M/S. CAUVERY AQUA PRIVATE LIMITED,BENGALURU vs. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CIRCLE- 2(1)(1), BENGALURU

The assessee has filed this appeal challenging the assessment order dated 29.7.2019 passed by the Assessing Officer for assessment year 2015-16 u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) of the Income- tax Act,1961 ['the Act' for short] in pursuance of directions given by Ld. Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP). The only issue urged in this appeal relates to transfer pricing adjustment made in respect of specified domestic transactions.

The assessee company is engaged in manufacture and supply of animal feed supplement to M/s. Virbac Group in India. The IT(TP)A No.2021/Bang/2019 M/s. Cauvery Aqua Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore Page 2 of 15 assessee had entered into specified domestic transactions as defined in section 92BA of the Act as detailed below:- Particulars Amount Method Purchase of HDPE 14,56,04,154 TNMM Bottles & Jars Purchase of Animal 3,01,97,210 TNMM Feeds Supplement Rent 3,93,092 TNMM Director 3,64,800 TNMM Remuneration Total 17,65,59,256

The Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) made transfer pricing adjustment of Rs.2.23 Crores and the same was affirmed by Ld. D.R.P. Accordingly, the A.O. passed the final assessment order by making addition of Rs.2.23 Crores by way of transfer pricing adjustment u/s 92CA of the Act. Aggrieved, the assessee has filed this appeal before us.

At the outset, the Ld. A.R. submitted that the specified domestic transactions mentioned above was originally included in clause (i) of section 92BA of the Act. Hence, the assessee has filed transfer pricing study before the tax authorities and the TPO has also passed the impugned order by making TP adjustment. However, the above said clause (i) has been omitted by the Finance Act, 2017 w.e.f. 1.4.2017. The Ld. A.R. submitted that the legal effect of omission of clause (i) of section 92BA was examined by the coordinate bench in the case of Texport Overseas Pvt.Ltd. Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax in IT(TP)A No.1722/Bang/2017 dated 22.12.2017 and the coordinate bench held as under:- “7. Having carefully examined the orders of authorities below in the light of rival submissions and relevant provisions and various judicial pronouncements, we find that by virtue of the insertion of section 92BA on the statute as per clause (i), any expenditure in respect of which IT(TP)A No.2021/Bang/2019 M/s. Cauvery Aqua Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore Page 3 of 15 payment has been made or is to be made to person referred to in clause (b) of sub section 2 of section 40A exceeds the prescribed limit, it would be a specified domestic transaction for which AO is required to make a reference to TPO under section 92CA of the Act for determination of the ALP. In the instant case, since the transaction exceeds the prescribed limit it becomes the specified domestic transaction for which reference was made by the AO to the TPO under section 92CA for determination of the ALP. Consequently, the TPO submitted a report which was objected to by the learned counsel for the assessee and filed a objection before the ORP. Having adjudicated the objections, the DRP has issued certain directions and consequently the AO passed an order. Subsequently, by Finance Act, 2017 w.e.f. 01.04.2017, clause (i) of section 92BA was omitted from the statute. Now the question arises as to whether on account of omission of clause (i) from the statute, the proceedings already initiated or action taken under clause (i) becomes redundant or otiose. In this regard, our attention was invited to judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd., (supra) in which the impact of omission of old rule 10 and 10A was examined. Having carefully examined the issue in the light of provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, their Lordship has observed "that in such a case, the court is to look to the provisions in the rule which has been introduced after omission of the previous rule to determine whether a pending proceeding will continue or lapse. If there is a provision therein that pending proceedings shall continue and be disposed of under the old rule as if the rule has not been deleted or omitted then such a proceeding will continue. If the case is covered by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act or there is a pari-materia provision in the statute under which the rule has been framed in that case also the pending proceeding will not be affected by omission of the rule. In the absence of any such provisions in the statute or in the rule, the pending proceeding will lapse under rule under which the notice was issued or proceeding being omitted or deleted".

