LATE JAYESH THAR ,MUMBAI vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER TDS, WARD KALYAN, KALYAN

आदेश / O R D E R PER M. BALAGANESH (A.M):

These appeals in ITA No.1476/Mum/2022 to 1479/Mum/2022 for A.Y.2013-14 arise out of the order by the ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC) in appeal No.NFAC/2012-13/10047066, NFAC/2012-13/10047067 NFAC/2012- 13/10047068 & NFAC/2012-13/10047069 dated 13/05/2022 (ld. CIT(A) in short) against the order of assessment passed u/s.154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as Act) dated 23/04/2021 by the ld.

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Income Tax Officer, TDS, TDS Ward, Kalyan (hereinafter referred to as ld. AO).

Identical issues are involved in all these appeals and hence they are taken up together and disposed of by this common order for the sake of convenience.

Quarter Form No. Due Date Date of Interest on Fee u/s Int u/s Filing 234E Late 220(2) payment Q2 24Q 15.10.12 3.4.13 3150 30000 15900 Q2 26Q 15.10.12 3.5.13 165 40000 34800 Q3 24Q 15.01.13 3.4.13 1800 15600 8268 Q3 26Q 15.01.13 3.5.13 1716 21600 11660

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provided for two kinds of adjustments in computation of TDS, namely, any arithmetic error, or any incorrect claim apparent from information in the TDS statements. Section 234E of the Act was inserted in the statute by the Finance Act 2012 and came into effect from 1.7.2012 which provided that in case of failure to deliver the TDS statement within the time prescribed u/s 200(3) of the Act , a person shall be liable to pay a fee amounting to Rs 200/- for every day during which the failure continues, subject to not exceeding the amount of tax deductible. The ld. CIT(A), NFAC observed that section 200A of the Act has been subsequently amended by Finance Act 2015 with effect from 1.6.2015 wherein 2 new clauses (c ) and (d) were inserted bringing clarification that during processing of a TDS statement, the fee, if any, shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E of the Act. There were contrary views on the disputed issue by the various High Courts. The ld. CIT(A), NFAC observed that the fee u/s 234E of the Act is required to be paid by the deductor at the time of submission of the TDS statements calculated at the rate of Rs 200/- per day for each day of default. There is no provision in the Act which allows for waiver from the payment of such fees. Accordingly, he upheld the levy of fees u/s 234E of the Act and consequential charging of interest u/s 220(2) of the Act for late payment of the said fees.

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on the subject has been considered. The relevant operative portion of the decision is reproduced hereunder:-

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terms of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in CIT V/s Vegetable products Ltd. (1972 88 ITR 192). 2.2.The learned CIT(A), going by the law of stare decisis as explained by Hon’ble Bombay High Court in CIT V/s Thana Electric Supply Ltd. (206 ITR 727) concluded that in case of conflicting decisions of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the later decision is to be preferred if it was reached after full consideration of the earlier decisions and therefore, upheld the levy of fees u/s 234E. Since the decision of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court was later in point of time and rendered after consideration of earlier conflicting decisions, the same was to be followed, as per the aforesaid principal. Hence, the assessee’s plea was rejected and the late filing fees charged by revenue u/s 234E was upheld. Aggrieved, the assessee is under further appeal before us challenging the aforesaid adjudication. 3.1 Upon careful consideration, we find that the provisions of Section 234E, as inserted by Finance Act 2012 w.e.f. 01/07/2012, envisages levy of fees @Rs.200/- for every day of default on the part of the assessee to deliver the statement of TDS within the time prescribed u/s 200(3) or Section 206C(3). Section 200A deal with processing of statements of tax deducted at source. A clause (c) has been inserted into this Section by Finance Act, 2015 with effect from 01/06/2015 which provide that the fees, if any, shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of Section 234E. 3.2 The case of the assessee is that since the amendment to Section 200A by way of insertion of clause (c) is only with effect from 01/06/2015, no fees would be payable by the assessee for any period prior to 01/06/2015 as held by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in Fatehraj Singhvi V/s Union of India (73 Taxmann.com 252 26/08/2016) which has subsequently been followed by same court while adjudicating Writ Petition No. 618/2015 filed by Shree Ayappa Educational Charitable Trust. The relevant observations of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court, for ease of reference, could be extracted in the following manner: - 6. We have heard learned Senior Counsel Mr.Kumar and Mr.A.Shankar, appearing for the appellants and Mr.K.V.Aravind, learned counsel appearing for Income Tax Department. 7. We may at the outset record that, learned counsel appearing for both sides have made submissions which shall be dealt with appropriately at the later stage. But, in order to appreciate the controversies including that of the background, certain aspects deserve to be taken note of which are as under:

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paid before delivering or causing to be delivered a statement in accordance with sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C. (4) The provisions of this section shall apply to a statement referred to in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C which is to be delivered or caused to be delivered for tax deducted at source or tax collected at source, as the case may be, on or after the 1st day of July, 2012." 11.Similarly, Section 271H was inserted with effect from 1.7.2012 providing for imposition of penalty for default in filing TDS statement and also for furnishing of incorrect information in such TDS statement. The proviso was inserted in Section 272A providing for no penalty under the said section will be imposed after 1.7.2012 for failure to file TDS statement on time possibly because a separate Section 271H was inserted in the Act. Section 271H will be relevant for our purpose and same for ready reference is reproduced and it reads as under: "Penalty for failure to furnish statements, etc. 271H. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Act, [the Assessing Officer may direct that a person shall pay by way of] penalty, if, he— (a) fails to deliver or cause to be delivered a statement within the time prescribed in sub- section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C; or furnishes incorrect information in the statement (b) which is required to be delivered or caused to be delivered under sub section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub- section (3) of section 206C. (2) The penalty referred to in sub-section (1) shall be a sum which shall not be less than ten thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, no penalty shall be levied for the failure referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), if the person proves that after paying tax deducted or collected along with the fee and interest, if any, to the credit of the Central Government, he had delivered or cause to be delivered the statement referred to in sub section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C before the expiry of a period of one year from the

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time prescribed for delivering or causing to be delivered such statement. (4) The provisions of this section shall apply to a statement referred to in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub section (3) of section 206C which is to be delivered or caused to be delivered for tax deducted at source or tax collected at source, as the case may be, on or after the 1st day of July, 2012." 12. On 1.6.2015, clauses (c) to (f) came to be substituted under Section 200A providing that the fee under Section 234E can be computed at the time of processing of the return and the intimation could be issued specifying the same payable by the deductor as fee under Section 234E of the Act. Section 200A would also be relevant in the present matter. Hence, the same for ready reference is reproduced as under: "Processing of statements of tax deducted at source. 200A. (1) Where a statement of tax deduction at source 69[or a correction statement] has been made by a person deducting any sum (hereafter referred to in this section as deductor) under section 200, such statement shall be processed in the following manner, namely:— (a) the sums deductible under this Chapter shall be computed after making the following adjustments, namely:— any arithmetical error in the statement; or (i)

(ii) an incorrect claim, apparent from any information in the statement; the interest, if any, shall be computed on the basis of (b) the sums deductible as computed in the statement; (c) the fee, if any, shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E; (d) the sum payable by, or the amount of refund due to, the deductor shall be determined after adjustment of the amount computed under clause (b) and clause (c) against any amount paid under section 200 or section 201 or section 234E and any amount paid otherwise by way of tax or interest or fee; (e) an intimation shall be prepared or generated and sent

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to the deductor specifying the sum determined to be payable by, or the amount of refund due to, him under clause (d); and (f) the amount of refund due to the deductor in pursuance of the determination under clause (d) shall be granted to the deductor:] Provided that no intimation under this sub-section shall be sent after the expiry of one year from the end of the financial year in which the statement is filed. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, "an incorrect claim apparent from any information in the statement" shall mean a claim, on the basis of an entry, in the statement— (i) of an item, which is inconsistent with another entry of the same or some other item in such statement; (ii) in respect of rate of deduction of tax at source, where such rate is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) For the purposes of processing of statements under sub-section (1), the Board may make a scheme for centralised processing of statements of tax deducted at source to expeditiously determine the tax payable by, or the refund due to, the deductor as required under the said sub-section." 13.When the returns for TDS filed by the respective appellant- petitioners were processed in purported exercise of the power under Section 200A, the amount of fee under Section 234E is computed and determined. The demand is made and the intimation given under Section 200A includes the computation and the determination of the fee payable by the appellant- petitioners.

