ITAT Pune Judgments — November 2025

The Tribunal noted that the assessee is a charitable organization and observed that sufficient opportunity was not granted to furnish the details called for by the CIT(E). Considering the facts and circumstances, and in the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to afford one more opportunity to the assessee. The issue regarding regular registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) and approval under clause (iii) of the first proviso to Section 80G(5) of the Act was remitted back to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(E) was directed to afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee, and the assessee was directed to be vigilant and not seek unnecessary adjournments. The impugned orders were set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal decided to set aside the order of the CIT(E) and remit the issue back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee had not furnished a reply to the discrepancies observed by the CIT(E). However, considering the larger interest and fairness to both parties, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to grant one more opportunity to the assessee. The CIT(E) is directed to afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee and pass a speaking order. The assessee is also directed to be vigilant, avoid unnecessary adjournments, and file all required details. The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided, but the core issue of approval under section 80G(5) was remanded for fresh consideration.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not receive sufficient opportunity to furnish the details. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and remitted the issue back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, granting one more opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal, finding that documents submitted by the assessee were not considered during assessment and appeal proceedings, set aside the Assessment Order for de novo adjudication. The assessee was directed to file all documents before the Assessing Officer, who was to provide an opportunity of hearing.

The Tribunal remitted the entire issue back to the ld. CIT(A) for fresh examination, with instructions to consider the outcome of the assessee's pending application for condonation of delay. The ld. CIT(A) is directed to afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee and decide the matter in accordance with law.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's failure to appear before both the AO and CIT(A) and to provide submissions. However, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to afford one more opportunity to the assessee by remitting the case back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal observed that the assessee's mistake in filing the application late appeared to be bonafide. The Tribunal also noted that a condonation of delay application was pending before the CBDT and that the delay was only 90 days after considering the extended timeline provided by a CBDT circular.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had taken a legally permissible view, and the CIT erred in invoking Section 263. The DTVSV settlement indicated the CIT's acceptance of the assessment. Therefore, the assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the Revenue.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) had conducted due verification regarding the trade creditors and arrived at a plausible view. Therefore, the Pr.CIT was precluded from invoking jurisdiction under Section 263 when two views were possible and the AO had adopted one. The assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue.

The Tribunal held that the intra-group services availed by the assessee did not fall into the category of shareholder/stewardship activities, duplicate services, or incidental benefits. The Tribunal found that the services were essential for the assessee's day-to-day business operations, adopting international standards and meeting export requirements. The Tribunal noted that if the assessee had not received these services from its AE, it would have incurred costs by engaging a third party. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the expenditure was incurred towards intra-group services. However, since the TPO had not examined the ALP adopted by the assessee (based on the TNM method) in light of the prescribed methods, the issue of determining the ALP was restored to the file of the TPO for necessary examination. Grounds of appeal No. 6 to 15 were allowed for statistical purposes. Regarding Ground No. 5, the Tribunal distinguished the case of CLSA India (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT, noting that in the present case, the TPO had not made any calculation of ALP but had observed that no services were received. The Tribunal found no merit in Ground No. 5 and dismissed it. Grounds No. 1, 2, and 3 were not pressed and were dismissed. Grounds No. 18, 19, and 20 concerning set-off of brought forward losses and unabsorbed depreciation were allowed and restored to the AO. Remaining grounds were considered consequential or general and did not require adjudication. The appeal was partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the AO erred in making the disallowance under Section 14A without recording proper satisfaction and that the CIT(A) rightly deleted the addition. Similarly, the weighted average deduction for R&D expenses was correctly granted by the CIT(A) as the necessary Form-3CL was subsequently provided.

The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the Assessee from deposits in nationalized banks and co-operative societies is attributable to its business and is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. This decision followed various pronouncements of the Supreme Court and High Courts.

The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission regarding the inability to furnish additional evidences earlier. It, therefore, remanded the entire matter back to the Ld. CIT(A) to re-examine the disallowance of interest expenses under Section 57 and the additions under Section 68, considering the new evidences after providing a fresh opportunity of hearing. The assessee was also permitted to raise an additional ground concerning interest capitalization.

