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577 tribunal orders from the Varanasi bench.
Counted from the judgments of this bench on BharatTax. The figure is how many of them cite each decision.
An appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal can be dismissed for non-prosecution or treated as unadmitted when the appellant fails to appear, cooperate, or show diligence, in accordance with Rule 19(2) of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules. The law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.
A court or tribunal is not bound to answer a reference or adjudicate an appeal on its merits if the party at whose instance the proceeding is made fails to appear at the hearing or take necessary steps for its proper conduct.
Beneficial provisions in tax law should be interpreted strictly, with the burden of proof on the assessee. Ambiguous beneficial provisions are interpreted in favour of the Revenue.
Employee contributions to PF and ESIC, deposited beyond the due date under the respective Acts but within the due date for filing the income tax return under Section 139(1), are allowable deductions under Section 36(1)(va). Such disallowance cannot be made during processing under Section 143(1).
A proviso inserted into a section to remedy unintended consequences, make the section workable, or supply an obvious omission must be read retrospectively in operation to give effect to the section as a whole.
Employees' contributions to welfare funds, such as provident fund, are not allowable as a deduction under section 36(1)(va) if deposited beyond the due date prescribed under the respective welfare statutes, even by a single day. Such delayed deposits are not cured even if made before the income-tax return filing due date.
Corroborative evidence is essential to support evidence found on third-party premises, and an assessment cannot be based on suspicion, surmises, or conjecture.
Belated remittance of employees' contribution to ESI and PF, even if deposited before the due date for filing the return of income under Section 139(1), is not allowed as a deduction. This disallowance falls under Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 2(24)(x), as Section 43B applies only to employer's contributions.
Deduction for employees' contributions to PF and ESIC is allowable under Section 43B if paid before the due date for filing the return under Section 139(1); similarly, delayed deposits of employers' contributions to ESIC and PF are also allowable.
Employee contributions to provident fund, ESI, and other welfare funds, if deposited by the due date for furnishing the return of income under Section 139(1), are allowable as a deduction and cannot be disallowed under Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 2(24)(x) or Section 43B, even if deposited after the due date prescribed by the respective welfare Acts.
A co-operative credit society engaged in banking business with the general public, accepting deposits from non-members and advancing loans to non-members, is treated as a co-operative bank. Such a society falls under the exclusionary clause of Section 80P(4) and is not eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).
Employee contributions to provident fund and ESI, if paid beyond the due date prescribed by the respective welfare fund statutes, are not allowed as a deduction under the Income Tax Act.
Employee contributions to Provident Fund (PF) and Employee State Insurance (ESI) are deductible under the Income Tax Act if deposited by the assessee before the due date for filing the return of income, even if such deposits are made after the specific due dates prescribed under the respective PF and ESI Acts.
Amendments to the Income-tax Act that are curative, clarificatory, or beneficial in nature apply retrospectively from the date the original statutory provision was introduced, even if not explicitly stated.
Employees' contributions to ESI and PF are not deductible if deposited after the due dates specified in the respective welfare statutes, even if paid before the income tax return filing due date under section 139(1). This is because sections 36(1)(va) and 43B operate independently, with section 36(1)(va) specifically governing such contributions.
Employee contributions to welfare funds, such as provident fund or ESI, are deductible under section 36(1)(va) of the Income-tax Act if paid before the due date for filing the return of income, even if paid after the due date specified in the respective welfare fund statute.
Employees' contribution towards Provident Fund (PF) and Employees' State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) is allowable as a deduction under Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 43B if deposited before the due date of filing the income tax return, even if deposited after the expiry of the statutory time period specified in the applicable fund's statute.
Sun Export Corporation held that any ambiguity in a tax exemption provision or notification must be interpreted in favor of the assessee or the subject.
The Supreme Court holds that for income tax purposes, the term 'income' includes 'loss,' allowing for the set-off of a spouse's or minor child's business losses when their income is clubbed with the assessee. This decision emphasizes interpreting tax statutes, especially benevolent provisions, by considering the legislative scheme over a strict literal construction.
