209 orders · Page 1 of 5
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was wrongly levied as the assessee had disclosed all relevant particulars and there was no intention to conceal income. The assessee acted on a bona fide presumption regarding the applicability of Section 115JB.
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was wrongly levied as the assessee had disclosed all relevant particulars and there was no intention to conceal income. The assessee acted on a bona fide presumption regarding the applicability of Section 115JB.
The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal. It restricted the addition on deposits in Standard Chartered Bank to Rs. 10 lakhs and deleted the addition on property valuation based on DVO's report without considering consideration paid. The addition for unaccounted stock was upheld.
The Tribunal held that since the quantum addition, which formed the basis for the penalty, had been deleted by a previous order of the Tribunal, the penalty was not sustainable. Therefore, the penalty was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to record proper satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings and did not clearly specify which limb of Section 271(1)(c) was violated. Following the Bombay High Court's decision, the penalty order was deemed infirm and cancelled.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were bad in law because the Assessing Officer failed to provide the assessee with the statements of third parties and did not dispose of the assessee's objections against the reopening with a speaking order, violating principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were bad in law because the Assessing Officer failed to provide the assessee with the statements of third parties and did not dispose of the assessee's objections against the reopening with a speaking order, violating principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to record proper satisfaction regarding which limb of Section 271(1)(c) was attracted for initiating penalty proceedings. This vitiated the penalty proceedings.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the receipts were intrinsically linked to the housing project and that proportionate deduction was allowable even for combined units exceeding the area limit. The allowance of liquidated damages was also confirmed.
The Tribunal allowed the exclusion of 'Agrima Consultants International Ltd.' as a comparable for benchmarking marketing and business support services. It also directed the AO to dispose of the assessee's rectification application for advance tax credit.
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was wrongly levied as the assessee had disclosed all relevant particulars and there was no intention to conceal income. The assessee acted on a bona fide presumption regarding the applicability of Section 115JB.
The Tribunal partly allowed the assessee's appeal by restricting the addition on business income to 200% of the declared tentative income, finding the 300% addition to be excessive. The Tribunal also remanded the issue of Section 115JB to the Assessing Officer for recomputation.
The Tribunal partly allowed the assessee's appeal by restricting the addition on business income to 200% of the declared tentative income, considering the lack of audited accounts. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal upheld the lower authorities' decision that rental income from warehouses should be assessed as 'Income from House Property', not 'Business Income'. However, it noted that income from services provided to tenants could be assessed under 'Business Income' or 'Income from Other Sources'.
The Tribunal held that guest house expenses, including telephone and electricity, are not allowable as per the Supreme Court decision in Britannia Industries Ltd. However, the compensation received for deferred payments for cable sales is derived from business activity and eligible for deduction under Section 80IA.
The Tribunal had previously held the reassessment order, which formed the basis for the penalty, to be invalid. Since the substratum for the penalty levy was eroded, the penalty was liable to be deleted.
The Tribunal admitted the additional ground of appeal regarding the principle of mutuality, as it emanates from existing facts. However, since this plea was raised for the first time, the matter was remitted to the Assessing Officer for examination.
The Tribunal held that the issue of eligibility for deduction under Section 10A(1) versus 10A(1A) needed to be re-examined by the CIT(A). The CIT(A) was directed to ascertain the assessee's eligibility under the relevant provisions and grant relief after following principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal upheld the restriction of deduction under Section 36(1)(viia) to the extent of provision in the books of account, following previous precedents. The Tribunal also admitted that the question of law was pending before the High Court.
The Tribunal admitted the additional ground of appeal regarding the principle of mutuality, as it emanates from existing facts. However, since this plea was raised for the first time, the matter was remitted to the Assessing Officer for examination.
The Tribunal held that the issue of eligibility for deduction under Section 10A(1) versus 10A(1A) needed re-examination by the CIT(A). The CIT(A) was directed to ascertain the correct eligibility and grant relief after following principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal upheld the restriction of deduction under Section 36(1)(viia) to the extent of provision in the books of account, following previous precedents. The Tribunal also admitted that the question of law was pending before the High Court.
The Tribunal upheld the addition, finding sufficient corroborative evidence in the seized documents and the builder's statement. The assessee's denial was not supported by evidence, and the Tribunal found no merit in the grounds of appeal regarding cross-examination and alternative pleas.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned on bank investments by a cooperative society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members is not necessarily 'income from other sources'. It can be considered business income eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) if the investments are made to meet operational needs or as part of its banking-like activities.
