Landmark Cases on Assessment Procedure

An assessment order, notice under Section 143(2), or revision order under Section 263 passed in the name of a deceased assessee after their death is void and invalid. Proceedings cannot be continued against a dead person, and participation by legal heirs does not validate defective notices issued in the name of the deceased.

A reference to the Director of Valuation (DVO) for assessing the value of cost of construction is permissible only after the assessee's books of account concerning such cost have been rejected by the revenue on a legal or justified basis. If the books of account are maintained and not rejected, a reference to the DVO is misconceived.

When two interpretations of a legal provision are possible, the interpretation favouring the assessee should be adopted.

A prima facie adjustment under section 143(1) cannot be made when the issue is debatable and two opinions are possible.

The Central Processing Centre (CPC) is empowered to disallow delayed payments of PF/ESIC under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act. This disallowance is valid even if the original assessment was framed under Section 143(3).

The jurisdiction to assess and the liability to pay tax are not conditional on the validity of the notice. Liability to pay tax is founded in charging sections, not machinery provisions.

When a statute or notification grants a concession, its conditions must be strictly complied with to avail that concession. The benefit of Input Tax Credit (ITC) is a concession, not a right, and requires fulfillment of specified conditions, such as producing an original tax invoice.

The Delhi High Court's ruling in Commissioner of Income-tax vs Anil Kumar Bhatia (2013) is affirmed as the prevailing legal position regarding assessment procedures.

The initiation of proceedings under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act can be supported based on the relationship between individuals and their control over group accounts, even when land development agreements are involved.

A notice issued under section 143(2) is invalid if the Assessing Officer issuing it lacks jurisdiction over the assessee's case. Jurisdiction cannot be retrospectively conferred.

When a return is filed as an artificial juridical person, the assessee cannot be treated as an association of persons.

An assessment for a particular year is final and conclusive only for that year. An earlier decision on the same issue is not binding in a subsequent year unless it is arbitrary or perverse.

An order passed under section 143(1) merges with a subsequent regular assessment under section 143(3), allowing arguments related to the section 143(1) order to be raised in appeal under section 143(3).

Filing Form 10-IE after the due date is a directory requirement, not mandatory, for opting into the concessional tax regime under section 115BAC. The benefit of the scheme should not be denied if the form is available during processing.

An assessment order passed by an Assessing Officer without jurisdiction is void ab initio. The assessee must raise an objection to jurisdiction within one month, failing which the Assessing Officer can proceed with the assessment.

An assessment order suffering from a defect of limitation is without jurisdiction. The absence of a date on an assessment order prevents it from being presumed to be made within the prescribed limitation period.

An admission of undisclosed income during a survey is a relevant factor to be considered when determining the tax liability, and the Assessing Officer should provide set-off for such admissions.

Mechanical approval of a draft assessment order by a superior authority renders the assessment order void ab initio, as it indicates a lack of proper application of mind.

This case is cited as authority for a proposition related to the assessment procedure, likely concerning the application of Section 148 or other aspects of reassessment, as it appears in a list of cases that are often cited together in such contexts.

When an Assessing Officer issues a questionnaire under Section 142(1) and the assessee provides explanations and materials, the failure to discuss these in the assessment order does not automatically render the assessment invalid, especially if no prejudice to the revenue is established. The Assessing Officer's failure to establish both error and prejudice is critical.

Service of a notice under section 143(2) within the statutory time limit is mandatory for proceedings under section 147/148, not merely a procedural requirement.

The power to disallow a deduction or relief claimed in a return under section 143(1)(a) can only be exercised when the claim is prima facie inadmissible, meaning the error is clear or self-evident from the face of the return and accompanying documents. A debatable issue cannot be decided under this section.

An assessment made in the name of a dissolved company after amalgamation, despite the assessing officer being informed of the amalgamation, is a procedural defect that can be cured, not an assessment that is void ab initio.

The court does not interfere with impugned judgments previously passed by the High Court in cases dealing with various aspects of income tax law.

Proceedings under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, initiated for unabated assessment years, are not sustainable in the absence of incriminating documents seized during a search.