14.We may now deal with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. The first contention for assailing the legality and validity of the intimation under Section 200A was that, the provision of Section 200A(1)(c), (d) and (f) have come into force only with effect from 1.6.2015 and hence, there was no authority or competence or jurisdiction on the part of the concerned Officer or the Department to compute and determine the fee under Section 234E in respect of the assessment year

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of the earlier period and the return filed for the said respective assessment years namely all assessment years and the returns prior to 1.6.2015. It was submitted that, when no express authority was conferred by the statute under Section 200A prior to 1.6.2015 for computation of any fee under Section 234E nor the determination thereof, the demand or the intimation for the previous period or previous year prior to 1.6.2015 could not have been made.

15.Whereas, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent- Department made two fold submissions;

16.One was that, by virtue of Section 234E, the liability to pay fee had already accrued since there was failure to submit return either under Section 200(3) of the Act or under Section 206C (3) of the Act. Section 234E can be said as a charging Section generating the liability to pay the fee therefore, irrespective of a fact or the aspect that sub-sections (1c), (1d), 1(e) & (1f) were inserted by way of substitution in Section 200A, when the fee was payable the aforesaid insertion of the aforesaid clause and Section 200A (1) (c), (d), (e) and (f) would not result into nullifying the liability to pay fee under Section 234E of the Act. Hence, in his submission, it cannot be said that the demand or the intimation by way of computation of the fee under Section 234E is invalid or unwarranted or is without jurisdiction.

17.The examination of the aforesaid contentions show that, Section 234E has come into force on 1.7.2012. Therefore, one may at the first blush say that, since Section 234E is a charging section for fee, the liability was generated or had accrued, if there was failure to deliver or cause to be delivered the statement/s of TDS within the prescribed time. But, in our view, Section 234E cannot be read in isolation and is required to be read with the mechanism and the mode provided for its enforcement. As observed by us hereinabove, when Section 234E was inserted in the Act simultaneously, Section 271H was also inserted in the Act providing for the penalty for failure of furnishing of statements etc. Therefore, if there was failure to submit the statement for TDS as per Section 234E, the fee payable is provided but the mechanism provided was that if there was failure to furnish statements within the prescribed date, the

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penalty under Section 271H (1) and (2) could be imposed. However, under sub- section (3) of Section 271H, the exception is provided that no penalty shall be levied for the failure referred to under clause (a) of sub-section (1) if the person proves that after paying TDS with the fee and interest the amount is credited and he had delivered or caused to deliver the statement within one year from the time prescribed for submission of the said statement. To put it in other words, for failure to submit the statements, the penalty provided under Section 271(1)(a) cannot be imposed if the deductor complies with the requirement of sub- section (3) of Section 271H. Hence, it can be said that the fee provided under Section 234E would take out from the rigors of penalty under Section 271H but of course subject to the outer limit of one year as prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 271H. It can also be said that when the Parliament intended to insert the provisions of Section 234E providing for fee simultaneously the utility of such fee was for conferring the privilege to the defaulter-deductor to come out from the rigors of penal provision of Section 271H. Be it recorded that, prior to Section 271H of the Act inserted in the statute book, the enforceability of requirement to file return under Section 200(3) and Section 206C(3) was by virtue of Section 272A(2)(k) of the Act which provided for the penalty of Rs.100/- per day for each day of default in filing TDS statements. But, when Section 234E was inserted with effect from 1.7.2012 simultaneously, a second proviso was added under Section 272A(2) with effect from 1.7.2012 as under: "Penalty for failure to answer questions, sign statements, furnish information, returns or statements, allow inspections, etc. 272A. (1)****** (2) If any person fails— (a) to comply with a notice issued under sub-section (6) of section 94; or (b) to give the notice of discontinuance of his business or profession as required by sub- section (3) of section 176; or (c) to furnish in due time any of the returns, statements or

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particulars mentioned in section 133 or section 206 or section 206C or section 285B; or (d) to allow inspection of any register referred to in section 134 or of any entry in such register or to allow copies of such register or of any entry therein to be taken; or (e) to furnish the return of income which he is required to furnish under sub-section (4A) or sub-section (4C) of section 139 or to furnish it within the time allowed and in the manner required under those sub-sections; or (f) to deliver or cause to be delivered in due time a copy of the declaration mentioned in section 197A; or (g) to furnish a certificate as required by section 203 or section 206C; or (h) to deduct and pay tax as required by sub-section (2) of section 226; (i) to furnish a statement as required by sub-section (2C) of section 192; (j) to deliver or cause to be delivered in due time a copy of the declaration referred to in sub-section (1A) of section 206C; (k) to deliver or cause to be delivered a copy of the statement within the time specified in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C; (l) to deliver or cause to be delivered the statements within the time specified in sub-section (1) of section 206A; [(m) to deliver or cause to be delivered a statement within the time as may be prescribed under sub-section (2A) of section 200 or sub-section (3A) of section 206C,] he shall pay, by way of penalty, a sum of one hundred rupees for every day during which the failure continues: Provided that the amount of penalty for failures in relation to a declaration mentioned in section 197A, a certificate as required by section 203 and returns under sections 206 and 206C and 71[statements under sub-section (2A) or sub section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub- section (3) or under sub-section (3A) of section 206C] shall not exceed the amount of tax deductible or collectible, as the case may be:

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Provided further that no penalty shall be levied under this section for the failure referred to in clause (k), if such failure relates to a statement referred to in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C which is to be delivered or caused to be delivered for tax deducted at source or tax collected at source, as the case may be, on or after the 1st day of July, 2012. ******* 18.The aforesaid shows that in the clause (k) if the said failure relates to a statement referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 200 or the sub-section (3) of Section 206C, no penalty shall be imposed for TDS after 01.07.2012.

19.Hence, it can be said that, the mechanism provided for enforceability of Section 200(3) or 206C (3) for filing of the statement by making it penal under Section 272A (2 (k) is done away in view of the insertion of Section 271H providing for penal provision for such failure to submit return. When the Parliament has simultaneously brought about Section 234E, Section 271H and the aforesaid proviso to Section 272A(2), it can be said that, the fee provided under Section 234E is contemplated to give a privilege to the defaulter to come out from the rigors of penalty provision under Section 271H (1) (a) if he pays the fee within one year and complies with the requirement of sub-section (3) of Section 271H.