Under these circumstances. where this clause (i) is omitted from the statute since its inception, the AO ought have required to frame the assessment in normal course after making necessary enquiries of particular claim of expenditure in accordance with law. But this exercise could not have been done on account of provisions of section 92BA Clause (i) of the Act. Now when this clause (i) has been omitted from the statute by virtue of the aforesaid amendments, the AO is required to adjudicate the issue of claim of expenditures in accordance with law after affording opportunity of being heard to the assessee. We therefore set aside the orders of the AO and the DRP and restore the matter to the AO with the direction to re-adjudicate the issue of claim of expenditure incurred in respect of which payment has been made or is to be made to person referred to in clause (b) of sub section 2 of section 40A of the Act. Accordingly, since we have restored the matter to the AO, we find no justification to deal with the other issues on merit. Accordingly, appeal of the assessee stand allowed for statistical purposes.”

Continuation of orders, etc., issued under enactments repealed and reenacted,. Where any (Central Act) or Regulation, is, after the commencement of this Act, repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided any (appointment notification,) order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, (made or) issued under the repealed Act or Regulation, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions reenacted, continue in force and be deemed to have been (made or) issued under the provisions so re- enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any (appointment, notification,) order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, (made or) issued under the provisions so re-enacted (and when any (Central Act) or Regulation, which, by a notification under Section 5 or 5A of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, (14 of 1874) or any like law, has been extended to any local area, has, by a subsequent notification, been withdrawn form the re-extended to such area or any part thereof the provisions of such Act or Regulations shall be deemed to have been repealed and re-enacted in such area or part within the meaning of this Section). 14. A careful reading of section 6 of General Clauses Act (this Act) makes it clear that made after the commencement of General Clauses Act, any Central Act or Regulation repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal IT(TP)A No.2021/Bang/2019 M/s. Cauvery Aqua Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore Page 8 of 15 shall not effect affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. 15.Further a careful reading of section 6A this Act make it clear that where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal.

The Hon'ble Apex court in the case of Fibre Boards Pvt. Ltd and M/s. Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling has doubted and disapproved its earlier decisions rendered in the case of Rayala Corporation (P) Ltd Vs Enforcement (1969) 2 SCR 412 and Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works Ltd Vs Union of India (2000) 2SCC536 and in the case of General Finance Company Vs CIT (2002) 7 SCC 1. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Fibre Boards (I) Ltd, after referring to the provisions of Section 6A of the General Clauses Act held that "a repeal can be by way of an express “omission" and that even an implied repeal of a statute would fall within the expression "repeal" in section 6 of the General clauses Act. Repeals may take any form and so long as a statute or part of it is obliterated, such obliteration would be covered by the expression "repeal" in section 6 of General clauses Act. Considering the latest decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Fibre Board and Bhagwati Steel, the earlier decisions rendered by the Constitution Bench in Rayala Corporation (P) Ltd and Kolhapur Cansugar Works cannot be said to have laid down any ratio decidendi on an interpretation of the word "repeal" an "omission" would not be included. Their observations are in the nature of obiter dicta as held by the Supreme Court in Fibre Boards. It is also held that the earlier decisions have not referred to Section 6A of the General clauses Act and they lose their binding effect on an application of the "per incuriam” principle, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Fibre Boards Private Limited. Thus, in our view the decision rendered in Royala Corporation Pvt. Ltd lacks binding value for the reasons discussed by the Apex Court in Fibre Boards Pvt. Ltd, the decision rendered in the case of Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works Ltd as also in the case of General Finance Company following the decision in Royala Corporation Ltd, loses its binding value.

As we have already noted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills again reiterated that repeal would IT(TP)A No.2021/Bang/2019 M/s. Cauvery Aqua Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore Page 11 of 15 include repeal by way of an express omission. The Supreme Court further held that the decision in Fibre Boards Private Limited clarifies the law in holding than an omission would amount to repeal. As a result, the provisions of Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply to allow the previous operation of the provision so omitted or anything duly done or suffered thereunder, and such a view is reasonable and for the public good.

At the coast of repetition we may note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Fibre Board (supra) and Bhagwati Steel Rolling (supra) had elaborately reproduced the paragraphs of General Finance Co., (supra) and also the earlier two judgments relied in General Finance Co., (supra), namely Rayala Corporation P. Ltd and Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works Ltd, and observed that even the court has not referred the matter to the larger bench. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Fibre Board (supra) and Bhagwati Steel Rolling (supra) had also discussed the provision of law including the General Clauses Act, Section 6A and 24 and thereafter held that the repeal, omission and deletion are interchangeable and thereafter had held that ‘omission’ will have an effect of ‘repeal’ and ‘repeal’ will have an effect of ‘omission’. The distinction carved out in Rayala Corporation (supra) was not correct and further the reference to the Constitution bench has not considered in view of a binding judgment of the Constitution bench in the matter of M.A.Tulloch& Co as well as the provisions of Section 6A of the General Clauses Act and thereafter the Court had held that the decision, in the matter of Rayala Corporation (supra) was per incurium.

