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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.V.BHATTI & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE BASANT BALAJI THURSDAY, THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 24TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ITA NO. 34 OF 2018 AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 24.05.2017 IN IT APPEAL No.41/Coch/2015 OF I.T.A.TRIBUNAL,COCHIN BENCH APPELLANT:
M/S.KOTTAYAM CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL & RURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK LTD. KOTTAYAM - 686 001. (PAN AAAT 6523 E)
BY ADVS. SRI.JOSEPH MARKOSE (SR.) SRI.V.ABRAHAM MARKOS SRI.ABRAHAM JOSEPH MARKOS SRI.P.G.CHANDAPILLAI ABRAHAM SRI.HARAN THOMAS GEORGE SRI.ISAAC THOMAS SMT.RACHEL ABRAHAM RESPONDENT:
THE INCOME TAX OFFICER WARD-4, KOTTAYAM - 686 001.
BY ADVS. SRI.P.K.R.MENON,SR.COUNSEL, GOI(TAXES) SRI.JOSE JOSEPH, SC, FOR INCOME TAX THIS INCOME TAX APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 15.12.2022, ALONG WITH ITA.25/2019, 27/2019 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
ITA Nos.34 & 35 of 2018 & 25 & 27 of 2019 2
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.V.BHATTI & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE BASANT BALAJI THURSDAY, THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 24TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ITA NO. 25 OF 2019 AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 25.10.2018 IN ITA 270/Coch/2018 OF I.T.A.TRIBUNAL,COCHIN BENCH APPELLANT/Appellant:
THE MEENACHIL CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK LTD., NO.K/197, PALAI, KOTTAYAM- 686 575.(PAN:AABAT 4524G)
BY ADVS. JOSEPH MARKOSE (SR.) SRI.V.ABRAHAM MARKOS SRI.ABRAHAM JOSEPH MARKOS SRI.ISAAC THOMAS SRI.P.G.CHANDAPILLAI ABRAHAM SHRI.VIPIN ANTO H.M. SHRI.ALEXANDER JOSEPH MARKOS SHRI.SHARAD JOSEPH KODANTHARA RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT:
THE INCOME TAX OFFICER,WARD-4,KOTTAYAM-686 001. SR.ADV.P.K.R.MENON THIS INCOME TAX APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 15.12.2022, ALONG WITH ITA.34/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
ITA Nos.34 & 35 of 2018 & 25 & 27 of 2019 3
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.V.BHATTI & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE BASANT BALAJI THURSDAY, THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 24TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ITA NO. 27 OF 2019 AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 17.10.2018 IN ITA 295/Coch/2018 OF I.T.A.TRIBUNAL,COCHIN BENCH APPELLANT:
M/S KOTTAYAM CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEV. BANK LTD. KOTTAYAM-686001, (PAN.AAAAT 6523E)
BY ADVS. JOSEPH MARKOSE (SR.) SRI.V.ABRAHAM MARKOS SRI.ABRAHAM JOSEPH MARKOS SRI.ISAAC THOMAS SRI.P.G.CHANDAPILLAI ABRAHAM SHRI.VIPIN ANTO H.M. SHRI.ALEXANDER JOSEPH MARKOS SHRI.SHARAD JOSEPH KODANTHARA RESPONDENT/Respondent:
THE INCOME TAX OFFICER WARD-5, KOTTAYAM. BY SR.ADV.P.K.R.MENON THIS INCOME TAX APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 15.12.2022, ALONG WITH ITA.34/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
ITA Nos.34 & 35 of 2018 & 25 & 27 of 2019 4
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.V.BHATTI & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE BASANT BALAJI THURSDAY, THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 24TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ITA NO. 35 OF 2018 AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 3.10.2017 IN ITA 143/Coch/2017 OF I.T.A.TRIBUNAL,COCHIN BENCH APPELLANT/Appellant:
THE MEENACHIL CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL & RURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK LTD. NO.K.197, PALAI, KOTTAYAM - 686 575.
BY ADVS. SRI.JOSEPH MARKOSE (SR.) SRI.V.ABRAHAM MARKOS SRI.ABRAHAM JOSEPH MARKOS SRI.P.G.CHANDAPILLAI ABRAHAM SRI.HARAN THOMAS GEORGE SRI.ISAAC THOMAS SMT.RACHEL ABRAHAM RESPONDENT/Respondent:
THE INCOME TAX OFFICER WARD-4, KOTTAYAM - 686 001.