20.In view of the aforesaid observations and discussion, two aspects may transpire one, for Section 234E providing for fee and given privilege to the defaulter if he pays the fee and hence, when a privilege is given for a particular purpose which in the present case is to come out from rigors of penal provision of Section 271H(1)(a), it cannot be said that the provisions of fee since creates a counter benefit or reciprocal benefit in favour of the defaulter in the rigors of the penal provision, the provisions of Section 234E would meet with the test of quid pro quo.

21.However, if Section 234E providing for fee was brought on the state book, keeping in view the aforesaid purpose and the intention then, the other mechanism provided for computation of fee and failure for payment of fee under Section 200A which has

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been brought about with effect from 1.6.2015 cannot be said as only by way of a regulatory mode or a regulatory mechanism but it can rather be termed as conferring substantive power upon the authority. It is true that, a regulatory mechanism by insertion of any provision made in the statute book, may have a retroactive character but, whether such provision provides for a mere regulatory mechanism or confers substantive power upon the authority would also be a aspect which may be required to be considered before such provisions is held to be retroactive in nature. Further, when any provision is inserted for liability to pay any tax or the fee by way of compensatory in nature or fee independently simultaneously mode and the manner of its enforceability is also required to be considered and examined. Not only that, but, if the mode and the manner is not expressly prescribed, the provisions may also be vulnerable. All such aspects will be required to be considered before one considers regulatory mechanism or provision for regulating the mode and the manner of recovery and its enforceability as retroactive. If at the time when the fee was provided under Section 234E, the Parliament also provided for its utility for giving privilege under Section 271H(3) that too by expressly put bar for penalty under Section 272A by insertion of proviso to Section 272A(2), it can be said that a particular set up for imposition and the payment of fee under Section 234E was provided but, it did not provide for making of demand of such fee under Section 200A payable under Section 234E. Hence, considering the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for respondent-Revenue that insertion of clause (c) to (f) under Section 200A(1) should be treated as retroactive in character and not prospective.

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of power under Section 200A by the respondent for the period of the respective assessment year prior to 1.6.2015. However, we make it clear that, if any deductor has already paid the fee after intimation received under Section 200A, the aforesaid view will not permit the deductor to reopen the said question unless he has made payment under protest.

23.In view of the aforesaid observation and discussion, since the impugned intimation given by the respondent-Department against all the appellants under Section 200A are so far as they are for the period prior to 1.6.2015 can be said as without any authority under law. Hence, the same can be said as illegal and invalid.

24.If the facts of the present cases are examined in light of the aforesaid observation and discussion, it appears that in all matters, the intimation given in purported exercise of power under Section 200A are in respect of fees under Section 234E for the period prior to 1.6.2015. As such, it is on account of the intimation given making demand of the fees in purported exercise of power under Section 200A, the same has necessitated the appellant-original petitioner to challenge the validity of Section 234E of the Act. In view of the reasons recorded by us hereinabove, when the amendment made under Section 200A of the Act which has come into effect on 1.6.2015 is held to be having prospective effect, no computation of fee for the demand or the intimation for the fee under Section 234E could be made for the TDS deducted for the respective assessment year prior to 1.6.2015. Hence, the demand notices under Section 200A by the respondent-authority for intimation for payment of fee under Section 234E can be said as without any authority of law and the same are quashed and set aside to that extent.

25.As such, as recorded earlier, it is on account of the intimation received under Section 200A for making computation and demand of fees under Section 234E, the same has necessitated the appellant to challenge the constitutional validity of Section 234E. When the intimation of the demand notices under Section 200A is held to be without authority of law so far as it relates to computation and demand of fee under Section 234E, we find that

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the question of further scrutiny for testing the constitutional validity of Section 234E would be rendered as an academic exercise because there would not be any cause on the part of the petitioners to continue to maintain the challenge to constitutional validity under Section 234E of the Act. At this stage, we may also record that the learned counsels appearing for the appellant had also declared that if the impugned notices under Section 200A are set aside, so far as it relates to computation and intimation for payment of fee under Section 234E, the appellant- petitioners would not press the challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act. But, they submitted that the question of constitutional validity of Section 234E may be kept open to be considered by the Division Bench and the Judgment of the learned Single Judge may not conclude the constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act.

26.Under these circumstances, we find that no further discussion would be required for examining the constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act. Save and except to observe that the question of constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act before the Division Bench of this Court shall remain open and shall not be treated as concluded.

27.In view of the aforesaid observations and discussion, the impugned notices under Section 200A of the Act for computation and intimation for payment of fee under Section 234E as they relate to for the period of the tax deducted prior to 1.6.2015 are set aside. It is clarified that the present judgment would not be interpreted to mean that even if the payment of the fees under Section 234E already made as per demand/intimation under Section 200A of the Act for the TDS for the period prior to 01.04.2015 is permitted to be reopened for claiming refund. The judgment will have prospective effect accordingly. It is further observed that the question of constitutional validity of Section 234E shall remain open to be considered by the Division Bench and shall not get concluded by the order of the learned Single Judge.

28.The appeals are partly allowed to the aforesaid extent.

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3.3.On the other hand, the case of the revenue would derive strength from the contrary decision of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court rendered in Rajesh Kourani V/s Union of India (297 CTR 502 20/06/2017) wherein the Hon’ble court has declined to concur with the aforesaid adjudication of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court, by observing as under: - 2.Brief facts are as under. 3. The petitioner is a proprietor of one M/s SaiBaba Textiles which is engaged in the manufacture and trading of ladies garments. In course of the business, the petitioner would make payments to individuals and agencies, many of which would require deducting tax at source. The provisions under the Act would further require the petitioner to file periodic statements of such tax deducted at source and depositing the tax in the Government within the time prescribed. With effect from 01.07.2012, section 234E was introduced in the Act for levying fee for default in furnishing the statement of tax deducted or collected at source. As per rule 31A of the Rules, the person responsible for deduction of tax in terms of sub-section (3) of section 200 would have to file quarterly statements in prescribed form. Sub-rule (2) of rule 31A prescribed dates by which such statements would have to be filed. 4. Section 200A of the Act pertains to processing of statements of tax deducted at source. This provision provides for processing the statement filed by person deducting the tax. Prior to 01.06.2015, this provision did not contain any reference to the adjustment of fee to be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E of the Act. This provision was made only with effect from 01.06.2015. 5. In the petition, the petitioner has raised following threefold grievances: I. That section 234E of the Act is ultra-vires and unconstitutional. II. Rule 31A of the Rules insofar as it prescribes longer period for the Government to file the statements as compared to the other assessees is discriminatory and arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional. Prior to 01.06.2015, section 200A did not authorize III. the Assessing Officer to make adjustment of the fee to be levied under section 234E of the Act. This provision introduced with effect from 01.03.2016 is not retrospective and therefore, for the period between 01.07.2002 i.e.

