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162 orders · Page 2 of 4
The Tribunal held that the exemption under Section 54F cannot be denied solely on the technical ground that it was not claimed in the return of income, especially when the eligibility and all relevant facts are on record. The lower authorities' denial of the deduction was deemed unjustified.
The Tribunal found that the ex-parte order was passed without proper notice and noted an error in the assessment year. The case was therefore restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the approval for reopening the assessment beyond three years was obtained from the incorrect authority (PCIT-2, Nagpur) instead of the CCIT/PCCIT, as mandated by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal. Consequently, the assumption of jurisdiction was vitiated.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC order was passed without proper procedure, as it did not address the grounds raised by the assessee and lacked clarity on the service of notices in set-aside proceedings. Therefore, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment.
The Tribunal held that quasi-judicial authorities should decide issues on merits and a reference to a wrong provision in an application is not a basis for dismissal. Procedural irregularities should be treated as technical non-compliance and the applicant should be given an opportunity to correct mistakes.
The Tribunal held that quasi-judicial authorities should decide issues on merits and a mistake in referencing a wrong provision should not lead to dismissal. The principle of substantial compliance should be applied to procedural irregularities.
The tribunal held that quasi-judicial authorities should decide issues on merits and that a minor error in mentioning a provision or a slight delay should not lead to outright rejection. The principle of substantial compliance should be applied, and the assessee should be given an opportunity to rectify mistakes.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under section 270A was unsustainable as it was based on an estimated profit after the quantum addition was already reduced by the Tribunal. For section 271DA, the Tribunal found that the assessment order lacked the necessary satisfaction for levying the penalty.
The Tribunal held that the delayed deposit of PF and ESIC contributions was justifiable due to intervening holidays. Regarding the deemed dividend, it was held that the opening balance of Rs. 1,29,07,644 was not taxable in the current year as it represented a carry-forward from previous years.
The Tribunal held that since the addition of Rs. 5,54,000/- which formed the basis for the penalty was deleted by the CIT(A) in the quantum proceedings, the penalty cannot be sustained. The Tribunal applied the principle 'Sublato Fundamento Cadit Opus' (when the foundation is removed, the superstructure falls).
The Tribunal held that the date of recording the satisfaction note is crucial, and since it was recorded after April 1, 2021, Section 153C(3) of the Act applies. Consequently, the assessment order passed under Section 153C was vitiated.
The Tribunal held that maintaining a Dharamshala cannot be considered a religious activity unless there are restrictions on entry based on religious order. The Tribunal found that many expenses classified as religious by the CIT(E) were actually general expenses for the trust's activities.
The Tribunal held that the timeline for filing the application is directory in nature and the assessee should be given an opportunity to contest on merits. The matter was restored to the CIT(E) for a fresh hearing and decision on merits.
The Tribunal held that the penalty appeals could not be adjudicated independently without deciding the quantum appeal. Therefore, the issues on merits and law were restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing and order.
The Tribunal held that the delay was not substantial and should have been condoned by the NFAC, especially considering the assessee had succeeded in a related quantum appeal which was restored to the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal found it appropriate to grant the assessee an opportunity to be heard on merits. The issues were restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing and order.
The Tribunal found that the mode of service of notice was not reflected and the assessee intended to file additional evidence. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside to allow the assessee a fresh opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the penalty appeals could not be adjudicated independently without deciding the quantum appeal. Therefore, the issues were restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing and decision.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC order was silent on the mode of service, and notices were to be served via email. Therefore, the case was restored to the NFAC for a fresh hearing and decision.
The Tribunal held that a mere reference to a wrong provision of law in an application cannot be a basis for rejection. Procedural irregularities should be treated as technical non-compliance and the authorities should allow rectification.
The tribunal found that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay were sufficient. The NFAC erred by not condoning the delay and passing an order on merits. The impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed another appeal which was allowed. Based on this, the assessee intended to withdraw the current appeal.
