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3,036 tribunal orders from the Patna bench.
Counted from the judgments of this bench on BharatTax. The figure is how many of them cite each decision.
Late fees under section 234E are not applicable for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as the amendment to section 200A inserting clause (c) was effective from that date.
The fee under Section 234E for late filing of TDS/TCS statements cannot be levied retrospectively by processing an intimation under Section 200A for defaults occurring before the amendment allowing such processing.
For revision under Section 263, the Assessing Officer's order must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue; if either condition is not met, the revisionary jurisdiction cannot be invoked. An order is not erroneous merely because the Assessing Officer did not record the details of enquiries conducted, provided due enquiries were made.
An assessment under section 153A is without jurisdiction if there is an absence of incriminating material for an unabated assessment year.
This case outlines the fundamental tests for invoking Section 263, holding that an assessment order is 'erroneous' if based on incorrect facts or incorrect application of law, or passed without due inquiry. For revision, both the conditions of being erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue must be fulfilled.
The Commissioner cannot revise an assessment order under Section 263 merely because they hold a different opinion or believe a deeper inquiry was warranted if the Assessing Officer has applied their mind and conducted some inquiry. Revision under Section 263 is permissible only in cases of a complete lack of inquiry or non-application of mind by the Assessing Officer, not for merely inadequate inquiry.
For exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 263, the Commissioner must first find that the Assessing Officer's order is erroneous and unsustainable in law, as this is a condition precedent. An order is not erroneous merely because two views are possible, or if the Commissioner disagrees with the Assessing Officer's permissible view, or to simply remit the matter for further enquiries.
A penalty notice issued under section 274 read with section 271(1)(c) is invalid if it fails to specify whether the penalty proceedings are initiated for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. This non-specification vitiates the penalty proceedings.
Approval under Section 153D for search assessments is invalid if granted mechanically, hastily, or without due application of mind, such as on the same day as the proposal or in a bunched manner. Such an invalid approval renders the consequential assessment order under Section 153A void ab initio.
Approval under Section 153D of the Income Tax Act is mandatory for assessment orders in search cases. While elaborate reasons for approval are not required, the approving authority must provide some indication that it has examined the draft orders and found them to meet the requirements of law.
The Commissioner (Appeals) must pass a speaking order on merits, considering the grounds raised in the assessee's appeal. They cannot dispose of an appeal by simply stating the Assessing Officer's order is self-speaking and requires no interference.
An assessment order is erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue's interests if the Assessing Officer accepts a sum offered as income by an assessee, even when that sum was not actually earned, thereby allowing revision under Section 263.
Strict adherence to approval protocols under Section 153D, including those in the Departmental Manual of Office Procedure, is essential for search assessments. An assessment is invalid if the approving authority fails to apply its mind or consider all relevant seized material before granting approval.
Appellate authorities can consider new claims and additional grounds if the relevant facts are already on record. The purpose of assessment is to correctly determine tax liability, allowing both parties to raise issues.
When two equally plausible interpretations of a taxing provision are possible, or when conflicting views exist from non-jurisdictional High Courts, the interpretation that favors the assessee must be adopted.
Where an assessment order is merely a copy-paste of observations from an investigation wing's appraisal report without independent verification, it is not a valid basis for making additions to income.
Approval granted by a superior authority under Section 153D in a mechanical or perfunctory manner, without proper application of mind, lacks legal sanctity and renders the subsequent assessment order null and void.
The Commissioner (Appeals) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution; the law does not empower them to do so. The appeal must be decided on merits and in writing, stating points for determination, decision, and reasons.
The Commissioner, while exercising revisional powers under Section 33B of the 1922 Act (analogous to Section 263 of the 1961 Act), must provide the assessee with an opportunity of being heard, even if a formal notice is not explicitly prescribed. Failure to adhere to these principles of natural justice vitiates the revisional order.
Most recent orders on record, from 2026.