BY ADVS. P.K. RAVINDRANATHA MENON (SR.) SRI.JOSE JOSEPH, SC, FOR INCOME TAX THIS INCOME TAX APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 15.12.2022, ALONG WITH ITA.34/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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S.V.BHATTI & BASANT BALAJI, JJ. ----------------------------------------------------------- ITA Nos.34 and 35 of 2018 and 25 & 27 of 2019 ---------------------------------------------------------- Dated this the 15th day of December 2022
JUDGMENT
S.V.Bhatti, J.
We have heard learned Senior Advocates Sri Joseph Markose and Sri PKR Menon. 2. The Meenachil Co-operative Agricultural & Rural Development Bank Ltd., Kottayam/Assessee is the appellant. The Income Tax Officer, Ward-4, Kottayam is the respondent. 3. The appellant raised an identical question of law for decision; the circumstances surrounding the controversy are similar in all
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the assessment years. Therefore, by this common judgment, the appeals stand disposed of. 4. The details of the year of assessment and orders of the authorities are stated in the following table: Sl.No. Assessment year and date of the assessment order Order of Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) Order of the Appellate Tribunal ITA No. 1 2010-2011; 20-03-2013 ITA-17/KTM/CIT(A)-IV/13- 14 dated 26.09.2014 ITA No.41/Coch/2015 dated 24.05.2017 ITA No.34 of 2018 2 2010-2011; 20-03-2013 ITA No.48/KTM/CIT(A)/ KTM/2013-14 dated 17.02.2017 ITA No.143/Coch/2017 dated 03.04.2017 ITA No.35 of 2018 3 2011-2012; 29.09.2015 ITA No.K51/CIT(A)/ KTM/2015-16 dated 16.03.2018 ITA No.270/Coch/2018 dated 25.10.2018 ITA No.25 of 2019 4 2011-2012; 29.09.2015 ITA No.K50/CIT(A)/KTM/2015- 16 dated 18.04.2018 ITA No.295/Coch/2018 dated 17.10.2018 ITA No.27 of 2019
For convenience, the learned counsel referred to the circumstances in ITA No.25 of 2019 as the lead case. ITA No.25 of 2019 5. The assessee is the Primary Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank, claimed and availed the benefits of deduction under Section 80P of the Income Tax Act (for short,
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'the Act'). The revenue for the assessment year 2010-2011 denied the deduction claimed under Section 80P of the Act. The assessee has an area of operation in more than one Taluk. Section 80P(4) was amended and read as follows: [(4). The provisions of this Section shall not apply in relation to any co-operative bank other than a primary agricultural credit society or a primary co- operative agricultural and rural development bank.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section.- (a) "co-operative bank" and "primary agricultural credit society" shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in Part V of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949); (b) "primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank" means a society having its area of operation confined to a taluk and the principal object of which is to provide for long-term credit for agricultural and rural development activities.]
The Assessing Officer, through an order dated 29.09.2015 (Annexure-A), has recorded the following finding: 14. In response, CA, Abraham K Thomas, authorised representative of the assesssee, has contended as follows:
``The amendment made to section 80P by insertion of sub-section (4) w.e.f. 01-04-2007 does not take away the applicability of the section to agricultural and rural development bank having its area of operation in more than one taluks. While the amendment also defines
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`primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank' as a Society having its area of operation confined to 'a taluk`, the usage of the article `a' before the word `taluk' is not to be understood to indicate a single taluk for the following reasons:
(1) Section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act provides as under:
13(2): Gender and number – In all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.-
[1] words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females; and [2] words in singular shall include the plural, and vice-versa'.
In the instant case, there is nothing in the Section to suggest that the definition restricts the applicability of section 80P only to agricultural and rural development banks having its area of operation in a single taluk. If that was the intention, the legislature could have very well have used the word 'single or one taluk".
(2) The expression, 'a taluk' should be understood in a sense that the operation of the bank should be at taluk level and 'a' should not be understood to indicate a singular number. It may be noted that there are agricultural and rural development banks which operate districtwise or statewise and the restriction in the definition is therefore to be understood as applicable to such banks and not to banks
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which operate in a few taluks.
(3) There is no similar restriction made with respect to primary agricultural credit society. Is to be noted that section 80P is now applicable to co-operative bank only if it is either a primary agricultural credit society or a primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank, if the intention was to confine the applicability only to such Societies which operate in a single taluk, a similar restriction would have been provided for primary agricultural credit society also, but this is clearly note the case.
