ITAT Pune Judgments — May 2023

The Tribunal held that Dabba Trading is an illegal activity prohibited under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. Consequently, any expenditure incurred for such an illegal purpose cannot be deemed to have been incurred for the purpose of business or profession under Explanation (1) to Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and no deduction or allowance can be made for such expenditure. Citing the Supreme Court decision in Apex Laboratories (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT, the Tribunal concluded that the Assessing Officer should have disallowed the entire expenditure claimed to have been incurred to earn profits from Dabba trading. Therefore, the entire value of transactions in Dabba trading is taxable as business income. The assessment orders, as confirmed by the CIT(A), were upheld, and the grounds of appeal were rejected. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal held that Dabba Trading is an illegal activity prohibited under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. Consequently, any expenditure incurred for such an illegal purpose cannot be deemed to have been incurred for the purpose of business or profession under Explanation (1) to Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and no deduction or allowance can be made for such expenditure. Citing the Supreme Court decision in Apex Laboratories (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT, the Tribunal concluded that the Assessing Officer should have disallowed the entire expenditure claimed to have been incurred to earn profits from Dabba trading. Therefore, the entire value of transactions in Dabba trading is taxable as business income. The assessment orders, as confirmed by the CIT(A), were upheld, and the grounds of appeal were rejected. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the AO overlooked the cash reconciliation statement provided by the assessee, which linked cash withdrawals preceding the deposits. The matter was remanded for re-examination.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to provide cogent documentary proof for the credit during assessment and appellate proceedings. Therefore, for the interest of justice, the matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the assessee's claim that the difference was due to service tax liability was not substantiated, especially in light of Form 3CD not reflecting any sales tax amounts. The addition was upheld as it was directly related to the reasons for scrutiny selection.

The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to substantiate the entire cash balance but acknowledged that savings from accepted salary income should be considered. Therefore, the addition was reduced by 50% of the accepted salary income.

The Tribunal held that the classification of income as business income was final. However, due to lack of detailed expense allocation, the matter was remitted to the AO to item-wise allocate expenses between business and house property income.

The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by a cooperative society from deposits made in other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d). Therefore, the PCIT's revision order was not sustainable.

The Tribunal held that for claiming deduction under Section 36(1)(va), the employee's contribution must be deposited on or before the due date prescribed by the respective statutes. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services P. Ltd., the disallowance was upheld.

The Tribunal upheld the penalty imposed by the lower authorities. It was held that timely filing of TDS statements is crucial for efficient tax administration and detection of tax evasion, and the assessee failed to provide valid reasons for the delay.

The Tribunal held that the classification of income as business income was final. However, due to lack of detailed expense allocation, the matter was remitted to the AO to item-wise allocate expenses between business and house property income.

The Tribunal held that the classification of income as business income was final. However, due to lack of detailed expense allocation, the matter was remitted to the AO to item-wise allocate expenses between business and house property income.

The Tribunal held that passing the final assessment order in the name of the amalgamating company after due communication of the amalgamation is illegal. The facts are governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Maruti Suzuki India Private Limited, making the assessment order void.

The Tribunal noted that the AO had not passed any consequential order and the time limit for doing so had elapsed. Therefore, the appeal was rendered infructuous.

The Tribunal held that the classification of income as business income was final. However, due to lack of detailed expense allocation, the matter was remitted to the AO to item-wise allocate expenses between business and house property income.

The Tribunal held that the classification of income as business income was final. However, due to lack of detailed expense allocation, the matter was remitted to the AO to item-wise allocate expenses between business and house property income.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existing entity is invalid. Therefore, the assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing High Court judgments that emphasize adjudication on merits unless deliberate delay is proven. The Tribunal further held that Section 234E for levying fees is applicable only for defaults committed after June 1, 2015.

The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte orders of the CIT(Exemption) and remitted the matter back for fresh adjudication. The assessee was granted an opportunity to present its case and lead fresh evidence.

The Tribunal held that the Pr. CIT wrongly invoked Section 263 for rent expenses as the Assessing Officer (AO) had conducted sufficient inquiries. However, for freight outward expenses, the Tribunal upheld the Pr. CIT's order as the assessee failed to provide details of actual payments.

The Tribunal held that the excess stock found during the survey, which was admitted as unexplained, should have been taxed under Section 69B and Section 115BBE of the Income Tax Act, not just adjusted in the P&L account. The AO's failure to apply the correct sections made the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to revenue.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, admitted the appeal, and set aside the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order. The matter was remitted back to the AO for fresh assessment after providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, noting that the legal issue regarding the levy of Section 234E fees for periods prior to June 1, 2015, has been decided in favour of the assessee by various High Courts.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing High Court judgments that emphasize adjudication on merits unless deliberate delay is proven. The Tribunal further held that Section 234E for levying fees is applicable only for defaults committed after June 1, 2015.