Most recent orders on record, from 2026.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment was vitiated in law. It noted that the assessee had, in its written submissions before the AO and in its computation of income for AY 2011-12, explicitly pointed out and added back the loss of Rs. 73,39,019/- on account of the sale of fixed assets. The AO, however, failed to take cognizance of this submission and the assessee's computation, proceeding to add back the amount again. The CIT(A) confirmed this action without observing that the assessee had already suo motu disallowed this amount. The Tribunal found that this led to a double addition of the same amount to the assessee's income. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 73,49,019/- was deleted. Furthermore, the Tribunal held that since the entire reopening was based on an incorrect appreciation of facts without recording any failure on the part of the assessee to fully and truly disclose material facts, the reopening was void ab initio. The addition and the imposition of tax at regular rates instead of MAT were quashed. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that only those investments which actually yielded exempt income during the relevant previous year can be factored into the average value computation for Section 14A disallowances. This principle was supported by various High Court decisions, including Cargo Motors Private Limited vs. Dy. CIT (Delhi HC), Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-1, Kolkata v. M/s. Shalimar Pellet Feeds Ltd (Cal. HC), and CIT, Chennai vs. Shriram Ownership Trust (Madras HC). The Tribunal also referred to ITAT Special Bench decision in ACIT v. Vireet Investment (P.) Ltd. (Delhi ITAT SB). Consequently, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s confirmation of the disallowance based on the total investment portfolio was incorrect. Since the assessee had already suo motu disallowed Rs. 73,715 considering mutual funds that yielded dividend income, the additional disallowance of Rs. 2,14,98,928 was deleted. As the remaining grounds were consequential to this addition, they were rendered infructuous and dismissed. The appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in restricting the adjudication of the appeal for AY 2010-11 solely to the issue of closing stock valuation. The Tribunal observed that while the ITAT's order for AY 2010-11 might not have explicitly detailed the reasons for restoration, the issues involved in AY 2009-10 were distinct from those in AY 2010-11. The use of the word "similarly" in the ITAT's order was interpreted as merely reflecting a similar approach to restoring the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, not limiting the scope to a specific issue. Consequently, the CIT(A) was obliged to consider all grounds of appeal raised by the assessee. Since the CIT(A) failed to do so, the matter was restored back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication of all grounds of appeal in accordance with the law. The Tribunal explicitly noted that the method of valuation of closing stock was not an issue under consideration for AY 2010-11.
The Tribunal dismissed ITA No. 74/VNS/2025 (AY 2012-13) in limine due to a delay of over five years in filing the appeal, noting the absence of a death certificate to substantiate the reason for the delay. Regarding ITA No. 72/VNS/2025 (AY 2013-14), the Tribunal upheld the penalty under Section 271B. The Tribunal reasoned that Section 44AB mandates getting accounts audited and furnishing the report by the specified date. While Circular No. 03/2009 waives the condition of furnishing the audit report along with the return if the return is filed on time with relevant columns filled, in this case, no return was furnished at all before the due date. The assessee's inconsistent pleas, first blaming the counsel and then claiming income below taxable limits, did not absolve her from the obligation under Section 44AB. The Tribunal held that since the assessee neither furnished the audit report nor a return of income with filled columns before the due date, the penalty under Section 271B was leviable and rightly imposed by the AO. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was engaged in an adventure in the nature of trade of construction and sale of flats, and therefore, the income should be assessed under the head 'income from business or profession'. The reasoning was based on analyzing the facts in light of the Supreme Court's parameters for determining the character of a transaction. Key factors considered were the construction of 12 flats, with two-thirds sold to unrelated parties, indicating an intention to exploit the property commercially. The fact that construction was funded by customer advances before completion further supported the intention to construct for sale, consistent with real estate developers. The Tribunal noted that even a single transaction can constitute an adventure in the nature of trade, as held in Commissioner Of Income Tax vs. Sutlej Cotton Mills Supply Agency. Consequently, the assessee was not entitled to deduction under section 54. However, the proportionate cost of land and construction attributable to the sold flats would be deductible from the sale proceeds while computing taxable business income.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee's failure to produce books of accounts justified rejecting them, the AO's addition of the entire amount of alleged suppressed sales was not sustainable. The AO's computation started with the assessee's opening stock from audited accounts, and there was no allegation of undisclosed investment in the stock sold outside the books. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that only the profit element in such transactions could be added. Accordingly, the addition was confirmed to the extent of 2.32% of the allegedly suppressed sales, representing the profit element based on the GP rate adopted by the AO. The balance of the addition was deleted. Grounds 2 and 4 were dismissed as not pressed due to lack of arguments or material. Ground 3 was held partly allowed as the addition was substantially varied.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had failed to consider the submissions and documents filed by the assessee during the appellate proceedings. While the Revenue argued that this was due to the assessee not justifying the non-furnishing of documents before the Assessing Officer under Rule 46A, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s order did not discuss this aspect. Instead, it appeared that the documents and explanations were simply not considered, as the order only made reference to the statement of facts and Form No. 35. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had issued notices to the assessee on 07.01.2021 and 23.09.2024 and was therefore bound to consider the submissions and documents furnished in response. The failure to do so rendered the CIT(A)'s order deficient and violative of the principles of natural justice. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for consideration of the explanations and documents filed by the assessee and to pass a fresh order. The Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 147 were bad in law and void ab initio. The AO's belief of income escapement was formed mechanically without establishing a live, rational, or proximate connection between the information received from the search and the alleged escapement of income. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that material relied upon by the AO was not provided, and the response to the show cause notice was not considered. Furthermore, there was a variance between the show cause notice and the assessment order, which was not explained. On merits, the Tribunal found that the AO treated purchases as bogus but accepted sales figures without rejecting the books of account, violating the principle that to effect sales, purchases must be made. Adding purchases as bogus without considering the issue of non-availability of stock lacked foundation. The Tribunal also held that Section 69C could not be applied as the revenue failed to establish that an expenditure was incurred and the assessee could not prove it. The assessee had provided voluminous documents, including audited balance sheets, ledgers, bank statements, and inventory registers, which the AO did not comment adversely upon. The AO's selective discarding of purchases while accepting sales, closing stock, and bank payments indicated a flip-flop approach. Therefore, the additions made by the AO and sustained by the NFAC were not sustainable on merits and were liable to be deleted. The reassessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance made by the AO under Section 40A(3) of the Act was not legally tenable because the AO did not bring any specific findings or point out specific violations, and the deeming provision of Section 40A(3) never came into operation as the AO lacked necessary details. The Tribunal affirmed the co-terminus powers of the CIT(A), stating that the CIT(A) could reject books of account under Section 145(3) and apply a net profit rate, even if the AO had incorrectly applied Section 40A(3). The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s approach of rejecting books of account and applying a 6% net profit rate on gross receipts could not be faulted, as the AO's invocation of Section 40A(3) had no legal foundation. Regarding Ground No. 4 concerning depreciation, no arguments were advanced by either party, and it was dismissed as not pressed. The appeal of the Department was dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that for subsequent assessment years, the Revenue accepted similar bank deposits as belonging to the society, not the individual. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that for subsequent assessment years, the Revenue accepted similar bank deposits as belonging to the society, not the individual. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that for subsequent assessment years, the Revenue accepted similar bank deposits as belonging to the society, not the individual. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that for subsequent assessment years, the Revenue accepted similar bank deposits as belonging to the society, not the individual. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the NFAC and restored the file to the Assessing Officer, granting the assessee one more opportunity to present its case. The assessee was cautioned to comply with future directions.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the NFAC, which had dismissed the appeal in limine due to delay. The Tribunal restored the file to the AO, directing that the assessee be given one more opportunity to present her case.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and restored the matter to the AO. The assessee was granted one more opportunity to present her case with supporting evidence for the cash deposits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer. The assessee is directed to provide documentation to explain the cash deposits from its Khadi and Village Industries business.
The Tribunal found that the reasons provided for the delay, including the illness of the Chartered Accountant's mother and a medical emergency of the representative, warranted a fresh consideration. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) due to sufficient cause. It held that the Assessing Officer was obliged to refer the matter to the Valuation Officer when the assessee objected to the stamp duty valuation.
The CIT(A) deleted the additions after admitting additional evidence and obtaining a remand report. The tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the transactions were indeed conducted by AOPs and the income was offered to tax in their hands, and that similar claims were accepted in other cases.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer. The assessee is directed to furnish evidence to explain the cash deposits, which are claimed to be from the sale of Vodafone top-ups and recharge coupons.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to technical issues with the e-filing portal. It held that the CIT(Exemption) should have treated the application as filed under the correct section, given the assessee's existing 12A registration and the CIT's satisfaction with the assessee's activities.
The Tribunal noted that the application was filed under the wrong section (80G(5)(ii) instead of 80G(5)(iii)). However, to provide relief, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to treat the application as filed under the correct section and decide accordingly.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had inadvertently filed under the wrong section due to a typographical error. It was held that the matter should be restored to the CIT(Exemption) to consider the application as if it were filed under the correct section.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) on liberal grounds, noting the assessee's claim of illness. The Tribunal found that the assessee, due to non-compliance and lack of awareness of notices, could not present facts to the AO or CIT(A). Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication.