DCIT-LTU - 2, MUMBAI vs. AMBUJA CEMENTS LTD , MUMBAI

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 1 of 99 THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MUMBAI K BENCH, MUMBAI [Coram: Pramod Kumar (Vice President), and Sandeep S Karhail (Judicial Member)] ITA No.2384 and 3475/Mum/2019 and 1241/Mum/2018 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Ambuja Cement Limited .…………………………Appellant (formerly known as Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd.) Elegant Business Park, MIDC Cross Road B, Andheri (E) Mumbai 400 059 [PAN: AAACG0569P] Vs. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax Large Tax Payer Unit, Mumbai ……………...…………Respondent ITA No. 2958 and 3843/Mum/2019 and 1889/Mum/2018 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12and 2012-13 Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Large Tax Payer Unit (1), Mumbai .…………………………Appellant Vs. Ambuja Cement Limited ……………...…………Respondent (formerly Known as Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd.) Elegant Business Park, MIDC, Cross Road B, Andheri (E) Mumbai 400 059Mumbai 400 021 [PAN: AAACG0569P] Appearances by: Yogesh Thar along with Chitanya D. Joshi, for the appellant Jagdish Jangid, for the respondent Date of concluding the hearing : 15/07/2022 and 12/10/2022 Date of pronouncing the order : 07/11/2022 O R D E R Per Pramod Kumar VP Assessment year 2010-11 These cross appeals are directed against the order dated 1st February 2019 passed by the 1. learned CIT(A) in the matter of assessment under section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 2010-11.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 2 of 99 2. We will first take up the appeal filed by the assessee. 3. In ground no. 1, the assessee has raised the following grievance: “On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Commissioner of Income-tax(Appeals)-7 [hereinafter referred to as Ld. CIT (A)] was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of the Additional Commissioner of Income- tax (Large tax payer Unit) [hereinafter referred to as 'AO] in adding back Rs. 53,64,316/- as notional expenses incurred towards earning exempt dividend income u/s 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) r.w.r 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 ('the Rules').” 4. Having heard the parties, and having perused the material on record, we are of the considered view that the assessee deserves to succeed on this issue on a very foundational aspect regarding there being no tax-exempt dividend income earned by the assessee in this assessment year. So far as this assessment year is concerned, it is an admitted position, as evident from the observations made by the Assessing Officer, is paragraph 6.1 of the assessment order that “during the year, the assessee has not received any dividend income” and yet a disallowance under section 14A is made. This is also an assessment year prior to the insertion of Explanation to section 14A, by the Finance Act 2022. Dealing with such a situation, a coordinate bench of this Tribunal in the case of ACIT Vs Bajaj Capital Ventures Pvt Ltd [(2022) 196 ITD 24 (Mum)], and speaking through one of us (i.e. the Vice President), has observed as follows: 7. We find that there is no dispute about the fact that the assessee did not have any tax-exempt income during the relevant previous year and that the period before us pertains to the period prior to the insertion of the explanation to section 14A. In this view of the matter, and in the light of consistent stand by co-ordinate benches, following Hon'ble Delhi High Court's judgment in the case of Cheminvest Ltd v. CIT [2015] 61 taxmann.com 118/234 Taxman 761/378 ITR 33, we uphold the plea of the assessee that no disallowance under section 14A was and in the circumstances of the case. The plea of the Assessing Officer is thus rejected. As regards the disallowance of Rs. 9,87,978/-it is sustained on the basis of computation given in the alternative plea of the assessee, but given the fact that the basic plea of non- disallowance itself was to be upheld, there was no occasion to consider the computation given in the alternative plea. This disallowance of Rs. 9,87,978/- must also be deleted. 5. In the case of PCIT Vs Delhi International Airport Pvt Ltd [(2022) 144 taxmann.com 80 (Del)], Hon‟ble Delhi High Court has observed as follows: 8. In the opinion of this Court, the present case is covered by the Division Bench judgment in Cheminvest Ltd. v. CIT, [2015] 61 Taxmann.com 118 (Delhi), wherein this Court has held that the expression 'does not form part of the total income' in Section 14A of the Act means that there should be an actual receipt of income which is not includible in the total income, during the relevant previous year for the

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 3 of 99 purpose of disallowing any expenditure incurred in relation to the said income. In other words, Section 14A will not apply if no exempt income is received or receivable during the relevant previous year. „ 9. Furthermore, this Court in Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-2 v. M/s Era Infrastructure (India) Ltd. in ITA No. 204/2022 vide judgment and order dated 20th July, 2022 has dealt with the issue of amendment made by the Finance Act, 2022 to Section 14A of the Act. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: "8. Consequently, this Court is of the view that the amendment of Section 14A, which is "for removal of doubts" cannot be presumed to be retrospective even where such language is used, if it alters or changes the law as it earlier stood." 6. In the light of this legal position, the disallowance under section 14A is not sustainable in law. We, therefore, delete the impugned disallowance of Rs 53,64,316. The assessee gets the relief accordingly. 7. Ground no. 1 is thus dismissed. 8. In ground no. 2, the assessee has raised the following grievance: “On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in not allowing the deduction for Education Cess levied on Income Tax, Dividend Distribution Tax and Fringe Benefit Tax aggregating to Rs. 15,76,96,788/- as allowable expenditure in computing the total income under the normal provisions of the Act.” 9. Learned counsel, however, submits that the assessee does not wish to press these grievance, and this ground of appeal, therefore, may be dismissed as not pressed. The prayer is accepted. The ground of appeal is dismissed as not pressed. 10. Ground no 2 is thus dismissed in the terms indicated above. 11. In ground no. 3, the assessee has raised the following grievance: “On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in not allowing the claim of leave encashment amounting to Rs. 10,78,90,641/-on provision basis based on actuarial valuation in computing the total income. . The Ld CIT(A) failed to record any cogent reason and concluded against the appellant merely because of stay on operation of judgment in case of Bharat Earth Movers Vs CIT (2000) 245 ITR 428(SC).” 12. Learned representatives fairly agree that whatever is decided on the above issue for the assessment year 2006-07, the cross-appeals for which were heard along with this set of cross-

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 4 of 99 appals will apply mutatis mutandis for this assessment year as well. While dealing with the assessment year 2006-07, we have held as follows: 44. Learned counsel for the assessee fairly submits that the issue now stands covered against the assessee, and deduction on a provision basis is indeed inadmissible. He, however, prays that a direction may be given that the Assessing Officer at least allows it on a payment basis as and when the payments are actually made. Learned Departmental Representative does not oppose this prayer, though he adds that the deduction can only be allowed when it is otherwise admissible, and that aspect of the matter will have to be examined by the Assessing Officer. That is indeed the correct approach. While we dismiss the grievance of the asseseee, we make it clear that the Assessing Officer will take a call, as and when the payment is actually made, on the admissibility of deduction in accordance with the law. 13. We have no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by us in the assessee‟s own case. The grievance of the assessee is, in terms of and subject to the above observations which will apply mutatis mutandis in this assessment year as well, rejected. 14. Ground no.3 is thus dismissed. 15. In ground no. 4, the assessee has raised the following grievance: “On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the denial of claim for exclusion of interest u/s 244A of Rs. 5,83,17,899 received during the year without cognizing the fact that the interest income was contingent in nature at provisional assessment stage and can be said to accrue only on completion of further pending proceeding.” 16. This grievance, though raised before the CIT(A) for the first time, was not pressed by the assessee. Yet, the assessee is in appeal on the same issue, but has not advanced any arguments in support of the same. It appears that the assessee does not wish to pursue the grievance. 17. Ground no. 4 is thus treated as not pressed 18. In ground no. 5, the assessee has raised the following grievance: “On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in not allowing exclusion of profit on sale of investment amounting to Rs. 87,51,71,262/- being capital profits in computing Book Profit us 115JB of the Act.” 19. Having heard the rival contentions and having perused the material on record, we are of the considered view that the assessee also deserves to succeed on this ground of appeal on a foundational issue. The reason is this. There is no dispute that the amount in question was in the capital field, and that it does not, therefore, is not required to be routed through the profit and

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 5 of 99 loss account. On such facts, and in the case of Shivalik Ventures Pvt Ltd Vs DCIT [(2015) 60 taxmann.com 214 (Mum)], a coordinate bench of thisb Tribunal has, inter-alia, held that “In view of the above said legal provisions, the assessee has contended that the profits and gains arising on transfer of a capital asset by a company to its subsidiary company does not fall under the definition of "Income" as given in sec. 2(24) of the Act and hence it does not enter into the computation provisions of the Income tax Act. Accordingly it was contended that, an item of receipt which is not considered as "income" at all and which does not enter into the computation provisions of the Income tax Act, cannot be subjected to tax u/s 115JB of the also”. Learned Departmental Representative has not been able to show anything contrary to this decision of the coordinate bench. In this view of the matter, and respectfully following the views of the coordinate bench, we uphold the plea of the assessee and direct the Assessing Officer to delete the impugned addition to the book profits under section 115JB. The assessee gets the relief accordingly. 20. Ground no. 5 is thus allowed. 21. In ground no. 6, the assessee has raised the following grievance: “On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the addition of Rs. 11,27,14,969/- provision for interest on income-tax in computing Book Profit u/s 115JB of the Act.” 22. No specific arguments were advanced in support of this plea. In any event, the law is clear and unambiguous, as Explanation 1 to Section 115JB categorically provides that “income tax paid or payable, and the provision in respect thereof” is to be added back to the book profits under section 115JB. We thus see no merits in the assessee's plea and reject the same. 23. Ground no. 6 is thus dismissed. 24. In ground no. 7, the assessee has raised the following grievance: “On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in adding Rs. 53,64,316/- being notionally allocated expenditure which is alleged to be incurred to earn dividend income in computing Book Profit u/s 115JB of the Act.” 25. Having heard the rival contentions and having perused the material on record, we are of the considered view that the assessee deserves to succeed in this plea for the reason that, eventually, there is no disallowance under section 14A on the facts of this case, and, in any event, the issue is covered, as regards the question of adjustment of book profits under section 15JB for the 14A disallowance, in favour of the assessee, by a special bench decision in the case of ACIT Vs Vireet Investments Pvt Ltd [(2017) 82 taxmann.com 415 (Del SB)]. The assessee gets relief on this point as well. 26. Ground no. 7 is thus allowed.

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ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 7 of 99 observations in the judgments in the cases of Tamilnadu Sugar Corporation Ltd Vs CIT [(2001) 251 ITR 843 (Mad)], CIT Vs Rajaram Maize Products [(2001) 251 ITR 427 (SC)], CIT Vs S KumarsTyre Manufacturing Co [(2004) 266 ITR 325 (MP)], and CIT Vs Abhishek Industries Ltd [(2006) 286 ITR 1 (P&H)]. The entire amount of Rs 1169.93 crores was added to income of the assessee. Aggrieved, assssee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A). Learned CIT(A) took note of the fact that these amounts pertained to five different units under four schemes- namely Maharshtra‟s Dispersal of Industries Package Scheme of Incentives 1993 (Maratha Unit), Punjab‟s Industrial Incentives Code under the Industrial Policy, 1996 (Ropar and Bhatinda Units), Rajasthan‟s Sales Tax New Incentives Scheme for Industries, 1989 (Rabriyawas Unit), and Exemptions/ Concessions to Industries Excise & Taxation Department Notification No EXN C(9)2/9- dated 31-1-2-1994 (Himachal Unit). He discussed these schemes in quite a bit of detail-to the extent wordings of the preamble of the schemes are concerned, and concluded that while the amounts aggregating to Rs 130,57,12,796, in respect of Punjab and Maharashtra Schemes, are indeed capital receipts in nature, and exempt from tax as such, the amounts aggregating to Rs 39,36,21,956 are revenue in nature, and to that extent the Assessing Officer was justified in including the same in taxable income. None of the parties is satisfied. While the assessee is aggrieved of the amount of Rs 39,36,21,956 being included in his taxable income, the Assessing Officer is aggrieved of the learned CIT(A)‟s granting relief of Rs 130,57,12,796. Both parties are in appeal before us. 6. We have heard the rival contentions, perused the material on record, and duly considered the facts of the case in the light of the applicable legal position. 7. We find that the learned CT(A) has, in his elaborate analysis, primarily followed the Special Bench decision in the case of DCIT Vs Reliance Industries Ltd [(2004) 88 ITD SB 273 (Mum)]. Upon analysis of this decision, he has noted that „for deciding the nature of subsidy, whether capital or revenue, what should be seen and examined is the purpose for which the subsidy has been given, and not the timing of the subsidy or the manner in which it has been given to the industry‟, as is also held by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs Ponni Sugar and Chemicals Ltd [(2008) 306 ITR 392 (SC)]. A large number of judicial precedents have been cited in this context. Learned CIT(A) has then held that so far as the object and purpose for which the subsidy is given, only the subsidy schemes of the Maharashtra and Punjab State specifically state that the subsidies in question are for achieving dispersal of industries outside Mumbai, to attract them to the underdeveloped and developing areas of the State, and to promote the growth of the industry in the State, in the preamble to the scheme. It is on this basis that he has held that so far as the subsidies given by the Maharashtra and Punjab States are concerned, these are required to be treated as capital in nature, whereas, the subsidies received from the State Governments of Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan, in the absence of specific mention to the effect in the preambles of the subsidy schemes that these subsidies are required to be held to be revenue in nature. However, in our considered view, the approach of discerning the purpose of the subsidy, solely from the specific words used in the preamble of the scheme and without examining the overall scheme of

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 8 of 99 the Act- which is admittedly to promote the growth of industry, is incorrect and superficial. The subsidies so received can be said to be revenue in nature unless these subsidies are for augmenting the profits of the assessee, and that is not even the case of the revenue. The CIT(A) is simply swayed by the wording of the preamble of the scheme- something clearly impermissible. These subsidy schemes are materially similar in nature, and there are, by now, a number of decisions of the coordinate benches, as also Hon‟ble Courts above, dealing with these schemes. It is also important to bear in mind the fact that the subsidies received by the assessee are in the nature of sales tax subsidies, and dealing with sales tax subsidies, Hon‟ble Gujarat High Court, in the case of CIT Vs Nirma Ltd [(2017) 397 ITR 49 (Guj)], has observed as follows:

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 9 of 99 55. We have heard both the parties and considered their rival submissions. Perusal of the scheme extending the aforesaid incentives to "prestigious" units announced by Government of Gujarat on 26/07/91 makes it amply clear that the scheme was announced to attract investment in core sector industry having potential, to spur industrial growth in ancillary, tertiary and secondary sector of the economy. The other scheme announced by the Government of Gujarat as Capital Investment Incentive Scheme on 11th September 1995 was intended to attract investments to generate greater employment in less industrially developed areas of Gujarat and also to secure balanced development of industries in Gujarat through dispersal of industries in the most backward area and backward areas. It is thus clear that the object of both the scheme was to ensure development of backward areas or for development of core sector industries in the State or for generating the employment. Perusal of both the schemes shows that the incentives extended to the eligible units were, inter alia, through exemption from payment of Sales Tax. Thus, the object of both the schemes was to attract capital investment to ensure development of backward areas and the modality or mechanism chosen to attract such investment was, inter alia, through exemption from payment of sales tax." 9. He further contended that in view of decisions of this Court in CIT v. Birla VXL Ltd. [2013] 32 taxmann.com 330/215 Taxman 117 (Guj.) and in Dy. CIT v. Munjal Auto Industries Ltd. [2013] 37 taxmann.com 115/218 taxman 135 (Guj.) the issue is squarely covered and the decisions which are sought to be relied upon by learned advocate for the appellant are not applicable in the facts of the present case. In the case of Birla VXL Ltd. (supra), this Court has observed as under:— '12. It can thus be straightaway seen that the benefit, though computed in terms of the Sales Tax liability in the hands of the recipient, the same was not mean to give any benefit on day-to-day functioning of the business, or for making the industry more profitable. The principle aim of the scheme was to cover the capital outlay already made by the assessee in undertaking special modernization of its existing industry. 13. In a recent decision dated 28th January 2013 in Tax Appeal No. 450 of 2012 and connected appeals, we had an occasion to examine the nature of incentives received by the assessee from the State Government in the form of entertaining tax waiver for setting up multiplexes. In such context, we had in wake of the revenues contention that the receipt was revenue in nature, held and observed as under : "From the provisions of the said scheme, it clearly emerges that the subsidy though computed in terms of sales tax deferment or waiver, in essence it was meant for capital outlay expended by the assessee for set up of the unit in case of a new industrial unit and for expansion and diversification of an existing unit. As noted, such subsidy was available

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 10 of 99 only to a new industrial unit or a unit undertaking expansion or diversification. Fixed capital investment has been defined as to include various investments in land under use, new construction, plant and machinery etc. The entitlement was related to percentage of fixed capital investment. It is undoubtedly true that such subsidy was computed in terms of sales tax deferment and necessarily therefore, would accrue to an industry only once the commercial production commences. However, this by itself would not be either a sole or concluding factor. In case of Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. and others v. Commissioner of Income-tax reported in 228 ITR 253, the Apex Court held and observed that the character of the subsidy in the hands of the recipient whether revenue or capital will have to be determined, having regard to the purpose for which the subsidy is given. The source of fund is quite immaterial. If the purpose is to help the assessee to set up its business or complete a project the monies must be treated as having been received for capital purposes. But, if monies are given to the assessee for assisting him in carrying out the business operations and given after the satisfaction of the conditions of commencement of production, such subsidy must be treated as assistance for the purpose of the trade." 14. In the result, we do not find that the Tribunal has committed any error. No question of law, therefore, arises. Tax Appeals are therefore dismissed.' 10. In the case of Munjal Auto Industries Ltd. (supra), this Court has observed as under:— "7. From the provisions of the said scheme, it clearly emerges that the subsidy though computed in terms of sales tax deferment or waiver, in essence it was meant for capital outlay expended by the assessee for set up of the unit in case of a new industrial unit and for expansion and diversification of an existing unit. As noted, such subsidy was available only to a new industrial unit or a unit undertaking expansion or diversification. Fixed capital investment has been defined as to include various investments in land under use, new construction, plant and machinery etc. The entitlement was related to percentage of fixed capital investment. 8. It is undoubtedly true that such subsidy was computed in terms of sales tax deferment and necessarily therefore, would accrue to an industry only once the commercial production commences. However, this by itself would not be either a sole or concluding factor. In case of Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. and others v. Commissioner of Income-tax reported in 228 ITR 253, the Apex Court held and observed that the character of the subsidy in the hands of the recipient whether revenue or capital will

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 11 of 99 have to be determined, having regard to the purpose for which the subsidy is given. The source of find is quite immaterial. If the purpose is to help the assessee to set up its business or complete a project the monies must be treated as having been received for capital purposes. Such But if monies are given to the assessee for assisting him in carrying out the business operations and given after the satisfaction of the conditions of commencement of production, such subsidy must be treated as assistance for the purpose of the trade." 11. He also submitted that in view of above decisions, these appeals may not be entertained. 12. We have heard both the learned counsel and perused the record. We have also gone through the decisions cited before us. After considering the material on record, we are of the view that the issues involved in these appeals are squarely covered by the decisions of this Court in Birla VXL Ltd. (supra) and in Munjal Auto Industries Ltd. (supra). Therefore, the questions of law posed for our consideration in these appeals are answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. Accordingly, all these appeals are dismissed. 8. In the case of JCIT Vs Grasim Industries Limited ( ITA Nos 2155/Mum/2016 and Ors; order date 29th April 2022), a coordinate bench has dealt with these legal issues in considerable detail and observed as follows:

5.3.5. …………. the dominant purpose for which the incentive scheme per se introduced by the respective State Governments was only for the purpose of setting up of industries in the respective areas for industrial development in State and also to accelerate development and absolutely not for augmenting the profits of the assessee. Effectively, the schemes of various State Governments envisaged the rapid industrialisation, growth and new employment generation in the respective areas which would in turn promote the growth of the State. Hence, it could be safely concluded that subsidy / incentive granted is only for setting up of the units based on the fixed percentage of the capital cost and not for running the business of the assessee. Moreover, even this subsidy which is determined based on sales tax assessment orders for 9 years, 6 years etc., are subject to maximum outer limit already fixed under the respective schemes. Though the quantification of the subsidy has been made post commencement of business, the measurement of subsidy is immaterial. In our considered opinion, none of the schemes contemplated to finance the assessee in the form of subsidy / incentive for meeting the working capital requirements of the assessee company post commencement of business. Hence, by applying the purpose test, apparently, the subsidy / incentive received in the instant case would only have to be construed as capital receipts not chargeable to income tax. In this regard, we find that ld. AR placed reliance on the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd., reported in 306 ITR 392, wherein the incentive conferred under

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 12 of 99 that scheme were two fold. First, in the nature of higher free sale sugar quota and second, in allowing the manufacturer to collect Excise duty on sale price on the free sale sugar in excess of the normal quota, but to pay to the Government only the Excise duty payable on the price of levy sugar. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in para 14 of its decision had held that “character of receipt of subsidy has to be determined with respect to the purpose for which the subsidy is given. The point of time at which the subsidy is paid is not relevant. The source is immaterial. The form of subsidy is immaterial.” In fact, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court while rendering this decision had duly considered its earlier decision in the case of Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd., reported in 228 ITR 253 and had absolutely no quarrel with that judgement. Rather, it concurred with the decision rendered in Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd., case. In this regard, it would be relevant to reproduce the operative portion of the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd., as under:- 14. The second case is Lincolnshire Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Smart 20 TC 643. In that case it was found that Lincolnshire Sugar Co. Ltd carried on the business of manufacturing sugar from home grown beet. The company was paid various sums under British Sugar Industry (Assistance) Act, 1931, out of monies provided by the Parliament. The question was whether these monies were to be taken into account as trade receipts or not. The object of the grant was that in the year 1981, in view of heavy fall in prices of sugar, sugar industries were in difficulty. The Government decided to give financial assistance to certain industries in respect of sugar manufactured by them from home-grown beet during the relevant period. Lord Macmillan held that— "What to my mind is decisive is that these payments were made to the company in order that the money might be used in their business." He further observed that: "I think that they were supplementary trade receipts bestowed upon the company by the Government and proper to be taken into computation in arriving at the balance of the company's profits and gains for the year in which they were received." 15. In the case before us, the payments were made to assist the new industries at the commencement of business to carry on their business. The payments were nothing but supplementary trade receipts. It is true that the assessee could not use this money for distribution as dividend to its shareholders. But the assessee was free to use the money in its business entirely as it liked and was not obliged to spend the money for a particular purpose like extension of docks as in the Seaham Harbour Dock Co. 5 case (supra). 16. There is a Canadian case St. John Dry Dock & Ship Building Co. Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue 4 DLR 1, which has close similarity to the

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 13 of 99 case of Seaham Harbour Dock Co. 's case (supra). In that case it was held that where subsidies were given under statutory authority, the statutory purpose for which they are authorised is relevant and may even be decisive in determining whether it is taxable income in the hands of the recipient. In that case, it was pointed out after discussing the Seaham Harbour Dock Co. 's case (supra)as well as that of Lincolnshire Sugar Co. Ltd. 5 case (supra)that subsidy given by the Canadian Government to encourage construction of dry docks was 'an aid to the construction of dry dock and not an operational subsidy'. 17. This precisely is the question raised in this case. By no stretch of imagination can the subsidies whether by way of refund of sales tax or relief of electricity charges or water charges can be treated as an aid to setting up of the industry of the assessee. As we have seen earlier, the payments were to be made only if and when the assessee commenced its production. The said payments were trade for a period of five years calculated from the date of commencement of production in the assessee's factory. The subsidies are operational subsidies and not capital subsidies. 5.3.6. Yet another decision was rendered by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Chapalkar Brothers reported in 400 ITR 279 which held that where the object of respective subsidy schemes of State Government was to encourage development of multiple theatre complexes, incentives would be held to be capital in nature and not revenue receipts. The relevant operative portion of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:- 18. After discussing the judgment in Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd.'s case (supra) this Court then held: "The importance of the judgment of this Court in Sahney Steel case lies in the fact that it has discussed and analysed the entire case law and it has laid down the basic test to the applied in judging the character of a subsidy. The test is that the character of the receipt in the hands of the assessee has to be determined with respect to the purpose for which the subsidy is given. In other words, in such cases, one has to apply the purpose test. The point of time at which the subsidy is paid is not relevant. The source is immaterial. The form of subsidy is immaterial. The main eligibility condition in the Scheme with which we are concerned in this case is that the incentive must be utilised for repayment of loans taken by the assessee to set up new units or for substantial expansion of existing units. On this aspect there is no dispute. If the object of the Subsidy Scheme was to enable the assessee to run the business more profitably then the receipt is on revenue account. On the other hand, if the object of the assistance under the Subsidy Scheme was to enable the assessee to set up a new unit or to expand the existing unit then the receipt of the subsidy was on capital account. Therefore, it is the object for which the subsidy/assistance is given which determines the nature of