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when section 234E was introduced in the Act and 01.06.2015 when proper mechanism was provided under section 200A of the Act for collection of fee, the department could not have charged such fee. 6. Appearing for the petitioner, learned advocate Shri Parth Contractor at the outset, stated that in view of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in case of Rashmikant Kundalia v. Union of India [2015] 373 ITR 268/229 Taxman 596/54 taxmann.com 200, he has instructions not to press the challenge to constitutionality of section 234E of the Act. He however made detailed submissions with respect to the other two grievances of the petitioner. Regarding rule 31A of the Rules, he pointed out that the legislature has prescribed different time limits for filing statements for the Government and the rest of the assessees. The special concession to the Government agencies was wholly unnecessary and not based on any rational. The same difficulties and complexities which are faced by Government agencies would also be faced by the individual assessees. 7. With respect to the amendment in sub-section (1) of section 200A, counsel submitted that prior to such amendment, there was no mechanism provided under the Act for collection of fee under section 234E of the Act. The Assessing Officer therefore could not have adjusted such fee in terms of section 200A of the Act. Counsel drew our attention to an intimation sent by the Assessing Officer, purported to be under section 200A of the Act, in which, he had adjusted a sum of Rs.33,123/- by way of late filing fee under section 234E of the Act. Counsel relied on a decision of Pune Bench of ITAT in case of Gajanan Constructions v. Dy, CIT [2016] 73 taxmann.com 380/161 ITD 313 (Pune - Trib.), in which, the Tribunal held that prior to 01.06.2015, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge fee under section 234E of the Act. Counsel also relied on a decision of Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in case of Fatheraj Singhvi v. Union of India [2016] 73 taxmann.com 252, in which, the Court has taken a view that the amendment in section 200A with effect from 01.06.2015 cannot have retrospective effect. 8. On the other hand learned counsel Shri Manish Bhatt for the department opposed the petition contending that two different time limits for filing statements under rule 31A are for Government and nonGovernment agencies. Looking to the multilayered system of operation of the Government agencies and overall workload, the legislature thought it fit to grant 15 days additional time to the Government agencies to file the statements. This is therefore not a case of discrimination, but a

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case of reasonable classification. 9. With respect to the amendment in section 200A, counsel submitted that the charging provision is section 200E of the Act. Section 200A merely provides a mechanism. Such a provision cannot govern the charging provision. Even in absence of amendment in section 200A, the Assessing Officer was always authorized to levy fee in terms of section 200E of the Act. At best, the amendment in the said provision should be seen as clarificatory or providing a mechanism which till then was missing. Counsel referred to the decision of Rajasthan High Court in case of Dundlod Shikshan Sansthan v. Union of India [2015] 63 taxmann.com 243/235 Taxman 446 (Raj.), where, in the context of challenge to the vires to the section 234E of the Act, incidentally this issue also came up for consideration. 10. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, we may take a closer look at the statutory provisions applicable. Section 200 of the Act pertains to duty of the person deducting tax and imposes a duty on a person deducting tax in accordance with the foregoing provisions of chapter-XVII to pay such sum to the credit of the Central Government within the time prescribed. Sub- section (3) of section 200 requires such a person to prepare such statements for the prescribed periods and to file the same within the prescribed time. Section 200C of the Act makes similar provision for the person responsible for the collection of tax at source to deposit the same with the Government revenue and to file a statement within the prescribed time. 11. Section 200A of the Act pertains to processing of statements of tax deducted at source. We would notice the provisions of this section prior to 01.06.2015 and the changes made therein by virtue of Finance Act, 2015, with effect from 01.06.2015. Further, we would take note of provisions of section 234E of the Act. For the time being, we may notice that section 200A provides for a mechanism for processing a statement filed under section 200 of the Act and enables the Assessing Officer to make some adjustments and to intimate the final outcome to the assessee. 12. Section 234E which pertains to fee for default in furnishing the statements was introduced for the first time by the Finance Act, 2012, with effect from 01.07.2015. Section 234E reads as under: "Fee for default in furnishing statements. 234E.(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Act, where a person fails to deliver or cause to be delivered a

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statement within the time prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C, he shall be liable to pay, by way of fee, a sum of two hundred rupees for every day during which the failure continues. (2) The amount of fee referred to in sub-section (1) shall not exceed the amount of tax deductible or collectible, as the case may be. (3) The amount of fee referred to in sub-section (1) shall be paid before delivering or causing to be delivered a statement in accordance with sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C. (4) The provisions of this section shall apply to a statement referred to in sub- section(3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C which is to be delivered or caused to be delivered for tax deducted at source or tax collected at source, as the case may be, on or after the 1st day of July, 2012." 13. With effect from 01.07.2012, the legislature also introduced section 271H of the Act providing penalty for failure to furnish statements required to be filed under sub-section (3) of section 200 or under proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C of the Act. As per sub-section (2) of section 271H in case of default to file the statements, the assessee may be liable to penalty of not less than rupees ten thousand but not more than rupees one lakh. Under sub-section (3) of section 271H however, such penalty would be avoided if the assessee proves that he had paid the tax deducted or collected alongwith interest and he had filed the necessary statement within one year from the time prescribed for filing such statements. We may also record that clause (k) of sub-section (2) of section 272A provides for penalty for failure to deliver the statement within the time specified in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C at a rate of rupees one hundred for every date during which the failure continues. However, with effect from 01.07.2012, a proviso was added limiting the effect of this provision upto 01.07.2012. In other words, after 01.07.2012, the penalty provision of section 271H would apply in such cases of defaults. 14. Section 200A(1) of the Act prior to 01.06.2015 provided as under:

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Section 200A(1) "Processing of statements of tax deducted at source. 200A. (1) Where a statement of tax deduction at source [or a correction statement] has been made by a person deducting any sum (hereafter referred to in this section as deductor) under section 200, such statement shall be processed in the following manner, namely:— (a) the sums deductible under this Chapter shall be computed after making the following adjustments, namely:— (i) any arithmetical error in the statement; or (ii) an incorrect claim, apparent from any information in the statement; (b) the interest, if any, shall be computed on the basis of the sums deductible as computed in the statement; (c) the sum payable by, or the amount of refund due to, the deductor shall be determined after adjustment of amount computed under clause (b) against any amount paid under section 200 and section 201, and any amount paid otherwise by way of tax or interest; (d) an intimation shall be prepared or generated and sent to the deductor specifying the sum determined to be payable by, or the amount of refund due to, him under clause (c); and (e) amount of refund due to the deductor in pursuance of the determination under clause (c) shall be granted to the deductor: (f) the amount of refund due to the deductor in pursuance of the determination under clause (d) shall be granted to the deductor:] Provided that no intimation under this sub-section shall be sent after the expiry of one year from the end of the financial year in which the statement is filed. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, "an incorrect claim apparent from any information in the statement" shall mean a claim, on the basis of an entry, in the statement— (i) of an item, which is inconsistent with another entry of the same or some other item in such statement; (ii) in respect of rate of deduction of tax at source, where such rate is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act;

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(2) For the purposes of processing of statements under sub- section (1), the Board may make a scheme for centralised processing of statements of tax deducted at source to expeditiously determine the tax payable by, or the refund due to, the deductor as required under the said sub-section." With effect from 01.06.2015, sub-section (1) of section 200A was amended. In the amended form, the same provision reads as under: Section 200A(1) "Processing of statements of tax deducted at source. 200A. (1) Where a statement of tax deduction at source [or a correction statement] has been made by a person deducting any sum (hereafter referred to in this section as deductor) under section 200, such statement shall be processed in the following manner, namely:— (a) the sums deductible under this Chapter shall be computed after making the following adjustments, namely:— (i) any arithmetical error in the statement; or (ii) an incorrect claim, apparent from any information in the statement; (b) the interest, if any, shall be computed on the basis of the sums deductible as computed in the statement; (c) the fee, if any, shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E; (d) the sum payable by, or the amount of refund due to, the deductor shall be determined after adjustment of the amount computed under clause (b) and clause (c) against any amount paid under section 200 or section 201 or section 234E and any amount paid otherwise by way of tax or interest or fee; (e) an intimation shall be prepared or generated and sent to the deductor specifying the sum determined to be payable by, or the amount of refund due to, him under clause (d); and (f) the amount of refund due to the deductor in pursuance of the determination under clause (d) shall be granted to the deductor:]