(4) The Allahabad High Court in Lakshmi Narain Sharma vs. District Board, Gazipur reported in AIR 1956 All 433 dealt with similar provision dealing with powers of the prescribed authority to make bye-laws for "a Gaon Panchayat under section 111 of the UP Panchayat Raj Act and the High Court held that in the context the words 'a Gaon Panchayat' in the said section shall include the plural and therefore the power to make rules as provided under section 111 is for one or more Gaon Panchayats within the area over which the Board functions.
(5) Similarly the article 'a' is used in section 54F with respect to exemption from capital gains on the purchase of a residential house'. This has come up for interpretation in many cases as indicated below:
• Vittal Krishna Conjeevaram vs. ITO (2013) 144 ITD 325 (Hyd) .
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• CIT and Anor. Vs. D Ananda Basappa (2009) ITR 329 (Kar)
• CIT vs. Smt. KG Rukumini Amma (2011) 96 Taxman 87 (Kar)".
I have gone through the contentions of the assessee carefully. I do not agree with the assessee's contentions. The provision under reference in the instance case, i.e. Explanation
(b) to section BOP(4), on the other hand, is a defining provision employing the word "means". The same has to be strictly construed, as is well settled, besides having been explained lately by the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of West Bengal Warehousing Corporation vs. Indrapuri Studio Pvc Ltd (in Civil Appeal No. 3865 of 2006 dated 19-10- 2010), wherein it held that the word ``means`' in a definition signifies a hard and fast definition. The issue is clearly discussed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench- B, Jaipur in ITA No.764/JP/2011, in the case of Kekri Sahakari Bhumi Vikas Bank Ltd vs. ITO Ward-2 (date of pronouncement: 23-03-2012). The relevant portion of the judgement is extracted below:
"4.4 We may without prejudice also examine the assessee's claim of being a primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank. The Revenue has rejected the asssessee's claim on the ground that it does not meet the definition thereof inasmuch as its area of operation is not confined to a taluk [Explanation (b) of section 80P(4)]. In this regard, we firstly observe that the
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assessee has not clarified if it is a member of the Rajasthan State Co-operative Land Development Bank and, if so, since when. Secondly, it has not shown that its principal object is to provide long-term credit for agricultural and rural development activities, which constitutes the defining attribute of such a bank, with its object clause nowhere indicating so. Thirdly, its area of operation admittedly extends beyond one taluk. The reliance placed on the decision in the case of CIT & Anr. Vs. Ananda Basappa (supra), based on section 54(1), Invoking the provision as enshrined in section 13 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is clearly misconceived, and rightly rejected by the Revenue. It does not take much strain, and a bare reading of said section would convince one that the investment that qualifies for exemption under section 54(1) is that in a residential house. i.e. specifies the nature of investment exempting the Income. Clearly, if the investment is in more than one residential house, every part of the investment would satisfy the condition of being in a residential house, and where within the defined time period as provided under the section would qualify for exemption. The provision under reference in the instance case, i.e. Explanation (b) to section 80P(4), on the other hand, is a defining provision employing the word "means". The same has to be strictly construed, as is well settled, besides having been explained lately by the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of West Bengal State Warehousing Corporation vs. Indrapuri Studio Pvt Ltd (in Civil Appeal No. 3865 of 2006 dated 19-10-2010). wherein it held that the
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word "means" in a definition signifies a hard and fast definition. Also, it is trite that an exemption provision is to be strictly construed. That apart, a bare reading of the provision makes it abundantly clear that the word 'a taluk' are with reference to the area of operation and not the nature of the area of operation, as contended by and on the assessee's behalf. We, therefore, find no basis to consider the assessee as being a primary co- operative agricultural and rural development bank as defined in section 80P, so as to be entitled for tax benefit thereunder on its income as one such."
The issue is also considered by the Income- tax Appellate Tribunal, Indore in the case of Vidisha Bhopal Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. ACIT vide order in ITA No. 215 & 216/Ind/2011 dated 18-06-2012. The Hon. Tribunal in this case has observed as under:
"Section 80P has been amended by Finance Act, 1006 and sub section (4) has been inserted. As per finding recorded by lower authorities, the assesssee is neither PACS nor PCARDB and hence not eligible for deduction under section 80P. A Society fulfilling two conditions is a PCARDB as per explanation to section 80P(4): (a) Area of operation confined to a taluk (b) The principal object of which is to provide for long-term credit for agricultural and rural development activities. The principal object of the assesssee has been discussed in detail later while discussing that assessee is not PACS and the object of the assessee and the range of the activities is not confined to taluk but is
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extended to entire District of Bhopal & Vidisha. It is clear that the assessee is not fulfilling the second condition also. Hence, assessee is not PCARDB."
