371 orders · Page 3 of 8
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was directed to cooperate fully and provide necessary documents without seeking adjournments.
The Tribunal held that the AO had conducted sufficient inquiries regarding the loan, considering the submissions and documents provided by the assessee. Therefore, the assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the benefit of Article 11 of the India-Italy DTAA in determining the Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT). The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had denied the benefit on the ground that the assessee was the payer and not the recipient of the dividend. However, the Tribunal referred to the recent decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of M/s. Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. (supra). The High Court had held that DDT, in substance, is a tax on the dividend income of the shareholder, even though it is paid by the company distributing the dividend for administrative convenience. Therefore, DDT is squarely covered under Article 11 of the DTAA, and the rate prescribed in the DTAA should apply. The Tribunal found the facts in the present case to be identical to those in M/s. Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. and considered it mandatory to follow the jurisdictional High Court's decision. While acknowledging a previous ITAT decision in the assessee's own case that favoured the Revenue, the Tribunal clarified that this decision was based on the Special Bench ruling of the ITAT, which predated the Bombay High Court's decision. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow the benefit of Article 11 of the India-Italy DTAA to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that substantial justice is more important than procedural delay, especially when the CPC incorrectly taxed entire receipts instead of only income. Therefore, the CIT(A) was directed to condone the delay and decide the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, citing the need for substantial justice over technicalities. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s orders and restored the applications to the CIT(E)'s file for de-novo adjudication, allowing the assessee one more opportunity to substantiate its case.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) to decide afresh on merits, considering the additional evidence filed by the assessee and the legal ground challenging the reopening. The penalty appeal was also set aside to be decided after the quantum appeal.
The Tribunal held that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations, especially when the delay is not deliberate. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A)'s file to decide the appeal on merits after condoning the delay.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s order and remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication. The assessee was granted an opportunity to provide necessary documents and clarifications.
The Tribunal held that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations when there is a non-deliberate delay. The CIT(A)'s order dismissing the appeal solely on delay was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the reopening was bad in law because the approval for issuing the notice under Section 148 was granted by the Principal Commissioner instead of the Principal Chief Commissioner, as required after three years. Additionally, the alleged escaped income was less than Rs. 50 lakhs, which is the threshold for reopening after three years.
The Tribunal held that the appeal bearing IT(TP)A No. 947/PUN/2026 was a duplicate appeal. The reasoning was based on the assessee's submission and the procedural history presented. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had originally filed appeal number 1050/PUN/2024, which was restored after being dismissed. The subsequent filing of appeal IT(TP)A No. 947/PUN/2026 was a consequence of an inadvertent error during the process of curing defects in the restored appeal. Therefore, the Tribunal treated the current appeal as a duplicate and dismissed it. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer. The assessee was directed to appear and provide substantiation for its claims, with the Assessing Officer to pass a fresh order after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee an opportunity to present his case and evidence, as the assessee claimed non-receipt of hearing notices.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) to decide afresh on merits, considering the additional evidence filed by the assessee and the legal ground challenging the reopening. The penalty appeal was also set aside to be decided after the quantum appeal.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, allowing the assessee an opportunity to present its case with supporting documents, considering the non-compliance was due to inadvertence.
The Tribunal held that co-operative societies are entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) on interest income earned from investments with other co-operative societies, even if those societies are banks. The Tribunal followed its previous decisions on this matter.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was due to the death of the Karta of the HUF and other unavoidable circumstances. Following Supreme Court judgments, the Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to condone the delay and decide the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal held that the penalty levied under Section 270A was not justified. Following judicial precedents, it was determined that an excess claim of depreciation, especially when it was a bona fide mistake or did not reduce tax liability, does not warrant penalty.
The Tribunal held that substantial justice is more important than procedural delay, especially when the CPC incorrectly taxed entire receipts instead of only income. Therefore, the CIT(A) was directed to condone the delay and decide the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of the Section 80P deduction. It ruled that as per Section 80AC of the Income Tax Act, such deductions are not admissible if the return of income is not furnished by the due date specified under Section 139(1).
