RAVI AGARWAL,JAIPUR vs. DCIT CIRCLE 7, JAIPUR

Shri Ravi Agarwal cuke The DCIT Vs. A-1A, Ajmer Road, Shyam Nagar Circle-7 Sodala , Jaipur -302 019 Jaipur LFkk;h ys[kk la-@thvkbZvkj la-@PAN/GIR No.: AAZPA 0088K vihykFkhZ@Appellant izR;FkhZ@Respondent fu/kZkfjrh dh vksj ls@ Assessee by : Shri Vivek Bhargava, CA jktLo dh vksj ls@ Revenue by: Smt. Monisha Choudhary, Addl.CIT lquokbZ dh rkjh[k@ Date of Hearing : 22/03/2023 mn?kks"k.kk dh rkjh[k@Date of Pronouncement: 03 /05/2023 vkns'k@ ORDER PER: RATHOD KAMLESH JAYANTBHAI, AM This appeal filed by the assessee is directed against order of the ld. CIT(A), National Faceless Appeal Centre (for short ‘’NFAC’’), Delhi dated 10-01-2023 for the assessment year 2019-20 wherein the assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal. ‘’1. The ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the disallowance of Rs.47,894/- and Rs.1,80,997/- being share of employees in ESI and PF

2 SHRI RAVI AGARWAL VS DCIT, CIRLCE-7, JAIPUR respectively deposited after prescribed due date under respective laws but before the due date of filing of ITR. 2. The ld. CIT(A) erred in law and on facts of confirming the addition of Rs.22,995/- being double addition of speculative income.’’ 2.1 During the course of hearing, the ld. AR of the assessee has not pressed the Ground No.2. Hence, the same is dismissed being not pressed. 3.1 As regards Ground No. 1 of the assessee, brief facts of the case are that the assessee e-filed his return of income on 26-10-2019 for the assessment year 2019- 20 declaring total loss of (-) Rs.1,88,42,030/- falling under various heads of income pertaining to both the streams of business activities i.e. Hospital Business and Security Trading. The return of income was processed by the AO at CPC, Bengaluru us 143(1) of the Act vide intimation dated 29-04-2020 and thus determining the total loss of the assessee at (-) Rs.1,84,92,800/-. During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO made an addition of Rs.2,28,891/- towards belated payment of employees contribution to PF and ESI u/s 2(24)(x) r.w.s. 36(1)(va) of the Act. 3.2 In first appeal, the ld. CIT(A) has confirmed the action of the AO by observing as under:- ‘’7.15 In view of the above, in the instant case, since the assessee made the payment of employees contribution to PF & ESI to the respective accounts beyond the due date (s) stipulated u/s 3 SHRI RAVI AGARWAL VS DCIT, CIRLCE-7, JAIPUR 36(1)(va) of the Act, respectfully following the judgement of the Hone’ble Supreme Court in the cases of (i) Checkmate Services Private Ltd. vs CIT and (ii) Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. vs CIT (supra), and the decision of Hon’ble ITAT, Chennai in the case of Electrical Ltd. vs ADIT (supra) and the decision of Hon’ble ITAT, Bengalore in the case of Legacy Global Projects (P) Ltd. vs ADIT (supra), I am inclined to confirm the addition made by the AO to the extent of Rs.2,28,891/-. Thus the grounds of appeal raised by the assessee on this issue are dismissed.’’ 3.3 During the course of hearing, the ld. AR of the assessee prayed for deletion of addition of Rs.2,28,891/- confirmed by the ld. CIT(A) towards belated payment of employees contribution to PF and ESI u/s 2(24)(x) r.w.s. 36(1)(va) of the Act. The ld.AR of the assessee relied upon the following case laws wherein the addition of employees share in PF and ESI paid on or before the due date of filing of retur has been deleted/ 1. Paris Elysees India Pvt. Ltd. vs DCIT (ITA No. 357/JPR/2022, Jaipur Trib) 2. Garg Heart Centre & Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. vs ACIT (ITA No. 1700/Del/2022 dated 25-08-2022) 3. Kalpesh Syntehtic (P) Ltd. vs DCIT (2022) 137 Taxmann.com 475 (Mumbai-Trib) 4. P R Packaging Service vs ACIT (ITA No. 2376/Mum/2022 dated 7-12-2022)

He further submitted that the above judgements have been delivered after judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Checkmate Services (P) Ltd. and 4 SHRI RAVI AGARWAL VS DCIT, CIRLCE-7, JAIPUR have similar facts. The ld. AR also submitted that it is a settled law that where different views of two courts are same status then the view favourable to the assessee should prevail. 3.4 On the other hand, the ld. DR supported the order of the ld.CIT(A) and also relied upon the judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Checkmate Services (P) Ltd. vs CIT (Civil Appeal No. 2833 of 2016 dated 12 Oct. 2022). 3.5 We have heard both the parties and perused the materials available on record including the case laws cited by both the parties. In this case, it is noted that the AO disallowed the amount of Rs.2,28,891/- u/s 36(1)(va) of the Act on the ground that payments of employees contribution towards EPF and PF had not been made on or before the due date by the employer as per respective Acts which has been confirmed by the ld. CIT(A). It is not imperative to repeat the facts of the case and the case laws cited by both the parties. The Bench has observed that the recently the Hon’ble Supreme Court has opined in the case of Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. vs CIT-1, 143 Taxmann.com 178 (SC)/Civil Appeal No. 2833 of 2016 held that the provision of Section 43B of the Act shall not apply to employee’s contribution to PF/ESI and the due date specified u/s 36(1)(va) of the Act shall apply for determination of deductibility of employee’s contribution to PF/ESI. The relevant portion of the Judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. vs CIT-1 (supra) is reproduced as under:-

5 SHRI RAVI AGARWAL VS DCIT, CIRLCE-7, JAIPUR ‘’53. The distinction between an employer’s contribution which is its primary liability under law – in terms of Section 36(1)(iv), and its liability to deposit amounts received by it or deducted by it (Section 36(1)(va)) is, thus crucial. The former forms part of the employers’ income, and the later retains its character as an income (albeit deemed), by virtue of Section 2(24)(x) - unless the conditions spelt by Explanation to Section 36(1)(va) are satisfied i.e., depositing such amount received or deducted from the employee on or before the due date. In other words, there is a marked distinction between the nature and character of the two amounts – the employer’s liability is to be paid out of its income whereas the second is deemed an income, by definition, since it is the deduction from the employees’ income and held in trust by the employer. This marked distinction has to be borne while interpreting the obligation of every assessee under Section 43B.

54. In the opinion of this Court, the reasoning in the impugned judgment that the non-obstante clause would not in any manner dilute or override the employer’s obligation to deposit the amounts retained by it or deducted by it from the employee’s income, unless the condition that it is deposited on or before the due date, is correct and justified. The non- obstante clause has to be understood in the context of the entire provision of Section 43B which is to ensure timely payment before the returns are filed, of certain liabilities which are to be borne by the assessee in the form of tax, interest payment and other statutory liability. In the case of these liabilities, what constitutes the due date is defined by the statute. Nevertheless, the assessees are given some leeway in that as long as deposits are made beyond the due date, but before the date of filing the return, the deduction is allowed. That, however, cannot apply in the case of amounts which are held in trust, as it is in the case of employees’ contributions- which are deducted from their income. They are not part of the assessee employer’s 6 SHRI RAVI AGARWAL VS DCIT, CIRLCE-7, JAIPUR income, nor are they heads of deduction per se in the form of statutory pay out. They are others’ income, monies, only deemed to be income, with the object of ensuring that they are paid within the due date specified in the particular law. They have to be deposited in terms of such welfare enactments. It is upon deposit, in terms of those enactments and on or before the due dates mandated by such concerned law, that the amount which is otherwise retained, and deemed an income, is treated as a deduction. Thus, it is an essential condition for the deduction that such amounts are deposited on or before the due date. If such interpretation were to be adopted, the non-obstante clause under Section 43B or anything contained in that provision would not absolve the assessee from its liability to deposit the employee’s contribution on or before the due date as a condition for deduction.

7 SHRI RAVI AGARWAL VS DCIT, CIRLCE-7, JAIPUR contribution to Provident Fund and ESI even though same were not deposited in respective fund within stipulated time – Apex Court in case of Checkmate Services (P) Ltd. vs CIT [2022] 143 taxmann.com 178/ [2023] 290 Taxman 19/[2022] 448 ITR 518/2022 SCC Online Sc 1423, held that non obstante clause under section 43B could not apply in case of employee’s contribution which were deducted from their income and was not part of assessee-employer’s income and, thus, said clause would not absolve assessee-employer from its liability to deposit employee’s contribution on or before due date as a condition for deduction. – Whether in view of the said judgement of Supreme Court, impugned order of High Court was to be set aside – Held , yes [Para 4) [In favour of Revenue] For the sake of convenience and brevity of the case, the order passed by the Supreme Court in the case of PCIT vs Strides Arcolab Ltd. (supra) is also reproduced as under:- ‘’1.Leave granted.

9 SHRI RAVI AGARWAL VS DCIT, CIRLCE-7, JAIPUR 8. It would be apt to refer to the relevant part of the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Kalpesh Synthetics [supra] followed in P R Packaging Service [supra] wherein it has been held as under:- “8. When the law enacted by the legislature has beenconstrued in a particular manner by the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court, it cannot be open to anyone in the jurisdiction of that Hon’ble High Court to read any other manner than as read by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court. The views expressed by the tax auditor in sucha situation, cannot be reason enough to disregard the binding views of the Hon'ble jurisdictional Court. To that extent, the provisions of section 143(1)(a)(iv) must be read down. What essentially follows is the adjustments under section 143(1)(a) in respect of” disallowance of expenditure indicated in the audit report but not taken into account in computing the total income in the return” is to be read as, for example, subject to the rider “except in a situation in which the audit report has taken a stand contrary to the law laid down by Hon'ble Courts above”. That is where the quasi judicial exercise of dealing with the objections of the assessee against proposed adjustments under section 143(1), assumes critical importance in the processing of returns, also important to bear in mind the fact that what constitutes jurisdictionalHigh Court will essentially depend upon the location of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. While dealing with jurisdiction for the appeals, rule 11(1) of the Central Processing of Returns Scheme, 2011 states that “Where a return is processed at the Centre, the appeal proceedings relating to the processing of the return shall lie with Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)] having jurisdiction over the jurisdictional Assessing Officer” Thensitus of the CPC or the Assessing Office CPC is thus irrelevant for the purpose of ascertaining the jurisdictional High Court. Therefore, in the present case, whether theCPC is within the jurisdiction of Hon'ble Bombay High Court or not, as for the regular Assessing Officer of the assesseeand the assessee are located in the jurisdiction of Hon'bleBombay High Court, the jurisdictional High Court, for all matters pertaining to the assessee, will be Hon'ble Bombay High Court. In our considered view, it cannot be open tothe Assessing Officer CPC to take a view contrary to the view taken by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court- moreso when his attention was specifically invited to bindingjudicial precedents in this regard. For this reason also, the inputs in question in the tax audit report cannot be reason enough to make the impugned disallowance. The assesseemust succeed for this reason as well.”

10 SHRI RAVI AGARWAL VS DCIT, CIRLCE-7, JAIPUR 9. With our utmost respect to the findings of the co-ordinate bench [supra], we are of the considered view that the co-ordinate bench has ignored the binding ratio decidendi of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Checkmate Services Pvt Ltd [supra]. It would be pertinent to refer to the most relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the impugned quarrel which read as under:- “32. The scheme of the provisions relating to deductions, such as Sections 32 - 37, on the other hand, deal primarily with business, commercial or professional expenditure, under various heads (including depreciation). Each of these deductions, has its contours, depending upon the expressions used, and the conditions that are to be met. It is therefore necessary to bear in mind that specific enumeration of deductions, dependent upon fulfillment of particular conditions, would qualify as allowable deductions: failure by the assessee to comply with those conditions, would render the claim vulnerable to rejection. In this scheme the deduction made by employers to approved provident fund schemes, is the subject matter of Section 36 (iv). It is noteworthy, that this provision was part of the original IT Act; it has largely remained unaltered. On the other hand, Section 36(1)(va) was specifically inserted by the Finance Act,1987, w.e.f. 01-04-1988. Through the same amendment, by Section 3(b), Section 2(24) – which defines various kinds of “income” – inserted clause (x). This is a significant amendment, because Parliament intended that amounts not earned by the assessee, but received by it, - whether in the form of deductions,or otherwise, as receipts, were to be treated as income. The inclusion of a class of receipt, i.e., amounts received (or deducted from the employees) were to be part of the employer/assessee’s income. Since these amounts were not receipts that belonged to the assessee, but were held by it, as trustees, as it were, Section 36(1)(va) was inserted specifically to ensure that if these receipts were deposited in the EPF/ESI accounts of the employees concerned, they could be treated as deductions. Section 36(1)(va) was hedged with the condition that the amounts/receipts had to be deposited by the employer, with the EPF/ESI, on or before the due date. The last expression “due date” was dealt with in the explanation as the date by which such amounts had to be credited by the employer, in the concerned enactments such as EPF/ESI Acts. Importantly, such a condition (i.e., depositing the amount on or before the due date) has not been enacted in relation to the employer’s contribution (i.e., Section 36(1)(iv)).