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 14 of 99 the incentive subsidy. The form of the mechanism through which the subsidy is given is irrelevant." 19. Sahney Steel was distinguished, in para 16 by then stating that this Court found that the assessee was free to use the money in its business entirely as it liked. 20. Finally, it was found that, applying the test of purpose, the Court was satisfied that the payment received by the assessee under the scheme was not in the nature of a helping hand to the trade but was capital in nature. 21. What is important from the ratio of this judgment is the fact that Sahney Steel was followed and the test laid down was the "purpose test". It was specifically held that the point of time at which the subsidy is paid is not relevant; the source of the subsidy is immaterial; the form of subsidy is equally immaterial. 22. Applying the aforesaid test contained in both Sahney Steel as well as Ponni Sugar, we are of the view that the object, as stated in the statement of objects and reasons, of the amendment ordinance was that since the average occupancy in cinema theatres has fallen considerably and hardly any new theatres have been started in the recent past, the concept of a Complete Family Entertainment Centre, more popularly known as Multiplex Theatre Complex, has emerged. These complexes offer various entertainment facilities for the entire family as a whole. It was noticed that these complexes are highly capital intensive and their gestation period is quite long and therefore, they need Government support in the form of incentives qua entertainment duty. It was also added that government with a view to commemorate the birth centenary of late Shri V. Shantaram decided to grant concession in entertainment duty to Multiplex Theatre Complexes to promote construction of new cinema houses in the State. The aforesaid object is clear and unequivocal. The object of the grant of the subsidy was in order that persons come forward to construct Multiplex Theatre Complexes, the idea being that exemption from entertainment duty for a period of three years and partial remission for a period of two years should go towards helping the industry to set up such highly capital intensive entertainment centers. This being the case, it is difficult to accept Mr. Narasimha's argument that it is only the immediate object and not the larger object which must be kept in mind in that the subsidy scheme kicks in only post construction, that is when cinema tickets are actually sold. We hasten to add that the object of the scheme is only one -there is no larger or immediate object. That the object is carried out in a particular manner is irrelevant, as has been held in both Ponni Sugar and Sahney Steel. 23. Mr. Ganesh, learned Senior Counsel, also sought to rely upon a judgment of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Shree Balaji Alloys v. CIT [2011] 9 taxmann.com 255/198 Taxman 122/ 333 ITR 335. While considering the scheme of refund of excise duty and interest subsidy in that case, it was held that the

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 15 of 99 scheme was capital in nature, despite the fact that the incentives were not available unless and until commercial production has started, and that the incentives in the form of excise duty or interest subsidy were not given to the assessee expressly for the purpose of purchasing capital assets or for the purpose of purchasing machinery. 24. After setting out both the Supreme Court judgments referred to hereinabove, the High Court found that the concessions were issued in order to achieve the twin objects of acceleration of industrial development in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and generation of employment in the said State. Thus considered, it was obvious that the incentives would have to be held capital and not revenue. Mr. Ganesh, learned Senior Counsel, pointed out that by an order dated 19.04.2016, this Court stated that the issue raised in those appeals was covered, inter alia, by the judgment in Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. case (supra) and the appeals were, therefore, dismissed. 25. We have no hesitation in holding that the finding of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court on the facts of the incentive subsidy contained in that case is absolutely correct. In that once the object of the subsidy was to industrialize the State and to generate employment in the State, the fact that the subsidy took a particular form and the fact that it was granted only after commencement of production would make no difference. 5.3.7. We further find that the Hon‟ble Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Munjal Auto Industries Ltd., in Tax Appeal No.450 with 451-453 of 2012 dated 28/01/2013 also had an occasion to consider the very same issue in dispute before us. In this case also, the Revenue had taken a specific argument that since subsidy would be received only once unit goes for production, subsidy would be revenue nature. The Hon‟ble Gujarat High Court referred to the relevant subsidy scheme noted that concession was capped @125% of fixed capital investment and could be availed within 9 years. The Hon‟ble Gujarat High Court after considering the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court both in the case of Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd., and Ponni Sugars and Chemicals referred to supra had held as under:- “7. From the provisions of the said scheme, it clearly emerges that the subsidy though computed in terms of sales tax deferment or waiver, in essence it was meant for capital outlay expended by the assessee for set up of the unit in case of a new industrial unit and for expansion and diversification of an existing unit. As noted, such subsidy was available only to a new industrial unit or a unit undertaking expansion or diversification. Fixed capital investment has been defined as to include various investments in land under use, new construction, plant and machinery etc. The entitlement was related to percentage of fixed capital investment.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 16 of 99 8. It is undoubtedly true that such subsidy was computed in terms of sales tax deferment and necessarily therefore, would accrue to an industry only once the commercial production commences. However, this by itself would not be either a sole or concluding factor. In case of Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. and others v. Commissioner of Income-tax reported in 228 ITR 253, the Apex Court held and observed that the character of the subsidy in the hands of the recipient whether revenue or capital will have to be determined, having regard to the purpose for which the subsidy is given. The source of find is quite immaterial. If the purpose is to help the assessee to set up its business or complete a project the monies must be treated as having been received for capital purposes. Such But if monies are given to the assessee for assisting him in carrying out the business operations and given after the satisfaction of the conditions of commencement of production, such subsidy must be treated as assistance for the purpose of the trade. 9. Such decision was considered in case of Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd.(supra) and the Apex Court held and observed as under : “13. The main controversy arises in these cases because of the reason that the incentives were given through the mechanism of price differential and the duty differential. According to the Department, price and costs are essential items that are basic to the profit making process and that any price related mechanism would normally be presumed to be revenue in nature. In other words, according to the Department, since incentives were given through price and duty differentials, the character of the impugned incentive in this case was revenue and not capital in nature. On the other hand, according to the assessee, what was relevant to decide the character of the incentive is the purpose test and not the mechanism of payment. 14. In our view, the controversy in hand can be resolved if we apply the test laid down in the judgment of this Court in the case of Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. (supra). In that case, on behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the subsidy given was up to 10% of the capital investment calculated on the basis of the quantum of investment in capital and, therefore, receipt of such subsidy was on capital account and not on revenue account. It was also urged in that case that subsidy granted on the basis of refund of sales tax on raw materials, machinery and finished goods were also of capital nature as the object of granting refund of sales tax was that the assessee could set up new business or expand his existing business. The contention of the assessee in that case was dismissed by the Tribunal and, therefore, the assessee had come to this Court by way of a special leave petition. It was held by this Court on the facts of that case and on the basis of the analyses of the Scheme therein that the subsidy given was on revenue account because it was given by way of assistancein carrying on of trade or business. On the facts of that case, it was held that the subsidy given was to meet recurring expenses. It was not for acquiring the capital asset. It was not to meet

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 17 of 99 part of the cost. It was not granted for the production of or bringing into existence any new asset. The subsidies in that case were granted year after year only after setting up of the new industry and only after commencement of production and, therefore, such a subsidy could only be treated as assistance given for the purpose of carrying on the business of the assessee. Consequently, the contentions raised on behalf of the assessee on the facts of that case stood rejected and it was held that the subsidy received by Sahney Steel could not be regarded as anything but a revenue receipt. Accordingly the matter was decided against the assessee. The importance of the judgment of this Court in Sahney Steel case lies in the fact that it has discussed and analysed the entire case law and it has laid down the basic test to be applied in judging the character of a subsidy. That test is that the character of the receipt in the hands of the assessee has to be determined with respect to the purpose for which the subsidy is given. In other words, in such cases, one has to apply the purpose test. The point of time at which the subsidy is paid is not relevant. The source is immaterial. The form of subsidy is immaterial. The main eligibility condition in the scheme with which we are concerned in this case is that the incentive must be utilized for repayment of loans taken by the assessee to set up new units or for substantial expansion of existing units. On this aspect there is no dispute. If the object of the subsidy scheme was to enable the assessee to run the business more profitably then the receipt is on revenue account. On the other hand, if the object of the assistance under the subsidy scheme was to enable the assessee to set up a new unit or to expand the existing unit then the receipt of the subsidy was on capital account. Therefore, it is the object for which the subsidy/assistance is given which determines the nature of the incentive subsidy. The form of the mechanism through which the subsidy is given is irrelevant.” 10. In a recent judgement dated 8.1.2013 in case of DCIT-Circle1(2)-Baroda v. Inox Leisure Ltd.,we had an occasion to consider somewhat similar question in the backdrop of entertainment tax waiver scheme of State of Gujarat as well as State of Maharashtra. Even in such a case, the entertainment tax waiver which was granted in terms of sale of tickets was treated as capital in nature when it was found that same was relatable to the capital investment made by the assessee. It was held as under : “10. From the above noted provisions of thescheme it can be clearly seen that the entire purpose of granting tax exemption was for giving the boost to the terrorism sector. This was to be achieved by attracting higher investment in areas with tourism potential. In order to achieve such purpose, exemption from various taxes as may be applicable was granted. It is true that the exemption was to be computed in terms of tax otherwise payable by the industry. However, the purpose of such exemption was to meet with the capital outlay already undertaken by the assessee. This clearly comes out from various provisions of the scheme. For example, the scheme was applicable only to the new project or to a existing project provided investment in fixed capital or capacity was increased atleast by

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 18 of 99 50%.Thus, the very eligibility for seeking exemption was linked with new investment being made in fixed capital. Further though the scheme envisaged a certain period spanning for 5 to 10 years during which such exemption could be availed depending on the category of the unit, such exemption would cease the moment the total incentives touched 100% of the eligible capital investments. In other words, the upper limit of total incentive which the unit could receive from the State Government in the form of tax waiver would not exist 100% of the eligible capital investment regardless of the residue of the period of its exemption eligibility as per the scheme. From the combined reading of salient features of the scheme, we have no doubt in our mind that the incentive was being offered for recouping or covering a capital investment or outlay already made by the assessee.” 11. In the result we find no error in view of the Tribunal. Tax Appeals are dismissed. 5.3.7.1. It is pertinent to note that against this judgement, civil appeals were dismissed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court vide its order dated 08/05/2018 on the ground that the issue is already covered in the decision of Chapalkar Brothers referred to supra. 5.3.8. Before us, the ld. Special Counsel for the Revenue referred to various decisions of Hon‟ble High Courts. But, all those decisions were rendered prior to the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court referred to above. Hence, the decisions relied upon by the ld. Special Counsel for the Revenue would not advance the case of the Revenue. 5.3.9. It is pertinent to note that in each of the aforesaid decisions of Hon‟ble Supreme Court, the Courts have been mindful of the fact that the subsidy has to be received after commencement of business and to be availed within 9,10 & 12 years, as the case may be, and yet by applying purpose test, it was held that subsidy was on capital account. 5.4. Applicability of Special Bench decision of Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Reliance Industries reported in 88 ITD 273. The ld. Special Counsel for the Revenue vehemently submitted that the decision of the Hon‟ble Special Bench has been reversed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court by remitting the matter back to the Hon‟ble Bombay High Court. First of all, it would be relevant to bring on record the crux of the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. In case of Special Bench decision of Reliance Industries Ltd, the scheme dealt with sales tax exemption under the scheme of Government of Maharashtra, 1979. Further the said scheme was implemented by SICOM. The following question was referred by the Hon‟ble President, Tribunal to the Special Bench:

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“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the assessee company is justified in its claim that the sales-tax incentive allowed to it during the previous year in terms of the relevant Government order constitutes capital receipt and is not to be taken into account in the computation of total income?” The Hon‟ble Tribunal for Asst Years 1984-85 and 1985-86 had held the sales tax exemption to be capital in nature as the same was given for industrial development of the backward districts as well as generation of employment. However, the matter was referred to the Special Bench as it was alleged that the decision for AY 1985-86 was virtually overruled by subsequent decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Bajaj Auto Ltd (ITA No. 49 and 1101 of 1991). The Special Bench held that the decision of Bajaj Auto has not overruled the decision of Hon‟ble Mumbai Tribunal for AY 1985-86 on the following basis: i) There cannot be any question of overruling the decision of one Bench by another bench of equal strength as it would be contrary to the established norms of judicial system in the country. ii) Even on merits it cannot be said that the Tribunal has laid out more stress on the form of the scheme and not their substance as held in Bajaj Auto as the Tribunal in the order for AY 1985-86 has explained the difference between exemption schemes of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh in detail. iii) Reliance placed by Tribunal in Asst Year 1985-86 on the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd. v. CIT (228 ITR 253) cannot be said to be erroneous. The Tribunal did recognise that the object with which subsidy is given is decisive as laid down by Hon‟ble Supreme Court. If the scheme is for setting up or expansion of industry in a backward area, it will be capital, irrespective of the modality or source of fund. If the scheme is for assisting of carrying out of business operations, it is revenue. Hon‟ble Supreme Court demonstrated the principle that the object of the subsidy must be given primary importance over the source of fund. 5.4.1. Ultimately the Special Bench after placing reliance on the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Sahney Steel and Hon‟ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. Reported in 260 ITR 605 held that the decision of the Tribunal in Asst Year 1985-86 is correct and observed the following:

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 20 of 99 37….The observations of the Madras High Court lend support to the view that the purpose and object of the Scheme under which the subsidy is given is of more fundamental importance than the fact that the subsidy was received after the commencement of production or conditional upon it. Therefore, in our view and with respect, the Tribunal in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. ( supra) had correctly interpreted and understood the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd.‟s case (supra). 38. In this view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. 5.4.2. The ld. AR vehemently submitted that the department did not challenge the decision of the Special Bench before the Hon‟ble Bombay High Court. However, he fairly stated that there was a subsequent decision of the Division Bench of this Tribunal which followed the Special Bench and that Division Bench order was challenged by the Revenue before the Hon‟ble Bombay High Court. The Hon‟ble Bombay High Court while disposing of the said appeal did not reverse the decision of the Special Bench and accepted the same. When that appeal was further challenged by the Revenue before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court remitted the matter back to the Hon‟ble Bombay High Court. Accordingly, he argued that the decision of Special Bench was never reversed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court as stated by the ld. Special Counsel for the Revenue and accordingly still is a good law and therefore a binding precedent on this Division Bench. In fact, in assessee‟s own case for A.Y.2001-02 in ITA No.778 of 2015 dated 18/12/2018 before the Hon‟ble Jurisdictional High Court, wherein the question Nos. c & d was exactly on this point. For the sake of convenience, the question Nos. c & d raised by the Revenue before the Hon‟ble Jurisdictional High Court is reproduced hereunder:- “(c) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was justified in restoring the issue of taxability of the sale tax exemption benefit of Rs.58 crores availed by the assessee to the file of the Assessing Officer for deciding afresh after considering the decision of the Special Bench of the ITAT in the case of DCIT V. Reliance Industries Ltd., 88 ITD 273, which has not been accepted by the Revenue? (d) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was justified in entertaining the additional ground without appreciating that the assessee had treated the amount of sales tax exemption benefit of Rs.58 crores as revenue receipt and had included this amount in the returned income and it had been taxed accordingly and the assessee did not raise this issue before the CIT(A) and the issue had attained finality?” 5.4.3. While disposing of the questions Nos. c & d, the Hon‟ble Jurisdictional High Court categorically held that the decision of the Special Bench of Tribunal

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 21 of 99 had not been reversed or stayed by any higher judicial forum and it holds good as on date. The relevant operative portion of the judgement of Hon‟ble Jurisdictional High Court in this regard is reproduced as under:- “3. We will first address the questions no. (c) and (d), which are different elements of the same issue. The respondent assessee had received a subsidy. It is undisputed that up to the level of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the assessee did not raise a contention that such subsidy was towards capital account and, therefore, not taxable. However, before the Tribunal such a contention was raised. The Tribunal by the impugned judgment relied upon its earlier judgment for the Assessment Year 1999-2000 in case of this very assessee and restored the issue back to the Assessing Officer. In the earlier order, the Tribunal had remanded the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer "to decide the issue afresh after considering the decision of Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. (supra)". Thus, the Tribunal remanded the issue back to the Assessing Officer to be decided in the light of the Special Bench judgment in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. The Revenue's grievance in this respect is two fold. It was contended that the issue was raised for the first time before the Tribunal and the same should not have been permitted. Secondly, the view of the Tribunal in case of Reliance Industries Ltd. was challenged before the High Court. The High Court in a judgment dated 15.04.2009 in Income Tax Appeal No. 1299 of 2008 had held that no question of law in this respect arises and thereby confirmed the judgment of the Tribunal. It was pointed out that against this judgment of the High Court, the Department had approached the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court had held that a question of law did arise. The Supreme Court framed a question and placed the matter back before the High Court. We are informed that this appeal is still pending. 4. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the assessee firstly contended that the Tribunal had merely remanded the issue back to the Assessing Officer. In earlier orders, the Revenue had approached the Court against the similar orders of the Tribunal. The High Court on two occasions, in the order dated 27.09.2016 and 22.11.2016 passed in Income Tax Appeal Nos. 475 of 2014 and 102 of 2014 respectively had not entertained the challenge of the Revenue. In any case, it was contended that the facts on record are available and the Tribunal has merely asked the Assessing Officer to take a decision on the assessee's contention. 5. As long as the material exists on record, a contention raised by the assessee for the first time before the Tribunal, cannot be barred. So much is clear from series of judgments of various Courts including of this Court in case of CIT Vs. Pruthvi Brokers and Shareholders P. Ltd. (2012) 349 ITR 336. It is not the case of the Revenue that the assessee in the context of its contention on the nature of the subsidy, desired to produce additional evidence. It is true that the judgment of this Court confirming the order of the Tribunal in case of Reliance Industries Ltd. has been partially reversed by the Supreme Court. A question of law has been framed

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 22 of 99 and placed for consideration of the 4 of High Court. However, this does not mean that the judgment of the Tribunal as on today stands reversed or stayed. In any case, quite apart from the judgment in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. of the Special Bench of the Tribunal, it is always been for the assessee to contend before the Assessing Officer by pointing out the relevant clauses of the subsidy that in law the subsidy cannot be treated to be towards revenue account. It would be equally open for the Revenue to oppose such a contention if so advised. The Assessing Officer and the Revenue authorities would have to take a decision in accordance with law. These questions, therefore, are not considered.” (emphasis applied by us while placing reliance on the decision of Hon‟ble Jurisdictional High Court) 5.4.4. Against this judgement on other issues, the Revenue preferred an SLP before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and the same was dismissed vide order dated 23/08/2019 in SLP (Civil) Diary No.22929/2019. In other words, the Revenue while preferring SLP before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court did not even challenge this ground of subsidy and the decision of Special Bench of Tribunal in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd., Hence, the order of the Hon‟ble Jurisdictional High Court in assessee‟s own case for A.Y.2001-02 had become final on the very same issue. Though the said decision has been rendered for subsequent assessment year as compared to the years under consideration before us, in view of identical facts and the same legal issue, and more especially, in order to address the fact of binding precedent of Special Bench decision in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd., this Bench deems it fit to place reliance on the said decision also of the Hon‟ble Jurisdictional High Court. Accordingly, we categorically hold that the decision of the Special Bench still holds the field and is a good law. The entire contentions raised by the ld. Special Counsel for the Revenue in this regard are hereby dismissed. 5.4.5. Further, we find that the Co-ordinate Bench of Ahmedabad Tribunal in the case of ACIT vs. Genus Electrotech Ltd., reported in 72 taxmann.com 101 had an occasion to consider the fact of Special Bench decision in a more elaborate manner. The relevant operative portion is reproduced hereunder:- “11. We find that so far as the Special Bench decision of this Tribunal in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. (supra) is concerned, it still holds the field. All that has happened, as a result of Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision dated 9th September 2011, is that Hon'ble Bombay High Court has now admitted the question "whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Tribunal was right in holding that sales tax exemption was a capital receipt" and will, in due course though, adjudicate on this legal issue. To that extent, Hon'ble Bombay High Court's order dated 15th April 2009, to the extent of declining to admit this question, stands reversed. However, the decision of the Special Bench still holds good as the same has not, and at least not yet, even been examined by Hon'ble

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 23 of 99 Bombay High Court. Mere admission of appeal against a decision, as is elementary, does not affect the biding nature of a judicial precedent. The Special Bench decision, in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. (supra), was not reversed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, but was directed to be examined, on merits, by Hon'ble Bombay High Court. That is quite different from disapproving the special bench decision, but it appears that the coordinate bench was led to believe, and there could not have been any other reason for ignoring the special bench decision, that this Special Bench decision is reversed. That is patently incorrect, and when we pointed it out to the learned Commissioner (DR), he did not have much to say except to rely upon the coordinate bench decision which seems to have followed that approach. The coordinate bench, in the case of Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. (supra), did indeed travel much beyond its limited mandate in ignoring a binding judicial precedent simply because appeal against that special bench decision is now pending before Hon'ble Bombay High Court. When posed with a special bench decision and a division bench directly on the issue, though touching different chords, we have no difficulty in recognizing our limitations. The wisdom of a division bench, even if superior- as strenuously argued by the learned Commissioner, has to make way for the higher wisdom of a larger bench. It is this faith of judicial hierarchical system that is the strength of our functioning, and we must follow the same. We, therefore, regret our inability to follow the division bench in the case of Jindal Power, no matter how deeply we respect and admire the work of all our colleagues, and we would rather be guided by the special bench decision - which is exactly what another division bench, on the same set of facts as before us, did in the case of Ajanta Manufacturing Ltd. (supra). As for learned Commissioner (DR)'s suggestion that we should follow the jurisdictional High Court decision in the case off Colourman Dyechem Ltd. (supra), we find that Their Lordships, in this case, were dealing with an entirely different type of subsidy which was clearly dealing with an expansion situation. However, we would rather refrain from making any further detailed observations on this issue, as we are alive to the fact that Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court, in Tax Appeal No 358 of 2012, has admitted appeal against the decision of this Tribunal in Ajanta's Manufacturing Ltd. case (supra) and all these issues will now come up for consideration of Their Lordships. The fact that appeal is admitted does not, as we have stated earlier as well, does not affect the binding nature of the judicial precedents. There is no dispute before us that the scheme under which the sales tax and excise duty subsidy are given to this assessee are the same as in the case of Ajanta Manufacturing Ltd. (supra). All the material facts being the same, there is no reason to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by the coordinate bench. We must, therefore, uphold the conclusions arrived at by the Commissioner (Appeals), which are in consonance with the Special Bench decision in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. (supra) and coordinate bench decision in the case of Ajanta Manufacturing Ltd. (supra), and decline to interfere in the matter.” (emphasis supplied by us)

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 24 of 99 5.4.6. In view of the above, no fault could be attributed on the ld. CIT(A) placing reliance on the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal and granting relief to the assessee in the instant case. 9. In the Special Bench decision in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd (supra), what came up for consideration was specifically the sales tax subsidy, and that decision, as we seen in the elaborate analysis of the coordinate bench- as extracted above still holds good in law. In the case of CIT Vs Chaphalkar Brothers [(2018) 400 ITR 279 (SC)], Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that where the object of respective subsidy schemes of State Governments was to encourage the development of Multiple Theatre Complexes, incentives would be held to be capital in nature and not revenue receipts, and, following the same logic, the sales tax subsidy schemes, which are admittedly to encourage industrial growth in the specific areas and the overall scheme in all the sales tax subsidy and exemption schemes unambiguously indicate so, are capital receipts in nature.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 25 of 99 challenged the correctness of the said judgment. That very approach is simply erroneous because it is only elementary in law that the mere pendency of the appeal, against a binding judicial precedent, in a higher judicial forum does not dilute, curtail or otherwise narrow down its binding nature. As long as the binding judicial precedent holds good in law, as it does unless it is upturned or reversed by a higher judicial forum, it binds the lower judicial forums. That apart, even otherwise, the view taken by Hon‟ble Bombay High Court in Sulzer‟s case (supra) now stands approved and confirmed by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs Balakrishna Industries Limited [(2017) 88 taxmann.com 273 (SC)] wherein Their Lordships have, inter alia, observed as follows:

……..The main judgment is dated 05.12.2014 which was rendered in a batch of appeals with leading case known as 'The CIT v. Sulzer India Ltd. [2015] 54 taxmann.com 161/229 Taxman 264/[2014] 369 ITR 717 (Bom.). It is this judgment which has been followed in other cases. Therefore, for the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the facts as noted in Sulzer India Ltd.'s case (supra). 4. The Assessee M/s. Sulzer India Ltd. filed return of income for the assessment year 2003-04 on 27th November, 2013, declaring total income at Rs. 10,59,76,986/-, claiming deduction under section 80HHC of the I.T. Act in the sum of Rs. 82,48,864/-. 5. During the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer observed that the Assessee had credited amount of Rs. 4,14,87,985/- to the capital reserve contending that the said amount was a remission of loan liability. The Assessee stated that under the Industrial Backward Area Scheme of the Government of Maharashtra, it was entitled to defer the Sales Tax liability for a period of 7 years under the Deferral Scheme of 1983 and for a period of 6 years under the Deferral Scheme of 1988. In response to a Notification issued by the Government of Maharashtra regarding premature repayment of deferral Sales Tax at Net Present Value (NPV), the Assessee made a repayment of Rs. 3,37,13,393/- against the total liability of Rs. 7,52,01,378/-. The Assessee remitted the balance amount of Rs. 4,14,87,985/- and credited the said amount to its capital reserve account. The Assessing Officer asked the Assessee to show cause as to why the said amount should not be taxed in the hands of the Assessee as a revenue receipt. Relying on Circulars of the Central Board of Direct Taxes being Nos. 496 and 674, the Assessee claimed that the deferral Sales Tax under the Deferral Scheme was required to be treated as actually paid for the purposes of section 43B of the I.T. Act. Further, the conversion of Sales Tax liability into loans would be taken as discharge of the liability of Sales Tax and, therefore, the deferral amount was in the form of a loan and not a trading receipt. On this basis, the Assessee contended that the remission of a loan cannot be treated as a revenue receipt and taxed as its income. The Assessing Officer rejected this claim and by

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 26 of 99 holding that the Board's Circular is in the context of section 43B of the Income Tax Act and therefore not relevant for the present issue. 6. Against the aforesaid Assessment Order passed by the Assessing Officer, M/s. Sulzer India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'assessee') preferred the appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) who dismissed the same by sustaining the assessment. This was challenged by the assessee before the Tribunal. In view of the difference of opinion of the two coordinate Benches on this issue, a special Bench was constituted. The special Bench decided the case in favour of the assessee and allowed the appeal. As mentioned above, it is this judgment, which has been upheld by the High Court as well and in these circumstances, the Revenue is in appeal before us. 7. A glimpse of the facts taken note of, shows that the assessee herein had collected the sales tax in the sum of Rs. 7,52,01,378/-. As per the Scheme floated by the Government of Maharashtra, for those assessees who set up their industries in the backward area, the sales tax liability was deferred for a period of 7 years and, thereafter, it can be paid over a period of 7 years under the Deferral Scheme of 1983 and over a period of 6 years under the Deferral Scheme of 1988. However, under the Scheme of 1988, the Government of Maharashtra promoted premature or payment of deferral sales tax at Net Present Value (NPV). 8. In the meantime, section 38 of the Sales Tax Act was amended which provides that where the NPV of deferred tax as may be prescribed was paid, the deferred tax was deemed to have been paid. Taking advantage of this Scheme, the assessee made repayment of Rs. 3,37,13,393/- against the total liability of Rs. 7,52,01,378/-. In this manner, the assessee could save a sum of Rs. 4,14,87,985/-. The issue is as to whether this amount, which the assessee could save, is to be treated as 'income' by applying the provisions of Section 41 of the Act. The Assessing Officer treated it as the revenue receipt and thereby income. Contention of the assessee is that it is a capital receipt, which is accepted by the High Court. 9. In a very detailed and exhaustive judgment rendered by the High Court, it has discussed the view taken by the Assessing Officer, which was confirmed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). Thereafter, the High Court noted in detail the manner in which the Tribunal has dealt with the issue. A perusal of the judgment would show that the High Court took into consideration the provisions of Section 41 of the Act and the conditions which are required to be satisfied for bringing a particular receipt as "income" within the ambit thereof and found that those conditions are not satisfied in the present case. The High Court also repelled the contention of the Revenue that the assessee obtained the benefit of reduction of sales tax liability under Section 43B of the Act as per the CBDT Circular No. 496

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 27 of 99 dated 25th September, 1987. The relevant portion of the discussion in this behalf reads as under: "It is not possible to agree with Mr. Gupta. Because, premature payment of Sales Tax already collected but its remittance to the Government, as Mr. Gupta envisages, is not covered by this provision else the subsections and particularly section 43B(1) would have been worded accordingly. Therefore Section 43B has no application. Insofar as applicability of section 41(1)(a), there also the applicability is to be considered in the light of the liability. It is a loss, expenditure or trading liability. In this case, the scheme under which the Sales Tax liability was deferred enables the Assessee to remit the Sales Tax collected from the customers or consumers to the Government not immediately but as agreed after 7 to 12 years. If the amount is not to be immediately paid to the Government upon collection but can be remitted later on in terms of the Scheme, then, we are of the opinion that the exercise undertaken by the Government of Maharashtra in terms of the amendment made to the Bombay Sales Tax Act and noted above, may relieve the Assessee of his obligation, but that is not by way of obtaining remission. The worth of the amount which has to be remitted after 7 to 12 years has been determined prematurely. That has been done by find out its NPV. If that is the value of the money that the State Government would be entitled to receive after the end of 7 to 12 years, then, we do not see how ingredients of sub section (1) of section 41 can be said to be fulfilled. The obligation to remit to the Government the Sales Tax amount already recovered and collected from the customers is in no way wiped out or diluted. The obligation remains. All that has happened is an option is given to the Assessee to approach the SICOM and request it to consider the application of the Assessee of premature payment and discharge of the liability by finding out its NPV. If that was a permissible exercise and in terms of the settled law, then, we do not see how the Assessee can be said to have been benefited and as claimed by the Revenue. The argument of Mr. Gupta is not that the Assessee having paid Rs. 3.37 crores has obtained for himself anything in terms of section 41(1), but the Assessee is deemed to have received the sum of Rs. 4.14 crores, which is the difference between the original amount to be remitted with the payment made. Mr. Gupta terms this as deemed payment and by the State to the Assessee. We are unable to agree with him. The Tribunal has found that the first requirement of section 41(1) is that the allowance or deduction is made in respect of the loss, expenditure or a trading liability incurred by the Assessee and the other requirement is the Assessee has subsequently obtained any amount in respect of such loss and expenditure or obtained a benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of a remission or cessation thereof. As rightly noted by the Tribunal, the Sales Tax collected by the Assessee during the relevant year amounting to Rs. 7,52,01,378/- was treated by the State Government as loan liability payable after 12 years in 6 annual/equal installments. Subsequently and pursuant to the amendment

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 28 of 99 made to the 4th proviso to section 38 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, the Assessee accepted the offer of SICOM, the implementing agency of the State Government, paid an amount of Rs. 3,37,13,393/- to SICOM, which, according to the Assessee, represented the NPV of the future sum as determined and prescribed by the SICOM. In other words, what the Assessee was required to pay after 12 years in 6 equal installments was paid by the Assessee prematurely in terms of the NPV of the same. That the State may have received a higher sum after the period of 12 years and in installments. However, the statutory arrangement and vide section 38, 4th proviso does not amount to remission or cessation of the Assessee's liability assuming the same to be a trading one. Rather that obtains a payment to the State prematurely and in terms of the correct value of the debt due to it. There is no evidence to show that there has been any remission or cessation of the liability by the State Government. We agree with the Tribunal that one of the requirement of section 41(1)(a) has not been fulfilled in the facts of the present case." 10. After hearing the counsel for the parties at length, we are of the view that the aforesaid approach of the High Court is without any blemish, inasmuch as all the requirements of Section 41(1) of the Act could not be fulfilled in this case. 24. In view of these discusssions, as also bearing in mind the entirety of the case, we approve the conclusions arrived at by the learned CIT(A), and decline to interfere in the matter.

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ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 30 of 99 CIT(A) was not only legally incorrect but wholly superficial. The following observations by Hon‟ble jurisdictional High Court, in the case of PCIT Vs Welspun Steel Limited [(2019) 103 taxmann.com 436 (Bom)] are relevant in this regard: 6. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties on this question, we notice that, the Government of Gujarat Sales Tax Incentive Scheme was envisaged to promote large scale investments in the Kutch District since on account of devastating earth-quake, development of the district had suffered. The Scheme envisaged that, the same was confined only with the Kutch District. Similar, being the purpose and philosophy of the Government of India, while granting excise duty exemption, we may not separately take note of the back-ground thereof. In view of these facts, the question arises is - whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that Sales Tax and Excise duty exemption enjoyed by the assessee under the said subsidy scheme, was not taxable as revenue receipt. Such and similar issue has came up before different High Courts and Supreme Court on the numerous occasions. Reference to all those judgments would be un-necessary. However, the principle that has evolved is that, not the nomenclature of the subsidy or the fact that, the computation of the subsidy benefit is in terms of tax payable, would not be conclusive. What is to be examined in each case is the purpose for granting such subsidy. We may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in case of CIT v. Chaphalkar Bro. [2017] 88 taxmann.com 178/[2018] 252 Taxman 360/400 ITR 279. It was a case arising out of judgment of this Court in which, the dispute between assessee and the Revenue was with respect to subsidy granted to the multiplex cinema operators in the form of entertainment tax waiver. The subsidy was granted in view of the fact that, industry was highly capital intensive. The Revenue argued that, the subsidy was revenue in nature. This Court after referring to several decisions of the Supreme Court including the case of CIT v. Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. [2008] 306 ITR 392/174 Taxman 87 and Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. v. CIT [1997] 94 Taxman 368/228 ITR 253 (SC) held that, subsidy had not been granted for construction but only after setting up of a new industry which was in the nature of assistance given for the purpose of carrying on business. 7. On further appeal by the Revenue, Supreme Court confirmed the decision of this Court. It was noted that, Maharashtra Government's subsidy was not in form of an exemption from payment of entertainment duty to multiplex theater complex. The scheme was introduced to start new cinema houses in the State. The Supreme Court observed that, in such circumstance, the purpose tests for grant of subsidy should be applied. It was concluded as under:— "Applying the aforesaid test contained in both Sahney Steel as well as Ponni Sugars, we are of the view that the object, as stated in the statement of

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 31 of 99 objects and reasons, of the amendment ordinance was that since the average occupancy in cinema theatres has fallen considerably and hardly any new theatres have been started in the recent past, the concept of a complete family entertainment centre, more popularly known as multiplex theatre complex, has emerged. Those complexes offer various entertainment facilitate for the entire family as a whole. It was noticed that these complexes are highly capital intensive and their gestation period is quite long and therefore, they need Government support in the form of incentives qua entertainment duty. It was also added that Government with a view to commemorate the birth centenary of late Shri V. Shantaram decided to grant concession in entertainment duty to multiplex theatre complexes to promote construction of new cinema houses in the State. The aforesaid object is clear and unequivocal. The object of the grant of the subsidy was in order that persons come forward to construct multiplex theatre complexes, the idea being that exemption from entertainment duty for a period of three years and partial remission for a period of two years should go towards helping the industry to set up such highly capital intensive entertainment centres. This being the case, it is difficult to accept Mr. Narasimha's argument that it is only the immediate object and not the larger object which must be kept in mind in that the subsidy scheme kicks in only post construction, that is when cinema tickets are actually sold. We hasten to add that the object of the scheme is only one - there is no larger or immediate object. That the object is carried out in a particular manner is irrelevant, as has been held in both Ponni Sugars and Sahney Steel." 8. In the present appeal also, as noted, the subsidy was granted under schemes framed by the State and the Central Government, to be given to the assesses who set up new industry in Kutch District. The scheme was envisaged to encourage investment which would in turn, provide fresh employment opportunity in the district which had suffered due to devastating earthquake. The computation of subsidy may be on the basis of sales tax or excise duty. Nevertheless, the purpose test would ensure that, the subsidy was capital in nature. 9. The second question raised by the Revenue is consequent of the first question, in which, the Revenue argues that, if the subsidy is treated as a capital in nature, the same must bring down assessee's costs of acquisition of plant and machinery. The assessee's claim of depreciation to that extent must shrink. Assessee argues that, the Tribunal correctly held that, the subsidy had not been given in relation to acquisition of plant or machinery and that, therefore, same cannot be adjusted towards cost of acquisition. 10. It is undoubted that, the subsidy had no relation to the assessee's acquisition of plant or machinery. It was to be granted to an industry which had set up the new industrial unit in the District of Kutch. In such back-

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 32 of 99 ground, question - arises whether such subsidy would be adjustable towards assessee's costs of acquisition of capital assets. We may notice that, a similar question was considered by Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in case of CIT v. Grace Paper Industries (P.) Ltd. [1990] 183 ITR 591/52 Taxman 18. The Court noted that, the subsidy was granted by the Government for development of industries in back-ward areas. It was not part of the actual cost of plant or machinery. The Court, therefore, held that it could not have been deducted towards costs of acquisition. The Court held as under:— "We have carefully considered the provisions relating to the grant of cash subsidy under the schemes framed by the Central Government and the State Government. The Central Government as well as the State Government noticed that areas specified as backward areas and tribal areas were undeveloped or under-developed. Entrepreneurs were not willing to set up industries in such undeveloped or under-developed areas. The industries were concentrating only in urban areas. In other words, rapid urbanization was taking place. So far as the State of Gujarat is concerned, there was rapid industrial growth in cities like Baroda, Ahmedabad and Surat resulting in strain on municipal services. Urbanization created several problems such as pollution, growth of slums etc . It was also necessary to have balanced growth of industry in different regions. However, as pointed out above, entrepreneurs were reluctant to set up industries in backward areas. These areas were identified as backward because there was un-development or underdevelopment of industries in these areas. It was, therefore, that the Government decided to give financial incentives to encourage and induce entrepreneurs to move to backward areas and establish industries there so that the region may develop and promote the welfare of the people living in that region. One of the incentives which the Government decided to grant was cash subsidy so that entrepreneurs could utilize such cash subsidy for any purpose connected with the establishment of industries in the backward areas. Once the decision to give cash subsidy was taken, the Government had to work out some method to determine the quantum of such subsidy. In other words, the question as to how the amount of cash subsidy should be determined had to be considered by the Government. The Government, in order to determine the amount of cash subsidy, decided to follow one of the recognized methods of working it out on the basis of the amount invested by an entrepreneurs in acquiring capital assets as cash subsidy. The scheme does not say as to in what manner the subsidy was granted is to be utilized. In other words, the entrepreneur to whom the subsidy was granted was free to utilize it in any manner he liked. It would, therefore, appear that quantification of subsidy on the basis of investment was a measure adopted by the Government for convenience to work out the subsidy. If subsidy could be utilized by the entrepreneur in any manner he liked, could it be said that it was granted for meeting the cost of the capital assets? In our opinion, taking an overall view of the various provisions of the scheme, it is difficult to

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 33 of 99 hold that cash subsidy was granted to entrepreneur to meet the cost of the fixed assets or part thereof The cost of the fixed assets was merely adopted as a measure for working out subsidy. In fact, a careful examination of the scheme reveals that it is the value of the fixed assets and not its cost which is adopted as the basis for computing the amount of the subsidy. Emphasis on value and not the cost is evident from the fact that land and building already owned by an industrial unit, cost of tools, jigs, dies and moulds, transport charges, insurance premium, erection cost, value of second-hand machinery purchased by an industrial unit etc. were to be taken into account while computing the value of fixed assets for the purposes of subsidy. In other words, it was the value of the fixed assets which formed the basis for computation of subsidy to be granted under the scheme. Subsidy, in our opinion, did not meet the cost of the fixed assets directly or indirectly. Under the scheme of the Central Government or the scheme of the State Government, cash subsidy was quantified by determining the same at a specified percentage of the value/ cost of the fixed assets. Therefore, as observed above, the basis adopted for determining the cash subsidy with reference to the cost or value of fixed assets was only a measure for quantifying the subsidy and it could not be said that the subsidy was given for the specific purpose of meeting any portion of the cost of the fixed assets. The subsidy was granted to compensate the entrepreneur for the hardship and inconvenience which he might encounter while setting up industries in backward areas."‟ 11. Similar issue came up for consideration again before the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Swastik Sanitary Works Ltd. [2006] 286 ITR 544. It was a case in which, the Government subsidy was intended as an incentive to encourage entrepreneurs to move to backward areas and establish industries. In such a case, specified percentage of the fixed capital cost, which was the basis for determining the subsidy, would be granted. The Court held that, such basis for determining the subsidy was only a measure adopted under the scheme to quantify the financial aid and it was not a payment, directly or indirectly to meet any portion of the actual cost of acquisition of capital asset. It was held and observed as under:— 'In so far as question No.2 is concerned, this court finds that the same is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. P. J. Chemicals Ltd., [1994] 210 ITR 830. In the said case, after review of the law on the point, the Supreme Court has held as under (head note): "Where Government subsidy is intended as an incentive to encourage entrepreneurs to move to backward areas and establish industries, the specified percentage of the fixed capital cost, which is the basis for determining the subsidy, being only a measure adopted under the scheme to quantify the financial aid, is not a payment, directly or indirectly, to meet

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 34 of 99 any portion of the 'actual cost The expression 'actual cost' in section 43(1) of the Income Tax Act,1961, needs to be interpreted liberally. Such a subsidy does not partake of the incidents which attract the conditions for its deductibility from 'actual cost'. The amount of subsidy is not to be deducted from the 'actual cost' under section 43(1) for the purpose of calculation of depreciation etc." 20. In view of these discussions, as also bearing in mind the entirety of the case, we uphold the plea of the assessee. The Assessing Office is, accordingly, directed to delete the impugned addition…. 43. In view of the above discussions, as also bearing in mind the entirety of the case, we see no legally sustainable merits in the grievance of the Assessing Officer. The views expressed by the learned CIT(A), being in conformity with our decisions for the preceding assessment years, meet our approval. We, therefore, confirm and approve the relief granted by the CIT(A) and decline to interfere in the matter. 44. Ground no. 3 is thus dismissed. 45. In ground no.4, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was right in deleting the disallowance of Community Welfare Expenses?" 46. This is a legacy issue and pertains to the expenditure incurred for community welfare as the factories of the assessee are concerned in backward areas and the expenditure is incurred for the smooth functioning of the business. Right from the assessment years 1988-89 to 1994-95, the coordinate benches have allowed appeal of the assessee on this point, and from the assessment years 1995-96 to 2004-05, in which the first appellate authority has deleted similar disallowance, the coordinate benches have rejected the grievances of the Assessing Officer, against the reliefs so granted by the CIT(A). Learned Departmental Representative does not dispute this position but relies upon the stand of the Assessing Officer nevertheless. 47. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by the coordinate benches all along. Respectfully following the same, we uphold the relief granted by the learned CIT(A) and decline to interfere in the matter. 48. Ground no. 4 is thus dismissed. 49. In ground no.5, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing the pre-operative expenses amounting to Rs. 71,07,28,259/- , whereas the assessee itself claimed these expenses as capital expenses in the books of accounts adding it to capital work in progress/fixed assets?"

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ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 36 of 99 the books of account the assessee had capitalised the expenses does not prevent the assessee from claiming them as revenue expenses since the question of allowance of expenses has to be considered in the light of the legal position and the accounting treatment cannot be conclusive”. The limited grievance raised by the Assessing Officer is thus devoid of any legally sustained merits, and we reject the same. In any event, even on merits, the well reasoned order of the learned CIT(A), in our considered view, does not merit any interference. We approve the conclusions arrived at by the learned CIT(A) on this point and decline to interfere in the matter. 100. Ground no. 8 is thus dismissed. 51. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by us in assessee‟s own cases for the preceding assessment years. Respectfully following the same, we approve the conclusions arrived at by the learned CIT(A) and decline to interfere in the matter. 52. Ground no. 5 is thus dismissed. 53. In ground no.6, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was right in allowing the additional depreciation on all the eligible assets acquired before 01.04.2008?" 54. Learned representatives fairly agree that this issue is also covered by coordinate bench decisions, including in the assessee‟s own cases for the preceding assessment years, even as the learned Departmental Representative relied upon and justified the stand of the Assessing Officer. In the case of DCIT Vs Gloster Jute Mills Limited [(2017) 88 taxmann.com 738 (Kol)], which has been subsequently followed by the other benches- including Mumbai benches, the coordinate bench has, inter-alia, observed as follows: 24. Ground No. 3 raised by the revenue reads as follows :- "3. That on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law by allowing assessee's claim of additional depreciation of plant and machinery on original cost in the year subsequent to the year of acquisition and installation and thereby has erred in deleting the addition of Rs.54,21,617/- without appreciating the fact that such additional depreciation is allowable on plant and machinery only in the year of acquisition and installation." 25. This ground of appeal relates to the claim of the Assessee for additional depreciation u/s.32(1)(iia) of the Act. The undisputed facts are that the original cost of the new machinery purchased and installed by the Assessee after 31-3-2005 but before 1-4-2006 in the 100% EOU and DTA unit Rs.29,77,470 and Rs.2,41,30,615. The WDV of these machineries as on 1-4-2006 was Rs.24,51,920/- and Rs.1,81,50,266/- respectively. The Assessee availed of additional depreciation @

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 37 of 99 20% on the original cost of the machinery at Rs.5,95,494/- and Rs.48,26,123/- respectively in AY 2006-07. In AY 2007-08 also the Assessee claimed additional depreciation at 20% of the original cost viz., Rs.5,95,494 and Rs.48,26,123 respectively in all depreciation totaling Rs.54,21,617/-. 26. According to the AO, the deduction u/s.32(1)(iia) of the Act is granted only to "new" plant and machinery and once depreciation is granted in the 1st year in which the machinery is installed or put to use, the machinery ceases to be a new machinery and therefore additional depreciation cannot be allowed. The plea of the Assessee however was that Section 32(1)(iia) of the Act merely provides that further to the normal depreciation at the prescribed rates, an additional depreciation shall be allowed to the assessee at the rate of 20% on new plant and machinery acquired and installed after 31-03-2005. However, the period the period during which such additional depreciation shall be allowed is not specified in the Act. Thus, one may conclude that the allowance of additional depreciation shall not only be restricted to the initial year but continue to second and subsequent years. 27. The claim for additional depreciation was however rejected by the CIT(A) for the reason that additional depreciation is available only in respect of new plant and machinery acquired and installed after 31-03-2005. The word 'new' is not defined in the Act. According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary the word 'new' means "not existing before; now made, or brought into existence, for the first time". The AO held that the assets on which additional depreciation was claimed by the assessee is neither "new" nor brought into existence in the hands of the assessee in the relevant previous year. It is already used in earlier years and is already depreciated and, therefore, old in the hands of the assessee in the previous year. He held that the qualification that the asset should be new was basic qualification for entitlement of additional depreciation as laid down in the provisions of Sec.32(1)(iia) of the Act and that conditions was not satisfied in the case of the Assessee. The AO accordingly disallowed the claim of the Assessee for additional depreciation. 28. Before we set out the conclusions of the CIT(A) on this issue, it would be worthwhile to examine the history of scheme of allowance by way of additional depreciation in the Act. 'Sec.32 Depreciation. (1) In respect of depreciation of— (i) buildings, machinery, plant or furniture, being tangible assets; (ii) know-how, patents, copyrights, trade marks, licences, franchises or any other business or commercial rights of similar nature, being intangible assets acquired on or after the 1st day of April, 1998, owned, wholly or partly, by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business or profession, the following deductions shall be allowed—

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 38 of 99 (i) in the case of assets of an undertaking engaged in generation or generation and distribution of power, such percentage on the actual cost thereof to the assessee as may be prescribed; (ii) in the case of any block of assets, such percentage on the written down value thereof as may be prescribed:

Section 32(1)(iia) of the Act was originally introduced by the finance (no.2) Act, 1980 w.e.f. 1-4-1981 reads thus (the sub-section existed upto 31-3-1988 and was deleted thereafter): "(iia) in the case of any new machinery or plant (other than ships and aircraft) which has been installed after the 31st day of March, 1980 but before the 1st day of April, 1985, a further sum equal to one-half of the amount admissible under clause (ii) (exclusive of extra allowance for double or multiple shift working of the machinery or plant and the extra allowance in respect of machinery or plant installed in any premises used as a hotel) in respect of the previous year in which such machinery or plant is installed or, if the machinery or plant is first put to use in the immediately succeeding previous year, then in respect of that previous year :" Sec.32(1)(iia) of the Act as reinserted by finance (No.2) Act, 2002 w.e.f. 1-4-2003, reads thus: '(iia) in the case of any new machinery or plant (other than ships and aircraft), which has been acquired and installed after the 31st day of March, 2002, by an assessee engaged in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing, a further sum equal to fifteen per cent of the actual cost of such machinery or plant shall be allowed as deduction under clause (ii): Provided that such further deduction of fifteen per cent shall be allowed to— (A) a new industrial undertaking during any previous year in which such undertaking begins to manufacture or produce any article or thing on or after the 1st day of April, 2002; or (B) any industrial undertaking existing before the 1st day of April, 2002, during any previous year in which it achieves the substantial expansion by way of increase in installed capacity by not less than *[ten per cent ]:

"Subs. for "twenty-five per cent" by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, (w.e.f. 1-4-2005)." Sec.32(1)(iia) as substituted by Finance Act, 2005, (w.e.f. 1-4-2006) reads as follows: "(iia) in the case of any new machinery or plant (other than ships and aircraft), which has been acquired and installed after the 31st day of March, 2005, by an assessee engaged in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing, a further sum equal to twenty per cent of the actual cost of such machinery or plant shall be allowed as deduction under clause (ii):"'

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ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 40 of 99 Further, it is also imperative to state that Section 32(1)(iia) is a beneficial provision enacted with the view to provide benefit to the assessee. The same is also evident from the Explanatory Notes to the Finance Act, 2005 wherein it has been clarified that in order to encourage investment the provisions of sec. 32(1)(iia) have been amended. In so far as the language used in the provision in concerned one has to construe the language beneficially and in favour of the assessee as held by the Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Indian JuteMill Association in 134 ITR 68. There is little merit in the contention of the AO that the asset is not new in the second year. In my view for claiming additional depreciation the assessee has to acquire and install the plant & machinery after 31-03-2005 and the same should be new in the year of installation. There is no requirement that the assets should be new in the year of claim of additional depreciation. For the reasons aforesaid I am of the view that in terms of provisions of Section 32(1)(iia), additional depreciation is available in AY 2006-07 and subsequent years in respect of all new plant & machinery acquired and installed after 31-03-2005 subject to overall criteria that total depreciation does not exceed the actual cost. Hence Ground No. 4 is decided in favour of the Appellant." 31. Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A) the revenue has raised ground no.3 before the Tribunal. The ld. DR placed reliance on the order of the AO. The ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that fiscal statute shall be interpreted on the basis of the language used therein and not de hors the same. It was argued that Clause (iia) to Sec. 32(1) was first introduced vide Finance (No. 2) Act, 1980 w.e.f. 01-04-81 and was applicable till AY 1987-88. The clause was subsequently re-introduced vide Finance Act, 2002 w.e.f. 01-04-03. On perusal of clause (iia) to Sec. 32(1) as existed during the aforesaid period, it could be seen that the legislature conferred the benefit of additional depreciation only in the first AY when the asset was installed and first put to use. However vide Finance Act, 2005, clause (iia) to Sec. 32(1) was amended w.e.f. 01-04-06 wherein the condition of claiming additional depreciation only in the initial AY was deleted. It was submitted that since the specific condition for claim of additional depreciation in one year has been done away with, it should be construed as the intention of the legislature to allow additional depreciation in subsequent years as well. Reliance was placed on the following decisions wherein it has been held that a fiscal statute shall have to be interpreted on the basis of the language used therein and not de hors the same. Even if there is a casus omissus, the defect can be remedied only by legislation and not by judicial interpretation :—

- Orissa State Warehousing Corpn. v. CIT [1999] 103 Taxman 623/237 ITR 589 (SC) - Prakash Nath Khanna v. CIT [2004] 135 Taxman 327/266 ITR 1 (SC)

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 41 of 99 - Smt. Tarulata Shyam v. CIT [1977] 108 ITR 345 (SC) - Padmasundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu [2002] 255 ITR 147 (SC)

Apart from the above, it was also pointed out that DTC Bill 2013 has proposed expressly that additional depreciation would be allowed in the FY in which the P&M is used for the first time and those provisions are not made with retrospective effect. It was argued that the legislature has consciously not restricted the allowance of additional depreciation on the original cost for AY 2006-07 till AY 2013-14 to one year only and therefore the additional depreciation should be allowed on the original cost of the asset for the second and subsequent years as well. It was submitted that the condition imposed by the relevant provisions was that Plant and Machinery must be new at the time of installation to be eligible for additional depreciation u/ s 32(1)(iia) and not new in subsequent years. 32. We have given very careful consideration to the rival submissions and are of the view that the provision of section 32(1)(iia) as amended w.e.f. 01-04-2006 by the Finance Act 2005, there is no restriction that the additional depreciation will be allowed only in one year or that it would be allowed only on the written down value. The law as it prevailed prior to the said amendment imposed such a condition that additional depreciation will be allowed only in the year of installation of machinery or plant or the year in which it is first put to use or the year in which the concerned undertaking begins to manufacture or produce any article or thing or achieves substantial expansion by way of increase in installed capacity by 25%. The only objection of the AO is that the provisions refer to "new machinery or plant" and therefore the machinery will cease to be a new machinery after the end of the first year in which it is installed or put to use. In our view this stand taken by the revenue is not supported by the language of statutory provision. The condition imposed by the relevant provisions is that Plant and Machinery must be new at the time of installation to be eligible for additional depreciation u/ s 32(1)(iia) and not new in subsequent years. The expression "new machinery" is therefore to be construed as referring to the condition that at the time of acquisition or installation the machinery or plant should be new. Going by the legislative history of the relevant provision, we are of the view that the condition for allowing additional depreciation only in the initial assessment year ceased to exist as and from 01-04-2006. The plain language of the section warrants such an interpretation. We therefore uphold the order of CIT(A) and dismiss ground No.3 raised by the revenue. 55. We see no other reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by the coordinate benches. Respectfully following the same, we approve the conclusions arrived at by the learned CIT(A) and decline to interfere in the matter. 56. Ground no. 6 is thus dismissed.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 42 of 99 57. In ground no.7, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was right in deleting the addition in respect of unutilized CENVAT credit?" 58. Learned representatives fairly agree that this issue is covered, in favour of the assessee, by decisions of the coordinate benches in assessee‟s own cases for the assessment years 1999- 2000 to 2004-05, even though the learned departmental representative rather dutifully relied upon the stand of the Assessing Officer. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter than so taken by the coordinate benches, and, respectfully following the same, we approve the conclusions arrived at by the learned CIT(A) and decline to interfere in the matter. 59. Ground no. 7 is thus dismissed

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 43 of 99 the assessee, were actually in force”. It was on this basis of this factual and legal position, and following Hon‟ble Supreme Court‟s judgment in the case of Kesoram Industries & Cotton Mills Ltd Vs CWT [(1966) 59 ITR 767 (SC)], that the learned CIT(A) has granted the impugned relief. No material has been brought before us to dislodge these findings and contrary to the legal position set out above. In this view of the matter, we see no reasons to disturb the conclusions arrived at by the learned CIT(A). We approve the same and decline to interfere in the matter. 65. Ground no. 9 is thus dismissed. 66. In the result, the appeal of the revenue is dismissed. 67. To sum up, while the appeal of the assessee for the assessment year 201-11 is partly allowed, the appeal of the revenue for the assessment year 2010-11 is dismissed. Assessment year 2011-12 These cross appeals are directed against the order dated 11th March 2019 passed by the 68. learned CIT(A) in the matter of assessment under section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 2011-12. 69. We will first take up the appeal filed by the assessee. 70. In ground no. 1, the assessee has raised the following grievances: a) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-7 (hereinafter referred to as Ld. CIT (A)] erred in confirming the action of the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax (Large tax payer Unit) [hereinafter referred to as 'AO'] in adding back Rs. 1,83,76,076/- on the contention that the same is notional and contingent in nature. b) The Appellant prays that the aforesaid addition be deleted. 71. So far as this ground of appeal is concerned, the relevant material facts are like this. During the course of the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had debited a sum of Rs 1,83,76,076 under the head „Employees Compensation Expenses‟ under the employee stock option scheme, being the loss on stock options offered to the employees. This was computed on the basis of the difference between the offer price of shares to employees and the fair market value of the shares as on the date on the declaration of the scheme. Reliance was also placed on Hon'ble Madras High Court's judgment in the case of CIT Vs PVP Ventures Limited [(2014) 101 ITR 161 (Mad)], wherein the difference between the market value of the shares and the value at which the shares were allotted to employees under ESOP was held to be an allowable deduction. The Assessing Officer was, however, of the view that this is notional, and best a contingent expense in nature inasmuch it is not certain as to how many employees will actually exercise the option, and what will be the share price on the date of the exercise. The

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 44 of 99 claim of the assessee was thus declined as premature. He also relied upon a decision of the coordinate bench of this Tribunal, in the case of Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd Vs ACIT [(2009) 124 TTJ 771 (Del)]. Aggrieved, the assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A) without success. The assessee is not satisfied and is in further appeal before us. 72. We have heard the rival contentions, perused the material on record and duly considered the facts of the case in the light of the applicable legal position. 73. We find that in assessee‟s own case, in the matter of revision proceedings for the assessment year 2013-14 and in the judgment reported as Ambuja Cements Ltd Vs CIT [(2022) 140 taxmann.com 347 (Mum)] a coordinate bench has, following the Special Bench decision in the case of Bicon Ltd Vs DCIT, rejected revenue‟s reliance on the decision of Ranbaxy Laboratories (supra). While doing so, the coordinate bench has observed that, “We find that the decision of the Hon'ble Special Bench of Bangalore Tribunal in the case of Biocon Ltd. (supra) says that the discount premium should be claimed evenly over the vesting period. In the instant case, from the aforesaid disclosures made in the audited financial statements, it is very much evident that the vesting period is only one year. Hence, the entire discount premium had to be claimed as expenditure in the year of vesting. From the above tabulation reproduced in page 149 of the factual paper book, it could be seen that the date of grant is 22-4-2010 and the one year period gets over on 22-4-2011 which falls in A.Y. 2012-13. Hence, the vesting period falls during A.Y. 2012-13. We find that no ESOP expenses are debited by the assessee in A.Y. 2013-14 which is accepted by the ld. PCIT itself and which fact is also staring from the audited financial statements of the assessee. Hence, the additional compensation cost of Rs. 32.55 Crores on account of ESOP has been debited as 'expenditure' by the assessee in the year of vesting i.e. A.Y. 2012-13 rightly, which is also in consonance with the decision of the Hon'ble Special Bench of Bangalore Tribunal in the case of Biocon Ltd. (supra)”. It is also important to bear in mind the fact that once one of the Hon‟ble High Courts, even if non-jurisdictional, takes a view of the matter contrary to what the Tribunal has said, we have to follow the same humbly. A coordinate bench of the Tribunal, in the case of Tej International Pvt Ltd Vs DCIT [(2000) 69 TTJ 650 (Del)], has observed that “In the hierarchical judicial system that we have, better wisdom of the Court below has to yield to higher wisdom of the Court above and, therefore, one a authority higher than this Tribunal has expressed an opinion on that issue, we are no longer at liberty to rely upon earlier decisions of this Tribunal even if we were a party to them. Such a High Court being a non-jurisdictional High Court does not alter the position as laid down by Hon‟ble Bombay High Court in the matter of CIT v. Godavari Devi Saraf [1978] 113 ITR 589 (Bom.)….” The authorities below were, therefore, not justified in simply brushing aside the judgment of Hon‟ble Madras High Court in the case of PVP Ventures (supra). In any event, even on merits, we may usefully refer to the observations made by a coordinate bench in the case of Dheeraj Amin Vs ACIT [(2016) 71 taxmann.com 288 (Bang)], wherein and after analysing the judgment of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Chainrup Sampatram Vs CIT [(1953) 54 ITR 506 (SC)], the coordinate bench, speaking through one of us (i.e. the Vice President), observed that “The principle is thus unambiguous. The principles of conservatism, and considerations of prudence, in the accounting treatment require that no anticipated profits be treated as income until the profits are realized, and, at the same

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 45 of 99 time, an anticipated loss to be deducted from commercial profits, at the first sign of its reasonable possibility”. Viewed thus, as long as a loss, even though it may not actually have crystallized, can be reasonably estimated, as indeed has been done in this case, it has to be taken into account in the computation of business income. In view of these discussions, as also following the views of the coordinate bench in the assessee‟s own case, we uphold the plea of the assessee. The Assessing Officer is, accordingly, directed to delete the impugned disallowance of Rs 1,83,76,076. The assessee gets the relief accordingly. 74. Ground no. 1 is thus allowed. 75. In ground no. 2, the assessee has raised the following grievances: a) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) erred in confirming the action of the AO in adding back Rs. 1,79,533/- as notional expenses incurred towards earning exempt dividend income u/s 14A of the Act r.w.r 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 ('the Rules'). b) The Appellant prays that the addition u/s. 14A rwr 8D be deleted. 76. In a connected ground of appeal, i.e. ground no. 11, the assessee has also raised the following grievance: Addition of Rs. 1,79,533/- being notional expenditure incurred to earn exempt income while computing book profits us. 115JB of the Act: a) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in adding Rs. 1,79,533/- being notionally allocated expenditure allegedly incurred to earn dividend income in computing Book Profit u/s 115 B. b) The Appellant prays that the AO be directed to exclude the amount of disallowance made u/s. 14A while computing book profits u/s. 115JB. 77. We find that an identical issue came up for our consideration in the assessee‟s own case for the assessment year 2008-09, and while dealing with the same and after hearing the parties and perusing the records, we have, vide our order of even date, has held as follows:

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 46 of 99 in the case of PCIT Vs Shapoorji Pallonji & Co Ltd [(2020) 117 taxmann.com 625(Mum)] has, inter alia, observed as follows: 6. On thorough consideration we find that the principle of apportionment does not arise in this case as the jurisdictional facts have not been pleaded by the Revenue. In fact Tribunal while affirming the order of the first appellate authority noted that the first appellate authority had deleted the addition made by the assessing officer under section 14-A of the Act by observing that the interest-free fund available with the respondent - assessee was far in excess of the advance given. Tribunal further noted that the Revenue does not dispute the said finding and relying on the decision of this Court in CIT v. Reliance Utilities & Power Ltd. [2009] 178 Taxman 135/313 ITR 340, affirmed the deletion made by the first appellate authority. 7. We have perused the decision of this Court in Reliance Utilities & Power Ltd. (supra) wherein it has been held that if there are funds available with the assessee, both, interest-free and overdraft and/ or loans taken, then a presumption would arise that investments would be out of the interest-free funds generated or available with the assessee if the interest-free funds were sufficient to meet the investments. In the facts of that case, it was noted that the said presumption was established considering the finding of fact returned by the first appellate authority as affirmed by the Tribunal which is identical in the present case. 7.1 We also note that the said decision of this Court has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Reliance Industries Ltd. [2019] 102 taxmann.com 52/261 Taxman 165/410 ITR 466. 6. Accordingly, while disallowance of the assessee is upheld in principle, the quantum shall stand reduced, upon verification of necessary facts, in the light of the above legal position. To this extent, this ground of appeal is allowed for statistical purposes. As regards the question of adjustment of book profits under section 15JB for the 14A disallowance, we find that this aspect of the matter stands concluded, in favour of the assessee, by a special bench decision in the case of ACIT Vs Vireet Investments Pvt Ltd [(2017) 82 taxmann.com 415 (Del SB)]. The assessee gets relief on this point as well. 7. Ground nos. 1 is thus allowed for statistical purposes, and ground no. 4 is thus allowed. 78. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by us in the assessee‟s own case. Respectfully following the same, we restrict the disallowance under section 14A under rule 8D so as not to disallow any amount on account of interest, and delete the adjustment on account of 14A disallowance from book profits computed under section 115 JB. The assessee gets the relief accordingly.

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ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 48 of 99 the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. Hon‟ble jurisdictional High Court has upheld the Tribunal‟s order holding that it is price to the consumer, and not the intra-power companies trading price, which must be taken into account. Rejecting admission of a substantial question of law against the order of the Tribunal Hon‟ble jurisdictional High Court, in the case of CIT Vs Reliance Industries Limited [(2020) 421 ITR 686 (Bom)] has, in this regard, observed as follows: 4. Question (c) pertains to the dispute between the department and the assessee regarding the rate at which the electricity generated by one unit of the assessee- company and provided to the another be valued. The assessee contended that such valuation should be at the rate at which the electricity distribution companies are allowed to supply electricity to the consumers. The revenue on the other hand argues that the appropriate rate should be the rate at which the electricity is purchased by the distribution companies from the electricity generating companies. 5. This controversy arose in the background of the fact that the assessee had set up a captive power generating unit and claimed deduction under Section 80IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ("the Act" for short) in respect of the profits arising out of such activity. Obviously, therefore the attempt on the part of the assessee was to claim larger profit under the unit which was eligible for such deduction as against this, attempt of the revenue would be see that the ineligible unit shows greater profit. 6. The Tribunal in the impugned judgment extracted extensively from the order of CIT (Appeals) and independent reasons for confirming the same. In such order CIT (Appeals) had placed reliance on an earlier judgment of the Tribunal in case of Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. Addl. CIT [2011] 9 taxmann.com 186 (Mum. - Trib.). Learned counsel for the assessee had placed on record a copy of the judgment of the Tribunal in case of Reliance Infrastructure limited. In such judgment an identical issue came up for consideration. The Tribunal by detailed judgment had held and observed as under:— "44. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the profits of the business of generation of power worked out by the Assessee on the basis of the price that it paid to TPC for purchase of power continues to be the best basis even after the order of MERC and therefore the same has to be accepted as was done in the past and as approved by the ITAT in Assesssee's case. We therefore dismiss ground No.4 of the revenue." 7. Counsel for the assessee pointed out that the judgment of the Tribunal in case of Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) was carried in appeal by the revenue before the High Court in Income Tax Appeal No.2180 of 2011, such appeal was dismissed making following observations:— "6. As far as question (d), namely, the claim relating to purchase price from Tata Power Company is concerned and that was for the deduction under Section 80IA,

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 49 of 99 the ITAT in paragraph 21 onwards has noted the factual findings and also referred to the order of the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Authority (for short "MERC"). Paragraph 36 set outs as to how the claim arose. The claim has been considered in the light of Section 80IA and particularly proviso and explanation thereto. The Tribunal eventually held that till the Assessment Year 2005-2006, the Revenue considered the rate at which the power was purchased by the Assessee from Tata Power Company as market value. There is nothing brought on record as to how the rate determined by the MERC is the true market value. The Assessee gave explanation that the rates determined by the MERC do not reflect the correct market rate. The finding is that the mode of computation and deduction under Section 80IA requires no deviation from the past. The findings of fact and to be found in paragraphs 42 to 50 also reflect that the very issue came up for consideration for the Assessment Year 2003-2004. For the reasons assigned by the ITAT and finding that the attempt is to seek reappreciation and reappraisal of the factual data that we come to a conclusion that even question (d) as framed is not a substantial question of law." 8. Thus, the issue at hand had been examined by this Court on earlier occasion and the view of the Tribunal under similar circumstances was approved. 9. Additionally, we also notice that similar issue came up for consideration before Chhattisgarh High Court in case of CIT v. Godawari Power & Ispat Ltd. [2014] 42 taxmann.com 551/223 Taxman 234, in which the Court held and observed as under: "31. The market value of the power supplied to the Steel-Division should be computed considering the rate of power to a consumer in the open market and it should not be compared with the rate of power when it is sold to a supplier as this is not the rate for which a consumer or the Steel-Division could have purchased power in the open market. The rate of power to a supplier is not the market rate to a consumer in the open market. 32. In our opinion, the AO committed an illegality in computing the market value by taking into account the rate charged to a supplier: it should have been compared with the market value of power supplied to a consumer." 10. Gujarat High Court in case of Pr. CIT v. Gujarat Alkalies & Chemicals Ltd. [2017] 395 ITR 247/88 taxmann.com 722 also had occasion to examine such an issue. It referred to earlier order in case of Asstt. CIT v. Pragati Glass Works (P.) Ltd. [Tax Appeal No. 1646 of 2010, dated 30-1-2012] in which following observations were made:— "7. To our mind, Tribunal has committed no error. Assessing Officer and CIT (Appeals) while adopting Rs. 4.51 per unit as the value of electricity generated by eligible unit of assessee and supplied through its non eligible unit only worked out cost of such electricity generation. In fact CIT (Appeals) in terms recorded that Rs. 4.51 was computed as the reasonable value of the electricity generated by eligible

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 50 of 99 unit of assessee. This amount included Rs. 4.17 per unit which was the cost of electricity generation and Rs. 0.34 per unit which was duty paid by the assessee to GEB for such power generation. Thus the sum of Rs. 4.51 per unit only represented the cost of electricity generation to the assessee. In Section 80IA(8) of the Act what is required to be ascertained is the market value of the goods transferred by the eligible business, when such transfer is by eligible business to another non eligible business of the same assessee and the consideration recorded in the accounts of the eligible business does not correspond to market value of such goods. Term "Market Value" is further explained in explanation to said sub-section to mean in relation to any goods or services, price that such goods or services will ordinarily fetch in the open market. To our mind sum of Rs. 4.51 per unit of electricity only represented cost of electricity generation to the assessee and not the market value thereof. It is not in dispute that the GEB charged Rs. 5 per unit for supplying electricity to other industries including non eligible unit of the assessee itself. Tribunal therefore, while adopting the said base figure and excluding excise duty therefrom to work out Rs. 4.90 as the market value of the electricity generated by the assessee, to our mind, committed no error. It can be easily seen that if the assessee were to supply such electricity or was allowed to do so in the open market, surely it would not fetch Rs. 4.51 per unit but Rs. 5 per unit as was being charged by GEB. Since the excise duty component thereof would not be retained by the assessee, Tribunal reduced the said figure by the nature of excise duty and came to the figure of Rs. 4.90 to ascertain the market value of electricity generated by the eligible unit and supplied to non eligible business of the assessee. No error was committed by the Tribunal. No question of law therefore, arises. Tax Appeal is dismissed." 11. Judgment of Calcutta High Court in case of CIT v. ITC Ltd. [2016] 236 Taxman 612/[2015] 64 taxmann.com 214 was also brought to our notice in which the said High Court has taken a different stand. However, since the issue has already been examined by this Court earlier and in view of the decisions of the Chhattisgarh and Gujarat High Court, we see no reason to entertain this question. 84. In view of the above, as bearing in mind the entirety of the case- including the fact that in assessee‟s own case for several preceding assessment years, the Assessing Officer had disputed the approach adopted by the assessee, we deem it fit and proper to uphold the plea of the assessee, and direct the Assessing Officer to delete the impugned adjustment of Rs 78,84,57,823. The assessee gets the relief accordingly. 85. Ground no. 3 is thus allowed. 86. In grounds nos. 4 & 5, the assessee has raised the following grievances: Ground No. 4: Disallowance of claim made for Rail System u/s 80-IA of the Act amounting to Rs.1,43,88,44,360/-:

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 51 of 99 a) On facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) erred in confirming the action of the AO in denying the deduction claimed by the Appellant u/s. 801A of the Act in respect of Rail System b) The Appellant prays that the AO be directed to allow the deduction u/s. 801A towards rail system to the Appellant as claimed. 87. So far as this grievance of the assessee is concerned, only a few material facts need to be taken note of. During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer took note of the fact that the assessee has claimed deduction under section 80IA on rail system comprising of railway sidings, railway tracks, loading and unloading systems, at Ropar, Maratha, Sankrail, Farraka and Bhatapara units. He also the assessee‟s contention that these rail systems alongside the cement plants are to enable the transportation of raw material (i.e. coal etc) and finished goods (i.e. cement) to and from the cement plants of the assessee. The assesse‟s claim that the rail system meets all the requirements of Section 80IA(4) was also noted. The method adopted for computing the income was being excess of road freight and handling charges payable for transportation of goods by road to the nearest railhead, over the tariff payable for transportation of goods from railway siding to the rais head as per tariff notified by the Indian Railways. This claim, however, did not find favour with the assessee this time, even though the same stand of the assessee was accepted for three consecutive preceding assessment years. After elaborately discussing the things in detail, and extensively referring to investigations carried out in the case of Ultratech Cements Limited, the Assessing Officer concluded that (a) the so called rail system of the assessee company is simply a private rail siding, and is not any infrastructure of public utility; (b) the agreements entered into between the assessee company and the Indian Railways consisting of terms and conditions for private sidings, and could not be viewed as an agreement for building, operating and maintenance of a rail system; (c) the conditions stipulated under section 80IA have not been satisfied; (d) the actual operation of the rail system (i.e. running of the goods train) was being done by the Indian Railways and not the assessee company; (e) all the four cement plant sites were notified as independent booking stations and the freight was charged for the entire distance- including the distance from these private sidings to the railheads; (f) the notional profit computation is incorrect; and (g) the decisions of the Tribunal were not applicable as these critical facts were not placed before the Tribunal. The claim for deduction under section 80IA in respect of the rail system was rejected. Aggrieved, assessee carried the matter in appeal but without success. Learned CIT(A) reiterated the same arguments and upheld the stand of the Assessing Officer. The assessee is not satisfied and is in further appeal before us. 88. We have heard the rival contentions, perused the material on record and duly considered the facts of the case in the light of the applicable legal position. 89. We find that the very case, on the basis of investigation in which the authorities below had decided the matter in favour of the assessee, came up before a coordinate bench of this Tribunal, and, in the said case, the matter was decided in favour of the assessee. In the said judgment, reported as Ultratech Cement Ltd Vs ACIT [(2017) 88 taxmann.com 907 (Mumbai)], the coordinate bench has held as follows:

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 52 of 99 9. During the course of assessment AO disallowed assessee's claim of deduction u/s.80IA in respect of profit of rail systems. The assessee made this claim on the ground that it had earned profit by operating its rail systems at Hirmi [Chhattisgarh], Tadipatri [AP], Arakkonam [Tamil Nadu] and Durgapur [West Bengal]. In the context, during the assessment proceedings it was explained that the assessee had inherited those rail systems [along with cement plants-Hirmi Cement Works, A P Cement Works, Arakkonam Cement Works & West Bengal Cement Works] out of demerger from L&T Ltd. at all those locations; that the rail systems were set-up by L&T Ltd. [and that way by the assessee company as it had inherited the cement plants from L&T Ltd. by way of demerger] to enable the transportation of raw material [coal etc] and finished goods [i.e. cements] at their cement plants through railway wagons, at all the said; four locations. It was explained that prior to putting up those rail systems, the assessee used to transfer the material from the cement plants [at all the four locations] to the nearest railway station and vice versa on road through trucks. Before the AO the claim of deduction was justified by assessee by taking the plea that the various conditions as prescribed u/s 80IA(4) was met with in as much as it had entered into an agreement with the government through department of Railways for developing, maintaining and operating the rail system [infrastructure facility]; and that in pursuance thereof it had developed the integrated rail system in between the plant and the nearest railway track [of Indian Railways] and running it [in between] for movement of the inward and outward material so as to enable it to transport the materials from its plants straightaway to the various destinations and vice versa at all those four locations; and that by way of such operation of rail systems, it has been able to save the expenses for loading [at those plants] into the trucks, road freight and expenses for unloading and loading the same at the site of nearest Indian railways and that resulted into the. profit of such rail systems. 10. However, the AO noted that those agreements were for laying out private sidings and not for any rail system [as referred to in Explanation (a) to the clause (t) of sub-section (4) section 80IA in reference to the infrastructure facility] as claimed by the assessee that railway had laid down those [sidings] partly on the land belonging to the railways and partly belonging to the assessee company so as to facilitate the transportation of raw materials/cement bags through railway wagons [from / to their plant sites]. The AO also noted that the assessee [rather L&T Ltd.] had primarily requested the' railway department to extend the sidings [railway tracks] to the site of cement plants of the company so as to enable it to transport its goods [raw material & cement] from/to their plant sites itself [so that it could avoid transportation through the roads till the nearest railway station and loading and unloading etc]; that on such request the railway authorities conducted survey and laid down sidings and charged the assessee for laying out the railway track and other related infrastructure. The AO also noted that the wagons were actually run on those sidings by the railway authority and not by the assessee company. The AO also took note that railway authorities had posted its staff for weighing raw material/ cement bags loaded/unloaded by the assessee; and that all activities were directly or indirectly being carried out by the railway authorities and the assessee only reimbursed the expenses or charges levied by the railways in r/o siding maintenance etc. as per the agreement. The AO inferred that the so called "rail system" [of the assessee company] is not a self reliant, independent unit; and that it is providing services to the cement plants of the assessee company only. The AO also stated that railway department do not allow operation of the railways by any private enterprise and for that reason it [railway department] had formulated a Build-own-lease- transfer (BOLT) scheme whereby the private enterprises could set-up the necessary and crucial components of a railway system and provide that on lease to Indian Railways for maintenance and operation; and in the context referred to the CBDT circular No. 733, dated 03.01.1996 whereby the benefit of Sec. 80IA was also extended to such rail system constructed / developed by the private enterprises as per the said BOLT scheme. By that circular, the Board had also clarified that such concession would be available only to an infrastructure facility meant for development of rail systems and not to any other infrastructural facility including rolling stocks. The AO also observed that the assessee, had not given the said railway system or the crucial component thereof on lease to the railway department [had it been so, the profit by way of lease rent from such rail. system would have qualified for deduction u/s 80lA as per the concession given by the aforesaid circular]. Finally, the

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 53 of 99 AO held that assessee was not eligible to claim the deduction u/s 80lA in r/o such rail systems and disallowed the claim accordingly. 11. In its appellate order CIT(A) noted that the issue has come up first in A.Y. 2004-05. In that year, the assessee had claimed deduction of Rs 15.63 crores in r/o rail system at Hirmi, Raipur District, Chattisgarh. In A.Ys. 2005- 06 & 2006-07, the assessee claimed deduction of Rs.16.30 crs. & Rs 20.95 crs. respectively in r/o that rail system at Hirmi. In A.Y. 2007- 08, the claim was made in r/o two more rail systems [one at Tadipatri in Andhra Pradesh & the other at Arakkonam in Tamil Nadu]. The total claim for that year amounted to Rs 52.38 crs. [Rs 21.09 crs. -Hirmi; Rs 25.56 crs. -Tadipatri & Rs 5.73 crs. -Arakkonam]. In A.Y. 2008-09, the claim extended to one more rail system at Durgapur [West Bengal] and the total claim amounted to Rs 61.56 crs. This claim for AY 2009-10 i.e. for the year under consideration had risen to 73.13 crs. 12. The rail systems at all these four locations viz. Hirmi, Tadipatri, Arakkonam & Durgapur are said to have commenced the operations in AY. 2000-01, AY. 1999-00, AY. 2001-02 ft AY. 2002-03 respectively [refer assessee's reply dated 06.01.2014] It was further observed by CIT(A) that the L&T Ltd. on whose request the private sidings were set up at all these four locations, never claimed any such deduction u/s 80IA(4). The deductions are being claimed by the assessee company since AY. 2004-05, after the various cements plants were transferred to the assessee company [in the year 2003- 04] as per demerger scheme. In AY. 2004-05, claim was made [for the first time] in respect of such Rail System at Hirmi. Then in AY. 2007-08, it started claiming deduction in respect of rails systems at Tadipatri and Arakkonam and then in AY. 2008-09 for Durgapur also. From AY. 2009-10 and onwards the claim pertains to all the four units. 13. The CIT(A) further noted that in Ays. 2004-05 & 2005-06, the Hon'ble ITAT vide its order dated 20.08.2009 in ITA Nos. 7735 & 7736/Mum/2007 had decided this issue in the favour of assessee. Later that decision of the tribunal was followed by the ITAT in its [assessee] case in AY. 2006-07 [ ITA No. 2604/M/09 order dated 31.5.2010] and in AYs 2007-08 & 2008-09 [ITA Nos. 8143/mum/2010 and 1813/Mum12012, order dated 28.02.2014]. The relevant part of the Tribunal's decision in AY. 2004- 05 is reproduced hereunder: "13. Regarding the issue in r/o deduction u/s 80lA on profit of Rail system at Hirmi, the AO rejected the claim on the ground that the rail system is not a profit centre but it is a cost centre and that the rail system is not an independent unit but it is 100% depending on the cement unit. Detailed submissions filed by the assessee which are reproduced in the assessment order was not found satisfactorily to the AO. Detailed submissions were again filed before the CIT(A). It was explained that the company had established a cement plant in Hirmi, The nearest available railway siding was at a distance of around 15 km. from the plant. To facilitate inward and outward movement of goods, the assessee developed infrastructure facility of rail system which was made operating in 1999. The assessee company duly entered into an agreement with the railways, which is a part of Government of India. It was submitted that there was option available u/s 80lA with the assessee to claim deduction for any of 10 consecutive years as its own choice. The assessee has opted for claiming the deduction from A.Y. 2004-05 on wards. It was submitted that the income offered for tax by the assessee includes income from rail system and that certificate of M/s Sharp & Tannan, CA in Form No. 10CCB certifying the correctness of the aforesaid claim was duly submitted to the AO. 13.1. It was further submitted that the rail system is a profit centre. The rail system is engaged in business of providing transportation facility to the cement plant, profit of which is embedded in the profit of the assessee company as a whole. It was submitted that by developing this infrastructure facility, there has been saving in transportation cost and overall profits of the company have increased due to such savings. It was such that the mere fact that it does not raise an invoice from its railway unit to its cement unit cannot govern the tax implication of the profits delivered by the rail system. In support of its contention that treatment of a transaction in books of accounts cannot govern the tax statement reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kadernath Jute Manufacturing Company Ltd. 82 ITR 362; in the case of Tutcorin Alali Chemicals

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 54 of 99 Ltd. in 227 ITR 172; in the case of Godhra Electricity Company in 91 Taxman 91; in the case of Bokaro Steel Ltd in 263 ITR 315 and in the case of Sutlet Cotton Mills Ltd. in 116 ITR 1 and submitted that it would be totally incorrect to say that an assessee who raises internal invoices would be entitled to benefit of Sec 80IA and an assessee who does not raise internal invoices would not be entitled to such benefit. 13.2. The assessee further submitted that Sec. 80IA(8) itself contemplates a situation where goods or services are transferred by an eligible undertaking to non-eligible undertaking and vice versa. In such cases, deduction is to be allowed based on the market value of such goods or services. It was further submitted that the section itself envisages situation of captive consumption. Reliance was placed on the decision reported in 59 ITR 514 (Guj.) and 254 ITR 17 (Bom). 13.3. Further reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd. in 48 ITR 123 and stated that in that case, the assessee was engaged in the business of extraction of iron ore and manufacturing of iron and steel therefrom. The final product sold by the company was the finished iron and steel. Under some statute, a cess was leviable on the annual net profits derived from the mines. It was contended that since no iron ore extracted is sold to an outsider, no profits could be said to have been derived from the extracting activities. This argument was advanced based on the principle that a person cannot make profits out of himself, The Supreme Court negative this argument and held that despite captive consumption of iron ore certain profits can be regarded as having derived from the extraction activities. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of bifurcating the total profits into two activities viz. the extraction activity and the manufacturing activity. It was therefore submitted that in view of the above, it is not correct to say that the assessee does not earn any profits from its rail system merely because the rail system is used for the captive purposes of the cement plant. 13.4. It was further submitted that the Board Circular No. 733 dated 03.01.1996 states that deduction u/s 80lA is applicable to an infrastructure facility meant for development of rail system. It was contended that the AO has categorically stated in para 5.2.3 of his order that rail system was developed by L&T and was inherited by the assessee out of demerger. It was further submitted that in a demerger all the property of the undertaking is necessarily transferred by the demerged company to the resulting company, therefore it is immaterial whether the rail system was developed by L&T Ltd. or by the resulting company i.e. the assessee. Further it was submitted that the facility of rail system consists of all that is required to carry on the railway activity in an organized and systematic manner. The activity of rail system is real and substantial and it is carried on with said purpose viz transportation of goods from one place to another and thereby augmenting profits of the company as a whole by saving transportation cost which it would have otherwise incurred. It was further submitted that the profits derived from the rail systems are clearly arising out of the business of developing operating and maintaining the rail system. 13.5. It was further submitted that substantial investment has been made in developing the railway system. There is an agreement with the railways for operating and maintaining the rail system. It employs required personnel directly or through the railway authorities and it bearing the salary cost relating thereto. It was submitted that the rail system is developed on the basis of entirely different technology and employs different equipment and machinery from those applied by the cement unit for cement production. It is was further submitted that the rail system is not formed by splitting up or reconstruction of a business already in existence or by the transfer to a new business of machinery previously used for any purpose. It was therefore argued that the rail system is not a part of the cement unit but is an, independent unit. It was further submitted' that the conditions specified in Sec. 8OIA(4)(i) in r/o an infrastructure facility are fully satisfied in the present case. The rail system is owned by the assessee company which is a company registered in India. The assessee has entered into an agreement with the Railways for operating and maintaining the new infrastructure facility. It has started operating and maintenance the infrastructure facility after 01.04.1995.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 55 of 99 14. After considering the submission and perusing the material on record, the CIT(A) was satisfied with the explanation of the assessee and taking into consideration the various case laws held that the assessee is eligible for deduction us BOIA in rlo profits from rail system. Accordingly, the AO was directed to allow deduction u/s 80IA. Now the department is in appeal here before the Tribunal. 15. The Id. DR on the other hand placed reliance on the order of the AO and on the other hand the Id counsel of the assessee placed reliance on the order of the CIT(A). Attention of the Bench was drawn on para 5.2 of the order of the AO and then on the provision of Sec 8OIA clause 2 and sub- clauses 3&4. It was further explained that the assessee can avail benefit of deduction u/s 80IA in 10 years of his choice out of 15 years period. The provisions are very clear. Attention of the Bench was also drawn on the copy of the agreement placed at page .93 of the paper book. It was further submitted that all the conditions of Sec. 80IA have been fulfilled. Reliance was placed on the decision reported in 40 ITR 123. It was submitted that the ClT(A) has discussed the issue extensively and the findings of the ld. CIT(A) remained uncontroverted. Therefore the order of the CIT(A) is liable to be confirmed in this regard. 16. We have heard the rival submission and considered them carefully: We have also perused the various material placed on record on which our attention was drawn. After taking into consideration we find that the CIT(A) has dealt with the aspect in detail. Contention raised before the ClT(A) on behalf of the assessee were not found incorrect or false. Conditions of Sec. 80IA have been fulfilled by the assessee. Thereafter, the CIT(A) came to the conclusion that the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s 80IA. The findings of the Id. CIT(A) are given in para 3.10 are as under :- 3.10 After perusal of the facts of the case, findings given by the AO and submissions made by the appellant, I find that the only issues in this case is whether the appellant is eligible for deduction u/s. 80IA in r/o profits derived from the rail system. There is no dispute that the appellant (i) is a company (if) has developed the rail system and (iii) it" has entered into an agreement for operation and maintenance of the rail system with the railways i.e the Government. Thus all the 3 conditions required to be fulfilled as per Sec. 80IA(4)(i) have been satisfied by the appellant. Moreover rail system is defined in explanation to sec. 80IA(4)(i) as an infrastructure facility. Further separate books of account are being maintained by the appellant. The mere fact that internal invoices are not raised does not mean that the rail system is not a profit centre. It is also found that all the doubts raised by the AO in the assessment order have been fully explained by the appellant the AO has himself stated in the assessment order that the rail system was developed by L&T Ltd which has been inherited by the appellant as a result of the demerger and Circular No. 733 dated 03.01.1996categorically stated that benefit of sec. 80IA is applicable to development of rail system and there is no gain saying that fact that the appellant has developed the rail system and is operating and maintaining the same. After perusal of the facts as well as the judicial pronouncements quoted above it is therefore held that the appellant is eligible for deduction u/s 80IA in r/o profits from rail system. In view of the same, the AO is directed to allow deduction u/s 80IA of Rs. 15,64,33,576/-17. As stated above neither the findings of the Id CIT(A) could 'be controverted by the Id DR nor any other material was brought on record to establish otherwise. Therefore in view of the uncontroverted reasoning given by the Id. CIT(A) we confirm his order on this issue also." 14. After having all the above observation, the CIT(A) noted that the issue of the allowability of the assessee's claim u/s 80IA(4) in respect of ' Rail Systems' as referred to by the assessee has been examined by him afresh from the point of view of the relevant provisions of the Act and the facts as to whether the 'Rail System' as referred to by the assessee could indeed be treated as the infrastructure facility for which deduction u/s 80lA is intended to by the legislature; and whether the assessee operated that rail system. 15. Replies and justification filed by assessee was not accepted by CIT(A) and he held that the rail system of the assessee do not fall within the definition of the infrastructure facility, as the same could not be treated as a facility of public utility. For this reason the assessee company was held to be not

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 56 of 99 entitled for the deduction u/s.80IA in r/o the profit, from the operation of rail system. Reasons for the same was as under:- 16. The CIT(A) observed that the agreements under reference were not at all any agreements for developing, maintaining and operating any infrastructure facility to which benefit of exemption is intended to be given in Section 80IA. For this reason also the assessee company was held to be not entitled for deduction u/s.80IA in r/o the profit from the operation of rail system. 17. The CIT(A) also observed that L&T Ltd., who have developed the said rail system was also not eligible u/s.80IA on operations of those rail systems under the provisions that existed at the relevant time i.e., prior to 01/04/2002 when such infrastructure facility was said to have become operational. 18. The CIT(A) observed that the L&T Ltd., did not claim exemption on operation of those rail systems. Rather the assessee company has started claiming exemption from AY. 2004-05 after the ownership over the cement plants together with such rail systems were transferred to it following the demerger scheme in FY. 2003-04. 19. The CIT(A) further observed that the provision of railway track, signals, level crossings etc are the essential components of a rail system but that in itself would not give rise to any profit. For that movement of traffic [i.e. material] is to be made over those railway tracks. The profit would arise by charging the freight thereon. 20. The CIT(A) further observed that as per' the agreement, the railway track, signals, level crossings etc were laid out on the cost of L&T Ltd. The cost of maintenance was also to be borne by L&T Ltd. [and now by the assessee]. On that only expenses are incurred and there would be no profit element. Then the issue arises of running the wagons onto those tracks. As per the agreement, the assessee was not permitted to run the wagon onto those tracks. 21. As per CIT(A), it is not a case of running of railways [goods train] by L&T Ltd. or the assessee company on those private sidings and as such the assessee did not run any rail system onto those private sidings. Therefore, it cannot be said that the assessee company had operated any rail systems at all. Therefore the deduction u/s 80lA would not be available to it onto the profit, if any, from such rail systems. 22. The CIT(A) also observed that there is very limited profit on operation of such rail system and the claim made by assessee u/s.80IA is exorbitant. 23. In view of the above discussion, the CIT(A) concluded that assessee's claim of deduction u/s.80IA is not allowable. However, by observing that the Tribunal has allowed the claim of assessee in the Ays. 2004-05, 2006-07 to 2008-09, to follow the judicial discipline, he followed the order of Tribunal and allowed assessee's claim in the A.Y.2009-10. However, by stating that new facts have been brought on record in the A.Y. 2010-11, he declined claim of deduction u/s. 80IB(4). 24. With regard to the disallowance, deduction u/s. 80IA(4), Revenue is in appeal before us in the A.Y. 2009-10, whereas assessee is in appeal for the A.Y. 2010-11. 25. It was vehemently argued by learned AR that Revenue authorities have not considered the eligibility requirement u/s.80IA as brought by the Finance Act 2001 wherein Finance Act, 2001 has deleted the requirement of the assessee to transfer the infrastructure facility to the concern Government authorities within prescribed time. He contended that CIT(A) has wrongly applied the provisions of law as applicable prior to 01/04/2002 while considering the assessee's claim for deduction for the Ays.2009-10 and 2010-11 under consideration. Learned A.R threadbare taken us to the objections raised by the CIT(A) and the reply filed by the assessee controverting each and every objection of the CIT(A). Our attention was invited to the amended provisions of Section 80IA(4) which does not require infrastructure facility to be a public facility for allowing deduction u/s. 80IA. Our attention was also invited to the terms and conditions of the agreement entered between the assessee company and the railway department which contained conditions for construction of

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 57 of 99 railway sidings, development of sidings, laying of tracks, signaling system and all the essential components of rail system. The terms of the agreement also provided for its operation and maintenance. He vehemently argued that the rail systems were developed in accordance with the agreements entered with the Indian Railways, wherein assessee was allowed to operate and maintain these sidings under supervision and as per the guidelines of Indian Railway. Our attention was invited to the various clauses particularly Class 2, 6, 7(a), 17 and 8(b) which stipulate for construction of railway sidings at the cost of the assessee. Construction work was awarded either to railway or third party contractors based on their expertise and the work was undertaken under the supervision of the Railways. Clause 6 is specifically provided for payment in advance to the railway administration, the total estimated cost of the work done by the party and thus by the railway administration. Clause 7(a) stipulate that assessee will provide and deliver at site the permanent way and other materials in accordance with the railway administration standard and specifications. Clause 17 stipulate that assessee shall provide labour for and bear the cost of all Operations on the siding. Clause 9(b) provides for maintenance and other charges for the operation of the sidings at assessee's cost and expense to the satisfaction of railway administration.' 26. Learned AR also argued that all the conditions of Section 80IA(4) was complied with for claiming deductions. Learned AR also invited our attention to the observation of CIT(A) with respect to the freight rate insofar as CIT(A) has wrongly considered the rate for quintals as against per Metric Ton adopted by assessee while computing eligible amount of deduction u/s.80IA (4). It was also contended by learned AR that assessee has started claiming deduction for rail system u/s.80IA only from A.Y.2004-05 since it has satisfied all the conditions as prescribed u/s.80IA (4). 27. With regard to disallowance u/s.14A on account of interest, our attention was invited to the profit earned by the undertaking during the year as well as interest free funds available with the assessee for making investment in tax free securities and it was contended that since investment was out of assessee's own interest free funds, in terms of decision of Jurisdictional High Court in case of CIT v. Reliance Utilities & Power Ltd. [2009] 178 Taxman 135/313 ITR 340 (Bom.) and CIT v. HDFC Bank Ltd., [2014] 49 taxmann.com 335/226 Taxman 132 (Mag.)/366 ITR 505 (Bom.), no disallowance of interest is warranted. With regard to the disallowance made under Rule 8D(2)(iii) he contended that assessee itself has offered the amount attributable for earning the exempt income, therefore, further disallowance made by Revenue authorities was not justified. 28. Learned AR also invited our attention to the order of the Tribunal in assessee's own case for Ays. 2004-05 to 2008-09, wherein Tribunal have after considering in detail allowed the assessee's claim u/s.80IA with regard to rail system. Sales Tax exemption as capital receipt was also decided by Tribunal in assessee's own case for the Ays. 2004-05 to 2008-09, relevant decision of the Tribunal was also filed before us. 29. Learned AR relied on following judicial pronouncements in support of the proposition that benefit allowed in earlier year cannot be denied in subsequent years. 1. RadhaSoami Satsang v. CIT [1992] 60 Taxman 248/193 ITR 321 (SC) 2. CIT v. Western Outdoor Interactive (P) Ltd. [2012] 25 taxmann.com 340/210 Taxman 229 (Mag.)/349 ITR 309 (Bom.) 3. CIT v. Paul Brothers. [1995] 79 Taxman 378/216 ITR 548 (Bom.) 4. CIT v. Macbrout Engineering (P.) Ltd. [2014] 52 taxmann.com 219 /[2015] 232 Taxman 406 (Bombay) 5. CIT v. Modi Industries Ltd. [2010] 8 taxmann.com 129/327 ITR 570 (Delhi) 6. CIT v. Delhi Press Patra Prakashan Ltd. [2013] 34 taxmann.com 3/217 Taxman 288/355 ITR 14 (Delhi)

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ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 59 of 99 Railway systems were developed on or after 01/04/1995 by the L&T. year wise details of the aforesaid rail systems are as follows: Unit I Rail system Undertakings Year of Commencement of Initial year of claim (A.Y.) operations (A. Y.) Rail system at Hirmi in the state 2000-01 2004-05 of Chhattisgarh Rail system at Tadipatri in the 1999-00 2007-08 state of Andhra Pradesh Rail system at Arakkonam in the 2001-02 2007-08 state of Tamil Nadu Rail System at Durgapur in the 2002-03 2008-09 state of West Bengal

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(b) The provision of Sec.80-IA (8) contemplates a situation where goods or services are transferred by an eligible undertaking and vice versa. Undoubtedly therefore, the section itself envisages situations of captive consumption. (c) Further as mentioned in clause 15 of the agreement, the rail systems developed by the appellant can be made available to any third party with the prior approval of the Indian Railways. 36. It was therefore contended that the agreements as entered into by the assessee with Indian Railways are as envisaged u/s 80- IA( 4 )(i) and in no case it can be inferred that they are not the required agreements under section 80-IA. 37. The Govt can also enter into any arrangement with any person for developing and for operating rail systems subject to prior approvals and conditions of the Indian Railways. M/s L&T has accordingly entered into agreement with the appropriate rail authorities to Develop, Operate and Maintain its rail systems. M/s. L&T had awarded contract to the private parties for construction of rail sidings (including upto the nearest rail head) under the supervision of Indian Railways approved agency, and the entire cost for construction / development paid to the aforesaid agency and supervision charges paid to Indian Railways approved agency have been borne by the assessee, apart from all costs incurred for all the materials and incidental expenses. It was further explained in terms of clause 14, Wagons are hauled by the Railway Administration from the point marked 'X' or such other points as may be fixed upon by mutual consent of the applicants and railway administration in such manner as shall be determined in each case by the Railway administration. The assessee undertakes to shunt the wagons from such point to his premises and back with his own labour. However", no siding charges are charged by Indian Railways, since it is a private siding. The Clause 16 reads to mean that, charges such as Siding Charges are to be paid 'wherever leviable'. In assessee's case siding charges are not leviable. 38. The rail systems were developed by assessee under the agreements entered into with Indian Railways and assessee operates and maintains the same in accordance with terms and conditions of the Agreements, under the supervision and as per guidelines of Indian Railways. Relevant clauses of the agreements substantiating the same are as under:- (a) Clause No. 2, Agreement to Construct Siding - Wherein it is mentioned that "the Railway administration will at the cost and the expenses of the applicant, in all respect, construct the railway sidings " Further kindly be informed that, for construction of the siding under the supervision of the Railways, the contract for construction and supervision has been awarded by the applicant and the entire cost has been borne by the applicant. (b) Clause No. 6 - Payment by Applicant against the total estimated cost - wherein it is mentioned that, "The applicant will pay in advance to the railway administration the total estimated cost of the work consisting of the estimated costs of work done by the party and those by the railway administration .... " (c) Clause No. 7(a) - Permanent way materials - "The applicant will provide and deliver at site the permanent way and other materials (which includes Girders, Rails, Sleepers, fastenings, points, crossings, fencings, signals and overhead structures and any other things connected therewith for electric tractions and other machinery and equipments necessary for working of the sidings) in accordance with the Railway administration's standards and specifications. All charges incurred in laying and fitting the permanent way materials and all other equipments which may be provided shall entirely be borne by the applicant." (d) Clause No. 17 - Working of the Siding - wherein it is mentioned that " ... the applicant shall provide labour for and bear the cost of all Operations on the siding. The applicant shall be responsible for the strict compliance by himself and his employees and agents of all rules, regulations and standing orders made by the railway administration from time to time for the working of sidings and for all