The Tribunal acknowledged the error as a curable technical mistake, citing previous decisions from co-ordinate benches. It set aside the CIT's rejection order and remanded the case back to the CIT, Exemption, Pune, instructing them to treat the application as filed under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) and provide a fresh opportunity for a hearing.

The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the assessee from FDRs with nationalized banks was attributable to its business of providing credit facilities to its members. Following various judicial precedents, the Tribunal allowed the deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. For ITA No. 2732/PUN/2024, the Tribunal found that the assessee was given insufficient time to respond to the CIT(Exemption)'s notice, violating principles of natural justice, and thus remanded the issue for de novo consideration. Similarly, for ITA No. 2731/PUN/2024, the appeal was also remanded for similar reasons.

The Tribunal noted that a new legal issue was raised for the first time before it. Citing the 'Divine Infracon Pvt. Ltd.' case, it held that it has no jurisdiction to decide grounds not arising from the impugned order. However, considering the facts, the Tribunal decided to restore all issues to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, providing the assessee with another opportunity.

The Tribunal reversed the CIT(A)'s finding, concluding that the cash deposits were not in specified bank notes and originated from regular cash sales. The tribunal noted that a Bank Certificate provided details of denominations (Rs. 100/- or Rs. 2000/-) and that the comparative cash deposit in the preceding year for the same period was higher.

The Tribunal, considering the facts and circumstances and adopting a justice-oriented approach, decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity. The issues raised in the appeal were remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that interest earned from deposits with cooperative banks and dividend received by a cooperative society is eligible for deduction under Section 80P. The character of the income does not change, and it is attributable to the society's main business.

The Tribunal noted that a new legal issue was raised for the first time before it. Citing the 'Divine Infracon Pvt. Ltd.' case, it held that it has no jurisdiction to decide grounds not arising from the impugned order. However, considering the facts, the Tribunal decided to restore all issues to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, providing the assessee with another opportunity.

The ITAT condoned both the 75-day delay in filing the appeal before itself and the 18-month delay before the ld. CIT(A), citing 'reasonable cause' and adherence to judicial precedents. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the issues to the file of the ld. Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for verification. The AO is directed to check if the income totalling Rs. 32,52,795/- was indeed taxed twice and, if so, delete the corresponding addition, after providing a reasonable opportunity to the appellant.

The Tribunal restored the issues to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, granting the appellant one more opportunity to present their case. The Tribunal directed the appellant to update their contact details and remain vigilant.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. For ITA No. 2732/PUN/2024, the Tribunal found that the assessee was given insufficient time to respond to the CIT(Exemption)'s notice, violating principles of natural justice, and thus remanded the issue for de novo consideration. Similarly, for ITA No. 2731/PUN/2024, the appeal was also remanded for similar reasons.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals after finding a reasonable cause. The Tribunal restored the issues to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessees an opportunity for a hearing.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 306 days, accepting the "reasonable cause" presented due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. Following its decision in the assessee's own identical case for A.Y. 2015-16, the Tribunal deleted the penalty, holding that non-compliance during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a reasonable cause under Section 273B.

The Tribunal held that income earned by a cooperative credit society from investments in other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The facts of the Totgar's case were distinguished, and the decision of the jurisdictional Bombay High Court was followed.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer should have proceeded under Section 153C, not Section 147, as the information originated from a search at a third party's premises. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings under Section 147 were quashed.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer should have proceeded under Section 153C, not Section 147, as the information originated from a search at a third party's premises. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings under Section 147 were quashed.

The Tribunal held that the transfer pricing adjustment made by the TPO for corporate guarantee was not sustainable in law as no prescribed method was adopted for determining the Arm's Length Price (ALP). Similarly, an additional ground regarding protective addition on loan interest was also allowed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), citing the Supreme Court's order on COVID-19 related limitation extensions. The Tribunal restored the issues regarding the quantum addition and the consequential penalty to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, with directions to provide the assessee a reasonable opportunity.