The Tribunal held that the books of accounts were wrongly rejected by the AO under Section 145(3) of the Act. The assessee had provided details of labour charges, wage expenses, and labour/wages payable at the year-end, including labour registers with details of persons engaged, attendances, and daily wages. The AO did not point out any specific defects in the books to justify their rejection. Consequently, the rejection of books of accounts was not sustained. Regarding the addition of Rs. 51,72,29,144, the Tribunal noted that substantial billing for contractual work was done in March, with labour charges booked accordingly and shown as payable. Payments for work done in the current financial year were received in the subsequent financial year, and outstanding labour charges were discharged then, as evidenced by subsequent year's details. The Tribunal found the addition unrealistic and devoid of basis, noting that sustaining it would lead to an astronomically high and unachievable GP rate of 41.69%. The Tribunal also observed that the audited books of accounts did not draw any adverse inference from the auditors. Therefore, the appellate order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the AO was directed to delete the addition. The principle established is that rejection of books of accounts requires specific defects, and disallowances of expenses, particularly those related to contract work with subsequent year payments, should be supported by concrete evidence rather than assumptions leading to unrealistic profit margins.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was not bad in law. Regarding the initiation of proceedings with duplicate show-cause notices, the Tribunal noted that the first page of the PCIT's order correctly referred to the assessment order under Section 143(3), and the mention of Section 147 was a typographical error. The Tribunal also found that the PCIT's conclusions were related to the assessee, and objections regarding unrelated transactions were not sustainable under Section 292B. The Tribunal upheld the PCIT's findings on the re-examination of property investment (Ground No. 7) and the alleged unaccounted income from repairing activities (Ground No. 8), stating that the PCIT had correctly identified deficiencies in the AO's inquiry. Citing the case of CIT v. Shree Manjunathesware Packing Products & Camphor Works [1998] 231 ITR 53 (SC), the Tribunal noted that the PCIT's powers under Section 263 are of wide amplitude and it is sufficient if the PCIT comes to a prima facie conclusion that the AO's order was erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue, without necessarily recording a final conclusion on merits. Therefore, while Grounds 7 and 8 were allowed, the rest of the grounds were dismissed, and the PCIT's order was upheld. The appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that considering the submissions made by the assessee and the facts of the case, it was inclined to restore the appeal to the file of the CIT(E). The CIT(E) was directed to pass an order after hearing the assessee. The assessee was also directed to cooperate in the remand proceedings. The reasoning was based on providing an opportunity to the assessee to present their case, thereby adhering to principles of natural justice. The ratio decidendi is that where an application is rejected due to a procedural lapse by the assessee, and the revenue does not object, the matter should be remanded to provide a fair hearing. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that an ex-parte order was passed by the AO and the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal due to a delay of 104 days without any adjudication on the merits. Considering the facts, the assessee's prayer, and the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeal to the file of the AO. The delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was condoned. The AO was directed to pass a fresh order after affording an opportunity to the assessee to be heard. The assessee was directed to cooperate in the remand proceedings. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) had passed an order after a significant gap following the last hearing, and that the assessment order was made under Section 144 of the Act. The Tribunal found that the Commissioner (Appeals) had a duty under Section 250(6) to pass a speaking order with reasons and findings, which was not done. The Tribunal also observed that the assessee did not make proper representation at either the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) stage. Citing Ajji Basha Vs. CIT and Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) Nagpur v. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF), the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and is empowered to remand the matter. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to allow an opportunity of being heard to the assessee and the Assessing Officer as per Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, and then pass an order in accordance with law. The grounds taken by the assessee were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) had passed an order after a significant gap following the last hearing, and that the assessment order was made under Section 144 of the Act. The Tribunal found that the Commissioner (Appeals) had a duty under Section 250(6) to pass a speaking order with reasons and findings, which was not done. The Tribunal also observed that the assessee did not make proper representation at either the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) stage. Citing Ajji Basha Vs. CIT and Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) Nagpur v. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF), the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and is empowered to remand the matter. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to allow an opportunity of being heard to the assessee and the Assessing Officer as per Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, and then pass an order in accordance with law. The grounds taken by the assessee were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding regarding the service of notice u/s 143(2), finding the assessee's contentions to be incorrect based on the AO's records and the Inspector's report of affixing the notice. Consequently, the assessment was not considered void ab initio. Regarding the remand proceedings, the Tribunal found that the AO had merely reproduced the assessment order in the remand report without considering the documents submitted by the appellant during appellate proceedings. Therefore, the AO was directed to examine the submitted documents and provide an opportunity for hearing to the assessee. Additions were to be deleted if the documents were found in order. The Tribunal also directed the AO to consider the claim of exemption u/s 11 of the Act in view of the documents to be filed. The grounds of appeal were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the addition of ₹92,66,803/- made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was not justified. The Tribunal noted that the AO had merely reduced the returned income from the total capital introduced, treating the difference as unexplained capital. However, the assessee had reconciled this amount. The Tribunal found that the capital introduced of ₹5.77 crore included the profit of ₹2.5452 crore from the previous year, capital introduced during the current year, and other sources like salary. The Tribunal observed that ₹2.5452 crore related to the profit of the previous year for which evidence was filed. The remaining amount of ₹3,30,54,327/- related to capital introduced on account of salary and other sources, and ₹1.88 crore was the profit of the current year. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded there was no justification for upholding the CIT(A)'s findings. The addition of ₹92,66,803/- was directed to be deleted. Grounds 5 and 9 were allowed, and other grounds were not adjudicated separately as relief was granted on merits. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) had passed an order after a significant gap following the last hearing, and that the assessment order was made under Section 144 of the Act. The Tribunal found that the Commissioner (Appeals) had a duty under Section 250(6) to pass a speaking order with reasons and findings, which was not done. The Tribunal also observed that the assessee did not make proper representation at either the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) stage. Citing Ajji Basha Vs. CIT and Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) Nagpur v. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF), the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and is empowered to remand the matter. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to allow an opportunity of being heard to the assessee and the Assessing Officer as per Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, and then pass an order in accordance with law. The grounds taken by the assessee were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) had passed an order after a significant gap following the last hearing, and that the assessment order was made under Section 144 of the Act. The Tribunal found that the Commissioner (Appeals) had a duty under Section 250(6) to pass a speaking order with reasons and findings, which was not done. The Tribunal also observed that the assessee did not make proper representation at either the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) stage. Citing Ajji Basha Vs. CIT and Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) Nagpur v. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF), the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and is empowered to remand the matter. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to allow an opportunity of being heard to the assessee and the Assessing Officer as per Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, and then pass an order in accordance with law. The grounds taken by the assessee were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) had passed an order after a significant gap following the last hearing, and that the assessment order was made under Section 144 of the Act. The Tribunal found that the Commissioner (Appeals) had a duty under Section 250(6) to pass a speaking order with reasons and findings, which was not done. The Tribunal also observed that the assessee did not make proper representation at either the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) stage. Citing Ajji Basha Vs. CIT and Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) Nagpur v. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF), the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and is empowered to remand the matter. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to allow an opportunity of being heard to the assessee and the Assessing Officer as per Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, and then pass an order in accordance with law. The grounds taken by the assessee were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) had passed an order after a significant gap following the last hearing, and that the assessment order was made under Section 144 of the Act. The Tribunal found that the Commissioner (Appeals) had a duty under Section 250(6) to pass a speaking order with reasons and findings, which was not done. The Tribunal also observed that the assessee did not make proper representation at either the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) stage. Citing Ajji Basha Vs. CIT and Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) Nagpur v. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF), the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and is empowered to remand the matter. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to allow an opportunity of being heard to the assessee and the Assessing Officer as per Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, and then pass an order in accordance with law. The grounds taken by the assessee were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) had passed an order after a significant gap following the last hearing, and that the assessment order was made under Section 144 of the Act. The Tribunal found that the Commissioner (Appeals) had a duty under Section 250(6) to pass a speaking order with reasons and findings, which was not done. The Tribunal also observed that the assessee did not make proper representation at either the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) stage. Citing Ajji Basha Vs. CIT and Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) Nagpur v. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF), the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and is empowered to remand the matter. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to allow an opportunity of being heard to the assessee and the Assessing Officer as per Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, and then pass an order in accordance with law. The grounds taken by the assessee were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not file any explanation to the show cause notice issued by the AO. However, before the Ld. CIT(A), the assessee did file certain details. The Ld. CIT(A) observed that primary documents to support the claim that bank account credits represented business receipts were not filed, and thus upheld the addition. The ITAT found that the assessee's claim that bank credits were business receipts and withdrawals related to business transactions had not been examined by the AO. Since the assessee also wanted to file supporting documents, the Tribunal considered it fit to set aside the impugned assessment and restore it to the file of the AO for a de novo assessment. This would involve necessary verification and affording the assessee a proper opportunity of hearing. The issue of whether the addition was justified was not decided on merits but was remanded for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) had passed the quantum appeal order ex-parte without hearing the assessee and had not decided all the grounds of appeal on their merits. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) concerning the quantum appeal and remanded the matter back to the Ld. CIT(A) with a direction to decide the appeal afresh on its merits after providing the assessee an opportunity of being heard. Consequently, the order of the Ld. CIT(A) upholding the penalty order was also set aside and restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) to be decided along with the quantum appeal. The Tribunal expressly left no issue undecided.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding regarding the service of notice u/s 143(2), finding the assessee's contentions to be incorrect based on the AO's records and the Inspector's report of affixing the notice. Consequently, the assessment was not considered void ab initio. Regarding the remand proceedings, the Tribunal found that the AO had merely reproduced the assessment order in the remand report without considering the documents submitted by the appellant during appellate proceedings. Therefore, the AO was directed to examine the submitted documents and provide an opportunity for hearing to the assessee. Additions were to be deleted if the documents were found in order. The Tribunal also directed the AO to consider the claim of exemption u/s 11 of the Act in view of the documents to be filed. The grounds of appeal were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) had passed the quantum appeal order ex-parte without hearing the assessee and had not decided all the grounds of appeal on their merits. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) concerning the quantum appeal and remanded the matter back to the Ld. CIT(A) with a direction to decide the appeal afresh on its merits after providing the assessee an opportunity of being heard. Consequently, the order of the Ld. CIT(A) upholding the penalty order was also set aside and restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) to be decided along with the quantum appeal. The Tribunal expressly left no issue undecided.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 1131 days in filing the appeal, considering the reasons provided by the assessee in her affidavit. On the substantive issue, the Tribunal found that the matter was decided against the assessee in an ex-parte manner. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned assessment order and restored the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer was directed to frame a fresh assessment as per law after affording necessary opportunity to the assessee to present her case. The ratio decidendi is that where an assessment is made ex-parte and the assessee demonstrates a genuine need for an opportunity to present their case, the appellate authorities should provide such an opportunity in the interest of justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided some information regarding the source of investments to the AO but failed to submit supporting documents. It was also observed that the AO did not conduct any inquiry or verification on the submissions made by the assessee. Furthermore, the Ld. CIT(A) had directed the AO to verify the year of execution of the sale deed. Considering these facts, the Tribunal deemed it fit to set aside the impugned assessment and directed the AO to frame the assessment de novo after conducting necessary inquiry and verification. The assessee was directed to produce supporting documents and comply with the AO's notices. The issue of whether the additions and disallowance were justified was not decided on merits, but the case was remanded for fresh assessment.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the statutory time period before the Ld. CIT(A). Consequently, the delay in filing the appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) was condoned. The Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(A) to adjudicate the appeal on its merits after providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The issue regarding the denial of deduction under Section 80PA was not decided on merits by the ITAT, as the matter was remanded back to the Ld. CIT(A).
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 191 days in filing the appeal before it, considering the reasons provided. Regarding the appeal before the Ld. CIT(A), the Tribunal noted that the delay was indeed 27 days, not 2607 days as erroneously stated by the Ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal condoned this 27-day delay, setting aside the Ld. CIT(A)'s order. The matter was restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) with a direction to adjudicate the appeal afresh after providing the assessee with a necessary opportunity of hearing. The ratio decidendi is that procedural errors, such as miscalculation of delay, should not prevent an appeal from being heard on its merits, and appellate authorities have the discretion to condone reasonable delays to ensure justice.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had uploaded certain information and details for the AO's consideration. However, the AO observed that details were not furnished and proceeded to estimate income. The Tribunal found it apparent that the information and details of the assessee were not considered by either the AO or the Ld. CIT(A). Consequently, the Tribunal considered it fit to set aside the impugned assessment and restore all issues to the file of the AO for a de novo assessment. The AO is directed to frame the assessment after affording an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The ratio decidendi is that assessments made without considering the evidence and submissions furnished by the assessee are liable to be set aside and remanded for fresh consideration. The operative direction is to set aside the assessment order and restore the issues to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 617 days in filing the appeal, considering the explanation provided in the assessee's affidavit. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal observed that the assessment order was passed ex-parte, and the assessee had not complied with the hearing notices issued by the Ld. CIT(A) due to family disputes. Recognizing that the matter was adjudicated ex-parte at both levels, the Tribunal held that, to meet the ends of justice, the assessee should be granted one more opportunity to defend its case on merits before the Ld. CIT(A). Accordingly, the appeal was restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) with a direction to adjudicate the issues on merits after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The assessee was also directed to comply with future hearing notices. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the penalty appeals should be allowed. The reasoning was based on the order of a co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in ITA No.215/PAT/2026, which had set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and Assessing Officer and remanded the matter for de-novo assessment. The Tribunal reasoned that in light of this decision, the impugned penalty orders should also be set aside. The Assessing Officer was granted liberty to pass penalty orders in accordance with law, consequent to the de-novo assessment, and the assessee was to be provided an opportunity of being heard. The ratio decidendi is that penalty proceedings are consequential to the quantum assessment, and if the quantum assessment is set aside for de-novo assessment, the penalty orders should also be revisited.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 187 and 156 days in filing the appeals, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others, emphasizing a liberal approach to delay when supported by justifiable reasons for substantial justice. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(A) had passed the quantum appeal order ex-parte without hearing the assessee and had not decided all grounds of appeal on merits. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal remanded the quantum appeal to the Ld. CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits after providing an opportunity of being heard. Consequently, the order upholding the penalty was also set aside and restored to the Ld. CIT(A) to be decided along with the quantum appeal. The ratio is that an appellate authority must provide an opportunity of being heard to the assessee before passing an order, and failure to do so warrants a remand.