The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte orders of the CIT(Exemption) and remitted the matter back for fresh adjudication. The assessee was granted an opportunity to present its case and lead fresh evidence.

The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by a cooperative society from deposits made in other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) of the Act. Therefore, the PCIT's revision order was not sustainable.

The Tribunal held that the amendment allowing levy of fee under Section 234E via Section 200A(1)(c) was effective from 01-06-2015. Since the defaults pertained to earlier periods, the levy was not justified.

The Tribunal held that the amendment allowing levy of fee under Section 234E via Section 200A(1)(c) was effective from 01-06-2015. Since the defaults pertained to earlier periods, the levy was not justified.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing High Court judgments that emphasize adjudication on merits unless deliberate delay is proven. The Tribunal further held that Section 234E for levying fees is applicable only for defaults committed after June 1, 2015.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing High Court judgments that emphasize adjudication on merits unless deliberate delay is proven. The Tribunal further held that Section 234E for levying fees is applicable only for defaults committed after June 1, 2015.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing High Court judgments that emphasize adjudication on merits unless deliberate delay is proven. The Tribunal further held that Section 234E for levying fees is applicable only for defaults committed after June 1, 2015.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing High Court judgments that emphasize adjudication on merits unless deliberate delay is proven. The Tribunal further held that Section 234E for levying fees is applicable only for defaults committed after June 1, 2015.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing High Court judgments that emphasize adjudication on merits unless deliberate delay is proven. The Tribunal further held that Section 234E for levying fees is applicable only for defaults committed after June 1, 2015.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing High Court judgments that emphasize adjudication on merits unless deliberate delay is proven. The Tribunal further held that Section 234E for levying fees is applicable only for defaults committed after June 1, 2015.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing High Court judgments that emphasize adjudication on merits unless deliberate delay is proven. The Tribunal further held that Section 234E for levying fees is applicable only for defaults committed after June 1, 2015.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing High Court judgments that emphasize adjudication on merits unless deliberate delay is proven. The Tribunal further held that Section 234E for levying fees is applicable only for defaults committed after June 1, 2015.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing High Court judgments that emphasize adjudication on merits unless deliberate delay is proven. The Tribunal further held that Section 234E for levying fees is applicable only for defaults committed after June 1, 2015.

The Tribunal held that the levy of late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was not permissible under Section 200A as the amendment empowering such levy was prospective. Therefore, the late fees were deleted.

The Tribunal held that the levy of late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was not permissible under Section 200A as the amendment empowering such levy was prospective. Therefore, the late fees were deleted.

The Tribunal, following its own previous decisions for earlier assessment years, held that the assessee is entitled to claim depreciation. The CIT(A)'s finding was found to be justified.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, noting that similar issues in the assessee's own case had been decided by higher courts in favor of the assessee. Therefore, judicial consistency was maintained.

The Tribunal held that the levy of late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was not permissible under Section 200A as the amendment empowering such levy was prospective. Therefore, the late fees were deleted.

The Tribunal held that the original return could not be treated as defective under Section 139(9) as the assessee had not claimed to have paid self-assessment tax. Therefore, levying interest under Section 234A through rectification was not justified.

The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from deposits in other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d). Therefore, the revision order by the Principal CIT was not sustainable.

The tribunal is issuing a correction to its previous order to reflect the accurate name and address of the assessee. No other aspect of the original judgment is being altered.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and, following its previous order on a similar issue, restored the matter of Section 80G registration back to the CIT (Exemptions) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the AO's assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue's interest, as the issue of deductibility of interest income earned from cooperative banks under Section 80P was covered in favour of the assessee by various judicial precedents, including a coordinate bench decision and a Bombay High Court ruling.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had a reasonable and sufficient cause for the delay in filing the audit report due to suffering from Swine flu. Therefore, the penalty imposed under Section 271B should be deleted as per the provisions of Section 273B.

The Tribunal held that the disallowance of Section 80P deduction was not in accordance with the law, citing various judicial precedents. It also noted that the gratuity disallowance was covered by a CBDT circular. Consequently, the penalty imposed was found to be unsustainable.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s order dismissing the appeal was incorrect as the Vivad Se Vishwas scheme was not applicable to the reassessment order. The Tribunal vacated the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for disposal on merits.