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आयकर अपील�य अ�धकरण,सुरत �यायपीठ, सुरत IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, SURAT BENCH, SURAT BEFORE SHRI PAWAN SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND DR. ARJUN LAL SAINI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA No.61/SRT/2020 (for Q.1AY 2015-16) ITA No.62/SRT/2020 (for Q.2 AY 2015-16) ITA No.63/SRT/2020 (for Q.3 AY 2015-16) ITA No.64/SRT/2020(for Q.4 AY 2015-16) (Hearing in Virtual Court) Ranjitbhai Ambubhai Patel Assistant Commissioner of 1, Shivshakti Jewellers, Juni Income-tax, CPC TDS, Vs Gali, Soniwad, Bengaluru Bilimora-396321 PAN : AJDPP 1770 C अपीलाथ�/Appellant ��यथ� /Respondent
�नधा�रतीक�ओरसे /Assessee by Shri Sujesh C Suratwala, CA राज�वक�ओरसे /Revenue by Shri S.B.G Mahapatra, Sr.DR सुनवाई की तारीख/Date of hearing 02.08.2022 उ�घोषणा क� तार�ख/Date of 05.08.2022 pronouncement Order under section 254(1) of Income Tax Act PER PAWAN SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER: 1. This set of four appeals by single assessee are directed against the order of learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)- Valsad “hereinafter referred as Ld. CIT(A)” all dated 20-01- 2020, which in turn arise against the order of TDS, Central Processing Centre (CPC) Vaishali, Ghaziabad, in levying late fee charges for delay in furnishing statement of tax deducted at source (TDS) for various quarters for assessment year 2015-
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel 16. The assessee has raised common grounds of appeals, the facts in all appeals are common, thus all the appeals were clubbed, heard together and are decided by common order to avoid the conflicting decisions. With the consent of parties, the facts in ITA No.61/SRT/2020 (1stQuarter in TDS statement furnished in Form No. 26-Q for A.Y. 2015-16) is treated as “lead” case. The assessee has raised the following ground of appeal:-
“1.On the facts and in the circumstances of the case as also law on subject, the learned DCIT, CPC TDS has erred in levying the late fee of u/s 234E of the act which is ultravires and the same has been confirm by Ld. CIT(A) which is required to be deleted since the charging provision is applicable from 01.06.2015.
On the facts and in the circumstances of the case as also law on subject, the learned DCIT, CPC TDS has erred in giving effect to the levy of late fee in the course of intimation u/s 200A of the IT Act, 1961.
On the facts and in the circumstances of the case as also law on subject, the DCIT, CPC TDS should have initiated separate proceedings under section 234E”.
Brief facts of the case are that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source (TDS) on making certain payments as per Chapter XVII of Income Tax Act. The assessee deducted such tax at source and filed statement of TDS. However, there was
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel certain delay in furnishing / filing the statement of TDS of various quarters. The Central Processing Centre (CPC) Vaishali, Ghaziabad, while processing such statement levied late fee of Rs.10,200/- and interest of Rs.1,393/- thereupon for 1st Quarter of A.Y. 2015-16, vide intimation dated 10.09.2014. Similar late fee charges and interest levied for other different quarterly returns. 3. Aggrieved by the levy of late fee charges the assessee filed appeal before Ld. CIT(A). The Ld. CIT(A) while dismissing all the appeals held that the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in Rajesh Kourani Vs Union of India (2017) 83 taxmann.com 137 (Guj.) held that section 234E is charging provision creating a charge for levying fee for certain default in filing statement and fee prescribed under section 234E could be levied even in absence of regulatory provision being found in section 200A for computation of fee. All the appeals of the assessee were dismissed with similar observation. Thus, further aggrieved the assessee has filed present appeal before this Tribunal. 4. We have heard the submission of the learned Authorized Representative (AR) of the assessee and the learned Sr. Departmental Representative (Sr. DR) for the Revenue and perused the material available on record. The ld AR for the 3
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel assessee submits that the levy of late fee under section 234E in furnishing the statements of TDS was inserted vide Finance Act 2012, w.e.f 01.06.2015. The amendment all the TDS statement were furnished by the assessee for the period prior to 1st June 2015 and the provisions of section 234E are not applicable for the TDS return filed prior to that period. The Ld. AR for the assessee further submits that it is admitted facts that TDS was deducted prior to 01-06-2015. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in Fatheraj Singhvi Vs UOI reported viz (73 taxmann.com 252) was held that the amendment in section 200A has come into effect on 01.06.2015 and has prospective effect no computation of fee for the demand or the intimation for fee under section 234E can be made for TDS deducted prior to 01.06.2015, hence the demand of fee under section 234E is without authority of law. The Ld. AR for the assessee submits that Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Rajesh Kourani (supra) while passing the decision has missed the important aspect whether the enforcement of provisions of Section 234E from 01.07.2012 is retrospective in nature or not. Such aspect has been dealt in detail by Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Fatheraj Singhvi (supra) wherein it was held that as per well settled law of principle of 4
