MALLA REDDY EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY,HYDERABAD vs. DCIT., CENTRAL CIRCLE-2(1), HYDERABAD

With respect to not maintaining proper books of accounts and no such books have been found during at the place of business of the assessee society, the assessee society submitted before the learned PCIT, Central that, it has been maintaining proper set of books of accounts, which are duly audited and filed along with return of income being filed year on year within the due date as per the provisions of sec.139 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

With respect to unaccounted income as mentioned in the notice, it was the submission of the assessee society that, it is the individual income of the Trustee Shri Marri Rajashekhar Reddy which was surrendered by him during the course of search proceedings vide statement recorded u/sec.132(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the same have been undertaken by the Assessing Officer while completing the Assessment. This itself shows that the declaration made by the members of the society is accepted. Accordingly, the assessee society submitted that the Assessee Society has not been collecting any form of donation/capitation fee from the students being admitted and all the fee received related to the students admitted have been duly accounted for in the books of accounts and, therefore, submitted that, the assessee society has not violated any of the specified violations pointed-out by the learned PCIT, Central and, therefore, the assessee society was pleaded before the learned PCIT, Central that, since it has not violated any of the conditions stipulated in Sec.12AB(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, warranting cancellation of registration granted u/sec.12AA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by exercising his powers vested u/sec.12AB of the Income Tax Act, 1961, show cause notice issued for cancellation of registration of Society is incorrect.

The Ld. PCIT (Central) after considering the relevant submissions of the appellant society and also taken note of reference from the A.O. in terms of 2nd proviso to Section 143(3) of the Act, and also taking into account specified violations referred to u/s 12AB(4) and the explanation provided therein observed that there are occurrence of the specified violations during the previous year relevant to assessment year 2019-20 as defined in explanation u/s 12AB(4) of the Act warranting cancellation of registration granted to the appellant society u/s 12AA of the Act, and hence, by virtue of powers vested with him u/s 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act, cancelled the registration of the trust w.e.f Assessment Year 2019-20. The Ld. PCIT (Central) had discussed the issue at length in light of findings of the search coupled with statements recorded from various persons and observed that the appellant society has applied income derived from property held under trust, wholly or in part, other than the objects of the trust or institution and further, the activities of trust has been carried out is not to the appellant society. The Ld. PCIT (Central) observed that the seized material found during the course of search reveals suppression of fee receipts which is evident from the fact that as per the admission forms found and seized during the course of search, reveals that the fee packages exceeding government limits with lumpsum tuition fee lacking clear bifurcation from ancillary charges. Although, the trustees stated that package amounts collected from students includes fee fixed by the regulatory authorities, miscellaneous fee and hostel fee, but there is no evidence of hostel facilities provided to the students by the trustees. Further, there is no break up of fee referred to in the admission forms which is evident from the lumpsum amount collected from the students which is over and above the amount of fee fixed by the Government for admission to relevant courses. Further, the appellant society has accounted fee collected from the students as fixed by the State Government and excess fee over and above the amount fixed by the Government has been diverted to the trustees in violation of provisions of the Act. Therefore, observed that, the claim of the appellant society that admissions were conducted as per the Government norms and that no student complained of any mal-practices and further government recognition of the admissions does not automatically validate the fee collections.

The Ld. PCIT (Central) further observed that the documents found during the course of search in the form of Birla Sakthi Cement Diary from the premises of Shri Empally Raghunath Reddy reveals that during the period from 24.03.2019 to 31.03.2019 cash of Rs.2,44,69,000/- was spent not for the purpose/objects of the society. Further, the above cash expenditure and the unaccounted cash found and seized from the residential premises of trustees/associate persons evidence the fact that the appellant society has been generating unaccounted cash receipts from the fee collection of the appellant society. Although, the appellant society claims that the diary seized at the premises of Shri Empally Raghunadh Reddy does not relate to the appellant society and should not be relied upon as evidence, but the fact remains that the diary contain details of substantial cash transactions that align with the period during which capitation fee were being collected in excess of the fee prescribed by the State Government. Further, unaccounted cash was discovered at the premises of the trustees and their associates which directly links the expenditure recorded in the diary to the excess fee collections by the society. The absence of the direct reference of the appellant society names in the diary does not negate the circumstantial and corroborative evidence that demonstrate the connection between these funds and the appellant society financial mismanagement. Although, Shri Empally Raghunath Reddy statements attempt to distance him from the society, but his financial dealings align with the appellant society excess fee collections, therefore, observed students for admission under the management account. The Ld. PCIT (Central) further observed that the appellant society is not maintaining proper books of accounts, and no books of accounts were found at the registered address of the society at the time of search. This clearly shows that the appellant society activities are not carried out in accordance with all or any of the conditions subject to which the registration was granted u/s 12AA of the Act. Since the income derived from the property held under trust, wholly or in part has been applied, other than for the objects of the trust or institution and further, activities being carried out by the trust or institution is not genuine and are not being carried out in accordance with all or any of the conditions subject to which the registration was granted to the appellant society, the registration granted to the appellant society u/s 12AA of the Act should be withdrawn. Thus, rejected the explanation of the assessee and cancelled the registration granted u/s 12AA of the Act vide order dated 27.03.2025 w.e.f. A.Y. 2019-20 u/s 12AB(4)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The relevant findings of the Ld. PCIT (Central) are as under : “5. On careful consideration of the above written submissions filed against the proposed cancellation of registration of the assessee society, it is found that they are not acceptable for the following reasons: 5 (a) • Suppression of Fee receipts • The assessee’s claim that the collected amount represents hostel fees is entirely false and misleading, as there is no actual hostel business. In from students over and above the government-prescribed fee structure. By falsely labeling it as hostel fees, the assessee is attempting to conceal unaccounted income and evade tax liability. So, the argument that society is collecting fee as a package is not acceptable. • The absence of any hostel operations or related expenses confirms that the claimed hostel fee is a fabrication. The assessee has provided no proof of hostel facilities, accommodation records, or related financial transactions. If this were a legitimate hostel fee, the institution would have recorded both income and corresponding expenses, which it has failed to do. This directly points to intentional suppression of income. • The assessee's claim of compliance lacks merit, as students may not want confrontation with the institution and hence may not complain. Government recognition of admissions does not justify excess fee collection, violating the Income Tax Act, 1961. • The trustee’s detailed breakup of hostel fees only after the search indicates an afterthought designed to camouflage unaccounted cash collections. Initially, the assessee never disclosed any hostel business in its original ITR, nor was such income classified as business income before the search. The sudden post search claim that hostel fees were collected in an individual capacity and subsequently offered as business income under Section 148, instead of being voluntarily declared under Section 139, further confirms that this explanation is an attempt to legitimize the excess fees collected in cash. The retrospective classification of income is a clear indication of afterthought on part of the trustee as well as society. • The assessing officer has rejected the claim of hostel business of the trustee/member in the assessment orders of the trustees. Further to protect interest of revenue, AO has added the income estimated in case of Society, in hands of the trustees protectively. Thus, the argument that AO has accepted in individual hands is misleading. • The assessee was requested by the AO to provide the addresses and communication details of students who had given confirmation; however, the assessee failed to furnish these details. As a result, the AO was unable to conduct an independent inquiry in this matter. The assessee's non-compliance indicates a reluctance to disclose such information, suggesting that the students' responses may not be favourable to the assessee or could potentially contradict the assessee's claims.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the assessee society engaged in collection of unaccounted capitation fees, failed to maintain proper books of account and misrepresented actual fee collections. The society’s core objective is providing educational relief and as per elaborate discussion made above, excess fee collected in cash were omitted from the assessee society’s financial records and thereby following specified violations occurred during the previous year relevant to the A.Y 2019-2020 : 1. The income derived from property held under trust, wholly or in part has been applied, other than for the objects of the trust or institution 2. The activity being carried out by the trust or institution is not being carried out in accordance with all or any of the conditions subject to which registration was granted to Society.