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal in limine. It was found that advance tax is only required on admitted tax liability, which was NIL in this case. The matter was set aside to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, citing the need for substantial justice over technicalities. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s orders and restored the applications to the CIT(E)'s file for de-novo adjudication, allowing the assessee one more opportunity to substantiate its case.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were void ab initio due to improper service of notice under Section 148A. Furthermore, the Assessing Officer failed to verify crucial documents like sale deeds before initiating the proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not liable for advance tax as his admitted tax liability was nil, with tax on salary being deducted at source. Therefore, the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal on a technical ground.
The Tribunal noted that the quantum appeal for the same assessment year was set aside to the CIT(A) for de-novo adjudication. Therefore, the penalty appeal was also set aside to the CIT(A) for fresh decision after the quantum appeal is decided.
The Tribunal held that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations, especially when the delay is not deliberate. The CIT(A)'s order dismissing the appeal due to delay was set aside.
The Tribunal held that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations, especially when the delay is not deliberate. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A)'s file to decide the appeal on merits after condoning the delay.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's addition was based on surmises and conjectures, as he failed to consider that expenses were incurred through both cash and banking channels, and the books of account were audited. The addition was therefore deleted.
The Tribunal found that the impounded documents and related excel sheets did not contain any mention of cash payments by the assessee. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was baseless.
The Tribunal found sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal, considering the assessee's explanation and affidavits. The matter was set aside to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the onus was on the Revenue to prove that the transactions in 'Manasvi Enterprises' belonged to the assessee, especially since the assessee consistently denied them. As no such evidence was brought on record, the addition was deleted.
The Tribunal set aside the penalty under section 271AAC(1) to the CIT(A) for denovo adjudication. However, the penalty under section 272A(1)(d) was upheld due to non-compliance with notices and lack of specific reasons.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had filed Form 10B within the extended due date granted by the CBDT. Therefore, the denial of exemption by the CPC was erroneous.
The Tribunal set aside the penalty under section 271AAC(1) to the CIT(A) for denovo adjudication. However, the penalty under section 272A(1)(d) was upheld due to non-compliance with notices and lack of specific reasons.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) violated Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules by not providing the AO an opportunity to examine the additional evidence filed by the assessee. Therefore, the order was set aside for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the assessee earns meagre commission and the CIT(A)'s estimation of 2% was without basis. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition confirmed by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the loan received by the assessee firm from Mahesh Ginning Pvt. Ltd. is indeed a deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e). This is because the partners of the assessee firm were also substantial shareholders in the company that provided the loan, fulfilling the conditions of the section.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obliged to decide an appeal on merits and cannot dismiss it for non-prosecution, following a jurisdictional High Court ruling. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the case for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to consider the binding precedent that no late fee under Section 234E is leviable if the return was filed before June 1, 2015, and to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the case for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to consider the binding precedent that no late fee under Section 234E is leviable if the return was filed before June 1, 2015, and to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the addition was based on an unreliable excel sheet and retracted statements, and the AO failed to prove any cash payment. The assessee's evidence of legitimate payments and NRI status was considered.
The Tribunal held that the cash deposit was from the assessee's regular business of milk distribution and commission income. The genuineness of the business and a major portion of cash deposits were not in dispute.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal solely on the ground of delay without considering the merits. To ensure natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for a fresh adjudication, allowing the assessee one more opportunity to file an application for condonation of delay.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the CIT(A)'s file. The CIT(A) is directed to decide the appeal afresh after giving due opportunity of hearing to both parties, considering the assessee's challenge to the validity of the reassessment notice.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal solely on the ground of delay without considering the merits. To ensure natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for a fresh adjudication, allowing the assessee one more opportunity to file an application for condonation of delay.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the case for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to consider the binding precedent that no late fee under Section 234E is leviable if the return was filed before June 1, 2015, and to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the case for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to consider the binding precedent that no late fee under Section 234E is leviable if the return was filed before June 1, 2015, and to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the amount received under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019, is in the nature of retrenchment compensation and is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Act, not Section 10(10C).
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s order dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution without adjudicating on merits violated Section 250(6) of the Act. The matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal found the Revenue's contentions to be correct. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A)'s file for fresh adjudication after providing an opportunity to the parties.