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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, “B” BENCH, MUMBAI
Before: SHRI M. BALAGANESH, AM & SHRI AMARJIT SINGH, JM
O R D E R
PER AMARJIT SINGH, JM:
The assessee has filed the present appeal against the order dated 23.04.2019 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-08, Mumbai [hereinafter referred to as the “CIT(A)”] relevant to the A.Y.2014-15.
2. The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal: - “Disallowance under section 14A in respect of expenditure attributable to earning exempt income:
1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Commissioner of Income- tax (Appeals) erred in upholding the disallowance under section 14A computed at 0.5% of the average value of investments other than the investments which have yielded exempt income.
2. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Commissioner of Income- tax (Appeals) erred in not appreciating the fact that the appellant had already computed the disallowance under section 14A at Rs. 1,55,774 on a reasonable basis.
3. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Commissioner of Income- tax (Appeals) erred in upholding the action of the Assessing Officer in invoking the provisions of Rule SD without recording non- satisfaction with the correctness of the disallowance of Rs. 1,55,774 made by the appellant on a reasonable basis.
4. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Commissioner of Income- tax (Appeals) erred in holding that the appellant cannot challenge the non-recording of satisfaction before making the disallowance as per Rule 8D on the ground that the appellant had itself made a suo-moto disallowance.
2 A.Y. 2014-15 5. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Commissioner of Income- tax (Appeals) erred in not appreciating the fact that no expenditure is required to be incurred by the appellant in respect of long- term legacy investments in group companies.
On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Commissioner of Income- tax (Appeals) erred in not appreciating the fact that disallowance under section 14A can be only if the expenditure has a direct and proximate nexus with the earning of exempt income.
7. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Commissioner of Income- tax (Appeals) erred in rejecting the contention of the appellant that investments which have not yielded exempt income ought to be excluded while computing the disallowance under Rule 8D. Deduction in respect of education cess paid 8. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the appellant prays that the Assessing Officer be directed to grant deduction in respect of education cess on income tax paid during the year.”
3. The brief facts of the case are that the assessee filed its return of income on 27.11.2014 declaring total income to the tune of Rs.4,38,95,600/- for the A.Y.2014-15. Thereafter, the case was selected for scrutiny. Notices u/s 143(2) & 142(1) of the Act were issued and served upon the assessee. The assessee company is engaged in the business of ginning and pressing of cotton. The assessee has earned the exempt income in sum of Rs.11,40,73,541/- received from domestic companies against investment in shares and Rs.21,59,449/- from mutual funds investments. The AO applied the provisions u/s 14A r.w. Rule 8D of the Rules and assessed the expenditure to earn the exempt income in sum of Rs.26,34,970/- whereas the assessee has suo-moto disallowed expenses of Rs.1,55,774/-. The total expenses were assessed to the tune of Rs.24,79,196/- The total income of the assessee was assessed to the tune of Rs.4,63,74,796/-. Feeling aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A) who partly allowed the claim of the assessee, but the assessee was not satisfied, therefore, the assessee has filed the present appeal before us. ISSUE NOs. 1 to 7 4. All the grounds are in connection with the confirmation of disallowance u/s 14A r.w. Rule 8D of the Rules. At the very outset, the Ld. Representative of the assessee has argued that while assessing the expenditure to earn the exempt income in view of the provisions u/s 14A r.w. 8D(2) of the Rules, investment which was not attributable to the exempt income is liable to be excluded and in 3 A.Y. 2014-15 this regard, the Ld. Representative of the assessee has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of ACIT Vs. Vireet Investment P. Ltd. (2017) 82 taxmann.com 415 (Del). However, on the other hand, the Ld. Representative of the assessee has strongly relied upon the order passed by the CIT(A) in question. The relevant finding has been given in para no. 4.8 to 4.18 which is hereby reproduced as under.:- “ 4.8. Ld. counsel submitted that Section 14A contemplates disallowance of both direct and indirect expenditure having proximate connection with the exempt income. He submitted that in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 14A of the act, any expenditure incurred in relation to exempt income is not an allowable deduction Thus, the pre-requisite condition for applying the provisions of section 14A of the Act is that some expenditure must be incurred “in relation to” the earning of exempt income. The said expression “in relation to” has been judiciously explained to mean some real and dominant relationship. 4.9. In this regard ld. counsel has relied on the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs. Walford Share & Stock Brokers 326 ITR 1, wherein it has been held by the Apex Court that there must be proximate relationship of expenditure with the exempt income for the purpose of making disallowance u/s 14A of the Act. This decision was followed by the Hon‟ble Bombay High Court in the case of Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT 328 ITR 81 . 4.10. He further referred to the decision of Hon‟ble Delhi High Court in the case of Maxopp Investment Ltd. 347 ITR 272, wherein it has been held that no disallowance could be made under the said section where no expenditure had „actually‟ been incurred by the assessee in relation to earning of the exempt income. The Hon‟ble Delhi High Court approved the contention raised by the assessee that the term „expenditure incurred‟ appearing in Sec. 14A(1) of the Act would mean actual expenditure incurred. Thus, the provisions of sec. 14A of the Act would be applicable only when the assessee had actually incurred certain expenditure which had proximate nexus with earning of exempt income. 4.11. Ld. counsel pointed out that the contention of Revenue that disallowance calculated u/s 14A read with Rule 8D of the I.T. Rules should be ipso facto incorporated in clause (f) of Explanation 1 of section 115JB of the Act on the ground that the scope of both the provisions are similar is not correct inasmuch as while u/s 14A the expression used is „in relation‟, u/s 115JB of the Act, the term used is „relatable to‟ . 4.12. Ld. counsel submitted that this reasoning is legally untenable because sec. 14A contained in Chapter IV of the Act begins with the phrase “for the purposes of computing the total income under this Chapter”. It was pointed out that income under the normal provisions of the Act is computed under the five heads specified in section 14. Provisions relating to computation of income under different heads are contained in sections 14 to 59, forming part of Chapter IV of the Act. In other words, the said Chapter provides for computation of income of an assessee under the normal provisions of the Act. As a necessary corollary, provisions of section 14A cannot be extended to any Chapter, other than Chapter IV of the Act. 4.13. Section 115JB finds place under Chapter XII-B of the Act. Being so, provisions of sec. 14A contained in Chapter IV cannot be imported and incorporated u/s 115JB more so when clause (f) to Explanation 1 to the said section contains no reference to section 14A of the Act.
4 A.Y. 2014-15 4.14. Ld. counsel submitted that if provisions of Sec. 14A are to be imported into section 115JB of the Act, the same would tantamount to reading additional words into the statute which is not permissible and would be against the cardinal rule of „literal interpretation‟. In this regard ld. counsel has relied on following decisions: - Jugal Kishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. AIR 1955 SC 376, wherein it has been observed as under: " The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case, the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction. " 4.15. He also relied on various other Supreme Court decisions as mentioned in the Broad Proposition advanced by the ld. counsel. Ld. counsel also referred to the Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Great Eastern Exports v. CIT 332 ITR 14, wherein also it has been held that if the language of the statute is plain and capable of one and only one meaning, that obvious meaning is to be given to the said provision. 4.17. Accordingly, ld. counsel submitted that applicability of provisions of sec. 14A is confined to computation of tax liability under the five heads of income enumerated in sec. 14 under normal provisions contained in Chapter IV of the act. The said section 14A cannot be extended and read into section 115JB, falling under Chapter XII-B of the Act. 4.18. Ld. counsel further submitted that scope of section 14A and section 115JB of the act are entirely different. He submitted that u/s 14A of the Act disallowance is made of expenditure in relation to the earning of income not forming part of the total income. Thus, section 14A takes within its sweep both direct and indirect expenditure having proximate connection with earning of exempt income. However, under clause (f) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB of the Act, only those expenditure debited to the profit and loss amount, which are relatable to earning of income exempt u/s 10 (excluding section 10(38) or section 11 or section 12 are added back while computing adjusted book profit. Thus, only direct expenditure associated with the earning of said income would be added back.”
Accordingly, we are of the view that the investment which did not yield exempt income is liable to be excluded while assessing the expenditure to earn the exempt income u/s 14A r.w. Rule 8D(2). Accordingly, we set aside the finding of the CIT(A) in question and direct the AO to assess the expenditure to earn the exempt income while implementing the decision titled as ACIT Vs. Vireet Investment P. Ltd. (2017) 82 taxmann.com 415 (Del). Accordingly, these issues are decided in favour of the assessee against the revenue. ISSUE NO. 8 6. Under this issue the assessee has challenged the disallowance of Education Cess while assessing the income tax paid during the year. At the very outset, the 5 A.Y. 2014-15 Ld. Representative of the assessee has argued that the deduction in respect of Education Cess is liable to be given while assessing the income of the assessee and in this regard, the Ld. Representative of the assessee has placed reliance upon the decision passed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Sesa Goa 423 ITR 426. The relevant finding is hereby reproduced as under.:- “12. The Full Bench, upon detailed consideration of the matter has answered the aforesaid question of law in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue. In effect the Full Bench, has not agreed with the view taken by the Division Bench in Orient (Goa) Private Limited (supra).