The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under Section 147 was not valid. The AO received information that emerged during a search action under Section 132 at the premises of M/s. Shri Renuka Mata Multistate Credit Society Ltd. In such circumstances, the proper course of action for the AO should have been under Section 153C of the Act, as the provisions of Section 153C are clearly applicable when seized documents contain information relating to the assessee. The Tribunal relied on the decision in Vijaykumar Mangilal Chordiya (supra) and upheld the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC on the issue of the validity of reassessment proceedings. Consequently, the assessment order passed under Section 147 was quashed. Since the quantum assessment was quashed, the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) did not survive and was deleted. The grounds challenging the merits of the issue were rendered academic and not adjudicated.

The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment under Section 147 was not valid. The AO had reopened the assessment based on information that emerged during a search action under Section 132 at the premises of M/s. Shri Renuka Mata Multistate Credit Society Ltd. The Tribunal, respectfully following the decision in Vijaykumar Mangilal Chordiya (supra), opined that the proper course of action for the AO should have been under Section 153C of the Act, as the seized documents contained information relating to the assessee. Therefore, the initiation of proceedings under Section 147 was not in accordance with law and was liable to be quashed. The Tribunal allowed the additional ground raised by the assessee challenging the validity of reassessment proceedings and quashed the assessment orders. Consequently, the grounds challenging the merits of the additions became academic. For penalty appeals, since the quantum assessment order was quashed, the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) did not survive and was deleted. The appeals for all assessment years were allowed.

The Tribunal, adopting a justice-oriented approach, remitted the appeal back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, directing the CIT(A) to provide a reasonable opportunity to the assessee and pass a speaking order on merits.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed brought forward unabsorbed depreciation was permissible to be set off against income from other heads, provided returns were filed within the due date. The Tribunal found that the initial disallowance by CPC was based on section 143(1)(a)(iii) of the Act.

The Tribunal, noting the absence of the assessee and lack of proper documentation, remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting one last opportunity. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal found that the assessee's claimed expenditure of 21% of gross receipts was appropriate, differing from the CIT(A)'s 35% estimation. The Tribunal estimated the agricultural expenses and directed the AO to allow the expenditure accordingly.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals after finding a reasonable cause. The Tribunal restored the issues to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessees an opportunity for a hearing.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals after finding a reasonable cause. The Tribunal restored the issues to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessees an opportunity for a hearing.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer should have proceeded under Section 153C, not Section 147, as the information originated from a search at a third party's premises. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings under Section 147 were quashed.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer should have proceeded under Section 153C, not Section 147, as the information originated from a search at a third party's premises. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings under Section 147 were quashed.

The Tribunal held that income earned by a cooperative credit society from investments in other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The facts of the Totgar's case were distinguished, and the decision of the jurisdictional Bombay High Court was followed.

The Tribunal, noting the absence of the assessee and lack of proper documentation, remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting one last opportunity. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), citing the Supreme Court's order on COVID-19 related limitation extensions. The Tribunal restored the issues regarding the quantum addition and the consequential penalty to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, with directions to provide the assessee a reasonable opportunity.

The Tribunal held that the Principal Commissioner was not justified in assuming jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order under Section 153A was passed after obtaining prior approval from the Additional Commissioner under Section 153D. The Tribunal relied on the principle that for an assessment order to be revised under Section 263, the revisional authority must consider not only the assessment record but also the record of the approval. Without finding that the prior approval itself was vitiated or erroneous and prejudicial to revenue, the assessment order independently cannot be held as such. The Tribunal specifically referred to the Madras High Court's decision in PCIT vs. Prakhar Developers (P) Ltd., which held that once prior approval under Section 153D has been taken, the same authority cannot exercise power under Section 263 to reverse the Assessing Officer's order. Therefore, the PCIT's order was set aside, and the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals after finding a reasonable cause. The Tribunal restored the issues to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessees an opportunity for a hearing.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals after finding a reasonable cause. The Tribunal restored the issues to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessees an opportunity for a hearing.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing a change in PAN as 'reasonable cause'. While acknowledging that the eligibility for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest from cooperative banks is a settled issue, the Tribunal noted the lack of quantification details from the appellant before lower authorities. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination and verification of the claim.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal ex-parte for want of prosecution without providing reasonable opportunity of hearing, issuing notices in quick succession. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC ought to have decided all grounds raised by the assessee. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC and remanded the matter back with a direction to decide the legal grounds first after providing an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.