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239 orders · Page 2 of 5
The Tribunal noted that the appeals were filed incorrectly, quoting the assessment year instead of individual quarters and that a notice u/s.226(3) was mistakenly uploaded instead of an appeal against the order u/s.200A. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed as 'Infructuous'.
The Tribunal noted that the appeals were filed incorrectly, quoting the assessment year instead of individual quarters and that a notice u/s.226(3) was mistakenly uploaded instead of an appeal against the order u/s.200A. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed as 'Infructuous'.
The Tribunal condoned the 386-day delay in filing the appeal, emphasizing substantial justice. It held that the CIT(A) erred in not admitting additional evidence presented by the assessee. The Tribunal restored the issue to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, directing to provide the assessee one final opportunity to substantiate their case.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the Pr. CIT, finding that the Assessing Officer had failed to conduct proper inquiries on the issues of cash purchases and WDV discrepancies. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's grounds of appeal were not substantiated and that the Pr. CIT had rightly invoked Section 263.
The Tribunal found that while the assessee did comply with notices, the CIT did not provide a sufficient opportunity for the assessee to explain its case. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT's order and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that while there were procedural lapses in maintaining donation receipts, the charitable activity of the assessee for taking care of cows was not in dispute. The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided sufficient material to prove its charitable activities.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)/NFAC erred in not condoning the delay, considering the Supreme Court's extension of limitation due to the pandemic. The Tribunal also noted that documents submitted to the AO were considered additional evidence by the CIT(A)/NFAC without proper application of rules. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)/NFAC's order and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that interest earned by a cooperative society from its investment in deposits with other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal relied on previous decisions of the Pune Benches.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a Co-operative Society on deposits made out of surplus funds, even with cooperative banks, qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d). The decision followed judicial precedents from the High Court and ITAT.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, acknowledging it was not intentional. It then set aside the CIT(Exemption)'s order and restored the matter for fresh adjudication in light of a previous ITAT decision that granted Section 12AB registration.
The Tribunal found that the bank account was in the assessee's name, but the deposits were claimed to be business proceeds of the mother's hotel. The Tribunal noted that the AO did not consider withdrawals and that the CIT(A) did not thoroughly examine the details. The matter was restored to the AO for a final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate the case.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the Assessing Officer for a final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate his case with additional evidence, considering the new affidavits filed by the assessee. The assessee was directed to provide satisfactory details without seeking adjournments.
The Tribunal held that the addition under Section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii) was not attracted as the land purchased was agricultural land and not a capital asset, as defined by Section 2(14) of the Act. The land was situated more than 8 km from municipal limits.
The Tribunal noted that the Ld. DR had no objection to the application. Consequently, the appeal of the Revenue was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to restore if the settlement under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme failed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and set aside the order of the CIT(E). The matter was restored to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication after giving the assessee one opportunity to be heard and submit necessary documents.
The Tribunal held that the filing of Form 67 is a procedural and directory requirement, not mandatory, and FTC cannot be disallowed solely for non-compliance with this procedural requirement. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to verify the FTC claim and allow it in accordance with law.
Given that a related appeal and cross-objection for the same assessment year had already been decided by the Tribunal, setting aside the CIT(A)'s order and restoring the matter to the Assessing Officer for de-novo assessment, the present appeal is also set aside to the file of the Ld. AO. The AO is directed to decide the issues raised on merits in accordance with fact and law, after providing the assessee an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a senior citizen unfamiliar with e-proceedings, was prevented by sufficient cause from producing evidence before the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to admit the additional evidence and decide the case on merits after analyzing it.
The Tribunal determined that the assessee was not given a proper opportunity of hearing regarding the final notice. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT's orders and remanded both matters back for fresh adjudication, directing the CIT (Exemption) to provide a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had complied with all notices. However, it was also noted that the assessee contended they should have been given at least one more opportunity to explain if their initial reply was unsatisfactory. Considering the totality of facts and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT's order.