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel interpretation of statute, unless it is expressly provided or impliedly demonstrated any provision of statute is to be dealt as prospective effect and not retrospective effect. Under these circumstances, it is found that substitution made by Clause- (c) of 9(f) of sub-section (1) of Section 200A can be read as having prospective effect and not having retrospective character of effect. The judgment of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court is supported by decision of Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of J. K. Synthetics Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer (1994) 119 CTR 0222 (SC). In case of W. Ramand Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. vs. State of Madras AIR 1961 1 SC 1753 (SC). The Hon'ble Apex Court held that penal statutes are generally considered as prospective. Those penal statutes which creates offence or which have the effect of increasing penalties for existing offences will only be prospective by reason of constitutional restriction imposed by Article 20 of the Constitution. Further in Maruram vs. UOI AIR 1980 SC 2147 it has been held that when the Act creates new offence, it will being into its fold only those offenders who committed all ingredients of the offence after the Act came into operation. In Pyare Lal vs. M.D. J&K Industries AIR 1989 SC 184 it was held that, it is the basic principle of natural justice 5
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel that no one can be penalized on the ground of conduct, which was not penal on the day, it was committed. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid submission the Ld. AR of the assessee relied on the decision of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in Fatheraj Singhvi (supra) is the correct interpretation of Section 234E of the Act and pray to set aside / quash all the orders in different quarters passed against the assessee. 5. On the other hand, the Ld. Sr. DR for the revenue supported the order of lower authorities. The ld. Sr. DR for the revenue submits that the ld. CIT(A) has elaborately discussed the applicability of section 234E as well as section 200A of the Act and made reliance on the decision of Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in Rajesh Kourani Vs UOI (supra). The decision in Rajesh Kourani Vs UOI (supra) is the decision of Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court and is a binding precedent, irrespective of fact that Hon'ble Karnataka High Court has took a view favourable to assessee. The Ld. Sr.DR for the Revenue prayed to dismiss all the appeals filed by the assessee. 6. We have considered the rival submissions of the parties and perused the material available on record. We have also deliberated on various case laws relied by the parties. We find 6
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel that the assessee has raised multiple grounds of appeal challenging the validity of order passed by lower authorities, however, in our view the substantial grounds of appeal is whether the lower authorities are justified in charging late fee on late furnishing the statements of TDS of various quarters of different assessment years. There is no dispute that the assessee made TDS statement furnished by the assessee in all quarters were prior to 01-06-2015. This set of appeals was heard with ITA No. ITA Nos.505-526/SRT/2020, in Desai Infrastructure Private Limited, wherein, that assessee has raised similar grounds of appeals, after considering similar submissions of the parties, we have already dismissed those appeals, vide order dated 03.08.2020. The relevant portion of the order dated 03.08.2020 in ITA Nos.505-526/SRT/2020 (supra) is reproduced below: “8. We find that in case of Rajesh Kourani Vs UOI (supra) the Hon'ble High court while considering the constitutional validity of Section 200A held that fee prescribed under section 234E could be levied even without regulatory provision. In order to appreciate the completeness of this order, the relevant part of decision in Rajesh Kourani (supra) is extracted below:- “5. In the petition, the petitioner has raised following threefold grievances: I. That section 234E of the Act is ultra-vires and unconstitutional II. Rule 31A of the Rules insofar as it prescribes longer period for the Government to file the statements as compared to the other assessee is discriminatory and arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional.