The Tribunal held that the loss incurred on share trading could be treated as a business loss and set off against speculative gains. The CIT(A)'s order was upheld, finding no reason to interfere with the findings.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not given a finding on the assessee's submissions regarding agricultural income as the source of deposits. Additionally, a deposit made in a subsequent financial year was incorrectly added. Therefore, the issue was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned on bank investments by a cooperative society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members is not necessarily 'income from other sources'. It can be considered business income eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) if the investments are made to meet operational needs or as part of its banking-like activities.
The Tribunal held that the interest earned on FDRs by the assessee, a credit co-operative society, was not to be taxed as income from other sources. The Tribunal distinguished the case from the Supreme Court's decision in Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Ltd. by noting that the assessee utilized all its funds for business and had no surplus funds.
The Tribunal noted that the three companies from which the assessee received share application money were not mentioned in the statements of the 'entry providers'. Therefore, the issue was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh verification of the genuineness and creditworthiness of these companies.
The Tribunal held that lease premium cannot be construed as rent and therefore, the CIT was justified in invoking Section 263. The assessee's claim of being an extended arm of the State Government and thus not taxable was also rejected.
The Tribunal held that lease premium cannot be construed as rent and therefore, the CIT was justified in invoking Section 263. The assessee's claim of being an extended arm of the State Government and thus not taxable was also rejected.
The Tribunal held that the interest earned on FDRs by the assessee, a credit co-operative society, was not to be taxed as income from other sources. The Tribunal distinguished the case from the Supreme Court's decision in Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Ltd. by noting that the assessee utilized all its funds for business and had no surplus funds.
The Tribunal held that royalty payments should be aggregated with production and sales activity and could not be benchmarked separately. It also upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to treat royalty payments and project assistance technical charges as deductible expenditure.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act was prospective. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge late filing fees under Section 234E for TDS returns pertaining to periods prior to June 1, 2015, even if the returns were filed or processed after that date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act was prospective. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge late filing fees under Section 234E for TDS returns pertaining to periods before June 1, 2015, even if filed or processed after that date.
The Tribunal held that the assessee fulfilled the condition of holding a plot of land with an area of more than one acre, considering the actual measurements. Therefore, the assessee is eligible for the deduction under Section 80IB(10).
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271AAA was not leviable as the additional income offered was not on account of any asset found during the search or any entry in the books of account or documents found during the search. The conditions for levying penalty under Section 271AAA were not fulfilled.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act was prospective. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge late filing fees under Section 234E for TDS returns pertaining to periods prior to June 1, 2015, even if filed or processed after that date.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271AAA was not leviable as the additional income offered was not on account of any asset found during the search or any entry in the books of account or documents found during the search. The conditions for levying penalty under Section 271AAA were not fulfilled.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E, was prospective. Therefore, for TDS returns pertaining to periods prior to June 1, 2015, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge late filing fees, even if the returns were filed or processed after that date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E, was prospective. Therefore, for TDS statements pertaining to periods before June 1, 2015, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge such fees, even if the statements were filed or processed after that date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act was prospective. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge late filing fees under Section 234E for TDS returns pertaining to periods prior to June 1, 2015, even if filed or processed after that date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E, was prospective. Therefore, for TDS returns pertaining to periods prior to June 1, 2015, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge late filing fees, even if the returns were filed or processed after that date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act was prospective. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge late filing fees under Section 234E for TDS returns pertaining to periods prior to June 1, 2015, even if the returns were filed or processed after that date.
The tribunal dismissed the appeal in limine due to the delay in filing. The appeal was not pursued by the assessee, and the defects were not rectified.
The Tribunal held that royalty payments should be aggregated with production and sales activity and could not be benchmarked separately. It also upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to treat royalty payments and project assistance technical charges as deductible expenditure.
The Tribunal held that prior to the amendment of Section 200A effective from June 1, 2015, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to levy late filing fees under Section 234E. Therefore, the demand raised for periods prior to this date is invalid.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act was prospective. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge late filing fees under Section 234E for TDS returns pertaining to periods prior to June 1, 2015, even if the returns were filed or processed after that date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act was prospective. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge late filing fees under Section 234E for TDS returns pertaining to periods prior to June 1, 2015, even if the returns were filed or processed after that date.
The Tribunal held that the assessee fulfilled the condition of holding a plot of land with an area of more than one acre, considering the actual measurements. Therefore, the assessee is eligible for the deduction under Section 80IB(10).