Landmark Cases on Assessment Procedure

A revised return can only be filed if the assessee discovers an omission or wrong statement in the original return.

An assessment for a particular year is final and conclusive only for that year. An earlier decision on the same issue is not binding in a subsequent year unless it is arbitrary or perverse.

An order passed under section 143(1) merges with a subsequent regular assessment under section 143(3), allowing arguments related to the section 143(1) order to be raised in appeal under section 143(3).

Filing Form 10-IE after the due date is a directory requirement, not mandatory, for opting into the concessional tax regime under section 115BAC. The benefit of the scheme should not be denied if the form is available during processing.

An assessment order passed without jurisdiction is void ab initio. An objection to jurisdiction must be raised within one month as per Section 124(3)(a).

An assessment order suffering from a defect of limitation is without jurisdiction. The absence of a date on an assessment order prevents it from being presumed to be made within the prescribed limitation period.

Mechanical approval of a draft assessment order by a superior authority renders the assessment order void ab initio, as it indicates a lack of proper application of mind.

This case is cited as authority for a proposition related to the assessment procedure, likely concerning the application of Section 148 or other aspects of reassessment, as it appears in a list of cases that are often cited together in such contexts.

When an Assessing Officer issues a questionnaire under Section 142(1) and the assessee provides explanations and materials, the failure to discuss these in the assessment order does not automatically render the assessment invalid, especially if no prejudice to the revenue is established. The Assessing Officer's failure to establish both error and prejudice is critical.

Service of a notice under section 143(2) within the statutory time limit is mandatory for proceedings under section 147/148, and not merely a procedural requirement.

Circulars issued under section 119 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, while having the force of law, cannot override the substantive provisions of the Act itself. CBDT instructions cannot override parent legislation if they are contrary to the Act.

The power to disallow a deduction or relief claimed in a return under section 143(1)(a) can only be exercised when the claim is prima facie inadmissible, meaning the error is clear or self-evident from the face of the return and accompanying documents. A debatable issue cannot be decided under this section.

An assessment made in the name of a dissolved company after amalgamation, despite the assessing officer being informed of the amalgamation, is a procedural defect that can be cured, not an assessment that is void ab initio.

This case is cited for the proposition that the High Court's judgments, including those in Spice Entertainment Ltd. and Dimension Apparels (P) Ltd., are not subject to interference when there is no apparent reason to do so.

Proceedings under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, initiated for unabated assessment years, are not sustainable in the absence of incriminating documents seized during a search.

Amendments, even if framed as 'declaratory' or for the 'removal of doubts', are not presumed retrospective if they substantively change the law. Courts must examine the substance of an amendment, not just its wording, to determine if it's clarificatory or transformative.

An order or decision of an income tax authority becomes operative from the date it is signed. The signing of an assessment order by the Assessing Officer is mandatory and not a curable procedural defect.

The Delhi High Court affirmed the CIT(A)'s order and dismissed the Revenue's appeal. This implies an affirmation of a prior ruling or principle.

An assessee cannot challenge the jurisdiction of an assessing officer after the expiry of one month from the date of service of notice, unless the objection is raised within 30 days of the notice under section 124(3)(a).

Failure to maintain accounts as required by Section 44AA constitutes an offence under Section 271A, and once this offence is complete, no further offence under Section 44AA can be committed.

When an assessment is set aside, the Assessing Officer can make a fresh assessment in accordance with law. The court explained the distinction between setting aside, cancellation, and annulment of assessment and the time limits for fresh assessments.

Lower authorities are bound to accept the decisions of appellate authorities without reservation. If this healthy rule is not followed, it results in undue harassment to assessees and chaos in tax administration.

Once an application is admitted by the Settlement Commission, it has exclusive jurisdiction over the assessee's case until a final order is passed, precluding the Assessing Officer and Commissioner (Appeals) from invoking reassessment provisions.

An Assessing Officer can initiate reassessment proceedings under Section 147 even if an assessment under Section 143(1) has been made and the opportunity to scrutinize under Section 143(2) was not exercised, provided the conditions for Section 147 are met.

An audit report required for a deduction under section 80HHC can be filed after the due date for the return, but before the completion of assessment, and its subsequent filing is not fatal to the claim.

Rejection of books of accounts is not a precondition for an inquiry under section 142A.

Accepting a Director of Valuation (DVO) report received after the assessment order would undermine the finality of assessment and disregard time limits for framing assessments. The Income Tax Act does not grant Commissioners unlimited discretion to alter completed assessments.

Reopening of assessment is impermissible if the issue sought to be reopened was already considered and decided in a regular assessment under section 143(3), particularly if the subsequent reopening is based on a mere change of opinion.

Reopening an assessment under section 148 beyond four years from the relevant assessment year, following an assessment under section 143(3), is only valid if there's a proven failure by the assessee to disclose all material facts. The reassessment cannot be sustained if material facts were available during the original assessment or if it's based on a mere change of opinion.

The existence of an alternative statutory remedy will not prevent a High Court from exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 if the remedy is illusory, a mirage, or an exercise in futility. This is particularly true when the appeal is perceived as being 'from Caesar to Caesar's wife'.

If a statute prescribes a specific procedure for carrying out a particular action, that procedure must be followed precisely, and deviations are not permitted. The State cannot disregard the statutory intent and prescribed process.

The Supreme Court, while capable of making law and solving problems in nebulous areas, cannot ignore substantive statutory provisions when exercising its powers under Article 142, especially if such exercise directly conflicts with express statutory mandates.

The court may prevent its machinery from being used as a means of vexation and oppression, constituting an abuse of process, even regardless of the principles of Res Judicata. The use of court process must be bona fide and proper.

Economic legislation is afforded wide latitude, with courts applying a test that acknowledges the legislature's broad powers in this area. The interpretation of legislative provisions should rely on their plain reading rather than external materials like affidavits or submissions.

When interpreting a taxing statute, the charging provisions must be strictly construed, while machinery provisions related to tax calculation or procedure should be construed by ordinary rules of construction to ensure the machinery is workable and gives meaning to the charging provisions.

A change in the method of accounting cannot be a valid reason for filing a revised return of income under Section 139(5) of the Income-tax Act.

A notice issued under section 153A of the Income Tax Act to a non-existing or deceased person is invalid in law.

Prima facie adjustments under Section 143(1)(a) cannot be made for highly debatable issues. Such issues are not fit for summary adjustments and require detailed examination.

A notice issued under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act is upheld, with the matter remitted back to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits. This decision relies on the ITAT, Ahmedabad Bench's ruling in Bharat Ginning & Pressing Factory v. ITO (2013).

The initiation of reassessment proceedings under Section 147/148 is invalid if the required prior approval from the competent authority under Section 151 is not obtained, rendering the entire proceeding void ab initio.

Forms provided by a rule-making authority, being delegates of the legislature, cannot override a statutory provision and are subservient to legislation. Forms facilitate implementation and cannot supplant the law. Also, interest under section 234B, being compensatory, cannot be charged if taxes have already been paid.

The situs of the Assessing Officer at the time of framing an assessment determines the jurisdictional High Court for entertaining an appeal. Orders under Section 201 are considered akin to an assessment.

Service of notice by affixture is a nullity in the absence of a local witness.

The facts of NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Ltd. v. DDIT are distinct from other cases, particularly concerning the Assessing Officer's communication regarding the satisfaction of conditions for reopening under GKN Driveshafts India Ltd.

A revised income tax return offering additional income is not acceptable if the assessee cannot establish an inadvertent mistake or omission in the original return, and instead appears to be a change of opinion to correct a deliberate omission.

A reference under Section 142A cannot be resorted to unless contingencies are reflected on the record. This principle has been upheld in subsequent judgments.

A presumption exists that judicial and official acts, including assessment orders under section 143(3), are performed regularly and after application of mind.

The case is cited as authority for procedural aspects of income tax law, particularly concerning the interplay between different court decisions and their citation in legal proceedings. It establishes precedent for how tax appeals and assessments are referenced and contested.

A surcharge imposed by the Finance Act is a special addition to taxes on income, and its legislative history traces back to its recommendation in the report of the Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms.

A decision that disregards an earlier binding precedent from a coordinate bench is considered per incuriam and lacks precedential value. Such a decision cannot form the basis for referring a matter to a special bench, as this is reserved for cases with conflicting binding precedents.