Commissioner of Income Tax-II vs. M/s. Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation Ltd.

Bench: P.SAM KOSHY,LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY

Section 18 and explained its significance in the following words: ―22. The significance of Section 18 of the Act can be understood in the light of the above provisions. Section 18 provides for provisional assessment of duty in cases specified in sub-section (1) of the section. Clause (c) of sub-section (1) deals with cases where the importer

Mr. Vasamsetty Veera Venkata Satyanarayana vs. The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax -1

The appeal is allowed and the order passed

Bench: P.SAM KOSHY,NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA

reassessed the shipping bills and as such the order of the Learned Tribunal cannot be sustained in law? CUSTA NO. 14 OF 2025 REPORTABLE Page 3 of 50 B. Whether the Learned Tribunal has gone beyond its jurisdiction to award interest @12% p.a w.e.f 11.01.2011 till 5/6.09.2023 when admittedly the amount of excess duty to be refunded to the respondent

The Pr. Commissioner of Income-tax-4 vs. Sri. Krishna Chigullapally

Bench: N.TUKARAMJI,UJJAL BHUYAN

69 of the KVAT Act, rectifying the order by dropping estimated turnover as per the return and books of accounts. The JCCT(A)5 dismissed assessee’s appeal. On further appeal, KAT, by the impugned order, has allowed assessee’s appeal. Feeling aggrieved, the Revenue has preferred these petitions. 2 ‘KVAT Act’ for short 3 Assessing Officer 4 Assessment Year

M/S NMDC LIMITED vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

The appeal is allowed

Bench: T.VINOD KUMAR,M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO

Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The Trial Court, vide order dated 28.03.2014, directed the respondent-husband to pay maintenance of Rs. 8,000/- per month to the appellant-wife and Rs. 6,000/- per month to the minor son, along with Rs. 5,000/- towards litigation costs. The Trial Court, vide order dated 10.01.2016, dismissed the matrimonial

M/s. Kausalya Shelters Private Limited vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax

Bench: N.TUKARAMJI,UJJAL BHUYAN

Section 34 of the Act of 1996, shall not/ought not disturb the interpretation given by the learned Arbitrator, merely because another interpretation of the same Clause is also possible. Similarly, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Arbitrator in paragraph 51 of the Impugned Award is a plausible interpretation of the Clause 8(A)(c) of the sub-lease deed

Pinna Nageswara RAo, vs. Commissioner of Income tax, IV (A.P)

Bench: P.SAM KOSHY,SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO

Section 23(1)(A) of the LA Act from the date of award till the date of possession as there is a gap of 3 years from the date of award to possession of the acquired land. 18.6 Learned Senior Counsel/Learned Counsel for the Appellants submit that the acquired land’s potential, urban character, and intended acquisition purpose requires

PRL COMMR OF INCOME TAX-7, HYDERABAD vs. M/S SRI VENKATESWARA PADMAVATHI COMPAY, KHAMMAM DIST

Bench: P.SAM KOSHY,NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA

Section 23(1)(A) of the LA Act from the date of award till the date of possession as there is a gap of 3 years from the date of award to possession of the acquired land. 18.6 Learned Senior Counsel/Learned Counsel for the Appellants submit that the acquired land’s potential, urban character, and intended acquisition purpose requires

Kuchipudi Krishna Kishore vs. THE DCIT, CIR-2[1],

Bench: P.SAM KOSHY,N.TUKARAMJI

Section 23(1)(A) of the LA Act from the date of award till the date of possession as there is a gap of 3 years from the date of award to possession of the acquired land. 18.6 Learned Senior Counsel/Learned Counsel for the Appellants submit that the acquired land’s potential, urban character, and intended acquisition purpose requires

Commissioner of Income Tax -II, vs. M/S Kasila Farms Ltd.,

Bench: P.SAM KOSHY,LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY

Section 23(1)(A) of the LA Act from the date of award till the date of possession as there is a gap of 3 years from the date of award to possession of the acquired land. 18.6 Learned Senior Counsel/Learned Counsel for the Appellants submit that the acquired land’s potential, urban character, and intended acquisition purpose requires