As noted earlier, since, the ITAT in its impugned judgment and order dated 17th May, 2013, has solely relied upon Orient (Goa) (P.) Limited (supra) in order not to follow its own view, in respect of this very Appellant - Assessee, in respect of Assessment Year 2009-2010, we feel that the substantial questions of law Nos.(i) and (ii) now framed in Tax Appeal No. 17 of 2013, are required to be answered in favour of the Appellant - Assessee and against the Respondent - Revenue, now that the Full Bench of this Court has disagreed in view of the Division Bench in Orient (Goa) (P.) Limited (supra) and decided the substantial question of law in favour of Assessee and against the Revenue. We do so accordingly.
Therefore, the substantial questions of law Nos.(i) and (ii) framed in Tax Appeal No. 17 of 2013 are hereby answered in favour of the Appellant - Assessee and against the Respondent-Revenue. To that extent, the view taken by the ITAT in its impugned judgment and order dated 17th May, 2013 is ordered to be modified.
The substantial question of law No. (iii) in Tax Appeal No. 17 of 2013 and the only substantial question of law in Tax Appeal No. 18 of 2013 is one and the same namely, 'whether Education Cess and Higher and Secondary Education Cess, collectively referred to as "cess" is allowable as a deduction in the year of its payment ?'.
The aforesaid question arises in the context of provisions of Section 40(a)(ii) which inter alia provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in sections 30 to 38 of the IT Act, the following amounts shall not be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head "Profits and gains of business or profession", - (a) in the case of any assessee - (ia) … (ib) … (ic) … (ii) any sum paid on account of 6 A.Y. 2014-15 any rate or tax levied on the profits or gains of any business or profession or assessed at a proportion of, or otherwise on the basis of, any such profits or gains. [Explanation 1.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the purposes of this sub- clause, any sum paid on account of any rate or tax levied includes and shall be deemed always to have included any sum eligible for relief of tax under section 90 or, as the case may be, deduction from the Indian income-tax payable under section 91.] [Explanation 2.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the purposes of this sub- clause, any sum paid on account of any rate or tax levied includes any sum eligible for relief of tax under section 90A;] 17. Therefore, the question which arises for determination is whether the expression "any rate or tax levied" as it appears in section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act includes "cess". The Appellant - Assessee contends that the expression does not include "cess" and therefore, the amounts paid towards "cess" are liable to be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession". However, the Respondent - Revenue contends that "cess" is also included in the scope and import of the expression "any rate or tax levied" and consequently, the amounts paid towards the "cess" are not liable for deduction in computing the income chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession".
In relation to taxing statute, certain principles of interpretation are quite well settled. In New Shorrock Spinning and Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Raval, [1959] 37 ITR 41 (Bom.), it is held that one safe and infallible principle, which is of guidance in these matters, is to read the words through and see if the rule is clearly stated. If the language employed gives the rule in words of sufficient clarity and precision, nothing more requires to be done. Indeed, in such a case the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise : Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. The language used by the Legislature best declares its intention and must be accepted as decisive of it.
Besides, when it comes to interpretation of the IT Act, it is well established that no tax can be imposed on the subject without words in the Act clearly showing an intention to lay a burden on him. The subject cannot be taxed unless he comes within the letter of the law and the argument that he falls within the spirit of the law cannot be availed of by the department. [See CIT v. Motors & General Stores [1967] 66 ITR 692 (SC)].
7 A.Y. 2014-15 20. In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied, into the provisions which has not been provided by the legislature [See CIT v. Radhe Developers [2012] 17 taxmann.com 156/204 Taxman 543/341 ITR 403 (Guj.). One can only look fairly at the language used. No tax can be imposed by inference or analogy. It is also not permissible to construe a taxing statute by making assumptions and presumptions [See Goodyear v. State of Haryana [1991] 188 ITR 402(SC)].
There are several decisions which lay down rule that the provision for deduction, exemption or relief should be interpreted liberally, reasonably and in favour of the assessee and it should be so construed as to effectuate the object of the legislature and not to defeat it. Further, the interpretation cannot go to the extent of reading something that is not stated in the provision [See AGS Tiber v. CIT [1998] 233 ITR 207/[1997] 92 Taxman 268 (Mad.)].