We have heard both parties, perused the material on record and had gone through the orders of the authorities below. We have also carefully considered the relevant show-cause notices issued by the Ld. PCIT (Central) under Section 12AB(4)(i) of the Act, dated 29-11-2024, and subsequent order passed under Section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act, dated 27-3-2025. The Ld. PCIT (Central) cancelled the registration granted to the Appellant Society under Section 12AA of the Act, by virtue of powers vested with him under Section 12AB(4) of the Act for occurrence of the specified violations during the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2019- 20 as defined in the Explanation to Section 12AB(4) of the Act, 1961. The sole basis for the Ld. PCIT (Central) to invoke powers under Section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act is a reference received from the A.O., i.e., DCIT, Central Circle-2(1), Hyderabad under second proviso to Section 143(3) of the Act, for cancellation of registration of the Society granted under Section 12AA of the Act for occurrence of specified violations referred to under Section 12AB(4) and the Explanation provided thereon. The triggering point for reference by the A.O. to the Ld. PCIT (Central) for cancellation of registration of the Trust is a search and seizure operation conducted under Section 132 of the Act in the case of the Appellant Society on 22-11-2022, and consequent seizure of certain material, including admission forms of the institution, daily statements, excel sheets, etc. The Ld. PCIT (Central) observed that the seized documents reveal collecting fee over and above the maximum fee fixed by the Government, and fee only to the extent prescribed by the Government collected in the form of cash was deposited in the bank account of the respective institutions and the same were shown as receipts in the financial statements of the society. Further, the excess fee (donations/capitation fee) collected, over and above the prescribed fee by the college in the form of cash was never brought into the books of account of the appellant society. The Ld. PCIT (Central) further observed that the appellant society did not maintain proper books of account and no books of account were found at the registered address of the appellant society at the time of search.

The Ld. PCIT (Central) had also discussed the issue of a diary found and seized from the premises of Shri Empally Raghunath Reddy, which contained certain cash transactions for the period from 24.03.2019 to 31.03.2019 aggregating to Rs.2,44,69,000/- and observed that the cash expenditure had been incurred not for the purpose/objects of the appellant society. The Ld. PCIT (Central) further observed that the above cash expenses and the unaccounted cash found and seized from the residential premises of the trustees and related persons’ evidence the fact that the appellant society has been generating unaccounted cash receipts from fee collections and the same has been applied other than for the objects of the trust or institution. Therefore, the Ld. PCIT (Central) observed that the income derived from property held under trust, wholly or in part has been applied, other than for the objects of the trust or institution, and further, any activity being carried out by the trust or institution is not genuine or is not being carried out in accordance with all or any of the conditions subject to which registration granted to the society. Therefore, cancelled registration granted under Section 12AA of the Act by virtue of powers vested with him under Section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act, 1961 for A.Y. 2019-20. Therefore, it is necessary for us to examine the reasons given by the Ld. PCIT (Central) for cancellation of registration of the appellant society under Section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act, in light of the objects of the appellant society, activities carried out by the appellant society for the impugned assessment year, and the provisions of Section 12AB(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 18. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the appellant society has been formed on 13.12.2004 with the main object of promoting moral and cultural traditions of secular India through imparting education to children / students in the Educational Institutions, to promote the study of science, to establish Schools, Junior, Degree, Engineering, Management, I.T.I., Technical, Business Schools, Information Technology, Medical Colleges and other Educational Institutions and run the same for no profit and no loss basis. In pursuance of its objectives, the appellant society “Malla Reddy Institute of Technology”, “Malla Reddy Engineering College for Women”, “Malla Reddy Institute of Engineering and Technology”, “Malla Reddy Institute of Technology and Science” “CMR Inter The School” and “Malla Reddy B.ED College” for providing technical and management education to students. The institutions run by the appellant society have been recognized by the Government of Telangana, Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Hyderabad, and the All India Council for Technical Education, New Delhi, and also Pharmacy Council of India and the said approval granted by various authorities was in operation for the impugned assessment year, which is evident from relevant provisions and certificates furnished by the appellant society, which were found in the form of Paper Book filed by the appellant society. The appellant society is also a part of Malla Reddy Group of Institutions, which runs a number of institutions for providing technical, medical, and professional education to various students and as claimed by the learned counsel for the appellant society, about 80,000 students are studying in various institutions run by the appellant society and other associated societies of the Group. The appellant society was granted registration under Section 12AA of the Act on 10.08.2007 by the CIT (Exemptions), and the same has been extended/renewed from time to time on an application made by the appellant. Further, the appellant society had also obtained provisional registration as per the amended provisions of Section 12AA by the Finance Act, 2022, and the Department has granted provisional registration in Form No. 10AC for a period of 5 years, by the order dated 31.12.2021 with effect from A.Y. 2022- 23 to A.Y. 2026-27. Further, admissions to technical and medical education in the State of Telangana is governed by the relevant admission test conducted by the State and the National Medical Council for admissions to medical courses. The appellant society is also governed by relevant regulatory requirements for conducting examinations and admitting students to various courses, including the admissions to Malla Reddy Institute of Technology. In other words, for the assessment year under consideration, the admissions to Malla Reddy Group of Institutions is through proper admission mechanism in place as provided by the State Government for admission to professional courses and through common counselling. These facts are undisputed by the Revenue. In fact, there is no finding from the Ld. PCIT (Central) on the activities carried out by the appellant society insofar as running colleges in the name of “Malla Reddy Institute of Technology”, “Malla Reddy Engineering College for Women”, “Malla Reddy Institute of Engineering and Technology”, “Malla Reddy Institute of Technology and Science” “CMR Inter The School” and “Malla Reddy B.ED College” and admission of students to said institutions for the year under consideration, including any violations in the admission process conducted by the appellant society for the year under consideration. Therefore, it is necessary for us to examine the order passed by the Ld. PCIT (Central) under Section 12AB(4) of the Act, in light of the above facts.

The Ld. PCIT (Central) cancelled the registration granted to the appellant society under Section 12AA of the Act by virtue of powers vested under Section 12AB(4) of the Act for occurrence of specified violations referred to in the Explanation to Section 12AB(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, it is necessary for us to reproduce the relevant provisions of Section 12AB(4) and the Explanation provided thereof.

The provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 12AB of the Act have been amended by the Finance Act, 2022, with effect from 01.04.2022. As per the provisions of Section 12AB(4), the provisional registration of a trust or institution has been granted under (a) or (b) or (c) of sub-section (1) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 12AA of the Act, as the case may be, and subsequently, the Pr.CIT or CIT has noticed the occurrence of one or more specified violations during any previous year or a reference has been received from the A.O. under the 2nd Proviso to Section 143(3) of the Act, for any previous year, or such case has been selected in accordance with the risk management strategy formulated by the Board from time to time for any previous year, the Pr.CIT or CIT calls for such documents or information from the trust or institution or makes such inquiry as he thinks necessary in order to satisfy himself about the occurrence or otherwise of any specified violation and pass an order in writing cancelling the registration of such trust or institution, or pass an order in writing refusing cancellation of the registration of trust or institution, if he is not satisfied about the occurrence of one or more specified violations after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the trust or institution. For the purpose of sub-section (4), the “specified violation” has been defined, which includes diversion of income derived from property held under trust, wholly or in part for charitable or religious purpose other than for the objects of the trust or institution, or any activity being carried out by the trust or institution is not genuine or is not being carried out in accordance with all or any of the conditions subject to which it was registered.

In the present case, the Ld. PCIT (Central) invoked Clauses (a) and (e) of the Explanation to Section 12AB(4) of the Act. Before amendment by the Finance Act, 2022, w.e.f. 01.04.2022. sub- sections (4) and (5) deal with cancellation of registration, where the registration of a trust or institution has been granted under Section 12AA, and subsequently, the Pr.CIT or Commissioner is satisfied that the activities of such trust or institution are not genuine and are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust or institution, as the case may be, he shall pass an order in writing cancelling the registration of such trust or institution after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard. In other words, as per the un-amended provisions of Section 12AB(4) and Section 12AB(5), applicable up to 31.03.2022, the Pr.CIT or Commissioner shall cancel the registration of any trust or institution granted under Section 12AA of the Act, if the activities of the such trust or institution are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust or institution, as the case may be. Only after the insertion of amended provisions by the Finance Act, 2022w.e.f. 01.04.2022, the “specified violations” has been defined so as to invoke cancellation powers under Section 12AB(4) of the Act. In other words, before the amendment of Sections 12AB(4) and (5),it is only upon satisfying that the activities of the trust are not genuine then the Principal CIT or Commissioner shall cancel the registration of any trust or institution, however only after amendment to provisions of Sections 12AB(4) and (5), it should be only an occurrence of specified violations during any previous year, cancellation of trust or institution can be made in terms of Section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, from the above provisions of Section 12AB(4) and Section 12AB(5) of the Act, it is undisputedly clear that the basic purpose of Section 12AB(4) is to check misuse of exemption under the pretext of carrying out charitable activities when the same are not so. Therefore, it is necessary for the Principal CIT to make out a clear case for exercising powers under Section 12AB(4) of the Act, so as to cancel the registration under Section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and such powers can be exercised only upon satisfying the occurrence of one or more of the specified violations referred to in the Explanation under Section 12AB(4) of the Act. In absence of any occurrence of one or more specified violations, there is no power to the Pr.CIT to cancel registration granted to the trust or institution under Section 12AB(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Pr. CIT, before invoking powers under Section 12AB(4) of the Act, must have an objective satisfaction that the trust has committed one or more specified violations, which renders the activities of the trust are not genuine, and further, said trust or institution does not exist solely for the purpose of charitable activities.

The Ld. PCIT (Central)’s approach for deciding the eligibility of registration of a trust should be different from the angle by which an assessment of an income is made by the A.O. What purpose does it serve to Revenue by cancelling a registration if the activities are in public interest because in case of any breach of the laws the same is subject to tax under Sections 11 and 12. These two provisions and few other provisions are competent enough to tackle firmly a defaulter of philanthropic application of income or funds of the trust. The other adverse side of cancellation is that on refusal of registration the entire receipts shall be subject to assessment without granting benefit of ss. 11 and 12 to assess income which does not form part of total income though the factual position could be that major part might have been devoted towards achieving the objects i.e. imparting education, as in this case, but the AO shall be automatically forbidden to grant advantage of exemption consequent upon the cancellation, as is mandatory in statute. The outcome of the deliberation made in detail hereinabove is that mercurial opinion is to debar the Ld. PCIT (Central) to enter into the area of investigation of source of income and also application of income, so that the amount of correct exempt income shall not be prejudice. If the Ld. PCIT (Central) had an information of some wrongful means of earning fees in the form of a donation or if an information talks about excessive charging of fees, then, the Ld. PCIT (Central) in his right can pass on the information to the concerned office bearers working under the Regulatory bodies who control capitation fee menace. These authorities have enough power to deal with such nature of default, side by side the Ld. PCIT (Central) is to limit his jurisdiction within the ambit of provisions of the Act and expected to give a finding on facts that either the objects are not for charitable purpose or not achieved as prescribed under law. However presently the situation is that the Revenue has not said about any immoral activity of the appellant or the collection of fees was by wrongful means. Prima facie no case was made out by the Ld. PCIT (Central) so as to even vaguely demonstrate that the activities of the appellant were not genuine or activity of imparting of education, for which the Society was created, were not carried out. Even the Ld. PCIT (Central) has failed to establish that any part of the income/receipt of the trust was in any manner misutilized by the trustees for their personal benefit i.e., not in fulfilment of the object of the trust. Otherwise also there are three ways to look at this problem. One is, that the donations are raised but not utilized for achieving the objects i.e., towards imparting education, then such an institution must bear the consequence of cancellation of registration since ipso facto in- fringed Sections 12AA/12AB condition. Second aspect is, that though the donations received are meant to fulfil the objects but together with fees have infringed Anti Capitation Prohibition Act; that comes within the clutches of that Act but definitely not under sec. 12AA/12AB provisions. The provisions of section 13(1) are thus not directly relevant in this regard. "Nothing contained in section 11 or section 12 shall operate so as to exclude, from the total income of the previous year, of the person which clearly envisages operation of section 11 or section 12 before the provisions of section 13 can be applied or invoked in a given case. It also shows that the said provisions can be applied or invoked only at the time of computation of total income of the previous year of the person who is claiming exemption under section 11 or section 12. Both these situations contemplated in section 13 can arise only and only if registration under section 12A is granted to the said person. If the same is not granted and the person is refused registration under section 12A, he would not be entitled to claim any benefit available under section 11 or 12 and there will be no occasion to the Assessing Officer to invoke or apply section 13 in his case. This position would not only be contrary to the scheme of the Act as laid down in sections 11, 12, 12A, 12AA and 13 but the same may also cause prejudice/hardship to the persons in certain cases.