Amendments, even if framed as 'declaratory' or for the 'removal of doubts', are not presumed retrospective if they substantively change the law. Courts must examine the substance of an amendment, not just its wording, to determine if it's clarificatory or transformative.

An assessment order is valid only if it is signed. An unsigned assessment order is a defect that affects the validity of the subsequent demand notice and recovery proceedings.

An assessee cannot challenge the jurisdiction of an assessing officer after the expiry of one month from the date of service of notice, unless the objection is raised within 30 days of the notice under section 124(3)(a).

Failure to maintain accounts under section 44AA constitutes a complete offence, and subsequent maintenance of accounts cannot absolve the assessee of this prior offence.

The High Court's decision in this case is cited for the proposition that certain procedural aspects or principles related to income tax assessments were upheld or interpreted. The specific holding is not fully detailed in the provided excerpts.

An administrative approval granted by a higher authority does not invalidate an assessment order if the Assessing Officer retains their quasi-judicial power to determine income. The Assessing Officer's quasi-judicial powers are paramount in the assessment process.

Reassessment proceedings are not for the benefit of the assessee, and an assessee cannot use them to review their original assessment or raise claims unrelated to the reasons for reopening.

Lower authorities are bound to accept the decisions of appellate authorities without reservation. If this healthy rule is not followed, it results in undue harassment to assessees and chaos in tax administration.

Once an application is admitted by the Settlement Commission, it has exclusive jurisdiction over the assessee's case until a final order is passed, precluding the Assessing Officer and Commissioner (Appeals) from invoking reassessment provisions.

An Assessing Officer can initiate reassessment proceedings under Section 147 even if an assessment under Section 143(1) has been made and the opportunity to scrutinize under Section 143(2) was not exercised, provided the conditions for Section 147 are met.

The filing of an auditor's report is a distinct requirement from the maintenance and auditing of accounts.

The Assessing Officer's reliance on a previous judgment is challenged when that judgment's ratio has been distinguished by a subsequent High Court ruling, indicating the need for careful consideration of case precedents and their applicability.

A completed assessment order cannot be reopened based on a DVO report received after the assessment, as this would undermine the finality of assessments and the time limits prescribed by the Income Tax Act.

A revised return filed after the Department has discovered discrepancies is not considered voluntary. The assessee is bound to explain the additional income or omissions in the original return.

Reopening an assessment under section 148 beyond four years from the relevant assessment year, following an assessment under section 143(3), is only valid if there's a proven failure by the assessee to disclose all material facts. The reassessment cannot be sustained if material facts were available during the original assessment or if it's based on a mere change of opinion.

The existence of an alternative statutory remedy will not prevent a High Court from exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 if the remedy is illusory, a mirage, or an exercise in futility. This is particularly true when the appeal is perceived as being 'from Caesar to Caesar's wife'.

If a statute prescribes a specific procedure for carrying out a particular action, that procedure must be followed precisely, and deviations are not permitted. The State cannot disregard the statutory intent and prescribed process.

The Supreme Court, while capable of making law and solving problems in nebulous areas, cannot ignore substantive statutory provisions when exercising its powers under Article 142, especially if such exercise directly conflicts with express statutory mandates.

Re-litigating an issue already decided constitutes an abuse of the court process, even if not strictly barred by res judicata. The court should not lightly interfere with family arrangements regarding asset division, especially if substantially acted upon.

Economic legislation is afforded wide latitude, with courts applying a test that acknowledges the legislature's broad powers in this area. The interpretation of legislative provisions should rely on their plain reading rather than external materials like affidavits or submissions.

When interpreting a taxing statute, the charging provisions must be strictly construed, while machinery provisions related to tax calculation or procedure should be construed by ordinary rules of construction to ensure the machinery is workable and gives meaning to the charging provisions.

A change in the method of accounting cannot be a valid reason for filing a revised return of income under Section 139(5) of the Income-tax Act.

A notice issued under section 153A of the Income Tax Act to a non-existing or deceased person is invalid in law.

Prima facie adjustments under Section 143(1)(a) cannot be made for highly debatable issues. Such issues are not fit for summary adjustments and require detailed examination.