11 SHRI RAVI AGARWAL VS DCIT, CIRLCE-7, JAIPUR 34. It is therefore, manifest that the definition of contribution in Section 2 (c) is used in entirely different senses, in the relevant deduction clauses. The differentiation is also evident from the fact that each of these contributions is separately dealt with in different clauses of Section 36 (1). All these establish that Parliament, while introducing Section 36(1)(va) along with Section 2(24)(x), was aware of the distinction between the two types of contributions. There was a statutory classification under the IT Act, between the two.

12 SHRI RAVI AGARWAL VS DCIT, CIRLCE-7, JAIPUR “15. …It is important to note once again that, by Finance Act, 2003, not only the second proviso is deleted but even the first proviso is sought to be amended by bringing about an uniformity in tax, duty, cess and fee on the one hand vis-a-vis contributions to welfare fundsof employee(s) on the other. This is one more reason whywe hold that the Finance Act, 2003, is retrospective in operation. Moreover, the judgement in Allied Motors (P)Limited (supra) is delivered by a Bench of three learned Judges, which is binding on us. Accordingly, we hold that Finance Act, 2003 will operate retrospectively with effectfrom 1st April, 1988 [when the first proviso stoodinserted]. Lastly, we may point out the hardship and the invidious discrimination which would be caused to theassessee(s) if the contention of the Department is to be accepted that Finance Act, 2003, 2003, to the above extent, operated prospectively. Take an example - in the present case, the respondents have deposited the contributions with the R.P.F.C. after 31st March [end of accounting year] but before filing of the Returns under the Income Tax Act and the date of payment falls after the due date under the Employees' Provident Fund Act,they will be denied deduction for all times. In view of the second proviso, which stood on the statute book at the relevant time, each of such assessee(s) would not be entitled to deduction under Section 43B of the Act for all times. They would lose the benefit of deduction even in the year of account in which they pay the contributions to the welfare funds, whereas a defaulter, who fails to pay the contribution to the welfare fund right upto 1st April,2004, and who pays the contribution after 1st April, 2004, would get the benefit of deduction under Section 43B of the Act. In our view, therefore, Finance Act, 2003,to the extent indicated above, should be read as retrospective. It would, therefore, operate from 1st April, 1988, when the first proviso was introduced. It is true that the Parliament has explicitly stated that Finance Act, 2003, will operate with effect from 1st April,2004. However, the matter before us involves the principle of construction to be placed on the provisions of Finance Act, 2003”. XXXX 48. One of the rules of interpretation of a tax statute is that if a deduction or exemption is available on compliance with certain conditions, the conditions are to be strictly complied with. Eagle Flask Industries Ltd Vs. Commissioner of Central Exercise 2004Supp (4) SCR 35. This rule is in line with the general principle that taxing statutes are to be construed strictly, and that there is no room for equitable considerations.

13 SHRI RAVI AGARWAL VS DCIT, CIRLCE-7, JAIPUR 25. In our view, the failure to comply with the requirements renders the writ petition filed by the respondent liable to be dismissed. While mandatory rule must be strictly observed, substantial compliance might suffice in the case of a directory rule.