Coming back to the appellant's case and the reasons given by the Ld. PCIT (Central) for cancellation of registration of the appellant society under Section 12AB(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Ld. PCIT (Central) cancelled registration of the Society under Section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act for occurrence of two specified violations referred to in Explanation under Section 12AB(4) of the Act. The first and foremost violation considered by the Ld. PCIT (Central) is income derived from property held under trust, wholly or in part, has been applied, other than for the objects of the trust or institution. Further, Ld. PCIT (Central) had also applied sub- clause(3) of specified violation, i.e. any activity being carried out by the trust or institution is not genuine or is not being carried out in accordance with all or any of the conditions subject to which the registration was granted to the Society. The Ld. PCIT (Central) had discussed the above two specified violations in light of material found and seized during the course of search conducted in the case of the appellant and other associated trusts or institutions on 22-11-2022. Admittedly, during the course of search, material in the form of admission application forms, daily statements, excel sheets, etc. were found and seized and the same was confronted to the trustees of the appellant society and a statement on oath was recorded. The Ld. PCIT (Central), on the basis of incriminating material found during the course of search, coupled with statements recorded from various persons came to the conclusion that the appellant society was collecting fee over and above the maximum fee prescribed by the Government for admission of students to various technical courses and the excess fee collected from the students over and above the prescribed fee has been diverted to the trustees. The Ld. PCIT (Central) observed that as per the admission application forms, fee packages exceeding government limits with lump sum tuition fee lacking clear bifurcation from ancillary charges has been collected and said fee amount is in excess of the prescribed fee fixed by the government for admission of students to various courses.

We have gone through the relevant fee details and material including the admission forms of students which are available in Paper Book filed by the appellant society. On perusal of the relevant admission forms, we find that, in fee details column, total package of tuition fee had been referred for all four academic years. Further, in the very same admission form, the details of amounts paid under various heads were also referred. Upon perusal of the relevant admission forms, we find that although the trustees in the statement given u/s 132(4) of the Act on the date of search, and explained that the package amount received from the students includes tuition fee for all four academic years, miscellaneous fee, and hostel fee. Further, the managing trustee or member, Shri Marri Rajashekhar Reddy, has clearly bifurcated the amount attributable to tuition fee and the amount attributable to hostel fee and also quantified the amount of hostel fee collected from management quota students admitted to the institutions/ colleges and claimed that the trustees/members had provided hostel facilities to the students outside the institution premises. Further, Shri Marri Rajashekhar Reddy had also quantified the amount attributable to hostel fee for each assessment year, and the same has been offered in their individual hands under the head “Income from Business or Profession,” and also admitted and undisclosed income of Rs. 25 crores for these assessment years. Therefore, from the above, it is very clear that the date of search itself, the institution has made it very clear that it has collected tuition fee as prescribed by the government for admission of students for technical courses and no excess fee has been collected from any student in the form of donation/capitation fee. This fact is further strengthened by the statement record from Shri Marri Rajashekhar Reddy and admission of income in his individual hands. It is also relevant to refer to the confirmation by the A.O. under Section 133(6), where no student has admitted that they have paid capitation fee or donation for getting admission to the college. Further, the appellant society had also obtained confirmations from various students, which are available in Paper Book No.1 filed by the appellant society, where none of the students has made any confession or admission that the institution has demanded capitation fee or donation and in fact, they have confirmed the package amount collected by the institution for giving admission, which includes tuition fee, miscellaneous fee, hostel fee, and transportation fee. Therefore, the allegation of the Ld. PCIT (Central) on the basis of admission forms, excel sheets, and statements recorded from various persons, that the appellant society has collected donation or capitation fee in excess of the prescribed fee fixed by the government for giving admission to students in violation of the Capitation Fee Act of the State Government, which falls under the specified violations referred to under Explanation to Section 12AB(4) of the Act, is devoid of merit. Although, the Ld. PCIT (Central) linked the excess fees claimed to have been collected by the appellant institution from the students and the cash expenditure referred to in Empally Raghunath Reddy Diary and cash found and seized during the course of search in the premises of trustees or related persons, in our considered view, going by the facts on record, the cash found during the course of search has been assessed in the hands of Marri Rajashekhar Reddy on individuals on protective basis. Therefore, the allegation of ld. Pr. CIT, Central that the appellant had collected capitation fees for admitting students in only on suspicious and surmise manner without there being any materials which suggest collection of capitation fees. Further, the ld. PCIT does not made out case of violation of capitation fees act by brining on record any single instances of collection of capitation fees from students and subsequent penal action taken by the regulatory authorities. In absence of any material which suggest collection of capitation fees, mere observation on the basis of admission form and statement employees who admitted collection of capitation fees is only an attempt to bring the case within the ambit of specified violations.

Insofar as the allegation of the Ld. PCIT (Central) linking Birla Sakthi Cement pocket diary to the fee collection is also lacks merit going by the facts available on record, because upon perusal of the relevant seized document, we find that it is nothing but a dumb document without there being any credible information, which suggest expenditure incurred by the appellant society other than for the objects of the society. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the observations of the Ld. PCIT (Central) that the appellant society has collected capitation fee or donation in excess of prescribed fee from the students and the same has been applied other than for the objectives of the trust, is only on persons.

Further, insofar as the allegation of the Ld. PCIT (Central) that the appellant society collected capitation fee or donation contrary to the Telangana Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983, in our considered view, going by the confirmations filed by the students in response to notice under Section 133(6) issued by the A.O. or Ld. PCIT (Central), there is no doubts of whatsoever with regard to the fact that the Ld. PCIT (Central) failed to prove existence of any donation or capitation fee for the impugned assessment year under consideration and further, there is no evidence with the Ld. PCIT (Central) to allege that the appellant society has collected capitation fee. If at all the allegation of the Ld. PCIT (Central) is correct that the appellant society is collecting capitation fee, then there should have been evidences including any complaints from the students or parents to the concerned authorities for collecting capitation fee in violation of the Telangana Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983. In the present case, there is no single evidence of any complaint filed by the parent with the concerned authorities or an order passed by the authority imposing any penalties on the appellant society for collecting capitation fee or donation contrary to the Act. In absence of any evidences, the mere allegation that made by the Ld. PCIT (Central) to bring the case within the ambit of ‘specified violation’ and, thus, in our considered view on the basis of suspicions, surmises and conjectures observations, cancellation of registration of the trust cannot be made under Section 12AB(4) of the Act.

Coming back to another observation of the Ld. PCIT (Central) in light of evidence found during the course of search in the premises of Shri E. Raghunath Reddy. During the course of search at the premises of E. Ragunath Reddy, a diary titled “Birla Sakthi Cement” was found and seized vide Annexure A/ERR/RES/03, which contains cash expenditure amounting to Rs. 2,44,69,000/-. The Ld. PCIT (Central) on the basis of said evidences, came to the conclusion that the appellant society has incurred cash expenditure to the tune of Rs. 2,44,69,000/- not for the purpose of the objects of the trust. The Ld. PCIT (Central) linked the above cash expenditure to the unaccounted fee collections in the form of donations or capitation fee from students for getting admissions to the institutions and observed that the activities carried out by the appellant society are not genuine and are not being carried out in accordance with all or any of the conditions subject to which the registration was granted.