Applying the aforesaid principles, we find that the legislature, in Section 40(a)(ii) has provided that "any rate or tax levied" on "profits and gains of business or profession" shall not be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession". There is no reference to any "cess". Obviously therefore, there is no scope to accept Ms. Linhares's contention that "cess" being in the nature of a "Ta x" is equally not deductable in computing the income chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession". Acceptance of such a contention will amount to reading something in the text of the provision which is not to be found in the text of the provision in section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act.
If the legislature intended to prohibit the deduction of amounts paid by a Assessee towards say, "education cess" or any other "cess", then, the legislature could have easily included reference to "cess" in clause (ii) of Section 40(a) of the IT Act. The fact that the legislature has not done so means that the legislature did not intend to prevent the deduction of amounts paid by a Assessee towards the "cess", when it comes to computing income chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession".
The legislative history bears out that the Income Ta x Bill, 1961, as introduced in the Parliament, had Section 40(a)(ii) which read as follows : "(ii) any sum paid on account of any cess, rate or tax levied on the profits or gains of any business or profession or assessed at a proportion of, or otherwise on the basis of, any such profits or gains"
However, when the matter came up before the Select Committee of the Parliament, it was decided to omit the word "cess" from the aforesaid clause from the Income-tax Bill, 1961. The effect of the omission of the word "cess" is that only any rate or tax levied on the profits or gains of any business or profession are to be deducted in computing the income 8 A.Y. 2014-15 chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession". Since the deletion of expression "cess" from the Income-tax Bill, 1961, was deliberate, there is no question of reintroducing this expression in Section 40(a)(ii) of IT Act and that too, under the guise of interpretation of taxing statute.
In fact, in the aforesaid precise regard, reference can usefully be made to the Circular No. F. No. 91/58/66-ITJ(19), dated 18th May, 1967 issued by the CBDT which reads as follows :— "Interpretation of provision of Section 40(a)(ii) of IT Act, 1961 - Clarification regarding.- "Recently a case has come to the notice of the Board where the Income-tax Officer has disallowed the 'cess' paid by the assessee on the ground that there has been no material change in the provisions of section 10(4) of the Old Act and Section 40(a)(ii) of the new Act.
The view of the Income-tax Officer is not correct. Clause 40(a)(ii) of the Income-tax Bill, 1961 as introduced in the Parliament stood as under:- "(ii) any sum paid on account of any cess, rate or tax levied on the profits or gains of any business or profession or assessed at a proportion of, or otherwise on the basis of, any such profits or gains". When the matter came up before the Select Committee, it was decided to omit the word 'cess' from the clause. The effect of the omission of the word 'cess' is that only taxes paid are to be disallowed in the assessments for the years 1962-63 and onwards.
The Board desire that the changed position may please be brought to the notice of all the Income-tax Officers so that further litigation on this account may be avoided.[Board's F. No. 91/58/66-ITJ(19), dated 18-5- 1967.] 27. The CBDT Circular, is binding upon the authorities under the IT Act like Assessing Officer and the Appellate Authority. The CBDT Circular is quite consistent with the principles of interpretation of taxing statute. This, according to us, is an additional reason as to why the expression "cess" ought not to be read or included in the expression "any rate or tax levied" as appearing in section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act.
In the Income-tax Act, 1922, section 10(4) had banned allowance of any sum paid on account of 'any cess, rate or tax levied on the profits or gains of any business or profession'. In the corresponding Section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act, 1961 the expression "cess" is quite conspicuous by its absence. In fact, legislative history bears out that this expression was in fact to be found in the Income-tax Bill, 1961 which was introduced in the Parliament. However, the Select Committee recommended the omission of expression "cess" and consequently, this expression finds no place in the final text of the provision in Section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act, 1961. The effect of such omission is that the provision in Section 40(a)(ii)
9 A.Y. 2014-15 does not include, "cess" and consequently, "cess" whenever paid in relation to business, is allowable as deductable expenditure.