In our humble view the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Fibre Board (supra) and Bhagwati Steel Rolling (supra) have declared that the law in Rayala Corporation is per in curium, on the basis of which General Finance Co., (supra) was passed. Thus, the later judgments in Fibre Board (supra) and Bhagwati Steel Rolling (supra) shall have a binding precedent on all Courts in India including this Tribunal.

We may mention that the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court is declaration of law as per Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The law declared by Hon’ble Apex Court in Fibre Boards (P) Ltd (supra) dated IT(TP)A No.2021/Bang/2019 M/s. Cauvery Aqua Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore Page 12 of 15 11.08.2015, was available when the decisions was rendered by Bangalore Tribunal Textport Overseas Pvt Limited Vs DCIT (supra), however, the same was not brought to the notice of the bench. The coordinate bench while rendering the decision relied on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in General Finance Co. Vs ACIT (supra), which was already declared as per-in curium. Similarly, the decision in General Finance Co (supra) is based on Rayala Corporation P. Ltd Vs Director of Enforcement (supra) and Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd Vs Union of India (supra). Considering the aforesaid legal position and the dates of various judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, we are of the view that ld. AR for the assessee has referred and relied on the decisions of General Finance Company Vs ACIT (supra) which have been declared as per-in curium by Hon’ble Apex Court.

We are conscious of the facts that the latest law declared by Hon’ble Apex Court in various cases (supra) was not confronted with the ld. AR for the assessee; however, it is always presumed that the law declared by the Court is in the knowledge of the legal practitioner. We instead of going in further discussions are of the view that in view of the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Fibre Boards (P) Ltd (supra), the word ‘repeal’ includes ‘omission’. Thus, we do not find any merit in the objection raised by the ld. AR for the assessee which we are rejecting, being without any merit and held that appeal filed by the revenue with in currency of the sub-section 2A of Section 253 of the Act, is valid.”

We heard the rival contentions and perused the record. We notice that the decision rendered by the coordinate bench of Bengaluru Tribunal in the case of Texport Overseas Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has since been upheld by the High Court of Karnataka with the following observations:-

In fact coordinate bench under similar circumstances had examined the effect of omission of sub-section (9) to Section 10B of the Act w.e.f. 01.04.2004 by Finance Act, 2003 and held that there was no IT(TP)A No.2021/Bang/2019 M/s. Cauvery Aqua Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore Page 14 of 15 saving clause or provision introduced by way of amendment by omitting sub-section (9) of Section 10B. In the matter of GENERAL FINANCE CO. vs. ACIT, which judgment has also been taken note of by the tribunal while repelling the contention raised by revenue with regard to retrospectivity of Section 92BA(i) of the Act. Thus, when clause (i) of Section 92BA having been omitted by the Finance Act, 2017, with effect from 01.07.2017 from the Statute the resultant effect is that it had never been passed and to be considered as a law never been existed. Hence, decision taken by the Assessing Officer under the effect of Section 92BI and reference made to the order of Transfer Pricing Officer-TOP under Section 92CA could be invalid and bad in law.

Since the decision rendered by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka is binding on this bench of Tribunal sitting in Bengaluru, we follow the same. Accordingly, we hold that the reference to the TPO in respect of specified domestic transactions mentioned in clause (i) of sec.92BA is not valid, as the said provision has been omitted. Accordingly, we direct the AO to delete the addition relating to specified domestic transactions made u/s 92CA of the Act.

We notice that the co-ordinate bench has restored the matter to the file of the A.O. with the direction to examine the claim of expenditure in accordance with the provisions of section 40A(2) of the Act. Following the same, we restore this issue to the file of the AO with the direction to examine the claim of expenditure mentioned above in terms of the provisions of section 40A(2) of the Act.

In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is treated as allowed for statistical purposes.