We have gone through the relevant seized material, Birla Shakthi Cement Diary, titled as A/ERR/RES/03 and upon search. Although it refers to certain jottings from 24-03-2019 to 31-03-2019, with names of certain persons and amounts, but there is no reference to the name of the appellant society or the purpose. In the absence of any reference to the name of the appellant society or the purpose for which the said amount has been mentioned, it cannot be alleged that the said document belongs to the appellant society and contents recorded therein are unexplained or unaccounted expenditure outside the books of the appellant society. Further, upon perusal of the relevant details, it serves no purpose and there is no narration as to why the said amount has been referred to therein. Further, Shri Empally Raghunath Reddy in the statement recorded during the course of search, very categorically disowned the said diary to the appellant society, and therefore, in our considered view, based on the said seized documents, it cannot be alleged that the appellant society has incurred expenditure other than for the objects of the trust contrary to law. Therefore, in our considered view, the conclusion drawn by the Ld. PCIT (Central) that the appellant trust has applied the income derived from the property held under the trust, other than for the objects of the trust or institution and that the activities carried out by the trust or institution are not genuine and are not being carried out in accordance with all or any of the conditions subject to which registration was granted, is devoid of merit and cannot be accepted.

Further, although the Ld. PCIT (Central) linked the cash found during the course of search at the residential premises of Marri Rajashekar Reddy and others to collection of donation or capitation fees, but the fact remains that the said transactions were finally assessed on substantive basis in the hands of Shri Marri Rajasekar Reddy and on protective basis in the hands of respective individuals where the cash was found and seized and therefore, from the above, it is undisputedly clear that the A.O. himself was on the doubt that whether the cash is belongs to the appellant Society or the individuals. In our considered view, it is a well-established principle of law by the various judicial pronouncements, including the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalji Haridas Vs. ITO[1961] 43 ITR 387 (SC), that in order to make substantive and protective assessments there should be uncertainty of ownership of the funds as well as that such uncertainty must be safeguarded to prevent actual loss to the revenue. In the present case, going by the assessment made by the A.O. towards cash found during the course of search in the hands of individuals on substantive basis and on protective basis, it is very clear that the A.O. himself is not sure about ownership of cash to the appellant society. Therefore, on the basis of said protective assessment, the allegation of the Ld. PCIT (Central) that the funds of the appellant society have been utilized other than for the objects of the trust, is devoid of merit and cannot be accepted. Further, from the above conduct of the A.O., it is very clear that the A.O. has no incriminating material to prove that funds of the the trust. This would lead to only two possibilities; (i)that unexplained cash has not been received by the appellant society at all, and (ii) that the funds have been utilized for the purpose of the objectives of the trust. Reason is that if the funds have been diverted for the benefits of the trustees or not utilized for the objects of the trust, then funds would have been lying with the appellant society. During the course of search, only Rs.16.64 crores found at the various premises of the managing trustees and the same was seized. Even it did not belong to the appellant society as the same has been added in the hands of the individuals on substantive basis and on further protective basis. Therefore, the allegation of the Ld. PCIT (Central) that the income derived from the property held under trust, wholly or in part has been applied, other than for the objects of the trust, is totally misconceived and not based on any evidences found during the course of search.

Further, unquestionably the onus for proving the existence of factors calling for the cancellation of a trust or institution is on the Department rather than on the institution. In the present case, the Ld. PCIT (Central) has miserably failed to discharge such onus. No material has been brought on record by the Ld. PCIT (Central) to prove that the appellant society existed not for charitable purposes. Further, the Ld. PCIT (Central) has not been able to discharge the onus of showing as to how the conditions for society. The appellant society remained enjoying the status of charitable obligation and also carrying out its activities in accordance with its objects by imparting education which is evident even during the course of such proceedings, where the recognition and approval granted to the appellant society was intact. The appellant society was running an institution under the name “Malla Reddy Group of Institutions” and also providing education to thousands of students. Once the predominant object of the appellant society is imparting education, and further, the appellant society is continuing to carry on charitable activities, in our considered view, mere suspicion of certain violations, including, specified violations cannot be a reason for cancellation of registration of a trust under Section 12AB(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. In the present case, although there is no condition precedent for invoking provisions of Section 12AB(4) of the Act, the Ld. PCIT (Central), without any specified violations, simply cancelled registration of a trust under Section 12AB(4) of the Act, 1961. In our considered view, even in the case where there is breach of trust on the actions of the trustees for their personal benefits, still the registration a trust or society cannot be cancelled, as long as the trust or society is carrying out its activities in accordance with its main objects as held by ITAT Hyderabad Bench in the case of ACIT Vs. Sai Society in ITA No.1857/2022. This is further fortified by the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Kamla Town Trust [1996] 217 ITR 699 (SC).Therefore, in our considered view, unless the Ld. PCIT (Central) makes out a case that there exists one or more specified violations referred to under Section 12AB(4) and the Explanation provided therein, merely on suspicion and surmises basis the registration granted under Section 12AA of the Act, cannot be cancelled. In our considered view, suspicion however strong cannot take the place of evidence as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Umacharan Shaw & Bros Vs. CIT(1959) 37 ITR 271(SC). A similar view has been taken by the CIT Vs. Daulat Ram Rawatmull (1973) 87 ITR 349 (SC), where it was held that the onus to prove that apparent is not real is on the person who claims it to be so. This view is fortified by the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Omar Salay Mohamed Sait vs. CIT (1959) 37 ITR 151(SC) where it was held that no addition can be made on the basis of suspicion and conjectures. Therefore, in our considered view, going by the facts available on record, the reasons given by the Ld. PCIT (Central) for cancellation of the registration of the Society under Section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act, are not based on appraisal of relevant facts and existence of one or more specified violations referred to under Section 12AB(4) of the Act, but purely on suspicion and surmises, which is not permissible under law.

Coming back to another observation of the Ld. PCIT (Central). The ld. PCIT observed that the appellant Society is not maintaining proper books of accounts, and further, at the time of address of the appellant society. We, once again, do not subscribe to the observations of the Ld. PCIT (Central) for the simple reason that, the appellant society is maintaining proper books of accounts for all these assessment years, which is evident from the return of income filed under Section 139(1) of the Act, along with audit report filed in Form 10B of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. Further, the appellant society was regularly filing return of income under Section 139(1) of the Act, and also maintaining regular books of accounts for relevant assessment years. Further, for few assessment years, the case of the appellant was subjected to scrutiny assessment, where there was no adverse inference against the books of accounts maintained by the appellant society for any of the assessment years. Since the appellant society is maintaining regular books of accounts for all these assessment years, and also filing return of income under Section 139(1), without there being any lapse for any of the assessment years, in our considered view, the observations of the Ld. PCIT (Central) that the appellant society did not maintain proper books of accounts, and no books of accounts were found at the registered address of the appellant society, is also a pure guess work and not based on any evidence and thus, is devoid of merit and cannot be accepted. Further, the observations of Ld. PCIT (Central) with regard to occurrence of one or more specified violations referred to under Section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act, on the basis of reference received from the A.O. in light of findings of the Department allegation by the Ld. PCIT (Central), but not a conclusive proof of specified violations so as to invoke provisions of Section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act, for cancellation of registration of the Society. Therefore, in our considered view, the Ld. PCIT (Central) is erred in cancelling the registration of the society u/s 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act.