In Kanga and Palkhivala's "The Law and Practice of Income Tax" (Tenth Edition), several decisions have been analyzed in the context of provisions of Section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act, 1961. There is reference to the decision of Privy Council in CIT v. Gurupada Dutta [1946] 14 ITR 100 (PC), where a union rate was imposed under a Village Self Government Act upon the assessee as the owner or occupier of business premises, and the quantum of the rate was fixed after consideration of the 'circumstances' of the assessee, including his business income. The Privy Council held that the rate was not 'assessed on the basis of profits' and was allowable as a business expense. Following this decision, the Supreme Court held in Jaipuria Samla Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. v. CIT 1971 [82 ITR 580] that the expression 'profits or gains of any business or profession' has reference only to profits and gains as determined in accordance with Section 29 of this Act and that any rate or tax levied upon profits calculated in a manner other than that provided by that section could not be disallowed under this sub-clause. Similarly, this sub-clause is inapplicable, and a deduction should be allowed, where a tax is imposed by a district board on business with reference to 'estimated income' or by a municipality with reference to 'gross income'. Besides, unlike Section 10(4) of the 1922 Act, this sub-clause does not refer to 'cess' and therefore, a 'cess' even if levied upon or calculated on the basis of business profits may be allowed in computing such profits under this Act.
The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) in Income-tax Appeal No. 52/2018 decided on 31st July, 2018 Chambal Fertilisers and Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT, by reference to the aforesaid CBDT Circular dated 18th May, 1967 has held that the ITAT erred in holding that the "education cess" is a disallowable expenditure under section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act. Ms. Linhares was unable to state whether the Revenue has appealed this decision. Mr. Ramani, learned Senior Advocate submitted that his research did not suggest that any appeal was instituted by the Revenue against this decision, which is directly on the point and favours the Assessee.
Mr. Ramani, in fact pointed out three decisions of ITAT, in which, the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Chambal Fertilisers and Chemicals Ltd.(supra) was followed and it was held that the amounts paid by the Assessee towards the 'education cess' were liable for deduction in computing the income chargeable under the head of "profits and gains of business or profession". They are as follows :— (i) Dy. CIT v. Peerless General Finance and Investment and Co. Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 1469 and 1470/Kol/2019 decided on 5-12-2019 by the ITAT, Calcutta; 10 A.Y. 2014-15 (ii) Dy. CIT v. Graphite India Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 472 and 474 Co. No. 64 and 66/Kol/2018 dated on 22-11- 2019)by the ITAT, Calcutta; (iii) Dy. CIT v. Bajaj Allianz General Insurance [IT Appeal No. 1111 and 1112/PUN/2017 dated on 25-7-2019) by the ITAT, Pune.
Again, Ms. Linhares, learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue was unable to say whether the Revenue had instituted the appeals in the aforesaid matters. Mr. Ramani, learned Senior Advocate for the Appellant submitted that to the best of his research, no appeals were instituted by the Revenue against the aforesaid decisions of the ITAT.
The ITAT, in the impugned judgment and order, has reasoned that since "cess" is collected as a part of the income tax and fringe benefit tax, therefore, such "cess" is to be construed as "tax". According to us, there is no scope for such implications, when construing a taxing statute. Even, though, "cess" may be collected as a part of income tax, that does not render such "cess", either rate or tax, which cannot be deducted in terms of the provisions in Section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act. The mode of collection, is really not determinative in such matters.
Ms. Linhares, has relied upon Unicorn Industries v. Union of India [2019] 112 taxmann.com 127 (SC) in support of her contention that "cess" is nothing but "tax" and therefore, there is no question of deduction of amounts paid towards "cess" when it comes to computation of income chargeable under the head profits or gains of any business or profession.
The issue involved in Unicorn Industries (supra) was not in the context of provisions in Section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act. Rather, the issue involved was whether the 'education cess, higher education cess and National Calamity Contingent Duty (NCCD)' on it could be construed as "duty of excise" which was exempted in terms of Notification dated 9th September, 2003 in respect of goods specified in the Notification and cleared from a unit located in the Industrial Growth Centre or other specified areas with the State of Sikkim. The High Court had held that the levy of education cess, higher education cess and NCCD could not be included in the expression "duty of excise" and consequently, the amounts paid towards such cess or NCCD did not qualify for exemption under the exemption Notification. This view of the High Court was upheld by the Apex Court in Unicorn Industries (supra).
The aforesaid means that the Supreme Court refused to regard the levy of education cess, higher education cess and NCCD as "duty of excise" when it came to construing exemption Notification. Based upon this, Mr. Ramani contends that similarly amounts paid by the Appellant - Assessee towards the "cess" can never be regarded as the amounts paid towards the "tax" so as to attract provisions of Section 40(a)(ii) of the IT 11 A.Y. 2014-15 Act. All that we may observe is that the issue involved in Unicorn Industries (supra) was not at all the issue involved in the present matters and therefore, the decision in Unicorn Industries (supra) can be of no assistance to the Respondent - Revenue in the present matters.