The Tribunal determined that the assessee was not given a proper opportunity of hearing regarding the final notice. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT's orders and remanded both matters back for fresh adjudication, directing the CIT (Exemption) to provide a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal restored the issue of the Rs. 27,00,50,766/- addition to the AO for fresh adjudication. This was due to the CIT(A) admitting additional evidence without providing the AO a reasonable opportunity to examine it, violating principles of natural justice and Rule 46A.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to properly examine the case on merits. The CIT(A) had access to the Income Tax Department's portal and could have verified the order under section 143(1) instead of dismissing the appeal due to non-submission of documents.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the CIT(A)'s file for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was directed to provide necessary support and evidence without seeking adjournments.
The Tribunal allowed grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, setting aside the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC and directing the Assessing Officer to delete the addition. The Tribunal relied on the principle that ex-gratia compensation received voluntarily, without any obligation on the part of the employer, does not amount to compensation under Section 17(3) of the Act. The Tribunal cited the Calcutta High Court decision in CIT vs. Ajit Kumar Bose and the Delhi Bench decision in ITO vs. Avirook Sen, which held that ex-gratia payments are voluntary and not taxable as profits in lieu of salary. The Tribunal noted that in similar cases of other employees of Pfizer Healthcare India Pvt. Ltd., the AO had treated such compensation as capital in nature, and this had attained finality. Therefore, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that the CIT(A)/NFAC was not justified in sustaining the addition. Grounds 6, 7, and 9 were dismissed as not pressed. Ground 8 became academic in view of the decision on grounds 1 to 5. Ground 10 was general.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for deduction in respect of provisions for standard assets and bad and doubtful debts reserves under Section 36(1)(viia) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the assessee is a cooperative bank regulated by the RBI and is obligated to follow RBI guidelines for provisioning. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Bellad Bagewadi Urban Souharda Sahakari Bank Niyamit Vs. CIT & Anr., which held that provisions on standard assets mandated by the RBI are allowable under Section 36(1)(viia). The Tribunal also noted that the Pune Bench of the Tribunal had decided similar issues in favour of the assessee. Since the Revenue had not placed any contrary binding decisions, the Tribunal dismissed the grounds raised by the Revenue and directed the AO to allow the assessee's claim. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order, which was a speaking order based on judicial precedents.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC wrongly dismissed the appeal on the ground of non-payment of advance tax without considering the assessee's contention that no advance tax was payable and that the ex-parte assessment order disallowed legitimate deductions. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)/NFAC's order.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from fixed deposits, where the funds were derived from its business activities, is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a) of the Act, following various judicial precedents.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT and remanded the matter back for fresh consideration. The CIT was directed to decide the application afresh after providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to comply with the notices.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficiently explained Rs. 18,29,000 of the deposits as being from premature fixed deposit encashments. However, the explanation for the remaining Rs. 73,000 was not satisfactory.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) deleting the addition of Rs. 2.5 crore. The Tribunal noted that the original assessment under Section 143(3) was completed on August 3, 2017, and the search took place on December 19, 2017, making it an unabated assessment. It was also an admitted fact that no incriminating material was found from the assessee's premises. The addition was solely based on WhatsApp messages found in the phone of Shri Kiran Baburao D Chandere. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd., which held that in cases of completed/unabated assessments, no addition can be made in the absence of any incriminating material unearthed during the search. The Tribunal clarified that such assessments can only be reopened under Sections 147/148, subject to their conditions. The CIT(A) was found to have correctly applied this principle, and the AO was given liberty to take appropriate action under Sections 147/148 if deemed necessary and in accordance with law.