The learned counsel for the appellant society relied upon the decision of the ITAT Bangalore Bench in the case of M/s. Devaraj Urs Educational Trust for Backwards Classes Vs. DCIT in to 506/Bang/2020 for A.Y. 2010-11 to 2016-17, and argued that as long as the objects of the trust or society are charitable in nature, and it is continuing its activities in accordance with its objects, registration of trust u/s 12AA(4) of the Act on the ground of activities being carried out are not genuine and are not being carried out as per the terms of the registration of the trust or society cannot be cancelled. We, find that Coordinate Bench of ITAT, Bangalore had considered an identical issue of denial of exemption and assessment of income on the basis of incriminating found during the course of search and held that on the basis of dumb documents or non-speaking documents, additions cannot be made towards capitation fee. The Coordinate Bench further held that in order to invoke cancellation of registration, there must be some material, which suggest occurrence of one or more specified violations referred to under Section 12AB(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. A similar view has been taken by the ITAT, Hyderabad Benches in the case of M/s. Prathima Educational Society Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Hyderabad, in ITA No.720 of 2012 order dt.08.11.2023, wherein the Tribunal held that the evidence collected not speaking with regard to collection of cash of unaccounted capitation fee cannot be the reason to deny the exemption under Section 11 of the Act. The seized material on which reliance is placed by the revenue authorities is not conclusive evidence to sustain the additions and deny exemption under Section 11 of the Act.

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Vanitha Vishram Society Vs. CIT (2005) 280 ITR 345 held that existing solely for educational purpose is sufficient for claiming exemption. The relevant portion of order is extracted below.

The ITAT, Pune bench in the case of Maharashtra Academy of Engineering Education Research Vs. CIT (2010)133 TTJ 706(Pune) held that if CIT had an information of wrongful means of earning fees in the form of donation or about excess charging of fees, the CIT can pass on the information to the concerned authority, but when there is no evidence of misutilisation of funds and the prescribed activity if continued to carried on by the assessee, then the CIT had no jurisdiction to cancel registration u/s 12AA(3). The relevant portion of order is extracted below. “In the recent past sub-section (3) was inserted in section 12AA with effect from 1-10-2004 which gives power of cancellation of registration to the CIT, if he finds that the activities are not genuine or not being carried out in accordance with the object of the trust. The need for the enactment had arisen due to belief of some quarter that in the absence of explicit law the CIT cannot exercise the power of cancellation of registration. To overcome this hurdle this sub-section is incorporated and now in operation. Naturally these powers are conferred with a view to ensure that if once a registration has been granted under section 12AA, a trust or institution may not take any such liberty of misuse of the registration or the provisions by going haywire rather furthering the objects of the trust or genuinely not pursuing the activities for which it was established. [Para 11.4] The most important feature of section 12AA is that this section has only laid down the procedure of registration and this section nowhere speaks that while considering the application of registration, the CIT shall also look into the procedure of earning of income and sources from where receipts are derived. The argument was, it also does not speak anywhere that while considering the registration the CIT shall also see the manner in which the receipts or the income is being spent by the trust. Various related provisions, the power of enquiry, in respect of sources of receipts and the utilization of income is entrusted in separate sections as already discussed ante. The language thus used in section 12AA only confines to enquire about the activities of the trust and its genuineness, which means, in consonance with the objects for which created and those objects as also activities should not be a camouflage but pure, sincere, charitable and for public utility at large. What is implicit is that the CIT has to sincerely examine that the objects as also the activities should not be prima facie against the basic structure for which beneficial law is made and also be not in conflict with the general public utility. Naturally an institution if established to carry out an illegal activity or activities are causing any type of nuisance not in the interest of the public at large should definitely lead to cancellation of registration. Therefore, this is the first requisite of the statute to mandate for the registration and in the absence of such registration disentitlement of exemption. So what is explicit is that though an institution may be doing charitable activities as prescribed but in the absence of registration cannot be entitled for the exemptions or benefits of sections 11 and 12. It is also explicit that registration ipso facto does not necessarily entitle an institution to get the receipts excluded from the income or exemption be granted automatically by just showing the registration certificate to the revenue authorities. [Para 11.5] Procedure of registration is a first step and a preliminary stage where the CIT shall restrict the enquiries as to whether the trust is actually and whole heartedly performing all the duties and activities for which it was created. On careful reading of this section it was gathered that at this initial stage there is no scope of any apprehension of misutilization of funds or to judge the taxability income. The scheme of the Act otherwise does not subscribe and allow a trust to take the benefit of the provisions of section 11 and 12 unless it establishes the prescribed utilization of the income even if at all he trust holds the registration in its hands. Therefore at the stage of granting registration the CIT is not expected to bother himself about the other provisions of the Act and supposed to confine himself to the procedure of registration as laid down therein. [Para 11.6] Another feature of the impugned order of the CIT is in fact bothering that nowhere he has taken any objection to the charitable and educational nature of the institution. In fact, the objects of the institution, as declared in the trust deed does reflect that all are imparting education. Strange enough there is no finding recorded by the CIT contrary to this fact. Be that as it may, the real and the only substantial objection for refusal of registration was that the institution has collected donations thus adopted some wrong means of collection of fees. But whether at this preliminary stage he had the right to draw an adverse inference so as to refuse registration or alternatively confine himself to the enquiry about the objects and the activities of the trust as per the limits of the jurisdiction of section 12AA. Rather this is also not the case of the CIT that the institution is doing some other activity of earning profit other than the activity of running educational institutions. The established factual position is that the institution is not doing in any other activity except running educational institutions. In such circumstances, can one uphold the action of cancellation of registration? Answer is obvious no. [Para 11.7] As far as the objective of the appellant is concerned this is not the case of the revenue that the assessee was not imparting education. The term education means to teach subjects to students for the development of his mind and also to equip students to deal with reality. The training process is either theoretical or practical but student has to be taught the essentials of the selected subjects so as to develop his skill and knowledge for the subjects studied by him. The appellant institute, admittedly, fulfils the requirements of imparting formal education by a systematic teaching and instructions. Since the question-about the imparting of education has not been doubted or challenged by the revenue therefore, the impugned order passed by the respondent is unsustainable in law. Strange enough there is nothing on record to prove sightlessly that the purpose of imparting of education was not fulfilled by this institute thus the revenue department has hopelessly failed to establish that there was any illegal activity or infringement of any law so that to doubt the genuineness of the activities. [Para 11.11] The sine qua non for cancellation of registration are two conditions prescribed in section 12AA(3) needs to be satisfied are: (a) That activities of the trust/institution are not genuine. (b) That activities of the trust are not carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust/institution. Thus the findings of the CIT has not to be only conceptual or contextual but should be within the four corners of law so that not surpassing the power, as listed above, granted in sub-section (3) of section 12AA. But unfortunately the fallacy is writ large as gathered on perusing the impugned order. The CIT's approach for deciding the eligibility of registration of a trust should be different from the angle by which an assessment of an income is made by the AO. About the ramification if one approve the action of CIT because in that case it may adversely affect the imparting of education especially when the revenue has not made out a case that the very purpose for creation of the trust was defeated. Rather one wonders that what purpose does it serve to revenue by cancelling a breach of the laws the same is subject to tax under sections 11 and 12. These two provisions and few other provisions are competent enough to tackle firmly a defaulter of philanthropic application of income or funds of the trust. The other adverse side of cancellation is that on refusal of registration the entire receipts shall be subject to assessment without granting benefit of section 11 and section 12 to assess income which do not form part of total income though the factual position could be that major part might have been devoted towards achieving the objects, i.e., imparting education, as in this case, but the AO shall be automatically forbidden to grant advantage of exemption consequent upon the cancellation as is mandatory in statute; relevant section already reproduced ante. The outcome of the deliberation made in detail hereinabove is that percurian opinion is to debar the CIT to enter into the area of investigation of source of income and also application of income, so that the amount of correct exempt income be not prejudged. [Para 11.12] The aspect of morality as touched by the CIT is appreciable. Every vigilant and law abiding citizen has to be fair in his conduct and should refrain from immoral activities. But existing blue laws are derived from the numerous extremely rigorous laws designed to regulate morals and conduct. These laws are enacted in such a fashion that if implemented correctly and efficiently then there is no scapegoat for an offender. One is tempted to write an idiomatic language due to the sensitivity of the issue, that a CIT cannot be allowed to hold a baton of morality in his hand to hit an immoral; but the statute has given him a flexible stick for inflicting tax on defaulter; that includes a trust or educational institution. The gist is that if the CIT had an information of some wrongful means of earning fees in the form of a donation or the information tells about excessive charging of fees; then the CIT in his rights can pass on the information to the concerned office bearers working under the Maharashtra Capitation Fees (Prohibition) Act. These authorities have enough power to deal with such nature of default, side by side the CIT is to limit his jurisdiction within the ambits of provisions of the Act and expected to give a finding on facts that either the objects are not for general public utility or not achieved as prescribed under law. However presently the situation is that the revenue has not said about any immoral activity of the appellant or the collection of fees was by wrongful means; hence deregistration sans the Tribunal's approval. [Para 11.13] Prima facie no case was made out by the CIT so as to even vaguely demonstrate that the activities of the appellant were not genuine or activity of imparting of education, for which the trust was created, were not carried out. Even the CIT has failed to establish that any part of the income/receipt of the trust was in any manner misutilized by the trustees for their personal benefit i.e., not in fulfillment of the object of the trust. Otherwise also there are three ways to look at this problem. One is, that the donations are raised but not utilized for achieving the objects, Le., towards imparting education; then such an institution must bear the consequence of cancellation of registration since ipso facto infringed section 12AA(3) condition. Second aspect is, that though the donations received are meant to fulfill the objects but together with fees have infringed Anti Capitation Prohibition Act; then comes within the clutches of that Act but definitely not under section 12AA(3) provisions. The third aspect is, that the donation plus fees do not exceed the prescribed limit of Anti Capitation Fee Act i.e., five times the normal fees; further that no evidence of misutilization other than the prescribed activity then no action can be suggested under section 12AA(3). The Assessee's case falls under the third category. With the result, totality of the circumstances thus warrants, in the light of the foregoing discussion, not to endorse the view of the CIT; consequence there upon reverse those findings. The order of cancellation of registration is hereby revoked".