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel III. Prior to 01.06.2015, section 200A did not authorize the Assessing Officer to make adjustment of the fee to be levied under section 234E of the Act. This provision introduced with effect from 01.03.2016 is not retrospective and therefore, for the period between 01.07.2002 i.e. when section 234E was introduced in the Act and 01.06.2015 when proper mechanism was provided under section 200A of the Act for collection of fee, the department could not have charged such fee.
Appearing for the petitioner, learned advocate Shri Parth Contractor at the outset, stated that in view of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in case of Rashmikant Kundalia v. Union of India [2015] 373 ITR 268/229 Taxman 596/54 taxmann.com 200, he has instructions not to press the challenge to constitutionality of section 234E of the Act. He however made detailed submissions with respect to the other two grievances of the petitioner. Regarding rule 31A of the Rules, he pointed out that the legislature has prescribed different time limits for filing statements for the Government and the rest of the assessees. The special concession to the Government agencies was wholly unnecessary and not based on any rational. The same difficulties and complexities which are faced by Government agencies would also be faced by the individual assessees. 7. With respect to the amendment in sub-section (1) of section 200A, counsel submitted that prior to such amendment, there was no mechanism provided under the Act for collection of fee under section 234E of the Act. The Assessing Officer therefore could not have adjusted such fee in terms of section 200A of the Act. Counsel drew our attention to an intimation sent by the Assessing Officer, purported to be under section 200A of the Act, in which, he had adjusted a sum of Rs.33,123/- by way of late filing fee under section 234E of the Act. Counsel relied on a decision of Pune Bench of ITAT in case of Gajanan Constructions v. Dy, CIT [2016] 73 taxmann.com 380/161 ITD 313 (Pune - Trib.), in which, the Tribunal held that prior to 01.06.2015, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge fee under section 234E of the Act. Counsel also relied on a decision of Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in case of Fatheraj Singhvi v. Union of India [2016] 73 taxmann.com 252, in which, the Court has taken a view that the amendment in section 200A with effect from 01.06.2015 cannot have retrospective effect. 8. On the other hand learned counsel Shri Manish Bhatt for the department opposed the petition contending that two different time limits for filing statements under rule 31A are for Government and non Government agencies. Looking to the multilayered system of operation of the Government agencies and overall workload, the legislature thought it fit to grant 15 days additional time to the Government agencies to file the statements. This is therefore not a case of discrimination, but a case of reasonable classification. 9. With respect to the amendment in section 200A, counsel submitted that the charging provision is section 200E of the Act. Section 200A merely provides a mechanism. Such a provision cannot govern the charging provision. Even in absence of amendment in section 200A, the Assessing Officer was always authorized to levy fee in terms of section 200E of the Act. At best, the amendment in the said provision should be seen as clarificatory or providing a mechanism which till then was missing. Counsel referred to the decision of Rajasthan High Court in case of Dundlod Shikshan Sansthan v. Union of 8
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel India [2015] 63 taxmann.com 243/235 Taxman 446 (Raj.), where, in the context of challenge to the vires to the section 234E of the Act, incidentally this issue also came up for consideration. 10. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, we may take a closer look at the statutory provisions applicable. Section 200 of the Act pertains to duty of the person deducting tax and imposes a duty on a person deducting tax in accordance with the foregoing provisions of chapter-XVII to pay such sum to the credit of the Central Government within the time prescribed. Sub-section (3) of section 200 requires such a person to prepare such statements for the prescribed periods and to file the same within the prescribed time. Section 200C of the Act makes similar provision for the person responsible for the collection of tax at source to deposit the same with the Government revenue and to file a statement within the prescribed time. 11. Section 200A of the Act pertains to processing of statements of tax deducted at source. We would notice the provisions of this section prior to 01.06.2015 and the changes made therein by virtue of Finance Act, 2015, with effect from 01.06.2015. Further, we would take note of provisions of section 234E of the Act. For the time being, we may notice that section 200A provides for a mechanism for processing a statement filed under section 200 of the Act and enables the Assessing Officer to make some adjustments and to intimate the final outcome to the assessee. 12. Section 234E which pertains to fee for default in furnishing the statements was introduced for the first time by the Finance Act, 2012, with effect from 01.07.2015. Section 234E reads as under: "Fee for default in furnishing statements. 234E.(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Act, where a person fails to deliver or cause to be delivered a statement within the time prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C, he shall be liable to pay, by way of fee, a sum of two hundred rupees for every day during which the failure continues. (2) The amount of fee referred to in sub-section (1) shall not exceed the amount of tax deductible or collectible, as the case may be. (3) The amount of fee referred to in sub-section (1) shall be paid before delivering or causing to be delivered a statement in accordance with sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C. (4) The provisions of this section shall apply to a statement referred to in sub- section(3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C which is to be delivered or caused to be delivered for tax deducted at source or tax collected at source, as the case may be, on or after the 1st day of July, 2012.” 13. With effect from 01.07.2012, the legislature also introduced section 271H of the Act providing penalty for failure to furnish statements required to be filed under sub- section (3) of section 200 or under proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C of the Act. As per sub-section (2) of section 271H in case of default to file the statements, the assessee may be liable to penalty of not less than rupees ten thousand but not 9
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel more than rupees one lakh. Under sub-section (3) of section 271H however, such penalty would be avoided if the assessee proves that he had paid the tax deducted or collected alongwith interest and he had filed the necessary statement within one year from the time prescribed for filing such statements. We may also record that clause (k) of sub-section (2) of section 272A provides for penalty for failure to deliver the statement within the time specified in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C at a rate of rupees one hundred for every date during which the failure continues. However, with effect from 01.07.2012, a proviso was added limiting the effect of this provision upto 01.07.2012. In other words, after 01.07.2012, the penalty provision of section 271H would apply in such cases of defaults. 14. Section 200A(1) of the Act prior to 01.06.2015 provided as under: Section 200A(1) "Processing of statements of tax deducted at source. 200A. (1) Where a statement of tax deduction at source [or a correction statement] has been made by a person deducting any sum (hereafter referred to in this section as deductor) under section 200, such statement shall be processed in the following manner, namely:— (a) the sums deductible under this Chapter shall be computed after making the following adjustments, namely:— (i) any arithmetical error in the statement; or (ii) an incorrect claim, apparent from any information in the statement; (b) the interest, if any, shall be computed on the basis of the sums deductible as computed in the statement; (c) the sum payable by, or the amount of refund due to, the deductor shall be determined after adjustment of amount computed under clause (b) against any amount paid under section 200 and section 201, and any amount paid otherwise by way of tax or interest; (d) an intimation shall be prepared or generated and sent to the deductor specifying the sum determined to be payable by, or the amount of refund due to, him under clause (c); and (e) amount of refund due to the deductor in pursuance of the determination under clause (c) shall be granted to the deductor: (f) the amount of refund due to the deductor in pursuance of the determination under clause (d) shall be granted to the deductor:] Provided that no intimation under this sub-section shall be sent after the expiry of one year from the end of the financial year in which the statement is filed. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, "an incorrect claim apparent from any information in the statement" shall mean a claim, on the basis of an entry, in the statement— (i) of an item, which is inconsistent with another entry of the same or some other item in such statement;
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel (ii) in respect of rate of deduction of tax at source, where such rate is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act; (iii) (2) For the purposes of processing of statements under sub-section (1), the Board may make a scheme for centralised processing of statements of tax deducted at source to expeditiously determine the tax payable by, or the refund due to, the deductor as required under the said sub-section." With effect from 01.06.2015, sub-section (1) of section 200A was amended. In the amended form, the same provision reads as under: Section 200A(1) "Processing of statements of tax deducted at source. 200A. (1) Where a statement of tax deduction at source [or a correction statement] has been made by a person deducting any sum (hereafter referred to in this section as deductor) under section 200, such statement shall be processed in the following manner, namely:— (a) the sums deductible under this Chapter shall be computed after making the following adjustments, namely:— (i) any arithmetical error in the statement; or (ii) an incorrect claim, apparent from any information in the statement; (b) the interest, if any, shall be computed on the basis of the sums deductible as computed in the statement; (c) the fee, if any, shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E; (d) the sum payable by, or the amount of refund due to, the deductor shall be determined after adjustment of the amount computed under clause (b) and clause (c) against any amount paid under section 200 or section 201 or section 234E and any amount paid otherwise by way of tax or interest or fee; (e) an intimation shall be prepared or generated and sent to the deductor specifying the sum determined to be payable by, or the amount of refund due to, him under clause (d); and (f) the amount of refund due to the deductor in pursuance of the determination under clause (d) shall be granted to the deductor:] Provided that no intimation under this sub-section shall be sent after the expiry of one year from the end of the financial year in which the statement is filed. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, "an incorrect claim apparent from any information in the statement" shall mean a claim, on the basis of an entry, in the statement— (i) of an item, which is inconsistent with another entry of the same or some other item in such statement; (ii) in respect of rate of deduction of tax at source, where such rate is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act;
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel (2) For the purposes of processing of statements under sub-section (1), the Board may make a scheme for centralised processing of statements of tax deducted at source to expeditiously determine the tax payable by, or the refund due to, the deductor as required under the said sub-section. 15. In view of such statutory provisions, we may consider the petitioner's two challenges. Coming to the question of discriminatory nature of rule 31A of the Rules, it can be seen that sub-rule (1) of rule 31A of the Rules provides for filing of the statements in prescribed forms as required under sub-section (3) of section 200. Sub-rule (2) of rule 31A lays down the time limit for filing such quarterly statements and provides as under: "(2) Statements referred to in sub-rule (1) for the quarter of the financial year ending with the date specified in column (2) of the Table below shall be furnished by-
(i) the due date specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) of the said Table, if the deductor is an office of Government; and (ii) the due date specified in the corresponding entry in column (4) of the said Table, if the deductor is a person other than the person referred to in clause (i) TABLE Sl.No. Date of ending of Due date Due date quarter of financial year (1) (2) (3) (4) 1 30th June 31st July of the financial year 15th July of the financial year 2 30th September 31st October of the financial 15th October of the year financial year 3 31st December 31st January of the financial 15th January of the year financial year 4 31st March 15th May of the financial 15th May of the financial year immediately following year immediately the financial year in which following the financial the deduction is made. year in which the deduction is made.”
This rule thus, while laying down the last date by which such statements should be filed, draws two categories; in case of deductor is an office of government and in case of a deductor is a person other than the office of the government. Consistently, the office of the government is granted 15 days extra time as compared to the other deductors. For example, the statement for the date of the quarter ending on 30th June, an ordinary deductor would have to file a statement latest by 15th July of the same year, whereas for the Government office, the last date for filing such statement would be 31st July of the said year. This 15 days extra time is a consistent feature in all four quarters. The short question is, did the legislature discriminate in doing so? It is well settled that Article 14 does not prohibit reasonable classification 12
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel but frowns upon class legislation. In the affidavit in reply filed, the respondents have pointed out that multiple agencies are involved in every transaction in the Government offices and the same therefore cannot be compared with the private individuals or business houses. We do not found that the extra time of 15 days for the Government to file a return of deduction of tax at source is in any manner either unreasonable or discriminatory. If the legislature found it appropriate to grant slightly longer period to the government agencies looking to the complex nature of transactions involved, the volume and turnover of such transactions and filtering necessary statements required at many stages, in our opinion, the same was perfectly legitimate. Looking to the differences between the Government agencies and private assessee’s in the context of providing the last date for filing the statements, do not form a homogeneous class which cannot be further bifurcated. 16. We now come to the petitioner's central challenge viz. of non permissibility to levy fee under section 234E of the Act till section 200A of the Act was amended with effect from 01.06.2015. We have noticed the relevant statutory provisions. The picture that emerges is that prior to 01.07.2012, the Act contained a single provision in section 272A providing for penalty in case of default in filing the statements in terms of section 200 or proviso to section 206C. Such penalty was prescribed at the rate of Rs.100 for every day during which the failure continued. With effect from 01.06.2012, three major changes were introduced in the Act. Section 234E as introduced for the first time to provide for charging of fee for late filing of the statements. Such fee would be levied at the rate of Rs.200/- for every day of failure subject to the maximum amount of tax deductible or collectible as the case may be. Section 271H was also introduced for the first time for levying penalty for failure to furnish the statements. Such penalty would be in the range of Rs.10,000/- and Rs.1 lakh. No penalty would be imposed if the tax is deposited with fee and interest and the statement is filed within one year of the due date. With addition to these two provisions prescribing fee and penalty respectively, clause (k) of sub-section (2) of section 272A became redundant and by adding a proviso to the said section, this effect was therefore limited upto 01.07.2012. 17. In essence, section 234E thus prescribed for the first time charging of a fee for every day of default in filing of statement under sub-section (3) of section 200 or any proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C. This provision was apparently added for making the compliance of deduction and collection of tax at source, depositing it with Government revenue and filing of the statements more stringent. 18. In this context, we may notice that section 200A which pertains to processing of statements of tax deducted at source provides for the procedure once a statement of deduction of tax at source is filed by the person responsible to do so and authorizes the Assessing Officer to make certain adjustments which are prima-facie or arithmetical in nature. The officer would then send an intimation of a statement to the assessee. Prior to 01.06.2015, this provision did not include any reference to the fee payable under section 234E of the Act. By recasting sub-section (1), the new clause-c permits the authority to compute the fee, if any, payable by the assessee under section 234E of the Act and by virtue of clause-d, adjust the said sum against the amount paid under the various provisions of the Act. 13
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel 19. In plain terms, section 200A of the Act is a machinery provision providing mechanism for processing a statement of deduction of tax at source and for making adjustments, which are, as noted earlier, arithmetical or prima-facie in nature. With effect from 01.06.2015, this provision specifically provides for computing the fee payable under section 234E of the Act. On the other hand, section 234E is a charging provision creating a charge for levying fee for certain defaults in filing the statements. Under no circumstances a machinery provision can override or overrule a charging provision. We are unable to see that section 200A of the Act creates any charge in any manner. It only provides a mechanism for processing a statement for tax deduction and the method in which the same would be done. When section 234E has already created a charge for levying fee that would thereafter not been necessary to have yet another provision creating the same charge. Viewing section 200A as creating a new charge would bring about a dichotomy. In plain terms, the provision in our understanding is a machinery provision and at best provides for a mechanism for processing and computing besides other, fee payable under section 234E for late filing of the statements. 20. Even in absence of section 200A of the Act with introduction of section 234E, it was always open for the Revenue to demand and collect the fee for late filing of the statements. Section 200A would merely regulate the manner in which the computation of such fee would be made and demand raised. In other words, we cannot subscribe to the view that without a regulatory provision being found for section 200A for computation of fee, the fee prescribed under section 234E cannot be levied. Any such view would amount to a charging section yielding to the machinery provision. If at all, the recasted clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 200A would be in nature of clarificatory amendment. Even in absence of such provision, as noted, it was always open for the Revenue to charge the fee in terms of section 234E of the Act. By amendment, this adjustment was brought within the fold of section 200A of the Act. This would have one direct effect. An order passed under section 200A of the Act is rectifiable under section 154 of the Act and is also appealable under section 246A. In absence of the power of authority to make such adjustment under section 200A of the Act, any calculation of the fee would not partake the character of the intimation under said provision and it could be argued that such an order would not be open to any rectification or appeal. Upon introduction of the recasted clause (c), this situation also would be obviated. Even prior to 01.06.2015, it was always open for the Revenue to calculate fee in terms of section 234E of the Act. The Karnataka High Court in case of Fatheraj Singhvi (supra) held that section 200A was not merely a regulatory provision, but was conferring substantive power on the authority. The Court was also of the opinion that section 234E of the Act was in the nature of privilege to the defaulter if he fails to pay fees then he would be rid of rigor of the penal provision of section 271H of the Act. With both these propositions, with respect, we are unable to concur. Section 200A is not a source of substantive power. Substantive power to levy fee can be traced to section 234E of the Act. Further the fee under section 234E of the Act is not in lieu of the penalty of section 271H of the Act. Both are independent levies. Section 271H only provides that such penalty would not be levy if certain conditions are fulfilled. One of the conditions is that the tax with fee and interest is paid. The additional condition being that the statement is filed latest within one year from the due date. 14