In the end, it denied the deduction claimed under Section 80P of the Act. The first appellate authority and the Tribunal have confirmed the finding of the assessing officer. Hence the second appeal and the following question is raised for our consideration: Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Appellate Tribunal is right in holding that, the Appellant is not entitled to the benefit of deduction under Section 80P for Assessment year 2011-12?
Sri Joseph Markose argues that the amendment introduced through the Finance Act, 2006, is effective from 1.4.2007, and the memorandum of objects for the amendment provided the underlying idea or the intention of the amendment, i.e., to restrict deduction under Sec.80 (P) to certain types of Co- operative Societies. But the memorandum does not specify any particular reason for determining the area of operation. The amendment of Section 80P(4) does not take away the applicability of Section to agricultural and rural development
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bank having the area of operation in more than one Taluk in as much as ‘article-A’ before the word 'taluk' shall not be understood as a single Taluk. Reliance is placed on Section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, the expression 'a Taluk' must be read to mean more than one Taluk. By drawing the comparison with the interpretation of a residential house arising under Section 54(f) of the Act and the judgment reported in Commissioner of Income-Tax and another v D.Ananda Basappa1 and Commissioner of Income Tax and another v Smt.K.G.Rukminiamma2, it is argued, the available interpretation to the expression 'a Taluk' means ‘more than a Taluk’. 9. Sri PKR Menon contends that the absence of reasons for restricting the availability of benefits under Section 80P(4) to a Taluk is not a reason to expand the meaning of a Taluk means as more than one or more Taluks. The explanation is clear and categorical. Applying the Golden Rule of interpretation, it is argued that the Explanation is clear and categorical as referring
1 [2009] 309 ITR 329 (Kar) 2 [2011] 331 ITR 211 (Karn)
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to a Taluk. Explanation (b) of Section 80P(4) means that a society has its area of operation confined to a Taluk, and the principal object of the society is to provide for long-term credit for agricultural and rural development activities. Therefore, to merit consideration of deduction under Section 80P(4), the assessee must satisfy the conditions stipulated in the explanation. There is no ambiguity in explanation (b) of Section 80P(4). Therefore, being a fiscal statute, the interpretation must be strict, and there is no reason to expand the meaning of ‘a Taluk’ to ‘many Taluks’. It is further contended that by reading the meaning of a Taluk as including plural i.e.many Taluks, the interpretation would be doing violence to other expressions in explanation (b) of Section 80P(4). For the said purpose, he invites our attention to the words a society having its area of operation confined to a Taluk, if the similar Taluk is made plural, the interpretation would be contrary to the company of words 'a Taluk', i.e. noscitur a sociis. He prays for dismissing the appeal as no substantial question arises for consideration.
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We have taken note of the rival submissions and are called upon to interpret whether the expression 'a Taluk’ is to be used as the meaning of a Taluk or more than a Taluk.
This Court in ITA No.65 and 62 of 2018 considered the interpretative tools to construe the Explanation appended to a section. 11.1 15.3 An explanation at times is appended to a section to explain the meaning of words contained in the section. It becomes part and parcel of the enactment. The meaning to be given to an explanation must depend upon its terms, and no theory of its purpose can be entertained unless it is to be inferred from the language used. (Krishna Ayyankar v. Nattaperumal Pillai (ILR 43 Madras 550) , Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra (1977 2 SCC 548) Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. State of Maharashtra (1989 (4) SCC 378). Purposive construction is permissible if any other construction does not fit with the description or the avowed purpose. We may sum up the objects of an explanation by referring to Sundaram Pillai v. Pattabiraman (1985 1 SCC 591):
“(a) to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself, (b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve. (c) to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and purposeful, (d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof but where some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the Court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment, and (e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of
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an Act by becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the same.”
To begin with, we apply the golden rule of interpretation, i.e. the words used in the provision of a Statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning, and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions giving effect to other criteria such as policy, object, reasons etc. The often quoted or relied on expression of S.R.Das, J. in Jugalkishore Saraf v Raw Cotton Company Ltd. AIR 1955 SC 376, reads as follows: "The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court may adopt the same. But if no, such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case a literal construction of the rule leads to no apparent absurdity and, therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction. "
Primary Co-operative Agricultural Rural Development bank means a society having its area of operation confined to a Taluk. Therefore, interpreted literally, the benefit is limited to a Taluk. But the argument for the assessee refers to Section 13(2)
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of the General Clauses Act to expand the meaning from singular to plural.