The ITAT, Hyderabad bench in the case of ACIT vs. B. Srinivasa Rao (2014) 159 TTJ 483(Hyderabad), held that department can cancel registration granted to a society u/s 12AA when activities of trust are not genuine or activities of trust are not carried on in accordance with object of trust. The relevant portion of order is extracted below:

The Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT. Vs. Fr. Mullers Charitable Institutions(2014) 363 ITR 230(Kar) held that in case of a charitable trust, it is only income from investment or deposit which has been made in violation of section 11(5) that is liable to be taxed and that violation under section 13(1)(d) does not tantamount to denial of exemption under section 11 on total income of assessee-trust. The SLP filed by the department before hon’ble Supreme Court, has been dismissed, therefore, no denial of exemption, if there is a violation.

The Hon’ble Allahabad High court, in the case of CIT vs. Shri Advait Ashram Society (2012) 28. Taxmann.com 18 (all) held that non filing of return of income for last several years cannot be a ground for declining registration u/s 12AA of the Act.

The Hon’ble Madras High court in the case of CIT vs. Sarvodaya IIakiya Pannai (2012) ITR 300(Mad) held that once Commissioner grants registration to a trust under section 12AA(1)(b)(ii) after satisfying himself about activities of trust, such of section 12AA(1)(b) to go into genuineness of activities of trust.

The ITAT, Ahmadabad in the case of Ajith Education Trust vs. CIT (2010) 143 TTJ 483 held that non maintenance and non filing of regular returns cannot be a ground for cancellation of registration. The relevant portion of order is extracted below.

In the case of CIT vs. Sree Narayana Chandrika Trust 212 ITR 456, the Hon’ble Kerala High Court held that application of income for charitable purpose is sufficient for claiming exemption. Relevant portion of order is extracted below.

The Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Islamic Academy of Higher Education (2015) 229 Taxmann. 274 held that where assessee trust was fulfilling its main object of imparting education, registration of trust could not be cancelled on the basis that trustees were misappropriating trust funds. The Relevant portion of order is extracted below.

The ITAT, Hyderabad in the case of Vignana Jyothi vs. DIT(E), (2017) 81 taxmann.com 204, held that where assessee society was carrying on activity of imparting education, mere fact that it had collected donation from students at the time of admission would not result in invoking provisions of section 12AA(3) so as to cancel its registration. The relevant portion of order is extracted below.

The Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of DIT Vs. Garden City Educational Trust, 28 DTR (Kar) 139 held that “where there is no dispute in respect of the objects of the trust, that of imparting education and also when there is no dispute regarding the fact that the trust has actually imparted education and not carrying on any other activities, the trust is qualified for getting registration u/s. 12A as a charitable institution and the question regarding the application of funds and allowability of benefit of exemption U/ss. 11 & 12 are matters which are to be examined by the assessing authority at the time of assessment and not by the registering authority”.

In this view of the matter and considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also by following the ratios of various judicial precedents, we are of the considered view that the conditions precedent for cancellation of registration granted to the appellant society under Section 12AA of the Act by virtue of powers conferred to the Ld. PCIT (Central) under Section 12AB(4)(ii) are not satisfied, inasmuch as the allegation of the Ld. PCIT (Central) that one or more specified violations occurred during the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration for invoking provisions under Section 12AB(4) of the Income Tax Act, is devoid of merit and cannot be accepted. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the order passed by the Ld. PCIT (Central) cancelling the registration of the Society granted under Section 12AA of the Act, by virtue of powers conferred under Section 12AB(4) and (5) of the Act, is illegal and cannot be upheld, and thus, we quash the order passed by the Ld. PCIT (Central) cancelling registration of the Society under Section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and restore the registration of society u/s 12AA/12AB of the Act.

Coming back to legal grounds taken by the appellant society challenging the powers of the Ld. PCIT (Central), cancelling the registration of the trust under Section 12AB(4) of the Act prior to assessment year 2023-24.

We have heard both the parties and considered relevant arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant society and the Ld. CIT-DR present for the revenue, in the light of the provisions of Section 12AB(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, existed prior to 01-04-2022 and also as amended by the Finance Act, 2022 with effect from 01-04-2022. Although, the learned counsel for the assessee and the Ld. CIT-DR argued the issue at length in light of amended provisions of section 12AB(4) of the Act, along with rules of interpretation of taxing statues, but in our considered view arguments of both sides becomes academic in nature because, on merits, we quashed the order passed by the ld. Pr. CIT (Central) u/s 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act, and restore registration of the Society u/s 12AA/12AB of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Thus, in our considered view, grounds taken by the appellant Society, challenging the powers of the ld. PCIT(Central), cancelling registration of the Trust with retrospective effect from Asst. Year 2019-20 on the basis amended provisions of section 12AB(4) of the Act, by the Finance Act, 2022, w.e.f. 1-4-2022 has been dismissed as infructuous.

The appellant society had also, through ground nos.19 to 21, challenged the validity of the order passed by the Ld. PCIT (Central) u/s 12AB4(ii) of the Act, cancelling registration of the appellant society in light of Section 119 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and argued that it is only the Ld. CIT (Exemptions), who is authorized to grant registration and also cancelled registration of any trust or institution, or society and thus, the order passed by the Ld. PCIT (Central) without such authority is invalid and void ab initio.

Although both parties argued the issue at length in light of relevant provisions of the Act along with certain judicial precedents, but in our considered view, the issue becomes academic in nature because the cancellation of registration of the appellant society has been dealt with by us on merits and the order passed by the Ld. PCIT (Central) under section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act has been quashed. Therefore, we reject these ground nos.19 to 21 taken by the appellant society, as infructuous.

The appellant society had also challenged, through ground nos.25 and 26, the validity of the order passed by the Ld. PCIT (Central) on the basis of the reference received from the A.O. under the second proviso to Section 143(3) of the Act, on the ground that when the A.O. had not even issued the notice u/s 148 or 143(2) for the A.Y. 2019-20, made a reference under the second proviso to Section 143(3) of the Act, and thus, it is a case of reference by the A.O. without any jurisdiction.

The learned counsel for the appellant society and the Ld. CIT-DR for the Revenue had argued the issue at length in light of the relevant provisions of the Act. In our considered view, this issue is not required to be specifically adjudicated at this point of time because it is only academic in nature, as we have already quashed the order passed by Ld. PCIT (Central) u/s 12AB4(ii) of the Act on merits. Thus, the ground nos.25 and 26 taken by the appellant society are dismissed as infructuous.

In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee, in A.Y. 2019-20 is allowed.

The asseesee has raised the following grounds in the instant appeal:

“The order passed by the Learned Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Hyderabad, is incorrect both on facts and law.

The facts and issues involved in this appeal are identical to the facts and issues, which we had considered in appellant own case in A.Y. 2019-20. The Ld. PCIT(Central) has cancelled the registration of the appellant society granted u/s 12AA of the Act by virtue of powers vested with him u/s 12AB(4)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on the ground that income derived from property held under trust, wholly granted to the society. The Ld. PCIT(Central) cancelled the registration of the appellant society for occurrence of one or more specified violations referred to under Sec.12AB(4) of the Act and such conclusion has been drawn by the Ld. PCIT(Central) on the basis of search conducted in the case of the appellant society and other Group Societies and consequent seizure of admission forms for students, dairy sheets, excel sheets etc. that the appellant society is collecting capitation fee/donation in cash and the same has not been accounted in the books of accounts of the society and further has been diverted to the members of the society. The Ld. PCIT (Central) had also considered a diary seized form Shri Empally Ragunath Reddy and linked the transactions recorded therein to the appellant society and collection of fee over and above the prescribed fee fixed by the state government for admission of students and observed that the income derived from the property held under the trust, wholly or in part has been applied, other than for the objects of the trust. The Ld. PCIT (Central) further observed that the activity being carried out by the trust or institution is not genuine or not carried out in accordance with all or any of the conditions subject to which registration was granted by the society and such conclusion has been drawn on the basis of search conducted in the case of the appellant and related persons. The Ld. PCIT (Central) had also made observations with regard to non-maintenance of books of accounts and books of accounts of the appellant society were not available at the time of search and thus, opined that the activities of the appellant society are not genuine and are not being carried out in accordance with all or any of the conditions subject to which registration was granted to the society. Therefore, passed an order u/s 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act dated 21.03.2025 and cancelled the registration of the appellant society.

We have heard both the parties, perused the material available on record and had gone through the orders of the authorities below. We find that, an identical issue had been considered by us in appellant own case in A.Y. 2019-20, where the Tribunal after considering relevant facts and arguments of both the sides held that conditions precedent for cancellation of registration of appellant society u/s 12AB(4)(ii) of the Act are not satisfied and thus, the Ld. PCIT (Central) was erred in cancelling the registration of appellant society. The reasons given by us in preceding paragraph nos.16 to 48 in for A.Y. 2019-20 shall mutatis mutandis apply to this appeal as well. Therefore, for similar reasons, we are of the considered view that the conditions precedent for cancellation of registration granted to the appellant society under Section 12AA of the Act by virtue of powers conferred to the Ld. PCIT (Central) under Section 12AB(4)(ii) are not satisfied, inasmuch as the allegation of the Ld. PCIT (Central) that one or more specified violations occurred during the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration for invoking provisions under Section 12AB(4) of the Income Tax Act, is devoid of merit and cannot be accepted. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the order passed by the Ld. PCIT (Central) cancelling the registration of the Society granted under Section 12AA of the Act, by virtue of powers conferred under Section 12AB(4) and (5) of the Act, is illegal and cannot be upheld, and thus, we quash the order passed by the Ld. PCIT (Central) cancelling registration of the Society under Section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and restore the registration of society u/s 12AA/12AB of the Act.

In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee in for A.Y. 2022-23 is allowed.

To sum up, both appeals of the assessee are allowed.