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel 21. Counsel for the petitioner however, referred to the decision of Supreme Court in case of CIT v. B.C. Srinivasa Setty [1981] 128 ITR 294/5 Taxman 1 (SC), to contend that when a machinery provision is not provided, the levy itself would fail. The decision of Supreme Court in case of B C Srinivasa Setty (supra) was rendered in entirely different background. Issue involved was of charging capital gain on transfer of a capital asset. In case on hand, the asset was in the nature of goodwill. The Supreme Court referring to various provisions concerning charging and computing capital gain observed that none of these provisions suggest that they include an asset in the acquisition of which no cost can be conceived. In such a case, the asset is sold and the consideration is brought to tax, what is charged is a capital value of the asset and not any profit or gain. This decision therefore would not apply in the present case. 22. In the result, petition fails and is dismissed.” 9. Before us, the Ld. AR for the assessee vehemently relied on the decision of Hon’ble Karnataka high Court in Fatheraj Singhvi vs UOI (supra), wherein it was held that the amendment in section 200A has come into effect on 01.06.2015 and has prospective effect, no computation of fee for the demand or the intimation for fee under section 234E can be made for TDS deducted prior to 01.06.2015, hence the demand of fee under section 234E is without authority of law. The Ld.AR for the assessee in support of his submission also relied certain case law of Hon'ble Apex Court, as recorded earlier paras. 10. On careful perusal of the decision of Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in Rajesh Kourani Vs UOI (supra), we find that that jurisdiction high court in para-20 of the decision has clearly dissented with the decision of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in Fatheraj Singhvi Vs UOI (supra) and held that even in absence of section 200A with introduction of section 234E, it was always open for the revenue to demand and collect the fee for late filing of the statements. Section 200A would merely regulate the manner in which the computation of such fee would be made and demand raised. In other words, the view that without a regulatory provision being found for section 200A for computation of fee, the fee prescribed under section 234E cannot be levied is not acceptable. Any such view would amount to a charging section yielding to the machinery provision. If at all, the recasted clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 200A would be in nature of clarificatory amendment. Even in absence of such provision, as noted, it was always open for the revenue to charge the fee in terms of section 234E. By amendment, this adjustment was brought within the fold of section 200A. This would have one direct effect. An order passed under section 200A is rectifiable under section 154 and is also appealable 15
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel under section 246A. In absence of the power of authority to make such adjustment under section 200A, any calculation of the fee would not partake the character of the intimation under said provision and it could be argued that such an order would not be open to any rectification or appeal. Upon introduction of the re-casted clause (c), this situation also would be obviated. Even prior to 1-6-2015, it was always open for the revenue to calculate fee in terms of section 234E. Section 200A is not a source of substantive power. Substantive power to levy fee can be traced to section 234E. 11. In our humble view the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court has clearly took a contrary view, with the decision of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court. It is settled position under legal hierarchy that decision of Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court is having binding precedent, in absence of any decision of Hon'ble Apex Court. Thus, all the submissions which is raised by Ld. AR for the assessee is not helpful to him. Therefore, respectfully following the ratio of law that section 234E is a charging provision creating a charge for levying of fee for certain default in filing statement, and the fee prescribed under this section could be levied even without a regulatory provision being found in section 200A for computation of fee. 12. In view of the above factual and legal discussions, we do not find any merit in the grounds of appeals raised by the assessee, which we dismissed.” 7. Considering the fact that on similar set of fact and on similar grounds of appeal in the case Desai Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. Vs ACIT, in ITA No.(s) 505-526/SRT/2020 dated 03.08.2020, we have already dismissed all the appeals of assessee. Therefore, following the principle of consistency, all the appeals of assessee are dismissed with similar observation.
ITA Nos.61-64/SRT/2020 (A.Y15-16) Sh. Ranjitbhai A Patel 8. In the result, all the appeals of assessee are dismissed. Copy of this common order be placed in each of the case file(s). Order pronounced in open Court on 05/08/2022 and the result was also placed on the notice board. Sd/- Sd/- ([लेखा सद�य/Dr ARJUN LAL SAINI) (�याियक सद�य PAWAN SINGH) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER Surat, Dated: 05/08/2022 Dkp. Outsourcing Sr.P.S. Copy to: 1. Appellant- 2. Respondent- 3. CIT(A)-2, Surat 4. CIT 5. DR 6. Guard File True copy/ // True Copy //
By order
Sr,P.S/P.S/Assistant Registrar, ITAT, Surat