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Provided that no intimation under this sub-section shall be sent after the expiry of one year from the end of the financial year in which the statement is filed. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, "an incorrect claim apparent from any information in the statement" shall mean a claim, on the basis of an entry, in the statement— (i) of an item, which is inconsistent with another entry of the same or some other item in such statement; (ii) in respect of rate of deduction of tax at source, where such rate is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act; (2) For the purposes of processing of statements under sub- section (1), the Board may make a scheme for centralised processing of statements of tax deducted at source to expeditiously determine the tax payable by, or the refund due to, the deductor as required under the said sub-section." 15. In view of such statutory provisions, we may consider the petitioner's two challenges. Coming to the question of discriminatory nature of rule 31A of the Rules, it can be seen that sub-rule (1) of rule 31A of the Rules provides for filing of the statements in prescribed forms as required under sub-section (3) of section 200. Sub- rule (2) of rule 31A lays down the time limit for filing such quarterly statements and provides as under: "(2) Statements referred to in sub-rule (1) for the quarter of the financial year ending with the date specified in column (2) of the Table below shall be furnished by- (i) the due date specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) of the said Table, if the deductor is an office of Government; and (ii) the due date specified in the corresponding entry in column (4) of the said Table, if the deductor is a person other than the person referred to in clause (i) TABLE SI. Date of ending of Due date Due date No. quarter of financial year (4) (1) (2) (3) 30th June 1 31st July of the financial 15th July of the financial year year

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2 30th September 31st October of the 15th October of the financial year financial year 31st December 3 31st January of the 15th January of the financial financial year year 31st March 4 15th May of the financial 15th May of the financial year immediately year immediately following the financial following the financial year in which the year in which the deduction is made deduction is made

This rule thus, while laying down the last date by which such statements should be filed, draws two categories; in case of deductor is an office of government and in case of a deductor is a person other than the office of the government. Consistently, the office of the government is granted 15 days extra time as compared to the other deductors. For example, the statement for the date of the quarter ending on 30th June, an ordinary deductor would have to file a statement latest by 15th July of the same year, whereas for the Government office, the last date for filing such statement would be 31st July of the said year. This 15 days extra time is a consistent feature in all four quarters. The short question is, did the legislature discriminate in doing so? It is well settled that Article 14 does not prohibit reasonable classification but frowns upon class legislation. In the affidavit in reply filed, the respondents have pointed out that multiple agencies are involved in every transaction in the Government offices and the same therefore cannot be compared with the private individuals or business houses. We do not found that the extra time of 15 days for the Government to file a return of deduction of tax at source is in any manner either unreasonable or discriminatory. If the legislature found it appropriate to grant slightly longer period to the government agencies looking to the complex nature of transactions involved, the volume and turnover of such transactions and filtering necessary statements required at many stages, in our opinion, the same was perfectly legitimate. Looking to the differences between the Government agencies and private assessees in the context of providing the last date for filing the statements, do not form a homogeneous class which cannot be further bifurcated.

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section 200A of the Act was amended with effect from 01.06.2015. We have noticed the relevant statutory provisions. The picture that emerges is that prior to 01.07.2012, the Act contained a single provision in section 272A providing for penalty in case of default in filing the statements in terms of section 200 or proviso to section 206C. Such penalty was prescribed at the rate of Rs.100 for every day during which the failure continued. With effect from 01.06.2012, three major changes were introduced in the Act. Section 234E as introduced for the first time to provide for charging of fee for late filing of the statements. Such fee would be levied at the rate of Rs.200/- for every day of failure subject to the maximum amount of tax deductible or collectible as the case may be. Section 271H was also introduced for the first time for levying penalty for failure to furnish the statements. Such penalty would be in the range of Rs.10,000/- and Rs.1 lakh. No penalty would be imposed if the tax is deposited with fee and interest and the statement is filed within one year of the due date. With addition to these two provisions prescribing fee and penalty respectively, clause (k) of sub-section (2) of section 272A became redundant and by adding a proviso to the said section, this effect was therefore limited upto 01.07.2012. 17. In essence, section 234E thus prescribed for the first time charging of a fee for every day of default in filing of statement under sub-section (3) of section 200 or any proviso to sub- section (3) of section 206C. This provision was apparently added for making the compliance of deduction and collection of tax at source, depositing it with Government revenue and filing of the statements more stringent. 18. In this context, we may notice that section 200A which pertains to processing of statements of tax deducted at source provides for the procedure once a statement of deduction of tax at source is filed by the person responsible to do so and authorizes the Assessing Officer to make certain adjustments which are prima-facie or arithmetical in nature. The officer would then send an intimation of a statement to the assessee. Prior to 01.06.2015, this provision did not include any reference to the fee payable under section 234E of the Act. By recasting sub- section (1), the new clause-c permits the authority to compute the fee, if any, payable by the assessee under section 234E of the Act and by virtue of clause-d, adjust the said sum against the amount paid under the various provisions of the Act. 19. In plain terms, section 200A of the Act is a machinery provision providing mechanism for processing a statement of deduction of tax at source and for making adjustments, which

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are, as noted earlier, arithmetical or prima-facie in nature. With effect from 01.06.2015, this provision specifically provides for computing the fee payable under section 234E of the Act. On the other hand, section 234E is a charging provision creating a charge for levying fee for certain defaults in filing the statements. Under no circumstances a machinery provision can override or overrule a charging provision. We are unable to see that section 200A of the Act creates any charge in any manner. It only provides a mechanism for processing a statement for tax deduction and the method in which the same would be done. When section 234E has already created a charge for levying fee that would thereafter not been necessary to have yet another provision creating the same charge. Viewing section 200A as creating a new charge would bring about a dichotomy. In plain terms, the provision in our understanding is a machinery provision and at best provides for a mechanism for processing and computing besides other, fee payable under section 234E for late filing of the statements. 20. Even in absence of section 200A of the Act with introduction of section 234E, it was always open for the Revenue to demand and collect the fee for late filing of the statements. Section 200A would merely regulate the manner in which the computation of such fee would be made and demand raised. In other words, we cannot subscribe to the view that without a regulatory provision being found for section 200A for computation of fee, the fee prescribed under section 234E cannot be levied. Any such view would amount to a charging section yielding to the machinery provision. If at all, the recasted clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 200A would be in nature of clarificatory amendment. Even in absence of such provision, as noted, it was always open for the Revenue to charge the fee in terms of section 234E of the Act. By amendment, this adjustment was brought within the fold of section 200A of the Act. This would have one direct effect. An order passed under section 200A of the Act is rectifiable under section 154 of the Act and is also appealable under section 246A. In absence of the power of authority to make such adjustment under section 200A of the Act, any calculation of the fee would not partake the character of the intimation under said provision and it could be argued that such an order would not be open to any rectification or appeal. Upon introduction of the recasted clause (c), this situation also would be obviated. Even prior to 01.06.2015, it was always open for the Revenue to calculate fee in terms of section 234E of the Act. The Karnataka High Court in case of Fatheraj Singhvi (supra) held that section 200A was not merely a regulatory provision, but was conferring substantive power on the authority. The Court was also of the

