Loading ITAT cases…
225 orders · Page 3 of 5
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Considering the documents submitted by the assessee suggesting agricultural activities and income, the Tribunal restored the issues to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment.
The Tribunal, prioritizing substantial justice over technicalities, set aside the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC's order. Citing Supreme Court precedents on condonation of delay, it directed the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the delay and readjudicate the appeal on its merits, granting the assessee a proper opportunity to present her case and submit all necessary details. The assessee was instructed to cooperate without seeking adjournments.
The Tribunal held that the rectification order passed by the CPC under Section 154 was illegal as no notice was given to the assessee before enhancing the liability, which is mandatory as per Section 154(3) of the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal held that the additional evidence filed by the assessee, including the approval orders for the amended MOA and the application for Charity Commissioner's approval, had a substantial bearing on the case and were crucial to its determination. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that these documents, which were not available during the proceedings before the CIT(E), needed to be considered. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(E) and restored the issues back to his file for a fresh decision. The CIT(E) was directed to consider the additional evidence and any further submissions made by the assessee. The assessee was directed to appear before the CIT(E) without seeking adjournments, failing which the CIT(E) would be at liberty to pass orders as per law. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence filed by the assessee, including approval orders for the amended MOA and the application for Charity Commissioner's approval. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contentions, particularly regarding the new evidence. It noted that the CIT(E) had rejected the applications based on the lack of permission under Section 36A of the Maharashtra Public Trust Act, the purchase of land not being an incidental activity, and certain construction activities not being included in the MOA. However, given the additional evidence, the Tribunal deemed it fit to set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(E). The issues were restored to the CIT(E)'s file for fresh decision, taking into account the additional evidence and any further submissions the assessee might make. The assessee was directed to appear before the CIT(E) without seeking adjournments. The grounds raised by the assessee in both appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that additions based on a cancelled/scratched loose paper have no evidentiary value and cannot be sustained without corroborative material. Additions related to other grounds were allowed based on prior decisions.
The Tribunal held that additions based on a cancelled/scratched loose paper have no evidentiary value and cannot be sustained without corroborative material. Additions related to other grounds were allowed based on prior decisions.
The Tribunal held that additions based on a cancelled/scratched loose paper have no evidentiary value and cannot be sustained without corroborative material. Additions related to other grounds were allowed based on prior decisions.
The Tribunal held that the action of the Assessing Officer (AO) was upheld, and the grounds of appeal concerning the withdrawal of interest under Section 244A were dismissed. The Tribunal found that Section 244A(2) of the Act mandates the exclusion of periods of delay attributable to the assessee in the calculation of interest. The assessee's failure to claim the advance tax credit in the original return led to a delay in the processing and issuance of the refund. The AO correctly identified this delay as attributable to the assessee and, therefore, rightly withdrew the interest granted under Section 244A for the period of delay. The Tribunal also noted that the rectification under Section 154 was permissible as the initial grant of interest on the delayed claim, without considering the assessee's own delay, was a mistake apparent from the record. The Tribunal referred to the case of Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax [2005] 93 ITD 7 (MUM.) to support its reasoning that delay caused by the assessee must be excluded from the eligible period for interest calculation, and there is no provision to condone such delays. The appeal was dismissed on this ground.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Observing that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal without dealing with the merits and citing a High Court judgment, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) has the power and obligation to decide appeals on merits and cannot dismiss them solely on grounds of delay or non-prosecution. Substantial justice is considered more important than procedural delay. The delay was condoned and the case was remitted.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of expenses was not justified as the genuineness of the expenses was not doubted, and the books of accounts were not rejected. The Tribunal also found that the assessee had provided necessary details regarding prior period expenses, including PANs of vendors.
The Tribunal held that furnishing Form 67 is directory and not mandatory. The delay in filing Form 67 was condoned, and the issue was restored to the Assessing Officer to examine the veracity of the FTC claim.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was prevented by a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the appeal and that the CIT(A)/NFAC should have decided the appeal on merits after condoning the delay. The order of the CIT(A)/NFAC was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the delay and decide the appeal afresh.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was prevented by a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the appeal and that the CIT(A)/NFAC should have decided the appeal on merits after condoning the delay. The order of the CIT(A)/NFAC was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the delay and decide the appeal afresh.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were not in accordance with the law due to an inappropriate approval obtained from the higher authority under Section 151 of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus under Section 68 by providing details like PAN, ITRs, confirmations, and bank statements. The director of the lender company appeared and confirmed the loan, stating it was out of sundry debtors and had been repaid.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to establish the identity, creditworthiness of the creditor, and genuineness of the unsecured loan transaction due to inconsistent stands and lack of evidence. The CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was prevented by a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the appeal and that the CIT(A)/NFAC should have decided the appeal on merits after condoning the delay. The order of the CIT(A)/NFAC was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the delay and decide the appeal afresh.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was prevented by a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the appeal and that the CIT(A)/NFAC should have decided the appeal on merits after condoning the delay. The order of the CIT(A)/NFAC was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the delay and decide the appeal afresh.
The Tribunal observed that the ld. CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the legal grounds raised by the Assessee and merely dismissed the appeal for non-compliance. Citing a Bombay High Court judgment, the Tribunal held that a CIT(A) is obligated to decide appeals on merits and cannot dismiss them for non-prosecution. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for de novo adjudication with proper opportunity to the Assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals. For the registration application, the matter was remanded to the CIT to decide afresh after providing an opportunity. For the 80G approval application, the Tribunal set aside the CIT's order and remanded it to condone the delay and decide afresh, considering the amended provisions and CBDT circulars.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC did not adjudicate each ground separately and did not pass a speaking order. Finding force in the assessee's arguments, the Tribunal set aside the order and remanded the matter back to the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that while the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Divine Infra Company Private Limited v. CIT (2025) 171 taxman.com 92 ruled that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to decide a ground not arising from the impugned order of the first appellate authority, the present case involves a legal issue that goes to the root of the additions. Citing the Hon'ble Apex Court's judgment in National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT (1998) 229 ITR 383 (SC), the Tribunal admitted the legal issue. In the larger interest of justice and fairness, the Tribunal decided to remit all issues raised in the appeal back to the file of the CIT(A) for necessary adjudication as contemplated under Section 250(6) of the Act. The CIT(A) is directed to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and decide the issues in accordance with law. The assessee is also directed to be vigilant and avoid unnecessary adjournments. The effective grounds of appeal are allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. Recognizing that the assessee could not respond to notices and to ensure fairness, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and remitted the matters back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer. The assessee is directed to provide all details and explanations regarding the transactions in the bank account.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and set aside the CIT's order. The matter was remanded back to the CIT to decide the application afresh after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals. For the registration application, the matter was remanded to the CIT to decide afresh after providing an opportunity. For the 80G approval application, the Tribunal set aside the CIT's order and remanded it to condone the delay and decide afresh, considering the amended provisions and CBDT circulars.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) condoned the initial delay in filing the appeal. It noted that an amendment to Section 80G(5)(iv) of the Act, effective from 01.10.2024, permits applications for approval even after the commencement of activities. Consequently, the ITAT set aside the CIT's order, concluding there was no delay in light of the amendment, and remanded the matter back to the CIT (Exemption) for fresh adjudication on merits, providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing and compliance.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC did not adjudicate each ground separately and did not pass a speaking order. Finding force in the assessee's arguments, the Tribunal set aside the order and remanded the matter back to the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. Recognizing that the assessee could not respond to notices and to ensure fairness, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and remitted the matters back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments with other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act, following numerous consistent decisions.
The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(A) failed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing by issuing four back-to-back notices within a short period of 20 days, despite the assessee seeking two adjournments. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order of the Ld. CIT(A) and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision after providing the assessee with a proper opportunity of being heard. Ground 1 of the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee was given multiple opportunities by the CIT(A) but failed to respond adequately. However, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the CIT(A)/NFAC, directing them to provide one final opportunity to the assessee to submit all necessary details and substantiate their case without further adjournments.
