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The Tribunal noted that the property registration date (18.10.2013) fell in the subsequent Financial Year (FY 2013-14, AY 2014-15), although some payments were made in advance during the impugned year (AY 2013-14). The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer did not consider the actual registration date before finalizing the assessment.
The Tribunal found that the source of deposits in the assessee's bank account were business receipts, supported by documentary evidence. However, since the assessee had not filed an ITR, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to estimate Net Profit at 8% of the total turnover under section 44AD of the Act, sustaining an addition of Rs.6,00,008/-.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the Ld. CIT(A) considering the circumstances. The matter was remitted back to the Ld. CIT(A) for adjudication on merits after providing a fair opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal noted that the additions were made based on the total sale consideration without allowing for costs, and the assessment order was ex-parte. Considering the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for a de-novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by dismissing the appeal without condoning the delay, especially since the assessee had paid taxes in the USA and provided evidence. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside and the matter remanded.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given a proper opportunity of hearing before the CIT(A)/NFAC, as notices were allegedly not received by the authorized representative. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A)/NFAC and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee, with a direction for the assessee to comply.
The Tribunal found it proper to restore the issue to the file of the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC with a direction to condone the delay and adjudicate the issue afresh after granting a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that co-operative banks are essentially co-operative societies, and therefore, the interest income earned by the assessee from deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The decision was based on a consistent line of previous tribunal rulings, and the Assessing Officer was directed to grant the deduction.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was required to pay advance tax on the basis of admitted tax and not assessed tax. Considering the assessee's payment of self-assessment tax and reinvestment of sale consideration, no further advance tax was payable.
The Tribunal held that co-operative banks are essentially co-operative societies, and therefore, the interest income earned by the assessee from deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The decision was based on a consistent line of previous tribunal rulings, and the Assessing Officer was directed to grant the deduction.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's failure to comply but, in the interest of justice, remitted the issue back to the Ld. Addl./JCIT(A) for adjudication on merits, with a direction for proper opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and restored the issue to the file of the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication after providing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The grounds raised were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal, noting the assessee's claim of illness supported by an affidavit and medical certificate during CIT(A) proceedings, and with no objection from the Revenue, decided to remand the matter back to the CIT(A)/NFAC. This allows the assessee a fresh opportunity to present evidence and submissions for a fair consideration of the additions made.
The Tribunal restored the issue of addition of unexplained cash deposit of Rs. 13,60,000/- back to the Assessing Officer. The AO was directed to examine the details filed by the assessee and decide the matter afresh, providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The tribunal restored the issue to the file of the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee an adequate opportunity of being heard, as no proper opportunity was granted earlier.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) noted the ex-parte order by the CIT(A) and the assessee's request for an additional opportunity. Considering the larger interest of justice and that the assessee may have had a genuine cause for non-appearance, the ITAT remitted the matter back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for de novo adjudication, with directions for the assessee to be vigilant and not seek unnecessary adjournments.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to appear and the order was ex-parte. Without delving into the merits, the Tribunal remitted the issue to the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication, ensuring a proper opportunity of hearing for the assessee.
The Tribunal affirmed the denial of deduction under Section 54F of the Act, finding that the assessee failed to construct the new residential house within the statutory period (one year before or two years after transfer for purchase, or three years after transfer for construction). The purchase of the plot and construction approvals occurred significantly prior to the sale of the original asset, and no completion certificate was provided, leading to the conclusion that the conditions for Section 54F were not satisfied.
The Tribunal found it appropriate to restore the issue to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to procure a valuation report from a Registered Valuer, and the Assessing Officer was to consider it and provide an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before both the CIT(A) (152 days) and the Tribunal (67 days), recognizing that the assessee should not suffer due to an inadvertent mistake or non-appearance of their representative. The case was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, with a direction to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee, who was also advised to be vigilant and avoid unnecessary adjournments.