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opinion that section 234E of the Act was in the nature of privilege to the defaulter if he fails to pay fees then he would be rid of rigor of the penal provision of section 271H of the Act. With both these propositions, with respect, we are unable to concur. Section 200A is not a source of substantive power. Substantive power to levy fee can be traced to section 234E of the Act. Further the fee under section 234E of the Act is not in lieu of the penalty of section 271H of the Act. Both are independent levies. Section 271H only provides that such penalty would not be levy if certain conditions are fulfilled. One of the conditions is that the tax with fee and interest is paid. The additional condition being that the statement is filed latest within one year from the due date. 21. Counsel for the petitioner however, referred to the decision of Supreme Court in case of CIT v. B.C. Srinivasa Setty [1981] 128 ITR 294/5 Taxman 1 (SC), to contend that when a machinery provision is not provided, the levy itself would fail. The decision of Supreme Court in case of B C Srinivasa Setty (supra) was rendered in entirely different background. Issue involved was of charging capital gain on transfer of a capital asset. In case on hand, the asset was in the nature of goodwill. The Supreme Court referring to various provisions concerning charging and computing capital gain observed that none of these provisions suggest that they include an asset in the acquisition of which no cost can be conceived. In such a case, the asset is sold and the consideration is brought to tax, what is charged is a capital value of the asset and not any profit or gain. This decision therefore would not apply in the present case. 22. In the result, petition fails and is dismissed. 3.4. Admittedly, there is no decision by Hon’ble Bombay High Court on the stated issue. The decision of Mumbai Tribunal as referred to in the impugned order has been rendered prior to the aforesaid decision of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court and therefore, no guidance could be obtained from the same. 3.5. The Ld. CIT(A), observing the conflicting decisions, chose to prefer the later decision of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court following the law of stare decisis as explained by Hon’ble Bombay High Court in CIT V/s Thana Electricity Supply Ltd. (206 ITR 727 22/04/1993) wherein Hon’ble Court has held as under: - On a careful consideration of the submissions of learned counsel for the assessee, we find that before taking up the issue involved

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in the question of law referred to us in this case for consideration, it is necessary to first decide the last submission of learned counsel that this court, while interpreting an all-India statute like the Income-tax Act, is bound to follow the decision of any other High Court and to decide accordingly even if its own view is contrary thereto, in view of the practice followed by this court in such matters. Because, if we are to accept this submission, it will be an exercise in futility to examine the real controversy before us with a view to decide the issue, as in that case in view of the Calcutta decision whatever may be our decision on the question of law referred to us, we would be bound to follow the decision of the Calcutta High Court and answer the question accordingly. This submission, in our opinion, is not tenable as it goes counter not only to the powers of this court to hear the reference and decide the questions of law raised therein and to deliver its judgment thereon but also to the doctrine of binding precedent known as stare decisis. We shall deal with the reasons for the same at some length a little later. We have also carefully gone through the decisions of this court referred to by counsel for the assessee in support of his above contention. In our opinion, the observations in those decisions have not been properly appreciated. They have been too widely interpreted. There appears to be a misconception about the nature thereof and their binding effect. We shall also refer to those decisions and the relevant observations therein and discuss their nature. Before doing that, it may be expedient to briefly state the doctrine of binding precedent, commonly known as stare decisis. At the outset, it may be appropriate to point out the well- settled legal position that what is binding on the courts is the ratio of a decision. There is a clear distinction between the ratio of a decision, obiter dicta and observations from the point of view of precedent value or their binding effect. It will be necessary in this case to explain this distinction. But before we do so, we may discuss the principle of binding precedent. This will take us to the question whose decision binds whom. For deciding whose decision is binding on whom, it is necessary to know the hierarchy of the courts. In India, the Supreme Court is the highest court of the country. That being so, so far as the decisions of the Supreme Court are concerned, it has been stated in article 141 of the Constitution itself that : "The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India." In that view of the matter, all courts in India are bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court.

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Though there is no provision like article 141 which specifically lays down the binding nature of the decision of the High Courts, it is a well-accepted legal position that a single judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as correct judgments of courts of co- ordinate jurisdiction and of the Division Benches and of the Full Benches of his court and of the Supreme Court. Equally well-settled is the position that when a Division Bench of the High Court gives a decision on a question of law, it should generally be followed by a co-ordinate Bench of the same High Court. If the co-ordinate Bench in the subsequent case wants the earlier decision to be reconsidered, it should refer the question at issue to a larger Bench. It is equally well-settled that the decision of one High Court is not a binding precedent on another High Court. The Supreme Court in Vattiama Champaka Pillai v. Sivathanu Pillai, AIR 1979 SC 1937, dealing with the controversy whether a decision of the erstwhile Travancore High Court can be made a binding precedent on the Madras High Court on the basis of the principle of stare decisis, clearly held that such a decision can at best have persuasive effect and not the force of binding precedent on the Madras High Court. Referring to the States Reorganisation Act, it was observed that there was nothing in the said Act or any other law which exalts the ratio of those decisions to the status of a binding law nor could the ratio decidendi of those decisions be perpetuated by invoking the doctrine of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis cannot be stretched that far as to make the decision of one High Court a binding precedent for the other. This doctrine is applicable only to different Benches of the same High Court. It is also well-settled that though there is no specific provision making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts, it is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior Tribunal that the Tribunals subject to its supervision would confirm to the law laid down by it. It is in that view of the matter that the Supreme Court in East India Commercial Co, Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1962 SC 1893 (at page 1905) declared : "We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest court in the State is binding on authorities or Tribunals under its superintendence, and they cannot ignore it " This position has been very aptly summed up by the Supreme Court in Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator-General of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 936 (at page 941) as follows :

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"Judicial decorum no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure. If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decisions. If one Division Bench of a High Court is unable to distinguish a previous decision of another Division Bench, and holding the view that the earlier decision is wrong, itself gives effect to that view, the result would be utter confusion. The position would be equally bad where a judge sitting singly in the High Court is of opinion that the previous decision of another single judge on a question of law is wrong and gives effect to that view instead of referring the matter to a larger Bench." The above decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Baradahanta Mishra v. Bhimsen Dixit, AIR 1972 SC 2466, wherein the legal position was reiterated in the following words (at page 2469) : "It would be anomalous to suggest that a Tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a Tribunal can do so, all the subordinate courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior Tribunal that all the Tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working; otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer." Having decided whose decision binds whom, we may next examine what is binding. It is well-settled that it is only the ratio decidendi that has a precedent value. As observed by the Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 (at page 231) : "It is elementary that what is binding on the court in a subsequent case is not the conclusion arrived at in a previous decision, but the ratio of that decision, for it is the ratio which binds as a precedent and not the conclusion." A case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what may come to follow logically from it. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes (see Amar Nath Om Parkash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 218; [1985] 1 SCC 345).