The Tribunal noted that although the CIT(A)/NFAC dismissed the appeal for non-compliance, it did not decide the appeal on merit. Considering the interest of justice and the assessee's claim of being a small individual, the case was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh decision on merit.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was a charitable organization and had not been granted sufficient opportunity to furnish details. Therefore, one more opportunity was granted by remitting the issue back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 203 days in filing the appeal, adopting a justice-oriented approach and relying on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal noted that the assessee's application for approval under section 80G(5) was rejected by the CIT(E) due to non-furnishing of details. However, the assessee made a prima facie case that reasonable cause prevented them from filing the details and claimed to possess all necessary information. Considering the facts and circumstances, and in the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to remit the issue of grant of approval under section 80G(5) back to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(E) was directed to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and decide the issue in accordance with law. The assessee was also directed to be vigilant and avoid unnecessary adjournments. The effective grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 138 days in filing the appeal, adopting a justice-oriented approach and relying on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. Regarding the rejection of the registration application, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had been granted provisional registration but failed to furnish explanations for discrepancies communicated by the CIT(E) when applying for regular registration. However, considering the larger interest of justice and fairness to both parties, the Tribunal decided to afford the assessee one more opportunity. The issue of regular registration under section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) was remitted back to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh adjudication. The Ld. CIT(E) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee, and the assessee was directed to be vigilant, avoid unnecessary adjournments, and file all required details. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was a charitable organization and had not been granted sufficient opportunity to furnish details. Therefore, one more opportunity was granted by remitting the issue back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the assessee's provisional approval under Section 80G(5) was valid until 31.03.2025, meaning the final application was due six months prior, by 30.09.2024. Since the application was filed on 29.09.2024, it was within the prescribed time limit. The Tribunal set aside the CIT's order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the date of recording the satisfaction note is the relevant date for reckoning the six-year period for issuing notices under section 153C, not the date of the search. This is in line with the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Jasjit Singh, which was followed in PCIT vs. Shalimar Town Planners Private Limited. The Supreme Court in Jasjit Singh held that the revenue's argument that the period relates back to the date of seizure is insubstantial and without merit, as it would cause disproportionate prejudice to the third-party assessee. The Tribunal found that the satisfaction note was recorded on 26.09.2017. Therefore, notices under section 153C could only be issued for the six assessment years preceding the financial year in which the satisfaction was recorded, starting from AY 2012-13 to AY 2017-18. Consequently, the notice issued under section 153C for AY 2010-11 and AY 2011-12, which are prior to AY 2012-13, were held to be time-barred. The consequential assessment orders for these assessment years were also held to be void ab initio. As a result, ground no. 7 raised by the assessee was allowed, and the other grounds on merits were rendered infructuous. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the date of recording the satisfaction note is the relevant date for reckoning the six-year period for issuing notices under section 153C, not the date of the search. This is in line with the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Jasjit Singh, which was followed in PCIT vs. Shalimar Town Planners Private Limited. The Supreme Court in Jasjit Singh held that the revenue's argument that the period relates back to the date of seizure is insubstantial and without merit, as it would cause disproportionate prejudice to the third-party assessee. The Tribunal found that the satisfaction note was recorded on 26.09.2017. Therefore, notices under section 153C could only be issued for the six assessment years preceding the financial year in which the satisfaction was recorded, starting from AY 2012-13 to AY 2017-18. Consequently, the notice issued under section 153C for AY 2010-11 and AY 2011-12, which are prior to AY 2012-13, were held to be time-barred. The consequential assessment orders for these assessment years were also held to be void ab initio. As a result, ground no. 7 raised by the assessee was allowed, and the other grounds on merits were rendered infructuous. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the assessee from deposits with banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income Tax Act. This decision was based on various High Court and Supreme Court precedents affirming that such income is attributable to the business of a co-operative society.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148, issued on July 29, 2022, for Assessment Year 2015-16, was beyond the statutory time limit as per the Supreme Court's decision in Rajeev Bansal. Consequently, the reassessment notice and the subsequent reassessment order were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under section 270A(2)(b) was imposed based on incorrect facts, as the assessee had filed its return and attended proceedings. The Tribunal noted that the penalty provision relied upon was for cases where no return was filed or furnished for the first time under section 148.
The Tribunal found that while the assessee had initially complied, it failed to respond to the final notice. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT (Exemption)'s order and remanded the matter back, directing the CIT to provide a fresh opportunity for hearing and decision after the assessee complies with all notices.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Considering the facts and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision, directing the CIT to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 144 days in filing the appeal before the ITAT, citing a justice-oriented approach and relying on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. The Tribunal found that the assessee was prevented from filing the appeal within time by a reasonable and sufficient cause, and the delay was not intentional. The Tribunal also held that the assessee deserved one more opportunity to go before the CIT(A) for adjudication of the issues on merits, considering that the assessee is dependent on a consultant and any delay at the consultant's end should not prejudice the assessee's right. Consequently, the Tribunal remitted the issues back to the file of the CIT(A) for necessary adjudication, directing the CIT(A) to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and decide the issues in accordance with law as contemplated under section 250(6) of the Act. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was not a speaking order and the AO failed to conduct proper inquiries and verifications regarding government grants and ECB loans, making the order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. The Tribunal confirmed the PCIT's order directing the AO to reframe the assessment.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to reasonable cause. Considering the assessee's non-compliance but deeming it not intentional, the Tribunal restored the issues to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, providing one more opportunity.