290 orders · Page 2 of 6
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) had accepted the assessee's contentions during the scrutiny proceedings and had not made any disallowance under Section 40(a)(i). The AO's inadvertent inclusion of the CPC's disallowance while computing total income was considered an error. Therefore, the disallowance was deleted.
The Tribunal, relying on the Special Bench decision in ACIT vs. Vireet Investment Pvt. Ltd., held that only investments yielding exempt income during the year should be considered for computing the average value for disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer to verify the investments that yielded exempt dividend income for a fresh computation.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application by the CIT(E) on the hyper-technical ground of selecting the wrong section code was not appropriate. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) had not made any adverse findings on the merits of the case. Following the decision of a Coordinate Bench in Kimaya Ashram Charitable Trust vs. CIT (Exemption), Pune, and considering CBDT Circular No. 7/2024, which addresses common errors in selecting section codes, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(E) and remanded the matter back to him with a direction to treat the original application as filed under the correct section (12A(1)(ac)(iii)). The assessee was directed to cooperate with the CIT(E) and provide necessary documents without seeking adjournments. The CIT(E) was instructed to decide the case denovo after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The issue of whether the application was filed under the correct clause was decided in favor of the assessee, allowing them an opportunity to rectify the defect.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in accepting the society's certificate without proper verification of its existence and registration. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after verifying the society's genuineness and records.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) passed a non-speaking order without dealing with the merits of the case. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication, granting one more opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 74,91,000/- was based on surmises and conjectures as the Assessing Officer did not doubt the assessee's cash book balance and accepted other cash deposits. The addition of Rs. 1,66,389/- was deleted as the identity, genuineness, and creditworthiness of the transaction with the mother were established.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 159 days, accepting the assessee's explanation of communication gap and lack of sufficient knowledge. On merits, the Tribunal found that the assessee had complied with notices and decided to grant one more opportunity.
The Tribunal found the Assessing Officer's rejection of the assessee's reconciliation statement unjustified. It directed the Assessing Officer to re-verify the sales receipts, remove duplicate entries, and then estimate profit on any suppressed sales.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in treating the claim under Section 80P(2)(d) as a fresh claim, as it was made in the computation of income and audit report. Following judicial precedents, the Tribunal allowed the deduction for interest income derived from investments with other cooperative societies.
The Tribunal found the Assessing Officer's rejection of the assessee's reconciliation statement unjustified. It directed the Assessing Officer to re-verify the sales receipts, remove duplicate entries, and then estimate profit on any suppressed sales.
The tribunal noted that the CIT(A) did not pass a speaking order and that an appeal should be disposed of on merits even if ex-parte. The tribunal restored the issues to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee failed to pay the taxes under the IDS and did not provide any evidence to substantiate the nature and source of the declared income, the Assessing Officer was justified in treating the amount as unexplained money and taxing it under Section 69A read with Section 115BBE of the Act.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the transfer pricing adjustment for spares and components. Regarding CGF, the Tribunal allowed the claim for AY 2015-16 at the rate paid (0.19%) and for AY 2016-17 allowed it only up to 0.5%, disallowing the excess.
The Tribunal held that the penalty orders lacked specificity regarding the exact nature of the default and the specific documents not furnished by the assessee. Furthermore, the underlying transfer pricing adjustment had been deleted by the ITAT, and the Revenue failed to establish the specific defects in the assessee's documentation.
The Tribunal found the Assessing Officer's rejection of the assessee's reconciliation statement unjustified. It directed the Assessing Officer to re-verify the sales receipts, remove duplicate entries, and then estimate profit on any suppressed sales.
The Tribunal held that the penalty was not leviable as the additions/disallowances were made on an estimated basis. The Tribunal followed its own earlier decision and various High Court precedents stating that penalty cannot be imposed when income is determined on an estimate basis.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was in the business of buying and selling recharge coupons and that the cash deposits were for sales and payments to network providers. It held that only commission income needed to be computed and restored the case to the AO for a de novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was unaware of the CPC's rectification order which had already accepted the assessee's returned income. Therefore, the ex-parte order passed by the CIT(A) needed to be set aside.