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While following precedents, the court should keep in mind the following observations in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai [1976] 49 FJR 15, 32 ; AIR 1976 SC 1455 (at pages 1467-68) : "It is trite, going by Anglophonic principles, that a ruling of a superior court is binding law. It is not of scriptural sanctity but is of ratiowise luminosity within the edifice of facts where the judicial lamp plays the legal flame. Beyond those walls and de hors the milieu we cannot impart eternal vernal value to the decision, exalting the doctrine of precedents into a prison-house of bigotry, regardless of varying circumstances and myriad developments. Realism dictates that a judgment has to be read, subject to the facts directly presented for consideration and not affecting those matters which may lurk in the record. Whatever be the position of a subordinate court's casual observations, generalisations and subsilentio determinations must be judiciously read by courts of co- ordinate jurisdiction." Decision on a point not necessary for the purpose of the decision or which does not fall to be determined in that decision becomes an obiter dictum. So also, opinions on questions which are not necessary for determining or resolving the actual controversy arising in the case partake of the character of obiter. Obiter observations, as said by Bhagwati J. (as his Lordship then was) in Addl. District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivahant Shukla, AIR 1976 SC 1207, 1378, would undoubtedly be entitled to great weight, but "an obiter cannot take the place of the ratio. Judges are not oracles". Such observations do not have any binding effect and they cannot be regarded as conclusive. As observed by the Privy Council in Baker v. The Queen [1975] 3 All ER 55 (at page 64), the court's authoritative opinion must be distinguished from propositions assumed by the court to be correct for the purpose of disposing of the particular case. This position has been made further clear by the Supreme Court in a recent decision in CIT v. Sun Engineering Works P. Ltd. [1992] 198 ITR 297, at page 320, where it was observed : "It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete 'law' declared by this court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this court. A decision of this court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and, while applying the decision to a later case,

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the courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this court, to support their reasoning." In the above decision, the Supreme Court, also quoted with approval, the following note of caution given by it earlier in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 530, at page 578 (at page 320 of 198 ITR) : "It is not proper to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of the Supreme Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment." It is thus clear that it is only the ratio decidendi of a case which can be binding—not obiter dictum. Obiter, at best, may have some persuasive efficacy. From the foregoing discussion, the following propositions emerge : (a) The law declared by the Supreme Court being binding on all courts in India, the decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on all courts, except, however, the Supreme Court itself which is free to review the same and depart from its earlier opinion if the situation so warrants. What is binding is, of course, the ratio of the decision and not every expression found therein. (b) The decisions of the High Court are binding on the subordinate courts and authorities or Tribunals under its superintendence through out the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It does not extend beyond its territorial jurisdiction. (c) The position in regard to the binding nature of the decisions of a High Court on different Benches of the same court may be summed up as follows : (i) A single judge of a High Court is bound by the decision of another single judge or a Division Bench of the same High Court. It would be judicial impropriety to ignore that decision. Judicial comity demands that a binding decision to which his attention had been drawn should neither be ignored nor overlooked. If he does not find himself in agreement with the same, the proper procedure is to refer the binding decision and direct the papers

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to beplaced before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question (see Food Corporation of India v. Yadav Engineer and Contractor, AIR 1982 SC 1302). (ii) A Division Bench of a High Court should follow the decision of another Division Bench of equal strength or a Full Bench of the same High Court. If one Division Bench differs from another Division Bench of the same High Court, it should refer the case to a larger Bench. (iii) Where there are conflicting decisions of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the later decision is to be preferred if reached after full consideration of the earlier decisions.

(d) The decision of one High Court is neither binding precedent for another High Court nor for courts or Tribunals outside its own territorial jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the decision of a High Court will have the force of binding precedent only in the State or territories on which the court has jurisdiction. In other States or outside the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court it may, at best, have only persuasive effect. By no amount of stretching of the doctrine of stare decisis, can judgments of one High Court be given the status of a binding precedent so far as other High Courts or Courts or Tribunals within their territorial jurisdiction are concerned. Any such attempt will go counter to the very doctrine of stare decisis and also the various decisions of the Supreme Court which have interpreted the scope and ambit thereof. The fact that there is only one decision of any one High Court on a particular point or that a number of different High Courts have taken identical views in that regard is not at all relevant for that purpose. Whatever may be the conclusion, the decisions cannot have the force of binding precedent on other High Courts or on any subordinate courts or Tribunals within their jurisdiction. That status is reserved only for the decisions of the Supreme Court which are binding on all courts in the country by virtue of article 141 of the Constitution. However, upon perusal, we note that the observation that decision in later point of time has to be followed has been made in the context of decisions rendered by different benches of same High Court and the said observation do not apply in case of conflicting decisions of two non- jurisdictional High Court. 3.6. Proceeding further, we find that Pune bench of Tribunal in its

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recent decision tiled as Medical Superintendent Rural Hospital, DOBI, BK V/s DCIT (100 Taxmnan.com 78 25/10/2018), faced with similar factual matrix, chose to follow the favorable decision rendered by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court by drawing analogy from the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in CIT V/s Vegetable products Ltd. (1972 88 ITR 192) for the conclusion that in case of two reasonable constructions of taxing statutes, the one that favors the assessee must be adopted. The relevant findings of co-ordinate bench were as follows: - 11. We have heard the rival contentions and perused the record. The issue arising in the present bunch of appeals is against levy of late filing fees under section 234E of the Act while issuing intimation under section 200A of the Act, in the first bunch of appeals. The second bunch of appeals in the case of Junagade Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. is against order of Assessing Officer passed under section 154 of the Act rejecting rectification application moved by assessee against intimation issued levying late filing fees charged under section 234E of the Act. The case of assessee before us is that the issue is squarely covered by various orders of Tribunal, wherein the issue has been decided in respect of levy of late filing fees under section 234E of the Act, in the absence of empowerment by the Act upon Assessing Officer to levy such fees while issuing intimation under section 200A of the Act. The Tribunal vide order dated 21.09.2016 with lead order in Maharashtra Cricket Association v. Dy. CIT [2016] 74 taxmann.com 6 (Pune - Trib.) relating to assessment years 2013- 14 and 2014-15 for the respective quarters deliberated upon the issue and held as under:—

"34. Accordingly, we hold that the amendment to section 200A(1) of the Act is procedural in nature and in view thereof, the Assessing Officer while processing the TDS statements / returns in the present set of appeals for the period prior to 01.06.2015, was not empowered to charge fees under section 234E of the Act. Hence, the intimation issued by the Assessing Officer under section 200A of the Act in all these appeals does not stand and the demand raised by way of charging the fees under section 234E of the Act is not valid and the same is deleted. The intimation issued by the Assessing Officer was beyond the scope of adjustment provided under section 200A of the Act and such adjustment could not stand in the eye of law." 12. The said proposition has been applied in the next bunch of appeals with lead order in Vidya Vardhani Education & Research

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Foundation v. Dy. CIT [2017] 88 taxmann.com 894 (Pune - Trib.) and also in Swami Vivekanand Vidyalaya (supra) and Medical Superintendant Rural Hospital v. ACIT [IT Appeal Nos.2072 & 2073 (PUN) of 2017, order dated 21-12-2017], which has been relied upon by the learned Authorized Representative for the assessee. 13. The Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Fatheraj Singhvi (supra) had also laid down similar proposition that the amendment to section 200A of the Act w.e.f. 01.06.2015 has prospective effect and is not applicable for the period of respective assessment years prior to 01.06.2015. The relevant findings of the Hon'ble High Court are in paras 21 and 22, which read as under:— "21. However, if Section 234E providing for fee was brought on the state book, keeping in view the aforesaid purpose and the intention then, the other mechanism provided for computation of fee and failure for payment of fee under Section 200A which has been brought about with effect from 1.6.2015 cannot be said as only by way of a regulatory mode or a regulatory mechanism but it can rather be termed as conferring substantive power upon the authority. It is true that, a regulatory mechanism by insertion of any provision made in the statute book, may have a retroactive character but, whether such provision provides for a mere regulatory mechanism or confers substantive power upon the authority would also be a aspect which may be required to be considered before such provisions is held to be retroactive in nature. Further, when any provision is inserted for liability to pay any tax or the fee by way of compensatory in nature or fee independently simultaneously mode and the manner of its enforceability is also required to be considered and examined. Not only that, but, if the mode and the manner is not expressly prescribed, the provisions may also be vulnerable. All such aspects will be required to be considered before one considers regulatory mechanism or provision for regulating the mode and the manner of recovery and its enforceability as retroactive. If at the time when the fee was provided under Section 234E, the Parliament also provided for its utility for giving privilege under Section 271H(3) that too by expressly put bar for penalty under Section 272A by insertion of proviso to Section 272A(2), it can be said that a particular set up for imposition and the payment of fee under Section 234E was provided but, it did not provide for making of demand of such fee under Section 200A payable under Section