Ms. Linhares, learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue however submitted that the Appellant - Assessee, in its original return, had never claimed deduction towards the amounts paid by it as "cess". She submits that neither was any such claim made by filing any revised return before the Assessing Officer. She therefore relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Goetze (India) Ltd. v. CIT [2006] 284 ITR 323/157 taxman 1 (SC) to submit that the Assessing Officer, was not only quite right in denying such a deduction, but further the Assessing Officer had no power or jurisdiction to grant such a deduction to the Appellant - Assessee. She submits that this is what precisely held by the ITAT in its impugned judgments and orders and therefore, the same, warrants no interference.
Although, it is true that the Appellant - Assessee did not claim any deduction in respect of amounts paid by it towards "cess" in their original return of income nor did the Appellant - Assessee file any revised return of income, according to us, this was no bar to the Commissioner (Appeals) or the ITAT to consider and allow such deductions to the Appellant - Assessee in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The record bears out that such deduction was clearly claimed by the Appellant - Assessee, both before the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the ITAT.
In CIT v. Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders (P.) Ltd. [2012] 349 ITR 336/208 Taxman 498/23 taxmann.com 23 (Bom), one of the questions of law which came to be framed was whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the ITAT, in law, was right in holding that the claim of deduction not made in the original returns and not supported by revised return, was admissible. The Revenue had relied upon Goetze (supra) and urged that the ITAT had no power to allow the claim for deduction. However, the Division Bench, whilst proceeding on the assumption that the Assessing Officer in terms of law laid down in Goetze (supra) had no power, proceeded to hold that the Appellate Authority under the IT Act had sufficient powers to permit such a deduction. In taking this view, the Division Bench relied upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ahmedabad Electricity Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1993] 199 ITR 351/66 Taxman 27 (Bom.) to hold that the Appellate Authorities under the IT Act have very wide powers while considering an appeal which may be filed by the Assessee. The Appellate Authorities may confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or remand the case to the Assessing Officer. This is because, unlike an ordinary appeal, the basic purpose of a tax appeal is to ascertain the correct tax liability of the Assessee in accordance with law.
The decision in Goetze (supra) upon which reliance is placed by the ITAT also makes it clear that the issue involved in the said case was 12 A.Y. 2014-15 limited to the power of the assessing authority and does not impinge on the powers of the ITAT under section 254 of the said Act. This means that in Goetze India Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court was not dealing with the extent of the powers of the appellate authorities but the observations were in relation to the powers of the assessing authority. This is the distinction drawn by the division Bench in Pruthvi Brokers Shareholders (P.) Ltd. (supra) as well and this is the distinction which the ITAT failed to note in the impugned order.
Besides, we note that in the present case, though the claim for deduction was not raised in the original return or by filing revised return, the Appellant - Assessee had indeed addressed a letter claiming such deduction before the assessment could be completed. However, even if we proceed on the basis that there was no obligation on the Assessing Officer to consider the claim for deduction in such letter, the Commissioner (Appeals) or the ITAT, before whom such deduction was specifically claimed was duty bound to consider such claim. Accordingly, we are unable to agree with Ms. Linhare's contention based upon the decision in Goetze India Ltd. (supra).
For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the substantial question of law No. (iii) in Tax Appeal No. 17 of 2013 and the sole substantial question of law in Tax Appeal No. 18 of 2013 is also required to be answered in favour of the Appellant - Assessee and against the Respondent-Revenue. To that extent therefore, the impugned judgments and orders made by the ITAT warrant interference and modification.
Thus, we answer all the three substantial questions of law framed in Tax Appeal No. 17 of 2013 in favour of the Appellant - Assessee and against the Respondent -Revenue. Similarly, we answer the sole substantial question of law framed in Tax Appeal No. 18 of 2013, in favour of the Appellant - Assessee and against the Respondent - Revenue.
The impugned judgments and orders made by the ITAT are accordingly directed to be modified and necessary benefits extended to the Appellant - Assessee.”
In view of the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Sesa Goa (supra), we are of the view that the deduction in respect of education cess on the income tax paid during the year is liable to be granted in accordance with law. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the assessee against the revenue.
13 A.Y. 2014-15 8. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is hereby partly allowed.
Order pronounced in the open court on 07/04/2021 (M. BALAGANESH) (AMARJIT SINGH) लेखध सदस्य / ACCOUNTANT MEMBER न्यधनयक सदस्य/JUDICIAL MEMBER मुंबई Mumbai; ददनांक Dated : 07/04/2021 Vijay Pal Singh/Sr. PS