The tribunal held that dismissing the appeal for delay without proper condonation, after having called for submissions on merits, was not in accordance with law. The tribunal also noted that the assessment order was passed under Section 144.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) exceeded the scope of Section 154 by correcting its previous order. Ignorance of a Board Circular or reliance on judicial precedent for granting relief does not constitute an 'error apparent from record'.
The Tribunal admitted the assessee's additional ground challenging the assessment order. The assessee argued that the reopening was for a specific issue, but the Assessing Officer made additions on a different issue.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under section 270A was unsustainable as it was based on an estimated profit after the quantum addition was already reduced by the Tribunal. For section 271DA, the Tribunal found that the assessment order lacked the necessary satisfaction for levying the penalty.
The Tribunal found that the reasons provided for the delay, such as a mother's illness, were not sufficient without supporting evidence. Consequently, the appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, subject to the assessee paying costs.
The Tribunal found that the reasons provided for the delay, such as a mother's illness, were not sufficient without supporting evidence. Consequently, the appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, subject to the assessee paying costs.
The Tribunal considered the submissions of both parties. As the assessee wished to withdraw the appeal and the Revenue had no objection, the request was accepted.
The Tribunal found that the reasons provided for the delay, such as a mother's illness, were not sufficient without supporting evidence. Consequently, the appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, subject to the assessee paying costs.
The Tribunal found that the mode of service of notices was unclear and that the assessee's counsel's address should be provided in Form-35. For ends of justice, the assessee is granted another opportunity to contest the merits.
The Tribunal held that the penalty appeals could not be adjudicated independently without deciding the quantum appeal. Therefore, the issues were restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing and decision.
The Tribunal held that a mere reference to a wrong provision of law in an application cannot be a basis for rejection. Procedural irregularities should be treated as technical non-compliance and the authorities should allow rectification.
The Tribunal held that unrealized amounts from dishonoured cheques cannot be included in taxable sale consideration for capital gains. It also found that the assessee had provided evidence for investments qualifying for exemptions under sections 54B and 54F, which were wrongly denied.
The tribunal found that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal summarily. Citing a similar case, the tribunal decided to restore the appeal to the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the assessee's illiteracy and lack of awareness. It also set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A) due to issues with the mode of service and lack of a decision on merits.
The tribunal held that the timeline for filing the application is directory, and the prescribed authority has the power to condone delays. The delay in filing the appeal was condoned, and the matter was restored to the CIT(E) for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal held that the grants were 'tied up grants' received for specific purposes and did not form part of the assessee's income. The tax authorities erred in treating them as revenue receipts.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) correctly determined that the assessment was made on a best judgment basis, despite the AO quoting Section 143(3). The CIT(A) was empowered to set aside the assessment order under the amended Section 251(1) as the assessee was not fully responsive.
The Tribunal held that penalty proceedings require a clear accusation, and it is necessary to specify whether the penalty is for concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars. Since this was not clearly done, the penalty order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the grants were 'tied up grants' received for specific purposes and did not form part of the assessee's income. The tax authorities erred in treating them as revenue receipts.
The Tribunal held that the grants were 'tied up grants' received for specific purposes and did not form part of the assessee's income. The tax authorities erred in treating them as revenue receipts.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's explanation for not filing the return was not asserted at any earlier stage and thus not a bonafide plea. The penalty under Section 270A was rightly invoked as the income was under-reported and the assessee failed to respond to statutory notices.
The Tribunal found that the impugned order of the NFAC did not demonstrate that any notices were issued to the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that the notice under Section 148 was issued to an email address with which the assessee had no connection.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It found that the lower appellate authority dismissed the appeal without considering legal issues and proper notice service. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT wrongly exercised powers under Section 263. It found that the Assessing Officer had conducted necessary inquiries and verified evidence, and that the PCIT had not considered the rectification order passed by the AO and the prior approval for assessment.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, considering the assessee's age and medical condition. The appeals were restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing on merits and law.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to file relevant replies during the assessment proceedings. Therefore, the issues were restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding that the NFAC had not properly examined the assessee's reasons for delay. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits after providing the assessee with an adequate opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have first adjudicated the legal ground raised by the assessee regarding the assumption of jurisdiction before invoking powers for denovo assessment. The impugned order was set aside.