The Tribunal held that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations, especially when there is a reasonable cause for the delay. Citing Supreme Court judgments, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submissions regarding the delay and restored the matter to the CIT(A).
The Tribunal found that the assessee had indeed filed the original return within the due date. The controversy arose because the original return's timely filing was not acknowledged by the CPC or the lower appellate authority.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had indeed filed returns and paid the taxes, thus falling under Section 249(4)(a), not 249(4)(b). Consequently, the Ld. CIT(A) erred in not admitting the appeals. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s orders and remanded both appeals for de novo adjudication on merits, allowing them for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were bad in law because the approval for issuing the notice u/s 148 was not obtained from the competent authority as per Section 151. Additionally, on merits, the assessee was only a Power of Attorney holder for companies that actually purchased the properties.
The Tribunal held that the belated filing of Form 10BB was acceptable, especially when filed before the completion of assessment proceedings. It followed a coordinate bench's decision in the assessee's own case, finding no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's applications were filed within the time allowed under the Act, interpreting the relevant provisions to avoid absurdity, particularly for trusts that had already commenced charitable activities. The Tribunal also noted that the application for 80G approval was filed before the expiry of the provisional approval.
The Tribunal held that disallowance under Section 14A cannot exceed the exempt income earned. Based on various High Court decisions, it ruled that since the assessee earned only Rs.2,000/- as exempt income, the disallowance should be limited to this amount.
The Tribunal held that the penalty order was passed in the name of a deceased assessee, which is invalid. The Assessing Officer should have brought the legal heirs on record before passing the order.
The Tribunal held that both the AO and the CIT(A) failed to follow the correct procedure for calculating long-term capital gains, specifically regarding indexation of cost of acquisition. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) wrongly rejected the assessee's claim for deduction under section 54 as additional evidence.
The Tribunal held that the belated filing of Form 10BB was acceptable, especially when filed before the completion of assessment proceedings. It followed a coordinate bench's decision in the assessee's own case, finding no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's applications were filed within the time allowed under the Act, interpreting the relevant provisions to avoid absurdity, particularly for trusts that had already commenced charitable activities. The Tribunal also noted that the application for 80G approval was filed before the expiry of the provisional approval.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the addition. The assessee provided sufficient evidence of the source of the cash deposits from its members, and the Revenue failed to provide contrary evidence. The Tribunal followed its own previous decisions on similar matters.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had indeed filed returns and paid the taxes, thus falling under Section 249(4)(a), not 249(4)(b). Consequently, the Ld. CIT(A) erred in not admitting the appeals. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s orders and remanded both appeals for de novo adjudication on merits, allowing them for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not challenging the disallowance on merits but only the quantum. The CIT(A) had allowed interest to the extent of income from other sources. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s finding that the interest expenditure should be allowed to the extent of income earned from other sources, resulting in a modified total income and no carry forward of losses.
The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to cooperate fully and provide necessary documentation and explanations.
The Tribunal held that some of the objects of the assessee were not charitable as defined under Section 2(15) of the Act, and the assessee company was directly related to its parent company, Sonai Infrastructure Private Limited, formed to carry out its CSR obligations. It was also noted that the Directors of the assessee were related to the parent company and that the assessee had received donations from it. However, the Tribunal observed that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) had not applied his mind to the objects and activities of the assessee and had rejected the application solely on the ground of non-compliance without verifying the objects. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Commissioner passed under Section 12A and remanded the matter for de novo adjudication, directing the Commissioner to provide an opportunity to the assessee to file all necessary documents. The same reasoning was applied to the appeal concerning Section 80G, leading to its set aside and remand. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that it was an admitted fact that the assessee did not respond to the notices issued by the Ld. CIT(E) despite sufficient opportunities. The assessee's counsel submitted that this non-compliance was not intentional but due to circumstances beyond its control and that it could substantiate its case if given an opportunity. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's submission that its application for regular registration under Section 12AB was rejected, and a co-ordinate bench had set aside a similar issue. Considering the interest of justice and the assessee's plea for an opportunity to present its case, the Tribunal decided to set aside the impugned order to the file of the Ld. CIT(E). The Ld. CIT(E) was directed to re-adjudicate the matter afresh after providing the assessee with an opportunity of being heard and allowing it to furnish the requisite details. The issue of deletion of addition was not specifically addressed as it was part of a general prayer.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fee u/s 234E is applicable only for defaults committed after June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision was inserted by the Finance Act 2015 with effect from that date. Therefore, the levies for periods prior to June 1, 2015, were not sustainable.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to comply with notices and provide necessary details, leading to the rejection of the application. However, considering a co-ordinate bench's order in a related appeal concerning Section 12A registration, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s order and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC wrongly dismissed the appeal on the ground of non-payment of advance tax without adjudicating on merits. The assessee has the right to determine its advance tax liability, and if none exists, the appeal should be admitted.
The Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(Exemption) and remanded the cases back for denovo adjudication. It was held that the CIT(E) had not applied its mind to the assessee's objects and activities and had not properly verified compliance or adherence to other laws.
The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. It observed that the quarterly TDS returns for FY 2012-13 were processed prior to June 1, 2015. The Tribunal noted that the enabling provision for levying late fees under Section 234E, which is Section 200A(1)(c), was inserted by the Finance Act, 2015, with effect from June 1, 2015. Consequently, any fee levied under Section 234E for defaults committed prior to this date is unsustainable in law. The Tribunal relied on its own coordinate bench decisions in Pancharatna Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO and Dhairyasheel Pralhad Pawar vs. DCIT, as well as decisions from other benches and High Courts, which affirmed that Section 234E fees cannot be imposed for periods prior to June 1, 2015. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer-CPC to delete the late fee levied under Section 234E and any consequential interest under Section 220(2).
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the profit rate to 0.25% on bank credit entries. The Tribunal found no error in the CIT(A)'s order, noting that a similar profit rate was accepted by the Assessing Officer in preceding years for similar transactions.
The Tribunal held that the property was not considered sold as no stamp duty was paid on the unregistered agreement and possession was not handed over. It was also found that the total cost of acquisition, including cancellation charges, exceeded the market value, thus negating the addition under Section 56(vii)(b) and the short-term capital gains.
The Tribunal noted that the wrong section code was used inadvertently and the non-compliance was not intentional. The Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(E) to grant a final opportunity to the assessee to submit required details and decide afresh.
The Tribunal held that the interpretation of the statutory provision should avoid absurdity and that the application was filed within the time allowed. It also noted that the assessee had obtained provisional approval which was valid until AY 2024-25, and their application for permanent registration was filed before its expiry.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance made under Section 143(1) without assigning any reasons is unsustainable in law. It further noted that interest earned from co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d), relying on various ITAT decisions.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice was bad in law as it was issued after the prescribed period without fulfilling the conditions for extended reassessment. It also found that the additions were made without proper evidence and based on conjecture, as the funds were sourced from the husband's loan and personal funds.
The Tribunal held that the AO took a legally permissible view at the time of assessment regarding Section 14A and delayed PF contributions. The Tribunal found that no disallowance under Section 14A was warranted as the assessee had no investment out of interest-bearing funds and no dividend income was earned. Regarding PF contributions, the law at the time allowed for no disallowance if deposited before the return filing due date.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice issued on March 31, 2021, was within the extended limitation period. However, it found that the entire cash deposits could not be treated as income and directed that only a profit element of 8% on the total deposits be taxed.
The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. It observed that the quarterly TDS returns for FY 2012-13 were processed prior to June 1, 2015. The Tribunal noted that the enabling provision for levying late fees under Section 234E, which is Section 200A(1)(c), was inserted by the Finance Act, 2015, with effect from June 1, 2015. Consequently, any fee levied under Section 234E for defaults committed prior to this date is unsustainable in law. The Tribunal relied on its own coordinate bench decisions in Pancharatna Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO and Dhairyasheel Pralhad Pawar vs. DCIT, as well as decisions from other benches and High Courts, which affirmed that Section 234E fees cannot be imposed for periods prior to June 1, 2015. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer-CPC to delete the late fee levied under Section 234E and any consequential interest under Section 220(2).
The Tribunal noted that the assessment order fell within the Covid-19 lockdown period, during which the Supreme Court had extended all limitation dates. Consequently, the Tribunal ruled that there was no delay in the appeal filing. The case was therefore remitted back to the ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on its merits.