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accidents, loss or damage that may be ensured or be caused by reasons of negligence or non- observance of such rules, regulations and orders . (e) Clause No. 8(b) - Wherein it is mentioned that, \\ Maintenance and other Charges for the portion of the sidings - The applicant will at their own cost and expenses in all things and to the satisfaction of the railway administration and if required by the railway administration under its supervision maintains in good order and repair the said portion of the siding. Such charges as may be fixed by the railway for the supervision rendered shall be paid by the applicant. 39. These are other various clauses wherein it is evident that the Development, Operation and Maintenance is done by the assessee and the entire cost for the same is borne by the assessee. 40. From the record we also found that the assessee has duly submitted for all the rail systems, Form 10CCB, duly certified and audited by M/s. G.P Kapadia & Co., Chartered Accountants along with Balance Sheet, P&L account, Schedules forming part of Balance sheet and P&L Account. 41. However, the AO did not agree with assessee's contention and held that Rail systems developed by assessee is not eligible for claim of deduction u/s.80IA (4). Now, we deal precisely with the observation made by CIT(A) for declining Assessee's claim of deduction u/s.80IA. 42. With regard to CIT(A)'s observation as to whether rail systems developed by M/s. L&T were in accordance with the Build-Own-Lease-& Transfer (BOLT) scheme of the Indian Railways, we observe that L&T had entered into agreements with the railway authorities to develop, operate & maintain the rail systems, which in fact the company has done from the initial day. The assessee was permitted to setup and even operate & maintain the rail systems so developed. Further, regarding' Circular No. 733 dated 03-01-1996, we found that the Circular clarifies that tax holiday benefit u/s. 80-IA of the Act was also available to private enterprises which only built and leased out the rail system to the Indian Railways. In spite the absence of activities-'operate and maintain' the rail systems, such 'infrastructure facilities' were also declared as eligible to claim deduction under the said section. Further, the circular also states that rail systems developed other than under the BOLT scheme were also eligible for benefit u/s 80-IA. In case of the assessee, the clarification of benefits u/s. 80-IA being available to those rail systems who do not 'operate and maintain' the systems clearly establishes that, enterprises who in fact operate and maintain the rail systems were certainly eligible for tax holiday benefits. As the assessee has entered into agreements with the railway authorities to develop, operate & maintain the rail systems, which in fact the company has done from the initial day. There was indeed an 'infrastructure' facility eligible for deduction u/s 80lA. We also found that the Hon'ble ITAT in assessee's own case for AY. 2006-07, has categorically allowed the deduction u/s. 80-IA for its rail system after dealing with the Circular No. 733 dtd 3.1.1996. 43. The Rail systems of assessee at Hirmi, Tadipatri, Arakkonam and at Durgapur were developed under the Agreements entered into with Indian Railways and the assessee is allowed to Operate and Maintain in accordance with terms and conditions of the Agreements, under the supervision and as per guidelines of Indian Railways only. The copies of agreements between M/s L&T and Indian Railways for other rail systems i.e. at Tadipatri, Arakkonam and Durgapur are placed on record and we have carefully perused the relevant terms and conditions. The Indian Railways plays role in operations and maintenance of the Rail systems, traffic Management, etc. as mentioned under the various clauses of the Agreements entered into, and the entire cost of such operation and maintenance is borne by the assessee including for the Railway staff being deputed for the purpose. 44. From the record we found that M/s. L&T had entered into agreements with the Railway authorities to develop, Operate and Maintain the Rail systems which infact the company has done from initial day. This agreement with the Railway Authorities was not under the BOLT Scheme but infact the assessee was permitted to setup and even operate and maintain the rail system so developed in accordance with terms and conditions of the agreements under the supervision and as per guidelines of Indian Railways. As per the relevant provisions of law during relevant period there

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 62 of 99 is no requirement for Rail Infrastructure to be In BOLT scheme, to be eligible for claiming deduction under Section SO-lA (4)(i). Section 80-lA (4)(i) provides the following conditions to be complied with for claiming deductions; (i) ...... (a) it is owned by a company registered in India (b) it has entered into an agreement with the Central Government or a State Government or a local authority or any other statutory body for (i) developing or (ii) operating and maintaining or (iii) developing, operating and maintaining a new infrastructure facility; (c) it has started or starts operating and maintaining the infrastructure facility on or after the 1st day of April, 1995: 45. With regard to objection of revenue authorities on applicability of CBDT circular No.733 on BOLT schemes, systems developed under BOLT scheme are also eligible for 80-IA benefit, and in no way restricts the deduction u/s.80-IA to other rail systems. We found that the Hon'ble ITAT in assessee's own case for AY 2006-07, has categorically allowed the deduction u/s. 80-IA for its rail system after dealing with the Circular No. 733 dtd 3.1.1996. 46. Therefore the agreements as entered into by the assessee with Indian Railways are as envisaged u/s 80- IA(4)(i) and in no case it can be inferred that they are not the required agreements under section 80-IA. 47. We also found that no siding charges are levied by Indian Railways for the rail systems developed by the assessee. The assessee has developed, operates and maintains the rail systems. The systems are being operated by the assessee as permitted under the agreements entered into with Indian Railways and under the rules and regulations of Indian Railways from time to time. The entire cost was borne by the assessee and is appearing in the balance sheet of the assessee as placed on record. We have also verified the same and found it correct. 48. Contention of revenue authorities that Railways had constructed the rail system is not factually correct. In fact, M/s. L&T had entered into agreement with the appropriate rail authorities to Develop its rail systems. M/s. L&T had constructed the rail system by awarding contract to the private parties for construction of rail sidings (including upto the nearest rail head) under the supervision of Indian Railways approved agency, and the entire cost for construction/ development paid to the aforesaid agency and supervision charges paid to Indian Railways approved agency have been borne by the assessee, apart from all costs incurred for all the materials and incidental expenses. 49. From the record we found that the rail systems were developed under the agreements entered into with Indian Railways and assessee operates and maintains the same in accordance with terms and conditions of the Agreements, under the supervision and as per guidelines of Indian Railways. We have carefully gone through the relevant clauses of the agreements substantiating the same which reads as under: (a) Clause No. 2, Agreement to Construct Siding - Wherein it is mentioned that "the Railway administration will at the cost and the expenses of the applicant, in all respect, construct the railway sidings " Further kindly be informed that, for construction of the siding under the supervision of the Railways, the contract for construction and supervision has been awarded by the applicant and the entire cost has been borne by the applicant. (b) Clause No. 6 - Payment by Applicant against the total estimated cost -wherein it is mentioned that, "The applicant will pay in advance to the railway administration the total estimated cost of the work consisting of the estimated costs of work done by the party and those by the railway

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administration .... " (c) Clause No. 7(a) - Permanent way materials - "The applicant will provide and deliver at site the permanent way and other materials (which includes Girders, Rails, Sleepers, fastenings, points, crossings, fencings, signals and overhead structures and any other things connected therewith for electric tractions and other machinery and equipments necessary for working of the sidings) in accordance with the Railway administration's standards and specifications. All charges incurred in laying and fitting the permanent way materials and all other equipments which may be provided shall entirely be borne by the applicant." (d) Clause No. 17 - Working of the Siding - wherein it is mentioned that " ... the applicant shall provide labour for and bear the cost of all Operations on the siding. The applicant shall be responsible for the strict compliance by himself and his employees and agents of all rules, regulations and standing orders made by the railway administration from time to time for the working of sidings and for all accidents, loss or damage that may be ensured or be caused by reasons of negligence or non- observance of such rules, regulations and orders .... " Further, the appellant carries out all the operations for smooth movement of its goods, viz. Shunting of the Wagons, placing of the wagons at appropriate locations, Loading / Unloading of Wagons within the stipulated time and stipulated methods of Indian Railways through Wagon Loading Machines and Wagon Tipplers, Weighing of Wagons on Motion Weigh Bridges, Maintaining signa ling systems, Wagons, Couplings, Rake formation for dispatch, hauling of Wagons through its own locomotives, etc. Further, in Clause No. 14 - Traffic on Siding - it is mentioned that applicant undertakes to shunt the wagons from such point to his premises and back with his own labour and the railway administration would not be responsible for any delay, loss and damages caused in consequence of the failure of the applicant to arrange for such shunting. " Thus, the rail system is being operated by the appellant and the cost of above operations is borne by appellant. (e) Clause No. 8(b) - Wherein it is mentioned that, Maintenance and other Charges for the portion of the sidings - The applicant will at their own cost and expenses in all things and to the satisfaction of the railway administration and if required by the railway administration under its supervision maintains in good order and repair the said portion of the siding. Such charges as may be fixed by the railway for the supervision rendered shall be paid by the applicant. There are other various clauses wherein it is evident that the Development, Operation and Maintenance is done by the appellant and the entire cost for the same is borne by the appellant. 50. The question of allowability of the deduction u/s. 80IA in respect of rail systems has been settled in earlier years by the Hon'ble ITAT in assessee's own case. The facts and the agreements were also placed before authorities in those years. Therefore, the claim based on same facts needs to be allowed following the principle of Consistency in assessment proceedings. Even though the 'principles of res judicata' do not apply to income tax proceedings and each assessment year being a separate unit, what is decided in one year may not apply in the following year but where a fundamental aspect permeating through the different assessment years has been found as a fact one way or the other and parties have allowed that position to be sustained by not challenging the order, it would not be appropriate to allow the position to be changed in a subsequent year. The above principles have been accepted in the undernoted case: ♦ H.A. Shah & Co v. CIT [1956] (30 ITR 618) (Bom.) ♦ Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. Janapada Sabha AIR 1964 SC 1013 ♦ Cruch of South India Trust Association v. Telugu Church Council [1996] 2 SCC 520

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♦ Radhasoami Satsang (supra) 51. From the record we also found that the overall profits of the company have increased due to such commercial benefits and the same should have been treated as the revenue of the rail systems, which is the Fair Market Value of the services provided by the undertaking as per the provisions of Sec. 80IA(8) and the assessee is entitled for benefit u/s 80IA accordingly. However, the basis adopted for calculating the revenue from rail system by the assessee has been conservatively considered as lower of the freight chargeable through Rail and Road freight saved. The rail freight being lower is considered after further discounting it by 50% based on the circular of Indian Railways for the freight chargeable upto the nearest railway station. 52. We also found that assessee has furnished all the information with regard to No. of Railway Engines / Locomotives and Railway Wagons owned by the assessee before the lower authorities which are as under:-

Rail Systems at No. of Engines / Locomotives No.of Wagons Hirmi 2 49 Tadipatri 2 76 Arakkonam 1 30 Durgapur 2 30

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 65 of 99 55. We also found that the loading and unloading of goods is being done by the integrated Rail system set up by the assessee and expenses which were incurred earlier for loading and unloading of materials at the plant as well as the nearest Indian Railway station have been avoided and saved and are considered as income of the rail system arising due to setting up of such integrated rail system. The assessee has already submitted for all the Rail Systems form 10CCB duly certified and audited by M/s. GP Kapadia & Co. Chartered Accountants, alongwith Balance Sheet, P&L Account, Schedules forming part of Balance sheet and P&L Account. We have also checked the amount eligible for deduction as furnished in form 10 CCB and found the same as correct. 56. With regard to CIT(A)'s observation in the A.Y.2010-11 at page 42 to the effect that the so called 'Rail System' of the assessee company are simply a private siding and not any infrastructure facility of Public Utility therefore the infrastructure of such private sidings should be treated as "Private Facility", we observe that Section 801A(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not require the infrastructure facility to be a public facility for allowing deduction under section 801A. The explanation to section 801A(4) defines the term 'infrastructure facility' to mean a road including toll road, a bridge or a rail system without anything further. We observe that the CIT(A) has been referring to the pre-amended definition of the term 'infrastructure facility' which was applicable till AY. 2001-02. The assessee company began its claim of deduction from AY 2004-05 when the definition was simplified with no indication about 'public facility'. Thus CIT(A) was not correct while declining claim of deduction u/s.80IA(4) on this reasoning. 57. As per our considered view, even assuming that the requirement of public facility is to be fulfilled, it is worth noting that a section of public is also considered to be public. This principle has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of a Chamber of Commerce CIT v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce [1965] 55 ITR 722 wherein it was ruled that even though the Andhra Chamber of Commerce was established only to serve the traders and businessmen in the State of Andhra Pradesh, such traders and businessmen constituted a section of public and therefore the Chamber existed for a public charitable purpose. In the ultimate analysis of the facts in the case of assessee Company, the benefits of such siding does ensure to the public in general - to the consumers of cement. Any benefit to the business even though it is first enjoyed by the particular trade or establishment eventually is for the general public good. It has to be noted that several industries may come up on both the sides of sidings from the interchange point till factory gate, if anyone of them wants to make use of railway sidings, it is permissible for the Railway Administration to entertain such request and by making use of the exiting siding, can extend or branch off and lay railway tracks to the industry which makes the request and lay siding accordingly. Thus, the railway siding from the point of interchange till factory gate of the assessee has immense potential, with enabling powers to the Railway Administration (which itself is a public department), to be developed into a facility that will ensure to the public at large. The railway sidings are always constructed for captive consumption. Thus, the provisions of section 80IA(4) cannot be read in the manner to make it redundant, when the legislature in all its wisdom intended to give benefit of tax holiday for construction of infrastructure facility in the form of railway which is meant for captive consumption. 58. We have carefully gone through the terms and conditions of the agreement entered by the assessee with the railway authority, a perusal of clause 19 of the Railway Siding agreement entered into by the assessee with the Railway authorities, clarifies that construction and operation of the railway siding was not merely for the purpose of the business of the assessee, but was with a long term perspective to create an infrastructure facility which could, at a future point of time and in case a need arise, potentially confer benefit to the public at large. The agreement with the Railway authorities, provided that the facility so created could be made available to others with the discretion and prior permission of the railway authorities thereby rendering the facility open for general public at large. Hence, such a facility is in fact a public utility. 59. With regard to CIT(A)s conclusion for the A.Y. 2010-11 at page 42, to the effect that the agreements entered between the assessee Company & Railway Department, contained the terms &

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 66 of 99 conditions for construction of Private Sidings and that cannot be treated as any agreement for development, operation & maintenance of any Rail system, we observe that as per section 80- IA(4)(i)(b), an assessee has to enter into an agreement with the Central Government or a State Government or a Local Authority or any other statutory body for (i) developing or (ii) Operating and Maintaining or (iii) Developing, Operating and Maintaining the infrastructure facility. The Indian Railways, with whom the assessee has entered into an agreement, is the statutory body designated under the Indian Railways with whom the assessee has entered into an agreement, is the statutory body designated under the Indian Railways Act. We found that the agreement does not merely contain the terms and conditions of the construction of railway siding i.e. development of siding (laying of tracks, signal system and all the essential components of Rail Systems) but it also contains the terms and conditions relating to its operation and maintenance as well. 60. Our attention was also invited to letter No. 99/TC(FM)26/1/Pt-II (Sub-Liberalization of siding 'Rules) of the Railway Boar clarifying that the capital cost of new siding, maintenance cost, cost of Railway staff etc. will be borne by the enterprise only, which also supports our view. 61. As far as operations is concerned, we found that the assessee carries out all the following operations for smooth movement of its goods, viz. shunting of the wagons, placing of the wagons at appropriate locations, loading/unloading of wagons within the stipulated time and stipulated methods of Indian Railways through Wagon Loading Machines and Wagon Tipplers, weighing of wagons on Motion Weigh Bridges, wagon couplings and de-couplings, rake formation for dispatch, hauling of wagons through its own locomotives within the factory premises, etc. Thus, the rail system is being operated by the assessee and the cost of above operations is borne by assessee. 62. With regard to CIT(A)'s conclusion at page 42 of A.Y. 2010-11 to the effect that various conditions given in Section were not met with, we observe as under:- a. Section 80-IA (4)(i) provides the following conditions to be complied with for claiming deductions; (i) any enterprise carrying on the business of (i) developing, (ii) maintaining and operating or (iii) developing, maintaining and operating any infrastructure facility which fulfils all the following conditions, namely :- (a) it is owned by a company registered in India (b) it has entered into an agreement with the Central Government or a State Government or a local authority or any other statutory body for (i) developing or (ii) operating and maintaining or (iii) developing, operating and maintaining a new infrastructure facility; (c) it has started or starts operating and maintaining the infrastructure facility on or after the 1st day of April, 1995: 63. As per materials placed on record, all the railway systems are established and owned by the assessee which is a Company as defined under the Income-tax Act. This is an undisputed fact and there is no adverse remark by the AO or CIT(A) in this regard. 64. As per clause (b)of Section 80IA (4)(i) an agreement has to be entered with the Central Government or a State Government or a Local Authority or any other statutory body for (i) developing or (ii) Operating and maintaining or (iii) Developing, Operating and Maintaining the infrastructure facility. The Indian Railways, with whom the assessee has entered into an agreement, is the statutory body designated under the Indian Railways Act. 65. We also observe that the agreements entered into by the assessee are for the development, operation and maintenance of the Railway siding. Thus this fulfils the requirement in clause (b). 66. The last requirement as per clause (c) is regarding commencement of operation and maintenance of facility on or after 1st April, 1995. All the railway sidings were developed after April, 1995 as can

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 67 of 99 be verified from the date of agreements entered into by the assessee with the Railway authorities; which are as under:- Location Authority with which Agreement is entered Date of agreement Hirmi South Eastern Railway March 2000 Tadipatri South central Railway 03-05-1999 Arakkonam Southern Railway 08-01-2001 Durqapur Eastern Railway 18-10-2002 67. This also is an undisputed fact and there is no adverse remark by the AO or CIT(A) in this regard. In view of above all the conditions specified in section 80IA(4) has been complied with by the assessee entitling it to claim the tax holiday. 68. With regard to CIT(A)'s observation that the actual operation of Rail System [i.e. running of goods train] onto the private sidings between the serving railway station and plant premises [upto interchange point! exchange yard], was being done by the Indian Railways and not by the assessee Company. 69. We found that the CIT(A) has equated "running of goods train" with the "operation of Rail System". This is the sole basis on which he has arrived at his conclusion that since the assessee is not running the goods train it is not operation of Rail System and hence not eligible for claiming deduction under section 80IA(4). 70. As per our considered view, the operation of Rail System is not simply running of goods train. Operation of Railway Systems comprises of various activities viz. shunting of the wagons, placing of the wagons at appropriate locations, loading/unloading of wagons within the stipulated time and stipulated methods of Indian Railways through Wagon Loading Machines and Wagon Tipplers, weighing of wagons on Motion Weigh Bridges, wagon couplings and de-couplings, rake formation for dispatch, hauling of wagons through its own locomotives within the factory premises, etc. Thus, the rail system is being operated by the assessee and the cost of above operations is borne by assessee. 71. With regard to allegation of the CIT(A) that the assessee has never claimed that it is hauling the wagons on the entire siding, we found that hauling of wagons is only one of the activity in the entire operation of the rail system. Under the Railways Act, 1989 nobody other than railway administration is allowed to haul wagons of the railway tracks. As per materials placed on record, all the activities relating to the operation of rail system except hauling of wagons till the interchange point, is done by the assessee and the entire cost for the same is borne by it. 72. From the record we also found that even the maintenance of the Rail system such as alignment of track & gauge maintenance, patching of ballast, maintenance of railway track sleepers, signalling points and railway gate crossing from private siding to connecting point of nearest railway station is done by the assessee. 73. Thus the operation of rail is not merely hauling of wagons but comprises of various activities all of which is carried on by the assessee Company. 74. With regard to CIT(A)'s observation that all the four cement plants [having private sidings] were notified as independent booking station and the freight was charged by the railway department for the entire distance including the portion of private sidings [upto interchange point / exchange yard], we observe that this is a fact which is undisputed by the assessee and nothing turns out of it.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 68 of 99 75. CIT(A) also alleged that the notional profit computed for so called rail system has been very exorbitant and the method is also not correct. It need to be computed in the manner as explained in para 3.2.14 [with reference to table F] above. If that is done, there would hardly be any profit to those rail systems. 76. In this regard, we found that prior to setting up of railway siding, the assessee used to transport its goods through road to the nearest railway station. Only the few components of the cost of road transportation, which the cement division of the assessee was hitherto incurring for transportation of materials to and from the factory premises, is adopted as the basis of calculating the revenue of the railway undertaking. The revenue is, however, computed for the actual services rendered by the railway undertaking to the cement division. 77. After verifying the computation of income eligible for deduction u/s.80IA, as filed by assessee, we found that the CIT(A) has misunderstood the working of the revenue calculation and alleged that such working is ill-conceived as the actual transportation of materials on the siding is carried out by the railway authorities. Based on such misunderstanding, he further alleged that assessee has claimed deduction for notional profits whereas section 80lA allows deduction for profits derived from actual operations. 78. In this regard, we observe that the railway systems of the assessee has been rendering following services to the cement division: ♦ shunting of the wagons, ♦ placing of the wagons at appropriate locations, ♦ loading/unloading of wagons within the stipulated time and stipulated methods of Indian Railways through Wagon Loading Machines and Wagon Tipplers, ♦ weighing of wagons on Motion Weigh Bridges, ♦ wagon couplings and de-couplings, ♦ rake formation for dispatch, ♦ hauling of wagons through its own locomotives within the factory premises

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 69 of 99 81. In view of the above discussion, the explanation given by the CIT(A) and the tabular representation of the computation of revenue of rail system in Table F, has no relevance since it is merely based on his incorrect assumption. 82. Further, we found that observation of CIT(A) with respect to the freight rate is also not correct in so far as for comparison, he has considered the rate per quintal as against per Metric Ton adopted by the assessee which can be observed from the calculation submitted by assessee before the lower authorities. Without any evidence in hands, the CIT(A) has merely stated that crucial facts were not disclosed by the assessee without referring to any specific facts which were not disclosed. Perhaps he is indicating about the operations of railway siding being carried out by the railways and not by the assessee. However, as aforesaid, he is comparing the operation of railway siding with merely hauling of wagons. The operations of railway siding involves various activities other than the hauling of wagons. Mere haulage of wagons cannot be equated with operations of railway siding. We found that assessee has filed reports in Form 10CCB from M/s G.P.Kapadia & Co., Chartered Accountant. The CIT(A) himself has allowed the deduction in AY. 2009-10 based on the similar facts available on records but changed his decision merely based on the replies to questionnaire from various Railway Department. 83. The CIT(A) has also raised a query as to whether the L&T Ltd. which had developed said rail system was eligible for deduction u/s 80lA in respect of profit, if any, otherwise on operation & maintaining that system under the provisions that existed at the relevant time [prior to 01.04.2002] when such infrastructure facility is said to have become operational. As per our considered view one of condition for claiming deduction under the pre-amended section 80IA(4) (i.e. prior to AY 2002-03) stipulated that the assessee should enter into an agreement with the Government (Central or State) or other authorities mentioned therein for (i) developing, (ii) maintaining and operating or (iii) developing, maintaining and operating a new infrastructure facility. Further, the agreement should also provide for transfer of such infrastructure facility to such authorities within the period stipulated in the agreement. The Central Government realizing the need to encourage investment particularly in the area of surface transport, water supply, water treatment system, irrigation project, sanitation and sewerage system or solid waste management systems made certain amendments to the conditions for eligibility of claim u/s. 80lA through Finance Act, 2001. Amongst others amendments, the Central Govt. removed the abovementioned condition and accordingly, the amended section 80IA(4) clause (b) stood as under from AY. 2002-03 onwards: "(b) it has entered into an agreement with the Central Government or a State Government or a local authority or any other statutory body for (i) developing or (ii) operating and maintaining or (iii) developing, operating and maintaining a new infrastructure facility;" 84. Thus, the Finance Act, 2001 amongst other conditions, particularly deleted the requirement for an assessee to transfer the infrastructure facility to the concerned government authorities with prescribed time. 85. In this regard reliance can be placed on the decision of Gujarat High Court in case of Katira Construction Ltd. v. UOI [2013] 31 taxmann.com 250/214 Taxman 599/352 ITR 513, wherein Court held as under:- "32. It is true that with effect from 1-4-2002 some significant changes were made in the said provisions. Three of these changes which are material were: (i) that sub-section (4) of section 80-IA now required the enterprise to carry on the business of developing or operating and maintaining or developing, operating and maintaining any infrastructure facility. This was in contrast to the previous requirement of all three conditions being cumulatively satisfied; (ii) that the explanation of the term 'infrastructure facility' was changed to besides others, a road including toll road instead of hitherto existing expression 'road', and (iii) that the requirement of transferring the infrastructural facilities developed by the enterprise to the Central or the State Government or the local authority within the time stipulated in the agreement was done away with.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 70 of 99 33. These changes, however, would not alter the situation vis-a-vis the impugned amendment. These legislative changes did enlarge the scope of the deduction and in a sense, made it available to certain assessees who would not have been, but for the changes eligible for such deduction " 86. In terms of the above averments, after acquiring the cement business from L&T, the assessee started claiming deduction for Rail system u/s. 80-IA from Assessment year 2004-05 onwards since it satisfied all the conditions as prescribed u/s 80IA(4) as it stood during AY. 2004-05, viz: (a) It is owned by a company registered in India. (b) It has entered into an agreement with the Government for developing / operating / maintaining the infrastructure facility, and (c) It has started operating and maintaining the infrastructure facility on or after April,1995. 87. Thus, under the amended conditions of the section 80-IA(4) i.e. post AY 2002-03, L&T as well as UTCL were eligible for claiming deduction u/s 801A. As per section 80IA(2), the deduction is available at the option of the assessee, for any ten consecutive assessment years out of twenty years beginning from the year in which the undertaking or enterprise develop and operate any infrastructure facility. The assessee has started claiming deduction post AY. 2004-05 and is within the period of available twenty years. Under section 80IB, u/s 80lC, 80ID and 80lE, the first year in which the production is started is taken as initial previous year whereas, after the amendment in provisions of section 80lA w.e.f. 01.04.2000 the initial assessment year is at the option of the assessee to avail the benefit. 88. In view of the amended provisions of Section 80-IA, the year in which the claim is first made i.e. initial assessment year, must apply for determination of eligibility of the claim. In respect of AY. 2004-05 onwards including assessment years 2009-10 and 2010-11, since the condition relating to transfer of such facility to Central Govt. was no longer a pre-requisite for eligibility of claim u/s 80- IA(4)(b), the assessee has correctly made the claim. 89. In view of the above, we can safely conclude that even if an assessee does not fulfil all the requisite conditions for availing the tax holiday benefit in the year in which the new infrastructure facility is set up or has commenced operation, but in a subsequent year, all the requisite conditions for availing such benefit are fulfilled, the assessee would be entitled to avail the tax holiday benefit in respect of such subsequent assessment year(s). For this purpose reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon'ble ITAT of Jaipur in the case of Asstt. CIT v. Shiv Agrevo Ltd. [2009] 34 SOT 1 (URO). In this case, the assessee-company, whose main object was extraction of seeds for obtaining edible oils and refining thereof, set up a new industrial undertaking for the extraction and refining of edible oil. It claimed to have temporarily commenced the activity on and from 1-1-1997 on a trial run; however, the systematic activity of refining commenced only in the previous year relating to the assessment year 1998-99. After the final completion of the project, the assessee-company applied directly for a permanent registration certificate of its status as a small scale industry (SSI) under section 11-B of the Industrial Development Regulation Act, 1951 (IRDA) to the prescribed authority, who granted the certificate dated 30-3-1998, which was a conclusive and final proof of such a status under the provisions of IRDA. The return of income filed earlier by the assessee for the assessment year 1999-2000 as subsequently revised, wherein a claim of deduction under section 80-IA was made. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the assessee, on the ground that the assessee started production from the assessment year 1997-98 itself, the year in which the assessee was not a small scale industry, and, therefore, the assessee did not fulfil the condition of section 80-IA in the initial year. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals), allowed the assessee's claim under section 80-1A. On Revenues appeal, the ITAT held that for claiming deduction under section 80-IA, it has to be determined at end of relevant previous year that as to whether assessee is registered as SSI and there is no condition in Act that an industrial undertaking should fulfil all conditions as laid down under section 80-IA in very initial year itself and not thereafter.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 71 of 99 90. Even as per fiction created by section 80IA(5), the eligible business is the only source of income and the deduction would be allowed from the initial assessment year or any subsequent assessment year. It nowhere defines as to what is the "initial assessment year". Prior to 1-4-2000, section 80IA(12) defined the "initial assessment year" for various types of eligible assessees. However, after the amendment by the Finance Act, 1999, the definition of "initial assessment year" has been specifically taken away. Now, when the assessee exercises the option of choosing the initial assessment year as culled out in section 80IA(2) from which it chooses its' 10 years of deduction out of 20 years, then only deduction u/s 80lA can be determined. 91. ITAT Chennai Bench have dealt with similar issue in case of Mohan Breweries & Distilleries Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [2009] 116 ITD 241 which pertains to AY. 2004-05 (i.e., after the amendment of S. 80-IA by the Finance Act 1999), the Chennai Tribunal has held that the initial assessment year is the first year of claim and S. 80-IA itself becomes applicable only when the assessee makes the claim for the first time and not before that. Hon'ble Madras High Court has upheld the judgment of Chennai Tribunal and concurred with the view that Section does not mandate that first year of 10 consecutive assessment years should be always first year of set-up of enterprise. The High Court has held that as initial year is not defined in Section 80lA as compared to Section 80IB where it is specifically provided that the year of commencement of business will be the initial year for the purpose of claiming the deduction, the year of option has to be treated as initial assessment year for the purpose of Section 80IA. 92. It is pertinent to mention here that once the deduction for the very first is allowed then in subsequent year the deduction cannot be disallowed on the same ground. Hon'ble High Court decision in the case of Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd. (supra), has pointed out that once deduction is allowed in the first year, revenue has no power to deny the deduction in subsequent assessment years as provided under the Act. 93. Even the Supreme Court in case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT [1992] 62 Taxman 480 /196 ITR 188 held that a provision in the taxing statute for promoting growth and development is to be construed liberally and hence, even the restriction contained in such a provision has to be construed so as to advance the objective of the provision and not to frustrate it. 94. The CIT(A) has also raised an objection to the effect that since L&T was not eligible for deduction u/s.80IA on operation of those rail system, then whether the assessee company, which inherited the cement business [i.e. cement plants together with said rail system] of the L&T Ltd in the FY. 2003-04 on account of demerger, could be treated as eligible to the deduction under the aforesaid section in respect of profit, if any, of those rail system for the later years. In this regard we observe that assessee has inherited the cement business from L&T Ltd., in FY. 2003-04 on account of merger. Post merger it started claiming deduction for Rail system u/s. 80-IA from Assessment year 2004-05 onwards as it satisfied all the conditions as prescribed u/s 80IA(4). Section 80IA(12) provided that in the scheme of amalgamation or merger, the deduction is available to the amalgamated / resulting company. The relevant provision of sec. 80IA(12) reproduced hereunder:-"Where any undertaking of an Indian company which is entitled to the deduction under this section is transferred, before the expiry of the period specified in this section, to another Indian company in a scheme of amalgamation or demerger. (a) no deduction shall be admissible under this section to the amalgamating or the demerged company for the previous year in which the amalgamation or the demerger takes place; and (b) the provisions of this section shall, as far as may be, apply to the amalgamated or the resulting company as they would have applied to the amalgamating or the demerged company if the amalgamation or demerger had not taken place. 95. Section 80IA(2) further provides that the deduction is available at the option of the assessee for any ten consecutive assessment years out of twenty years beginning from the year in which the undertaking or enterprise develop and operate any infrastructure facility. UTCL has started to claim

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 72 of 99 deduction within the prescribed period of twenty years. The claim is thus legitimately made by assessee complying the requirements mentioned under section 801A. 96. In view of the above discussion and respectfully following the order of the Tribunal in assessee's own case for the Ays. 2004-05 to 2008-09, we do not find any merit in the action of the Revenue authorities declining the claim of deduction u/s.80IA(4). Accordingly AO is directed to allow the deduction as claimed by the assessee with respect to its rail system. We direct accordingly.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 73 of 99 wharfage, stevedoring, storage (at Jetty) and transportation (from Muldwarka to Kodinar cenement manufacturing unit). The market value of the captive Muldwarka port unit by considering the saving in port tariff by comparing the port tariff payable to Gujarat Pipavav Port Ltd (GPPL), with the actual port tariff paid at Muldwarka port unit and saving in road transportation between its cement manufacturing unit and GPPL. When Assessing Officer examined the computations given by the assessee, he was of the view that the notional savings of the assessee are much more than actual charges borne by the assesse, as evident from the fact, for example, that “the assessee has, in actual incurred and paid Rs 5,43,27,689 on account of wharfage, stevedoring and storage charges for their material (cement, clinkers, coal, gypsum) but has computed the notional market value for the same at whopping Rs 17,20,08,407 which are more than 300% of the actual charges” and this fact “clearly shows that the assessee had so arranged his affairs to show extraordinary profits…… to avail higher deduction under section 80IA of the Act, than admissible.” It was in this backdrop and solely for this recorded reason that the Assessing Officer invoked Section 80IA(10) which provides that “Where it appears to the Assessing Officer that, owing to the close connection between the assessee carrying on the eligible business to which this section applies and any other person, or for any other reason, the course of business between them is so arranged that the business transacted between them produces to the assessee more than the ordinary profits which might be expected to arise in such eligible business, the Assessing Officer shall, in computing the profits and gains of such eligible business for the purposes of the deduction under this section, take the amount of profits as may be reasonably deemed to have been derived therefrom”. He then referred to the Explanation to Section 80IA(8) , which provides that market value, in relation to any goods or services, means –(a) the price that such goods or services would ordinarily fetch in the open market” and compared the same with the Explanation below section 80A(6) which refers to “the price that such goods or services would cost if these were acquired by the undertaking or unit or enterprise or eligible business from the open market, subject to statutory or regulatory restrictions, if any” (emphasis supplied). The Assessing officer noted that, as per the assessee, “notional market value of the various services provided by that jetty shall be taken by comparing the service/price charge prevalent at the next nearest port (Pipavav in this case”, and observed that “the logic of the assessee sounds reasonable on the face of it, but the same does not hold good in the light of the legal provisions laid down in this regard”. He then analyzed the scheme of section 80IA(8) and observed that what the scheme of law envisages is the market price if there was to be a service from Mundwarka port, rather than computing notional savings by assuming what would have happened if it was not to exist. The Assessing Office thus formed the view that “the basic notion of the assessee company of presuming the absence of Mundwarka jetty, and calculating notional savings of its manufacturing unit vis-à-vis next nearest port, i.e. Pipavav, is wrong and against the express provisions of the law” and added that “what is required to calculate sale price which undertaking would have fetched if its services get sold open in the market”. The Assessing Officer, in this background, invoked 80IA(10) and held the maximum permissible markup to be 20%. Accordingly, the 80IA deduction was reworked to Rs 2,04,86,557, on the basis of the following calculations: Description Rs. Income from services as shown in 10CCB 770229912

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 74 of 99 Less: Notional receipts on account of Port Services 172008407 Less; Notional transport receipts 512391730 Add: Notional receipts on account of Port Services with 65193226.8 20% mark up to actual payments of Rs. 54327689 Add: Notional receipts on account of transport charges 103913996.4 with 20% up to actual payments of Rs. 86594997 Expenses as claimed 242897381 Profit of the Year 12039617.2 Add: Depreciation as per Books 18927319 Less: Depreciation as per Act 10480379 Business profits 20486557.2 Deduction u/s. 80IA @ 100%` 20486557.2

Aggrieved, assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A) but without success. 94. The assessee is not satisfied and is in further appeal before us. 95. We have heard the rival contentions, perused the material on record and duly considered the fact of the case in the light of the applicable legal position. 96. We find that the Assessing Officer has invoked the provisions of Section 80IA(10) for the short reason, as set out in the assessment order, that the notional savings of the assessee are much more than actual charges borne by the assesse, as evident from the fact, for example, that “the assessee has, in actual incurred and paid Rs 5,43,27,689 on account of wharfage, stevedoring and storage charges for their material (cement, clinkers, coal, gypsum) but has computed the notional market value for the same at whopping Rs 17,20,08,407 which are more than 300% of the actual charges” and this fact “clearly shows that the assessee had so arranged his affairs to show extraordinary profits…… to avail higher deduction under section 80IA of the Act, than admissible”. Clearly, therefore, there is nothing more than the quantum of savings which has led to the Assessing Officer‟s belief that the assessee has arranged his affairs so as to show extraordinary profits. In case the assessee was incurring Rs 100 on the transportation before the construction of the jetty, and his expenses, on this account and post construction of the jetty, has come down to Rs 33, that is indeed huge savings but that was the whole purpose of constructing the jetty. There is no justification for a presumption that just because the savings are more than 2/3rd of the expenses on that account, the assessee has manipulated the profits. The very trigger for invoking Section 80IA(10) is thus not sustainable in law. In any event, what Explanation to Section 80IA(10) visualizes is that “Where it appears to the Assessing Officer that, owing to the close connection between the assessee carrying on the eligible business to which this section applies and any other person, or for any other reason, the course of business between them is so arranged that the business transacted between them produces to the assessee more than the ordinary profits which might be expected to arise in such eligible business, the Assessing Officer shall, in computing the profits and gains of such eligible business for the purposes of the deduction under this section, take the amount of profits as may be reasonably deemed to have been derived therefrom”. In our considered view, the provisions of Section 80IA(10) thus come into play

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 75 of 99 when the close connection of the assessee with any other person, or any other reason of such a nature- as essentially a general expression following a specific expression entails by virtue of the principle of ejusdem generis, the course of business is so arranged as to produce more than ordinary profits. There is no question of impact on the profits in this case due to a close connection with any other person or contrived business operations, and that is not even an issue here, and the business does not “produce” more than ordinary profits for such reason. There is no arrangement in the transaction of business leading to contrived profit figures. What is used for computing the profits is working out the notional profits and that computation of notional profits has a certain basis. All that can be seen and examined by the Assessing Officer whether such a computation is in accordance with the law or not, but it is not open to the Assessing Officer, by invoking section 80IA(10), to disturb this computation- unless the computation itself does not meet the test of law. The only question thus open to the Assessing Officer was to take a call on whether this system of computing the profits on the basis of notional savings is an acceptable method of computing the profits or not. Once the Assessing Officer holds, as he implicitly did in this case as well, that the method is acceptable, it is not open to him to reject the results just because the savings were more than a very large portion of the expenditure. The mention of figures like 300% is in a way inappropriate because even if post construction of the jetty, the expense level is so reduced that the benefit is 300% of the actual expenses, all it means is that the savings are more than 3 times the actual expense level, i.e. 75% of earlier expenditure- but then unless such large savings are possible, none would make such huge investments in an infrastructure that he does not own at all. As regards the savings approach, it has been approved by the coordinate benches- as in, for example, in Assam Carbon Products Ltd Vs ACIT [(2007) 12 SOT 41 (Kol)], and no contrary decision has been brought to our notice. It is also important to bear in mind the fact that this jetty was set up vide agreement dated 17th June 2000 and all along the deduction under section 80IA was allowed. The dispute is only with respect to quantification and invoking 80IA(10), but once the very invoking of Section 80IA(10) is held to be unsustainable in law, nothing really survives for adjudication. In any case, the method of computing the profits is by taking the actual costs borne, prior to the construction of the jetty, with the actual costs borne by the assessee post-construction of the jetty. The argument that the transactions with the assessee alone cannot be treated as market value is unsustainable in law and has been specifically rejected by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Thiru Aroonan Sugar Ltd Vs CIT [(1997) 227 ITR 432 (SC)] by observing that “where the buyer was only one and the sellers were many it cannot be said that the sale was in a market and the price was the market price”. As a result of the construction of the jetty, the travel distance from the factory to the port from 110 kms is said to have been reduced to 11 km, there are significant savings in stevedoring and storing charges as also in wharfage. The manner in which the computations of the Assessing Officer work is that if the assessee spends Rs 100 in covering a distance of 11 km, the savings are worked out on the basis that the assessee will, at best, spend Rs 120 (that is at 20% markup on the actual expenses of Rs 100); that is a clearly incongruous approach. There is no good reason to reject the actual figures, just because actual figures show higher savings. There is thus not only there is no legally sustainable reason for invoking section 80IA(10), what the Assessing Officer has done post invoking section 80IA(10) is equally devoid of legally sustainable reasons.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 76 of 99 97. In view of these discussions, as also bearing in mind the entirety of the case- as also following the coordinate bench decision in the case of Assam Cardon (supra), we uphold the plea of the assessee, and vacate the adjustment made by the Assessing Officer to the claim of the assessee- particularly when similar claims were all along allowed to the assessee. The Assessing Officer is directed to delete the disallowance made by him, and grant the claim of deduction under section 80IA in respect of the jetty, as claimed by the assessee. 98. Ground no. 5 is thus allowed. 99. In ground no. 6, the assessee has raised the following grievances: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of the AO in treating CENVAT credit availed on inputs and capital goods used in the undertakings eligible for deduction u/s 801A as cost of the eligible undertakings. 100. So far as this grievance of the assessee is concerned, only a few material facts need to be taken note of. During the course of the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer noted that while computing the deduction under section 80IA in respect of captive power plants, ports and rail systems, the assessee had debited the expenses directly attributable to the eligible units, net of CENVAT credit availed, wherever applicable, on the expenditure incurred. These CENVAT credits are available under the excise provisions and adjusted against the excise duty liability on goods produced by the related cement manufacturing units. In effect, the component of expenses of statutory duties/ taxes is credited directly to „CENVAT receivable account‟ without routing it through the profit and loss account. The Assessing Officer was of the view that Section 80A(IA) provides for exemption in respect of „profit derived by an eligible undertaking‟ for the specified purposes, but the critical words are “derived from” and, therefore, “it is only the expenditure, which had a direct and proximate (immediate) nexus with the earning of profit from eligible undertaking that could be taken into consideration for determining such profits”. It was also noted that the eligible unit is to be viewed as an independent unit on the standalone basis, as Section 80IA(5) requires such an eligible unit to be treated “as if such eligible business were the only source of income of the assessee during the previous year relevant to the assessment year”. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer reduced the eligible deductions under section 80IA, by the amount of CENVAT credits attributable to eligible units, as the expenses were not booked through the profit and loss account, and, to that extent, the profits stood distorted/ inflated. These allocations were done on the basis of turnover “in the absence of any item wise details”. Aggrieved, inter-alia, by these adjustments on account of CENVAT credit, assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A) but without success. The assessee is not satisfied and is in further appeal before us. 101. We have heard the rival contentions, perused the material on record and duly considered the fact of the case in the light of the applicable legal position. 102. We find that Section 80IA(5), which has been heavily relied upon by the assessee, provides that " notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, the profits

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 77 of 99 and gains of an eligible business to which the provisions of sub-section (1) apply shall, for the purposes of determining the quantum of deduction under that sub-section for the assessment year immediately succeeding the initial assessment year or any subsequent assessment year, be computed as if such eligible business were the only source of income of the assessee during the previous year relevant to the initial assessment year and to every subsequent assessment year up to and including the assessment year for which the determination is to be made”. All that this provision does is that it provides for the profits of the eligible unit being treated on a standalone basis, but then in case the Assessing Officer makes an adjustment for the payment which has earned the CENVAT credit, he must also make an adjustment for the corresponding CENVAT credit availed by any other unit of the assessee – other than the eligible unit. If the captive power unit makes a payment of X amount, and in turn, it generates a CENVAT credit of X amount, which is availed by another unit, say Ropar Cement Manufacturing Unit, the hypothetical independence embedded in the profit computation on a standalone basis requires that the Ropar Cement Manufacturing Unit must reimburse the captive power unit for such a CENVAT credit. It cannot be open to the assessee to provide for the expenses which have earned the CENVAT credits, but not to account for the CENVAT credits and the benefits accruing form the same. In any event, the fiction envisages under section 80IA(5) is to enable computation of profits on a standalone basis, rather than to increase the scope of profits itself and allocate notional expenditure to the eligible units. When the eligible units are other units are treated as independent of each other, and the profit computations are on a standalone basis, the eligible unit must get the corresponding credit for the CENVAT credits availed by the other units. Viewed thus, not accounting for the CENVAT credit does not, in our considered view, vitiate the profits of the eligible undertaking, as long as all such credits are fully availed by the other units as is the undisputed position anyway. What the assessee has done is that the expenses are debited net of the CENVAT credit availed. To this extent, we see no infirmity in the stand of the assessee. 103. In view of these discussions, as also bearing in mind the entirety of the case, we uphold the plea of the assessee, and direct the Assessing Officer to delete the impugned adjustment on account of CENVAT in the profits of the eligible units. The assessee gets the relief accordingly. 104. Ground no. 6 is thus allowed.

a) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) was not justified in agreeing with the AO in apportioning indirect Head Office expenses aggregating to Rs. 2,40,26,65,930/- and in adjusting such allocated amount in computing Tax Holiday u/s 801A/ 80IC, without establishing any nexus between the nature of expenses and the eligible units of the appellant. b) Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) was not justified in agreeing with the AO in apportioning indirect Head Office expenses on the basis of turnover of the undertakings eligible

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 78 of 99 for tax holiday u/s 80IA/80IC computed in the audited accounts filed along with Form 10CCB instead of turnover of the eligible undertakings recomputed in the order u/s 143(3). c) Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, assuming without admitting that if it is held that indirect Head Office expenses is required to be allocated, such allocation should be made on the basis of total cost of the respective eligible undertaking to the total cost of the appellant company instead of allocation on the basis of turnover made in the order u/s 143(3). 106. So far as these grievances of the assessee are concerned, it is sufficient to take note of the fact that in the computation of profits of the eligible units, the assessee has made no adjustment for the common head office expenses. The assessee's stand was that such expenditure does not have direct or immediate nexus with these units. This plea did not find favour with the Assessing Officer, as he was of the view that the head office expenditure are common expenses which need to be allocated to every unit, including eligible units, as all the units benefit from the same. The allocation of expenses was done on the basis of the turnover. Aggrieved, the assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A), but without any success. The assessee is not satisfied and is in further appeal before us. 107. We have heard the rival contentions, perused the material on record and duly considered facts of the case in the light of the applicable legal position. 108. We are unable to see any merits in the stand of the assessee that the head office expenses cannot be allocated to all the units, as deductions and allowance of eligible units are required to be taken into account while treating such units as profit centres, and computing the profits accordingly. The fiction of the eligible units being treated on a standalone basis does not require that the profits of the units are to be computed as if they are independent of each other, and once that fiction sets in, the expenses incurred by someone other than eligible unit, in the interest of the eligible unit, are to be taken into account while computing the profits of the eligible unit. Accordingly, the allocation of expenses, as the learned Assessing Officer rightly contends, must be done. The assessee has further contended that HO expenses are not „derived from‟ or „derived by‟ the eligible undertakings, and, for this reasons, these expenses cannot be allocated to the eligible undertaking. We see no reasons to decline allocation of head office expenses to ensure that the profits of the eligible units are correctly worked out, on the basis of hypothetical independence embedded in the eligible units being treated on a standalone basis. To this extent, we reject the plea of the assessee. However, the basis of allocation as turnover is not really correct and reasonable, nor the relationship between the turnover and expenses always linear; the allocation would be more appropriate based on expenditure incurred by the units vis-à-vis overall expenditure. To this extent, we uphold the plea of the assessee. 109. In view of the above discussions, as also bearing in mind the entirety of the case, we reject the grievance of the assessee against allocation of HO expenses, but we permit the assessee‟s plea to the limited extent that the allocation of HO expenses should be done on the basis of expenditure incurred by the units vis-à-vis overall expenditure.

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ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 80 of 99 indeed the correct approach. While we dismiss the grievance of the asseseee, we make it clear that the Assessing Officer will take a call, as and when the payment is actually made, on the admissibility of deduction in accordance with the law.

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Addition of Rs. 6,54,66,319/- in respect of leave encashment on provision basis while computing book profits u/s. 115 B of the Act: a) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) erred in confirming the action of the AO in not excluding the provision for leave encashment while computing book profits u/s. 115JB. b) The Appellant prays that the AO be directed to exclude the provision for leave encashment while computing book profits u/s. 115JB. 123. To adjudicate on this ground, it is sufficient to take note of the fact that the assessee had debited Rs 6,54,66,319 on account of the provision for the leave encashment claims. The Assessing Officer added back the said amount in the computation of book profits under section 115JB on the ground that this represents a contingent liability. Aggrieved, assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A) but without success. The assessee is not satisfied and is in appeal before us. 124. Having heard the rival contentions and having perused the material on record, we are of the considered view that the stand of the Assessing Officer is unsustainable in law in view of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court‟s judgment in the case of Bharat Earth Movers Ltd Vs CIT [(2000) 245 ITR 428 (SC)] wherein Their Lordships have observed that “we are satisfied that the provision made by the appellant-company for meeting the liability incurred by it under the leave encashment scheme proportionate with the entitlement earned by employees of the company, inclusive of the officers and the staff, subject to the ceiling on accumulation as applicable on the relevant date, is entitled to deduction out of the gross receipts for the accounting year during which the provision is made for the liability. The liability is not a contingent liability”. Accordingly, we delete the impugned adjustment. The assessee gets the relief accordingly. 125. In ground no. 13, the assessee has raised the following grievances: On the facts and circumstances of the case, and in law, the CIT(A) erred in confirming the action of the AQ and thereby denying, the benefit of Article 10 of the India Mauritius Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DIAA'), in respect of dividend declared by the Appellant to Holding Investment Ltd Mauritius and accordingly, the tax on distributed income ought to have been levied it the rate of 5 percent. 126. Learned counsel submits that the learned CIT(A) did not admit this additional plea, and prays that the ground may be admitted and sent to the file of the Assessing Officer for adjudication on merits. Learned Departmental Representative, however, opposes the plea.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 82 of 99 127. Having heard the rival contentions and having perused the material on record, we deem it fit and proper to admit the ground of appeal but remit the same to the file of the Assessing Officer for adjudication on merits. Ordered, accordingly. 128. Ground no. 13 is thus allowed for statistical purposes. 129. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is partly allowed in the terms indicated above. 130. We will now take up the appeal filed by the Assessing Officer. 131. In ground no. 1, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) as right in allowing the appeal of the assessee and holding the sales tax incentives as capital in nature?" 132. While dealing with the appeal for the assessment year 2010-11 earlier in this order, and for the detailed reasons set out in paragraphs 32 to 35 and decisions referred to therein, we have dismissed exactly the same grievance of the assessee. Respectfully following the view so taken in assessee‟s own case, we dismiss this grievance as well, and decline to interfere in the matter. 133. Ground no 1 is thus dismissed. 134. In ground no. 2, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was right in allowing the appeal of the assessee and holding that incentive quantified on payment of net present value of the deferred sales tax liability in respect of its Suli and Nalagarh Unit as capital in nature?" 135. In a materially similar ground no. 3, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was right in allowing the appeal of the assessee and holding that gain arising out of pre-payment of deferred sales tax liability as capital receipt?" 136. The short issue requiring our adjudication in both these grounds is whether on payment of NPV of the sales tax liability, under the HP General Sales Tax (Deferred Payment of Tax) Scheme 2005, the difference between the sales tax liability and the NPV paid can be treated as capital receipt. The case of the assessee is that the purpose of the scheme is expansion of industries and industrialization of the backward areas, and that the issue is now settled in favour of the assessee by the Hon‟ble jurisdictional High Court‟s judgment in the case of Sulzer India Ltd (supra). This is a recurring issue and has come up for consideration in a number of preceding

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 83 of 99 assessment years. In the assessee‟s own case for the immediately preceding year, and for the detailed reasons set out in paragraphs 37 to 39 and following the decisions in the preceding assessment years referred to therein, we have upheld the similar relief allowed to the assessee. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter for this assessment year. Respectfully following our decisions in the assessee‟s own cases, we uphold the relief granted by the learned CIT(A) on this count as well. We thus confirm the conclusions arrived at by the CIT(A) on this count as well, and decline to interfere in the matter. 137. Ground no. 3 is thus dismissed. 138. In ground no.4, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was right in allowing the appeal of the assessee and holding excise duty exemption availed by the assessee as capital receipt?" 139. This is also a recurring issue and has come up for consideration in a number of preceding assessment years in assessee‟s own cases. In the assessee‟s own case for the immediately preceding year, and for the detailed reasons set out in paragraphs 40 to 42 and following the decisions in the preceding assessment years referred to therein, we have upheld the similar relief allowed to the assessee. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter for this assessment year. Respectfully following our decisions in the assessee‟s own cases, we uphold the relief granted by the learned CIT(A) on this count as well. We thus confirm the conclusions arrived at by the CIT(A) on this count as well, and decline to interfere in the matter 140. Ground no. 4 is thus dismissed. 141. In ground no.5, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing the road transport subsidy availed by the assessee, aggregating to Rs. 41,05,28,050/-, as capital in nature, whereas the same is in the nature of revenue incentive." 142. In a related ground of appeal, i.e. ground no. 6, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing the Interest Subsidy availed by the assessee, aggregating to Rs. 5,00,00,000/-, as capital in nature, whereas the same is in the nature of revenue incentive.” 143. So far as these grievances of the Assessing Officer are concerned, the relevant material facts are like this. The Assessing Officer has held that interest subsidy ends up reducing interest costs of the assessee, and transport subsidy ends up reducing transport costs of the assessee, and,

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 84 of 99 as such, both of these subsidies are inherently revenue in nature. This approach has been rejected by the CIT(A), as, in his considered view, it is the purpose of the subsidy which decides whether its in capital field or in revenue field. The CIT(A) has noted there is no dispute that both of these subsidies are given for the purpose of promoting growth and setting up of industries in certain backward areas, and it is for this short reason that, in accordance with the settled legal position about the same, treated the subsidies as capital in nature. The Assessing Officer is aggrieved and is in appeal before us. 144. Having heard the rival contentions and having perused the material on record, we see no reasons to interfere in the matter. It is so for the reason that as we have seen in dealing with the grounds of appeal pertaining to other subsidies, the legal position is fairly well settled, particularly in the light of the Special Bench decision of this Tribunal in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd (supra) and of Hon‟ble Supreme Court‟ decision in the case of Chaphalkar Bros (supra), and the learned Departmental Representative has not brought any material on record to show that the purpose of the subsidy is in the revenue field, or even claimed that. We, therefore, approve the conclusions arrived at by the learnd CIT(A) and decline to interfere in the matter. 145. Ground nos. 5 and 6 are thus dismissed. 146. In ground no.7, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing the pre-operative expenses amounting to Rs. 10,73,50,135/, whereas the assessee itself claimed these expenses as capital expenses in the books of accounts adding it to capital work in progress/ fixed assets?" 147. This is also a recurring issue and has come up for consideration in assessee‟s own case for several preceding assessment years. In our order for the assessment year 2009-10, this issue has been discussed at length from paragraphs 96-100, and in the assessee‟s own case for the immediately preceding year 2010-11, which is being disposed of vide this consolidated order, and for the detailed reasons set out in paragraphs 48-51 and following the decisions in the preceding assessment years referred to therein, we have upheld the similar relief allowed to the assessee. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter for this assessment year. Respectfully following our decisions in the assessee‟s own cases, we uphold the relief granted by the learned CIT(A) on this count as well. We thus confirm the conclusions arrived at by the CIT(A) on this count as well, and decline to interfere in the matter. 148. Ground no. 7 is thus dismissed. 149. In ground no.8, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was right in allowing the additional depreciation on all the eligible assets acquired before 01.04.2009?"

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ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 87 of 99 issue in favour of the assessee. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken for the immediately preceding assessment year, i.e. 2011-12. As a matter of fact, the orders for the said assessment year extensively rely upon, and refer to, this assessment year. Therefore, respectfully following our decision for the assessment year 2011-12, we uphold the plea of the assessee, and direct the Assessing Officer to delete the adjustments made by him in this regard. The assessee gets the relief accordingly. 164. Ground no. 1 is thus allowed.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 88 of 99 false claim was never made available to the appellant. The Ld. CIT(A) failed to appreciate and ought to have held that since the said decision of the CIT(A) in Ultratech's case has been overturned by the Hon'ble Mumbai Tribunal, therefore the very basis of the AO no longer survives and therefore deduction deserves to be allowed to the Appellant. 2(f). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT (A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of the AO in disallowing the claim of deduction u/s 80IA on Rail System on mere conjectures, surmises and preconceived notion. 2(g). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in rejecting the method of computing deduction u/s 80IA on Rail System adopted by the Appellant and applying method which is unsustainable in law. 2(h). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) grossly erred in confirming the AO's action who himself was in a quandary in suggesting two alternative methods for computing deduction us 801A on Rail System and thus was not justified in not quantifying the exact amount of deduction available to the appellant if deduction u/s 80-IA on allowance of deduction in appellate proceedings. 2(i) Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) grossly erred and not justified in not deciding upon the AO's suggestion that in case the appellant was found to be eligible in appellate proceedings, adjustments on account of allocated HO expenses and "CENVAT" expenses were to be made while determining the claim. 166. While dealing with the same issue for the immediately preceding assessment year, and for the detailed reasons set out in paragraphs 79 to 84 earlier in this order, we have decided this issue in favour of the assessee. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken for the immediately preceding assessment year, i.e. 2011-12. As a matter of fact, the orders for the said assessment year extensively rely upon, and refer to, this assessment year. Therefore, respectfully following our decision for the assessment year 2011-12, we uphold the plea of the assessee, and direct the Assessing Officer to delete the adjustments made by him in this regard. The assessee gets the relief accordingly. 167. Ground no. 2 is thus allowed. 168. In ground no. 3, the assessee has raised the following grievance:

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 89 of 99 3(a). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in rejecting the method of computing deduction u/s 80IA on infrastructure facility, being Port, adopted by the appellant and concluding without basis that the method adopted by the Appellant cannot be accepted. 3(b). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the method of computation of tax holiday u/s 80IA on Port adopted by the AO and confirmed by Ld. CIT(A) suffers from computational error since the AO has reduced gross transport receipts from total turnover of the Port instead of reducing the net transport receipts. 3(c) Without prejudice to above, n the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A), while rejecting the method adopted by the appellant to determine the eligible profits as "Perusable from commercial point" but "not in accordance with specific provisions of Section 80 IA(8)", failed to suggest any alternative method and computation, and thereby was completely unjustified & erred in law in rejecting the claim filed by the appellant as a whole, especially when the eligibility of the benefit was never in question. 169. While dealing with the same issue for the immediately preceding assessment year, and for the detailed reasons set out in paragraphs 88 to 99 earlier in this order, we have decided this issue in favour of the assessee. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken for the immediately preceding assessment year, i.e. 2011-12. As a matter of fact, the orders for the said assessment year extensively rely upon, and refer to, this assessment year. Therefore, respectfully following our decision for the assessment year 2011-12, we uphold the plea of the assessee, and direct the Assessing Officer to delete the adjustments made by him in this regard. The assessee gets the relief accordingly. 170. Ground no. 3 is thus allowed. 171. In ground no. 4, the assessee has raised the following grievances: 4(a). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in agreeing with the AO in treating CENVAT credit availed on inputs and capital goods used in the undertakings eligible for deduction u/s 801A as cost of the eligible undertakings. 4(b). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, assuming without admitting that if it is held that CENVAT credit relating to undertakings eligible for deduction u/s 80IA is required to be reduced from the profits of the eligible undertakings, such adjustment should be made on the basis of the actual Cenvat Credit availed on Inputs and capital goods used in the undertakings eligible for deduction u/s 80IA.

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4(c). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified in agreeing with the AO's action of apportioning CENVAT credit on the basis of turnover of the undertakings eligible for deduction u/s 80IA computed in the audited accounts filed along with Form 10CCB instead of turnover of the eligible undertakings recomputed in the order u/s 143(3). 4(d). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, assuming without admitting that if it is held that CENVAT credit relating to undertakings eligible for deduction u/s 80IA is required to be allocated, such allocation should be made on the basis of total cost of the respective eligible undertaking to the total cost (aggregate of cost of cement manufacturing unit and cost of the eligible unit) instead of allocation on the basis of turnover made in the order u/s 143(3).

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 91 of 99 5(c). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, assuming without admitting that if it is held that indirect Head Office expenses is required to be allocated, such allocation should be made on the basis of total cost of the respective eligible undertaking to the total cost of the appellant company instead of allocation on the basis of turnover made in the order u/s 143(3).

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 92 of 99 181. Learned representatives fairly agree that whatever is decided on the above issue for the assessment year 2006-07, the cross-appeals for which were heard along with this set of cross- appalls will apply mutatis mutandis for this assessment year as well. While dealing with the assessment year 2006-07, we have held as follows: 44. Learned counsel for the assessee fairly submits that the issue now stands covered against the assessee, and deduction on a provision basis is indeed inadmissible. He, however, prays that a direction may be given that the Assessing Officer at least allows it on a payment basis as and when the payments are actually made. Learned Departmental Representative does not oppose this prayer, though he adds that the deduction can only be allowed when it is otherwise admissible, and that aspect of the matter will have to be examined by the Assessing Officer. That is indeed the correct approach. While we dismiss the grievance of the asseseee, we make it clear that the Assessing Officer will take a call, as and when the payment is actually made, on the admissibility of deduction in accordance with the law. 182. We have no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by us in assessee‟s own case. The grievance of the assessee is, in terms of and subject to the above observations which will apply mutatis mutandis in this assessment year as well, rejected. 183. Ground no. 7 is thus dismissed. 184. In ground no. 8, the assessee has raised the following grievance: “On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of the AO/TPO in enhancing the Arm's Length Price of international transaction, being License Fee amounting to Rs. 3,46,89,411/- at 8.5% of Net Sales applying CUP Method instead of 0.30% of the Net Sales as submitted by the appellant in the absence of exact comparables.”

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 93 of 99 ALP adjustment for Rs 3,10,02,614 was made. Aggrieved, assessee carried the matter in appeal but without any success. The assessee is not satisfied and is in further appeal before us. 186. Having heard the rival contentions and having perused the material on record, and particularly in the absence of any substantive arguments, we see no reasons to interfere in the matter. The findings of the CIT(A) are thus confirmed. 187. In ground no. 9, the assessee has raised the following grievance: “On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in agreeing with action of AO in not allowing exclusion of profit on sale of investments amounting to Rs. 67,23,87,778/-, being capital profits, in computing Book Profit u/s 115JB of the Act.” 188. Learned representatives fairly agree that the above issue is now covered, in favour of the assessee, by Hon‟ble Calcutta High Court‟s judgment in the case of PCIT Vs Ankit metal & Power Ltd [(2019) 416 ITR 591 (Cal)], by Hon‟ble jurisdictional High Court‟s judgment in the case of CIT Vs Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd [ITA No 1132 of 2014, dated 4th January 2017] and by a coordinate bench decision in the case of ACIT Vs JSW Steel Limited [(2019) 112 taxmann.com 55 (Mum)]. Learned Departmental Representative, however, relied upon the stand of the authorities below. 189. We find that a coordinate bench of this Tribunal, in JSW Ltd‟s case (supra), has inter alia, observed as follows: 47. We further noted that Hon'ble Kolkata High Court, in the case of Pr. CIT v. Ankit Metal & Power Ltd. [2019] 109 taxmann.com 93/266 Taxman 237 Ltd. had considered an identical issue and after considering the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. (supra) held that when a receipt is not in the character of income as defined under section 2(24) of the I.T. Act, 1961, then it cannot form part of the book profit u/s 115JB of the I.T. Act, 1961. The Hon'ble High court, further observed that sales tax subsidy received by the assessee is capital receipt and does not come within definition of income under section 2(24) of the I.T. Act, 1961 and when, a receipt is not a in the nature of income, it cannot form part of book profit u/s 115JB of the I.T. Act, 1961. The Court, further observed that the facts of case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. (supra) were altogether difference, where the income in question was taxable, but was exempt under a specific provision of the Act, and as such it was to be included as a part of book profit, but where the receipt is not in the nature of income at all, it cannot be included in book profit for the purpose of computation u/s 115JB of the I.T. Act, 1961. 48. We further noted that the ITAT special bench of Kolkata Tribunal, in the case of Sutlej Cotton mills Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [1993] 45 ITD 22 (Cal.) (SB), held that a particular receipt, which is admittedly not an income cannot be brought to tax

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 94 of 99 under the deeming provisions of section 115J of the Act, as it defies the basic intention behind introduction of provisions of section 115JB of the Act. The ITAT Jaipur bench, in case of Shree Cement Ltd. (supra) had considered an identical issue and held that incentives granted to the assessee is capital receipt and hence, cannot be part of book profit computed u/s 115JB of the Act. Similarly, the ITAT Kolkata Bench, in the case of Sipca India (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2017] 80 taxmann.com 87 (Trib.) had considered an identical issue and held that when, subsidy in question is not in the nature of income, it cannot be regarded as income even for the purpose of book profit u/s 115JB of the Act, though credited in the profit and loss account and have to be excluded for arriving at the book profit u/s 115JB of the Act. 49. Insofar as, case laws relied upon by the department , we find that all those case laws have been either considered by the Tribunal or High Court and came to conclusion that in those cases the capital receipt is in the nature of income, but by a specific provision, the same has been exempted and hence, the came to the conclusion that, once particular receipt is routed through profit and loss account, then it should be part of book profit and cannot be excluded, while arriving at book profit u/s 115JB of the Act 1961. 50. In this view of the matter and considering the ratio of case laws discussed hereinabove, we are of the considered view that when a particular receipt is exempt from tax under the Income tax law, then the same cannot be considered for the purpose of computation of book profit u/s 115JB of the I.T.Act 1961. Hence, we direct the Ld. AO to exclude sales tax subsidy received by the assessee amounting to Rs. 36,15,49,828/- from book profits computed u/s 115JB of the I.T. Act, 1961. 190. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by the coordinate bench. Respectfully following the same, we uphold the plea of the assessee and direct the Assessing Officer to exclude the sales tax incentive subsidy for computing book profit under section 115 JB of the Act. The assessee gets the relief accordingly. 191. Ground nos. 9 is thus allowed in the terms indicated above. 192. In ground no.10, the assessee has raised the following grievance: 10(a). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A)erred in not admitting additional ground raised by the Appellant that the Appellant ought to be granted the benefit of Article 10 of the India Mauritius Double Tax Avoidance Agreement on the dividends declared to Holderind Investments Ltd., Mauritius. 10(b). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) erred in not admitting additional evidences submitted by the Appellant. 10(c). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) ought to have held that the dividend declared by the Appellant should have been

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 95 of 99 liable to dividend distribution tax (DDT') at the rate of 5 percent as against 16.2225 percent and the refund of excess DDT paid ought to have been allowed to the Appellant. 193. Learned counsel submits that the learned CIT(A) did not admit this additional plea, and prays that the ground may be admitted and sent to the file of the Assessing Officer for adjudication on merits. Learned Departmental Representative, however, opposes the plea. 194. Having heard the rival contentions and having perused the material on record, we deem it fit and proper to admit the ground of appeal but remit the same to the file of the Assessing Officer for adjudication on merits. Ordered, accordingly. 195. Ground no. 13 is thus allowed for statistical purposes.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 96 of 99 taken in assessee‟s own case, we dismiss this grievance as well, and decline to interfere in the matter. 203. Ground no 2 is thus dismissed. 204. In ground no. 3, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing the exclusion of excise duty incentive availed by the assessee, aggregating to Rs.126,32,00,487/-, as capital in nature, while computing its total income, whereas the same is in the nature of revenue incentive. 205. This is also a recurring issue and has come up for consideration before us in assessee‟s own case for several preceding assessment years. While dealing with the appeal for the assessment year 2011-12 earlier in this order, and for the detailed reasons set out in paragraphs 139 to 141 and decisions referred to therein, we have dismissed exactly the same grievance of the assessee. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter in this assessment year. Respectfully following the view so taken in assessee‟s own case, we dismiss this grievance as well, and decline to interfere in the matter. 206. Ground no 3 is thus dismissed. 207. In ground no. 4, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing the road transport subsidy availed by the assessee, aggregating to Rs. 55,74,02,199/-, as capital in nature, whereas the same is in the nature of revenue incentive.” 208. While dealing with the appeal for the assessment year 2011-12 earlier in this order, and for the detailed reasons set out in paragraphs 142 to 146 and decisions referred to therein, we have dismissed exactly the same grievance of the assessee. Respectfully following the view so taken in assessee‟s own case, we dismiss this grievance as well, and decline to interfere in the matter. 209. Ground no 4 is thus dismissed. 210. In ground no. 5, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing the pre-operative expenses amounting to Rs. 5,15,11,993/- , whereas the assessee itself claimed these expenses as capital expenses in the books of accounts adding it to capital work in progress/ fixed assets.”

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 97 of 99 211. This is also a recurring issue and has come up for consideration in several preceding assessment years in assessee‟s own cases. While dealing with the appeal for the assessment year 2011-12 earlier in this order, and for the detailed reasons set out in paragraphs 147 to 149 and decisions referred to therein, we have dismissed exactly the same grievance of the assessee. Respectfully following the view so taken in assessee‟s own case, we dismiss this grievance as well, and decline to interfere in the matter. 212. Ground no 5 is thus dismissed. 213. In ground no. 6, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance:

"On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing the additional depreciation u/s. 32(1)(üa) on all the eligible assets acquired on or after 01.04.2005 instead of 01.04.2011, to the tune of Rs.267,03,82,371/-" 214. This is also a recurring isse and has come up for our consideration in a number of preceding assessment years in the assessee‟s own cases. While dealing with the appeal for the assessment year 2010-11 earlier in this order, and for the detailed reasons set out in paragraphs 52 to 55 and decisions referred to therein, we have dismissed exactly the same grievance of the assessee. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by us. Respectfully following the view so taken in assessee‟s own case, we dismiss this grievance as well, and decline to interfere in the matter. 215. Ground no 6 is thus dismissed. 216. In ground no. 7, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld. CIT(A) erred in directing the assessing officer to delete the addition of unutilized CENVAT credit on last day of accounting year being 31.03.2012 to the closing stock u/s. 145A of the Act." 217. This is also a recurring issue and has come up for our consideration in a number of preceding assessment years in the assessee‟s own cases. While dealing with the appeal for the assessment year 2011-12 earlier in this order, and for the detailed reasons set out in paragraphs 153 to 155 and decisions referred to therein, we have dismissed exactly the same grievance of the assessee. The same is view of the coordinate benches in assessee‟s own cases right form 1999-2000 onwards. We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by us. Respectfully following the view so taken in assessee‟s own case, we dismiss this grievance as well, and decline to interfere in the matter. 218. Ground no 6 is thus dismissed.

ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 Assessment years: 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 Page 98 of 99 219. In ground no. 8 and 9, which we will trake up together, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing the addition, amounting to Rs.8,63,37,421/-, on account of cessation of liability towards sundry creditors, which was outstanding for a very long period of time. "On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld. CIT(A) erred in ignoring the decision dated 20.07.2012 of Hon'ble Delhi High Court, in the case of CIT vs. Chipsoft Technology Put. Ltd., in ITA No. 598 of 2011.” 220 To adjudicate on these grievances, it is sufficient to take note of the fact that the outstanding credit balances for more than three years, which aggregated to Rs 8,63,37,421, were treated as cessation of income by the Assessing Officer and brought to tax. The Assessing Officer was of the view that when dues are outstanding for so long, they cease to be in existence either because creditors are not demanding it or because they cannot demand it on account of the operation of law. Aggrieved, the assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A), who deleted this addition by observing that just because these entries are old entries, these entries cannot be added to the income of the assessee, that these amounts were allowed in the earlier years as well and that there is nothing to indicate that there is any cessation or remission of these liabilities. The Assessing Officer is aggrieved of the relief so granted by the CIT(A) and is in appeal before us. 221. We have heard the rival contentions, perused the material on record and duly considered facts of the case in the light of the applicable legal position. 222. As learned CIT(A) has rightly observed, just because entries are old entries and have remained unpaid, and particularly when the Assessing Officer has not conducted any enquiries which lead to the conclusion about lack of bonafides of such entries, it cannot be inferred that there is a cessation of liability and these entries can be added to the income of the assessee. We have noted that the Assessing Officer has not conducted any enquiries whatsoever, and there is nothing more than the entries being old that has been put against the assessee. In these circumstances, in our considered view, the learned CIT(A) was indeed justified in deleting the impugned addition on account of income from the cessation of liability. We approve the conclusions arrived at by the learned CIT(A) and decline to interfere in the matter. 223. Ground no. 9 is also thus dismissed. 224. In ground no. 10, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance: "On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing the exclusion of sales tax incentive, excise duty exemption and road transport subsidy as capital in nature, while computing the total income u/s. 115JB of the Act, whereas the same are in the nature of revenue incentive.”

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