Section 13(2) reads as follows: [1] Section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act provides as under:- "13(2). Gender and number.- In all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- 1. words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females; and 2. words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa."
Therefore, the argument is that there is nothing in the section to suggest that the restriction of explanation is only to a Taluk and the meaning of the word, a Taluk, should be understood as the operation of the bank at the Taluk level. 15. Section 13(2) deals with gender and number. The very section says that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, - words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females, and words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa. Now let us examine whether the construction commended to this Court, viz. to interpret ‘a Taluk’ as ‘many Taluks’, would satisfy the subject and context in which
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the expression 'a Taluk’ is used. The expression 'a Taluk' is preceded by the words, a Society having its area of operation confined, i.e. to a Taluk. We cannot go into the wisdom or the necessity of the Parliament in employing the words noted in explanation (b) of Section 80P(4). But the effect of acceptance of construction suggested by the appellant would result in an absurd situation, such as a society having its area of operation confined to Taluks. The meaning confined to Taluks will neither satisfy the subject nor the context. 16. On the other hand, the expansion of the words “a Taluk”would mean ‘more than one Taluk’ will render the words “a society having its area of operation confined” entirely otiose. We have referred to the argument, and for the deliberation, we have undertaken above, we are satisfied that the construction commented to us would treat a Taluk as more than a Taluk does not arise in the present setting of Explanation- (b). Therefore, the questions are answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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Appeal Nos.34 & 35 of 2018 and 27 of 2019 The Questions raised in these appeals, by following the reasoning and conclusion in the lead case, are answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. Appeals fail and are dismissed.
Sd/- S.V.BHATTI, JUDGE
Sd/- BASANT BALAJI, JUDGE
css/
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APPENDIX OF ITA 25/2019
PETITIONER ANNEXURES Annexure A TRUE COPY OF ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 29/9/2015 Annexure B TRUE COPY OF APPELLATE ORDER DATED 16/3/2018 OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (APPEALS), KOTTAYAM Annexure C TRUE COPY OF SECOND APPEAL DATED 15/5/2018 FILED BY THE APPELLANT BEFORE THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, COCHIN BENCH. Annexure D CERTIFIED COPY OF IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 25/10/2018 PASSED BY THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, COCHIN BENCH IN I.T APPEAL NO.270/COCH/2018
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APPENDIX OF ITA 27/2019
PETITIONER ANNEXURES ANNEXURE A TRUE COPY OF ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 29.09.2015. ANNEXURE B TRUE COPY OF ORDER OF THE COMMISSIONER (APPEALS) DATED 18.04.2018. ANNEXURE C TRUE COPY OF SECOND APPEAL DATED 15.05.2018 FILED BY THE APPELLANT BEFORE THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, COCHIN BENCH. ANNEXURE D CERTIFIED COPY OF ORDER DATED 17.10.2018 PASSED BY THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, COCHIN BENCH IN I.T.APPEAL NO.295/COCH/2018.
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APPENDIX OF ITA 35/2018
PETITIONER ANNEXURES Annexure A TRUE COPY OF ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 20.03.2013. Annexure B TRUE COPY OF APPELLATE ORDER DATED 17.02.2017 OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (APPEALS), KOTTAYAM. Annexure C TRUE COPY OF SECOND APPEAL DATED 03.04.2017 FILED BY THE APPELLANT BEFORE THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, COCHIN BENCH. Annexure D CERTIFIED COPY OF IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 03.10.2017 PASSED BY THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, COCHIN BENCH IN I.T APPEAL NO. 143/COCH/2017.
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APPENDIX OF ITA 34/2018
PETITIONER ANNEXURES Annexure A TRUE COPY OF ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 20.03.2013. Annexure B TRUE COPY OF ORDER OF THE COMMISSIONER (APPEALS) DATED 26.09.2014. Annexure C TRUE COPY OF SECOND APPEAL DATED 02.01.2015 FILED BY THE APPELLANT BEFORE THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, COCHIN BENCH. Annexure D CERTIFIED COPY OF ORDER DATED 24.05.2017 PASSED BY THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, COCHIN BENCH IN I.T APPEAL NO. 41/COCH/2016.