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234E. Hence, considering the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for respondent-Revenue that insertion of clause (c) to (f) under Section 200A(1) should be treated as retroactive in character and not prospective.

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High Court of Karnataka (supra), there is no merit in observations of CIT(A) that in the present case, where the returns of TDS were filed for each of the quarters after 1st day of June, 2015 and even the order charging late filing fees was passed after June, 2015, then the same are maintainable, since the amendment had come into effect. The CIT(A) has overlooked the fact that notices under section 200A of the Act were issued for computing and charging late filing fees under section 234E of the Act for the period of tax deducted prior to 1st day of June, 2015. The same cannot be charged by issue of notices after 1st day of June, 2015 even where the returns were filed belatedly by the deductor after 1st June, 2015, where it clearly related to the period prior to 01.06.2015. 16. We hold that the issue raised in the present bunch of appeals is identical to the issue raised before the Tribunal in different bunches of appeals and since the amendment to section 200A of the Act was prospective in nature, the Assessing Officer while processing TDS returns / statements for the period prior to 01.06.2015 was not empowered to charge late filing fees under section 234E of the Act, even in cases where such TDS returns were filed belatedly after June, 2015 and even in cases where the Assessing Officer processed the said TDS returns after June, 2015. Accordingly, we hold that intimation issued by Assessing Officer under section 200A of the Act in all the appeals does not stand and the demand raised by charging late filing fees under section 234E of the Act is not valid and the same is deleted. 17. Before parting, we may also refer to the order of CIT(A) in relying on the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in Rajesh Kourani (supra). On the other hand, the learned Authorized Representative for the assessee has pointed out that the issue is settled in favour of assessee by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Fatheraj Singhvi (supra). Since we have already relied on the said ratio laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka, the CIT(A) has mis-referred to both decisions of Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka and Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat; but the CIT(A) has failed to take into consideration the settled law that where there is difference of opinion between different High Courts on an issue, then the one in favour of assessee needs to be followed as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vegetable Products Ltd. (supra), in the absence of any decision rendered by the jurisdictional High Court. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Rashmikant Kundalia v. Union of India [2015] 54 taxmann.com 200 had decided the constitutional validity of provisions of section 234E of the Act and had held them to be ultra vires but had not decided the second issue of amendment brought to section 200A of the Act w.e.f. 01.06.2015. In view

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thereof, respectfully following the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka and Pune Bench of Tribunal in series of cases, we delete the late filing fees charged under section 234E of the Act for the TDS returns for the period prior to 01.06.2015. Further before parting, we may also refer to the order of 18. CIT(A) in the case of Junagade Healthcare Pvt. Ltd., where the CIT(A) had dismissed appeals of assessee being delayed for period of December, 2013 and July, 2014. The CIT(A) while computing delay had taken the date of intimation under section 200A of the Act as the basis, whereas the assessee had filed appeals before CIT(A) against the order passed under section 154 of the Act. The CIT(A) had noted that rectification application was filed in February, 2018 which was rejected by CPC on the same day. The CIT(A) was of the view that there was no merit in condonation of delay, wherein appeals were filed beyond the period prescribed. The assessee had filed appeals against the order passed under section 154 of the Act, hence the time period of appeals filed by assessee before the CIT(A) have to be computed from the date of order passed under section 154 of the Act and not from the date of issue of intimation. Thus, there is no merit in the order of CIT(A) in dismissing the appeals of assessee on this issue. We find similar issue has been decided by us in the case 19. of Medical Superintendent Rural Hospital (supra) and vide para 15, order dated 21.12.2017 it was held as under:— "15. Further, before parting, we may also refer to the order of the CIT(A) in these two appeals. The CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals of the assessee being delayed for a period of two and half years. The CIT(A) had taken the date of intimation under section 200A(3) dated 07-08-2014 and computed the delay in filing the appeal late before him. However, the assessee had filed the appeal before the CIT(A) against the order passed under section 154 of the Act. The said application for rectification under section 154 was filed on 08-06-2017/09-03-2017 in the respective years. The said application was decided by the Assessing Officer on 09-06-2017. The assessee filed an appeal against the dismissal of the rectification application filed under section 154 of the Act. The said fact is clear from the perusal of Form No.35 with special reference to Column 2(a) and 2(b). In the entirety of the above said facts and circumstances, we find no merit in the order of CIT(A) in the case of Medical Superintendent Rural Hospital, Surgana in dismissing the appeal in-limine being filed beyond the

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period of limitation. We have already decided the issue on merits in favour of assessee." 20. We have already decided the issue on merits in favour of assessee. Accordingly, the grounds of appeal raised by assessee in all appeals are allowed. 21. In the result, all the appeals of assessee are allowed.

As rightly observed by co-ordinate bench in para-17, the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Rashmikant Kundalia v. Union of India [2015] 54 taxmann.com 200 deal only with examining the constitutional validity of provisions of section 234E of the Act and do not deal with effect of amendment in Section 200A w.e.f. 01.06.2015. Therefore, respectfully following the aforesaid view of co-ordinate bench of Pune Tribunal, we hold that view favorable to the assessee was to be adopted and therefore, the levy of fees u/s 234E for any period prior to 01/06/2015 would not be sustainable in the eyes of law. We order so. 4. In the result, the appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated in the order.

7.We find that factual matrix to be identical in the present appeals. Undisputedly, the TDS returns have been processed before 01/06/2015 which is evident from the fact that impugned order is dated 14/05/2015. Therefore, drawing analogy from the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in CIT V/s Vegetable products Ltd. (1972 88 ITR 192), we prefer to follow the decision of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court rendered in Fatehraj Singhvi V/s Union of India (73 Taxmann.com 252 26/08/2016) and delete the late filing fees u/s 234E for all the 4 quarters, as imposed by revenue.

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and cancel the levy of late filing fees u/s 234E of the Act for both the quarters for both Form 24Q and 26Q TDS statements.

Order pronounced on 19/09/2022 by way of proper mentioning in the notice board.

Sd/- Sd/- (KAVITHA RAJAGOPAL) (M.BALAGANESH) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Mumbai; Dated 19/09/2022 KARUNA, sr.ps

Copy of the Order forwarded to : The Appellant 1. The Respondent. 2. The CIT(A), Mumbai. 3. CIT 4. DR, ITAT, Mumbai 5. 6. Guard file. //True Copy//

BY ORDER,

(Sr. Private Secretary / Asstt. Registrar) ITAT, Mumbai