The Tribunal held that since cooperative banks are essentially cooperative societies, the interest earned on deposits held with them is also eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal followed its own precedents and the assessee's own case from a previous assessment year.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the Ld. CIT(A) considering the circumstances. The matter was remitted back to the Ld. CIT(A) for adjudication on merits after providing a fair opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by a co-operative society from investments in other co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The decision followed precedents from the Tribunal's co-ordinate benches.
The Tribunal accepted the affidavit of the earlier counsel, condoned the delay in filing the appeal before CIT(A), and held that the filing of Form 10B is directory. Citing CBDT Circular No.10/2019, the Tribunal directed to grant the benefit of Section 11.
The Tribunal condoned a 176-day delay in filing the appeal. Recognizing that the assessee had removed the objectionable clauses from its MoA and produced the registered amended MoA, the Tribunal set aside the CIT, Exemption's order. The matter was remanded back to the CIT, Exemption for a fresh decision, directing the assessee to comply with notices and provide the amended MoA without seeking adjournments.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not given a proper opportunity to present its case. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and restored the issue on merits to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)/NFAC did not provide a proper opportunity of hearing as notices were sent to an erstwhile consultant's email ID and not conveyed to the assessee. The ex-parte order was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's arguments, considering the delay unintentional and beyond their control. They set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to condone the delay and decide the appeal on its merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to reasonable cause. However, the legal issue raised regarding the validity of reopening under Section 147 was dismissed as the assessee failed to respond to notices. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for de-novo adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that co-operative banks are essentially co-operative societies, and therefore, the interest income earned by the assessee from deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The decision was based on a consistent line of previous tribunal rulings, and the Assessing Officer was directed to grant the deduction.
The Tribunal found that the assessment order, although passed on 28.12.2018, was manually served on 29.01.2019. Considering the date of manual service, the appeal filed by the assessee on 22.02.2019 was within the prescribed time limits. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter for a decision on the merits.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal, noting no objection from the Revenue's DR. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal found that in separate quantum proceedings for the same assessment year, the additions related to capital account and sundry creditors, which formed the basis for the Section 270A penalty, had already been deleted. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the penalty could not survive and directed the Assessing Officer to cancel it, allowing the assessee's appeal.
The Tribunal granted the appellant permission to withdraw the appeal. The appeal is dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to revive if the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme certificate is not issued.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT, Exemption's order, concluding that the assessee deserved another opportunity to provide the requested details. The matter was remanded back to the CIT, Exemption for fresh consideration of the application after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee, who is directed to comply without seeking adjournments.
The Tribunal restored both appeals to the file of the CIT(Exemption) for fresh adjudication. This was done considering an earlier order of the Tribunal remitting the issue and the assessee's filing of a fresh appeal based on a CBDT circular.
The Tribunal held that the excess stock found during the survey is to be treated as business income and not income from other sources. Consequently, Section 115BBE is not applicable.
The Tribunal restored both the applications for registration under Section 12A and approval under Section 80G back to the file of the CIT(Exemption) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(Exemption) was directed to decide the issues afresh after providing due opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that brought forward unabsorbed depreciation needs to be added to the current year's depreciation, and once it takes the character of current year depreciation, it becomes eligible for set-off against income from other sources as per Section 72(1) of the Act.
The tribunal allowed the assessee's request for non-prosecution of the appeal, as there was no objection from the Ld. DR.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had complied with the requirements of the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme. In the absence of any objection from the Revenue and considering the assessee's compliance, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had complied with the initial notice but argued insufficient time for the subsequent one. Considering the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT's order and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal found that there was reasonable cause for the delay, citing the assessee's father's serious illness and subsequent death, as well as an employee's mistake. Following a Supreme Court precedent, the Tribunal condoned the delay and restored the matter to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a decision on merits.
