challenging Hexaware Technologies Ltd. is dismissed, there would be no question of revival.
The High Court held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after the faceless reassessment scheme was promulgated on March 29, 2022. This decision was based on the consistent view of the Bombay High Court, as established in the case of Hexaware Technologies Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax Circle 15(1)(2). The Court found that, following this precedent, notices under Section 148 could only be issued by the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) after the specified date. Consequently, the impugned notice issued by the JAO and all consequential proceedings were set aside. The Court granted liberty to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. is set aside by the Supreme Court, with the petition to be decided on its merits if revived. The operative direction was to set aside the notice and proceedings, with a conditional liberty to revive.
The Court held that, in line with its consistent view based on the judgment in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax Circle 15(1)(2), the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after the faceless reassessment scheme was promulgated on March 29, 2022. The Court found that such notices can only be issued by a Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO). Consequently, the impugned notice under Section 148 and all consequential proceedings were set aside. However, liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. is set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Court clarified that revival could be sought via a praecipe, and if revived, the notice would be stayed until further orders. If the Supreme Court dismisses the SLP against Hexaware, there would be no revival. The revived petition would be decided on its merits, considering other issues raised.
The Tribunal held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after the faceless reassessment scheme was promulgated on March 29, 2022. This decision was based on the consistent view of the Bombay High Court, as established in the case of Hexaware Technologies Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax Circle 15(1)(2). The Court found the Delhi High Court's view in T.K.S. Builders Pvt. Ltd. to be contrary to its own established precedent. Consequently, the impugned notice under Section 148 and all consequential proceedings were set aside. However, liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. is set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Court clarified that revival could be sought via a praecipe, and if revived, the petition would be decided on its merits, considering other raised issues.
The Tribunal held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after the faceless reassessment scheme was promulgated on March 29, 2022. This decision was based on the consistent view of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hexaware Technologies Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax Circle 15(1)(2) (2024). The Court found no reason to deviate from its established precedent, despite the Revenue's reliance on a contrary Delhi High Court ruling. Consequently, the impugned notice under Section 148 and all consequential proceedings were set aside. However, liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. is set aside by the Supreme Court. The Court clarified that revival could be sought via a praecipe, and if revived, the petition would be decided on its merits, considering other issues raised.
The Tribunal held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after the faceless reassessment scheme was promulgated on March 29, 2022. This decision was based on the consistent view of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hexaware Technologies Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax Circle 15(1)(2). The Court found the revenue's reliance on the Delhi High Court's decision in T.K.S. Builders Pvt. Ltd. to be unpersuasive in light of its own established precedent. Consequently, the impugned notice issued under Section 148 and all consequential proceedings were set aside. However, liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. is set aside by the Supreme Court. The Court also noted that if the petition is revived, it will be decided on its merits, as other issues were also raised.
The Tribunal held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after the faceless reassessment scheme was promulgated on March 29, 2022. This decision was based on the consistent view of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hexaware Technologies Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax. The court set aside the impugned notice and all consequential proceedings. However, liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. is set aside by the Supreme Court. The court clarified that revival could be sought via a praecipe, and if revived, the petition would be decided on its merits, considering other issues raised. If the Supreme Court dismisses the SLP challenging Hexaware Technologies Ltd., there would be no question of revival.
The Tribunal held that, consistent with its own prior rulings based on the judgment in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax Circle 15(1)(2), the JAO does not have the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act after March 29, 2022. The Tribunal found that only the FAO has such authority. Consequently, the impugned notice issued by the JAO under Section 148 and all consequential proceedings were set aside. However, liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. is overturned by the Supreme Court. The Tribunal clarified that revival could be sought via a praecipe, and if revived, the petition would be decided on its merits, considering other issues raised. If the Supreme Court upholds the Hexaware decision, there would be no revival.
The Tribunal held that, in line with the consistent view of the Bombay High Court, particularly in the case of Hexaware Technologies Ltd. (supra), the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after March 29, 2022. The Court found that only a Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) is empowered to issue such notices subsequent to the implementation of the faceless reassessment scheme. The reasoning is based on the precedent set by the Division Bench of the same High Court. Consequently, the impugned notice under Section 148 and all consequential proceedings were set aside. However, liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the writ petition if the decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. (supra) is set aside by the Supreme Court. The Court also noted that if the petition is revived, it would be decided on its merits, considering other issues raised.