The Tribunal, relying on judicial precedents from the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana and its own Pune Bench, held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from deposits made with other co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and/or Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer was directed to allow the deduction for the interest amount.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee was not given a fair opportunity to present its case or make necessary submissions. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the matter was remitted back to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication after granting the assessee a fair hearing.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had erroneously reproduced facts pertaining to A.Y. 2011-12 in the order for A.Y. 2014-15. Following the jurisdictional High Court's decision, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that since the minor's income was clubbed with the assessee's, the corresponding TCS collected should also be given credit to the assessee. The amendment allowing such credit was considered retrospective in effect to avoid undue hardship.
The Tribunal found that the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, was not applicable as the initial compensation was paid in 2010, before the Act's commencement, and the land possession was taken. However, the Tribunal set aside the assessment order to allow the Assessing Officer to adjudicate the claim that the amount had not accrued due to pending litigation, allowing the additional ground for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that while the CIT(A) may have lacked the specific jurisdiction to restore the matter, in the interest of justice, the issue of the correctness of the deduction claim u/s 80P(2)(a)(i) should be restored to the file of the AO for necessary verification, considering the lack of requisite details furnished by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by a co-operative society from its surplus funds deposited with banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal relied on various High Court and ITAT decisions that distinguished the Supreme Court ruling in Totagars.
The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition made under section 69A, finding that the assessee had explained the source of cash deposits as sales and that the provisions of section 69A were not applicable. The rejection of books of account was upheld, but the profit was to be estimated on total sales including cash sales.
The Tribunal acknowledged the non-compliance was partly due to the Chartered Accountant's unavailability. It set aside the CIT's rejection orders and remanded both the application for registration under Section 12AB and the approval under Section 80G(5) back to the CIT (Exemption) for de novo adjudication, providing the assessee a fresh opportunity for compliance and hearing.
The Tribunal acknowledged the non-compliance was partly due to the Chartered Accountant's unavailability. It set aside the CIT's rejection orders and remanded both the application for registration under Section 12AB and the approval under Section 80G(5) back to the CIT (Exemption) for de novo adjudication, providing the assessee a fresh opportunity for compliance and hearing.
The Tribunal held that the mistake in mentioning the wrong section code was a curable defect and an inadvertent error. Relying on previous decisions and a CBDT circular, the Tribunal decided to set aside the CIT's order.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT and remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of hearing and producing documents.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT (Exemption)'s order, concluding that the assessee was not afforded a proper opportunity to reply to the final notice. The case was remanded back to the CIT (Exemption) for a fresh decision after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing and compliance.
The Tribunal held that the error in mentioning the wrong clause in the application was a curable defect. Following previous decisions, the Tribunal set aside the CIT's order and remanded the matter back.
The Tribunal held that the CPC erred in disallowing the assessee's claim for deduction under Section 80P. The Tribunal found that the assessee had properly claimed the deduction in the relevant schedules of the return of income. Crucially, the Tribunal noted that the CPC had violated the provisions of Section 143(1) of the Act by not issuing a letter or notice to the assessee prior to making the adjustment disallowing the deduction. The Tribunal also observed that the revenue's representative could not point out any defect in the return. Furthermore, the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had no jurisdiction to travel beyond the reason stated in the Section 143(1) order and introduce a new issue regarding the eligibility of interest income for deduction, citing the Supreme Court's decision in CIT Vs. Rai Bahadur Hardutory Motilal Chamaria, which held that an appellate authority cannot enhance the assessment on a ground not considered by the assessing officer. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was deemed unsustainable. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to allow the assessee's deduction under Section 80P.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, holding it not maintainable due to the tax effect being below Rs. 60 lakhs as per the CBDT Circular. The Assessee's appeal was also dismissed as not pressed by their counsel.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, holding it not maintainable due to the tax effect being below Rs. 60 lakhs as per the CBDT Circular. The Assessee's appeal was also dismissed as not pressed by their counsel.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the Finance Act, 2015, effective from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, fee u/s.234E can only be levied for defaults committed after 01.06.2015.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing appeals should be condoned, citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Collector Land Acquisition Vs. MST Katiji. Since the appeals were decided ex-parte, the matters were remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.