The Tribunal held that the cancellation of registration by the PCIT was not justified. The Tribunal found that the societies' activities, such as organizing conferences and covering faculty expenses, did not necessarily constitute violations of the MCI regulations or the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal decided to condone the delay in filing the appeal. The reasoning was based on the fact that the assessee had demonstrated sufficient cause for the delay, which was attributed to administrative reasons and the process of amalgamation. The Tribunal emphasized that the primary objective is to ensure substantial justice and provide an opportunity for the assessee to present its case on merits. By condoning the delay, the Tribunal allowed the appeal to be heard on its merits, thereby upholding the principle that procedural technicalities should not bar a genuine grievance from being addressed. The finding on the substantive issues of the appeal is not recorded as the judgment focuses solely on the condonation of delay. The operative direction is to admit the appeal for hearing on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessees' trusts were genuinely and consistently carrying on work for their charitable objects and that the funds received from pharmaceutical companies were applied for these objects. The Tribunal noted that the Indian Medical Council's code of conduct, as amended on December 1, 2016, deleted the specific mention of "Professional Association of doctors," meaning the assessees were no longer explicitly covered by those regulations. Furthermore, the alleged violations and receipt of funds from pharmaceutical companies were for periods subsequent to this amendment. The Tribunal found no violation committed by the assessees. Citing the Bombay High Court's decision in Audyogik Shikshan Mandal, the Tribunal stated that exemptions should only be denied to the extent of the violative portion, and since the assessees were genuinely carrying out charitable activities, their registration could not be cancelled. The Tribunal also distinguished the Apex Court's decision in M/s. Apex Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT, stating it pertained to claims of expenditure by pharma companies and freebies to doctors, not professional associations. Consequently, the PCIT's finding of cancellation of registration was reversed, and the registrations were reinstated. The grounds of appeal related to merits were allowed. For MOGS, AOGS, and ASI, the findings were applied mutatis mutandis.
The Tribunal held that the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Pune, erred in cancelling the registration granted to the assessees under Section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by invoking powers under Section 12AB(4). The Tribunal noted that Section 12AB(4) specifically deals with the cancellation of registrations granted under Section 12AB(1) or Section 12AA(1). It found that the Principal Commissioner did not have the power to disturb or cancel registrations granted under the older Section 12A by using the provisions of Section 12AB(4). The Tribunal also observed that the criteria of 'specified violation' under Section 12AB(4) are applicable from Assessment Year 2022-23 onwards, and therefore, could not be applied to the earlier assessment years in question. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the Principal Commissioner had not reached a state of 'satisfaction' regarding specified violations, but rather reached conclusions based on mere suspicion, without proper consideration of the facts and legal provisions. Consequently, the cancellation of registration was deemed inappropriate and not permissible. The appeals were allowed, and the cancellation orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (PCIT) erred in cancelling the registration of the assessee trusts. The Tribunal noted that the Indian Medical Council (IMC) Regulations, specifically clause 6.8 concerning the relationship between doctors and the pharmaceutical industry, were amended by a Notification on 01.12.2016. This amendment deleted the words 'and professional association of doctors' from the code of conduct. Therefore, professional associations of doctors, like the assessee trusts, were no longer covered by these regulations prior to the alleged violations. The Tribunal found that the assessee trusts were genuinely carrying out charitable objects, and the funds received from pharmaceutical companies were applied for these objects. It was held that denial of exemptions can only be to the extent of the violation. The Tribunal relied on the Bombay High Court's decision in 'Audyogik Shikshan Mandal' (supra) that exemption should be denied only to the extent of the violative portion. Since the trusts were genuinely carrying out charitable activities and were no longer covered by the relevant IMC regulations for the period in question, their registration could not be cancelled. The Tribunal also distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in 'M/s. Apex Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT' (supra), stating it pertained to claims of expenditure by pharma companies and freebies received by doctors, not professional associations. Consequently, the PCIT's finding of cancellation was reversed, and the registrations granted under Section 12A/12AA/12AB were reinstated.