ITAT Mumbai Judgments — October 2026

The Tribunal held that the assessee's appeal is allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal condoned the technical breach on the part of the assessee in filing the application under the wrong clause of the first proviso to section 80G(5). The reasoning was that the assessee had already been granted regular registration under section 12AB and had sought renewal of its existing regular registration under section 80G(5). There was no finding on the merits of the case. Therefore, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to set aside the matter to the file of the ld. CIT(E). The CIT(E) is directed to consider the application as if it was filed under clause (ii) of the first proviso to section 80G(5) and decide the matter afresh in accordance with law, after providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee. The ratio decidendi is that a technical error in filing an application under a procedural provision, when the substantive conditions are met and no prejudice is caused, should not lead to denial of a legitimate claim, especially when the assessee has a prior registration and no adverse findings on merits exist. The operative direction is to remand the matter to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that neither the TPO's approach of making a 100% adjustment nor the CIT(A)'s approach of granting 50% ad-hoc relief could be sustained. The TPO could not disallow 100% of the payment solely due to the assessee's failure to furnish complete supporting evidence. The transfer pricing provisions require the arm's length price (ALP) to be computed by applying one of the prescribed methods under Section 92C, not through ad-hoc or estimated disallowances. Similarly, the CIT(A) erred by substituting the TPO's 100% adjustment with another estimated percentage (50%) without computing the ALP using a prescribed method. Such adjustments must be based on proper benchmarking, not on what is considered reasonable or fair. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer was directed to refer the matter back to the TPO to re-examine the international transactions and compute the ALP in accordance with Section 92C, adopting the most appropriate method based on available material. The assessee was to be given an opportunity to furnish relevant documents. The TPO was to pass a speaking order, avoiding ad-hoc or percentage-based adjustments.

The Tribunal noted that there was a delay in filing the appeal, which was condoned after considering the assessee's application and affidavit, as the revenue did not rebut the contents. The Tribunal then proceeded to adjudicate the appeal. The primary issue was the dismissal of the assessee's appeal by the CIT(A) for non-prosecution. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal without adjudicating on the merits. The Tribunal found that the assessee's company name was struck off, which was the reason for non-prosecution before the CIT(A). However, the Tribunal did not decide the other grounds of appeal concerning the validity of the re-opening, sanction under Section 151, and the disallowance of business loss, as the appeal was being disposed of on a procedural aspect. The Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to decide the appeal on merits after restoration.

The Tribunal held that for issue 1 & 2 (broken period interest), the Ld.CIT(A) was correct in allowing the claim. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in the assessee's own case and the Bombay High Court's decision in American Express Banking Corp., affirming that where securities are treated as stock-in-trade, broken period interest is allowable as revenue expenditure. The factual position that securities constituted stock-in-trade was not controverted. For issue 3 (supervisory/oversight functions), the Tribunal held that these functions did not constitute a separate international transaction warranting an independent remuneration. The employees' activities were incidental to their primary employment in India. The Tribunal noted that there was no evidence of dedicated personnel or specific expenditure for rendering independent services, nor was there an identifiable service availed by overseas branches for which a charge would arise. The revenue-based allocation by the TPO was insufficient to establish a separate transaction or benefit. The Tribunal deleted the adjustment sustained by the Ld.CIT(A). Accordingly, Assessee's Ground No. 15 was allowed, and Revenue's Ground No. 9 was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(E) erred in imposing the condition that the registration under section 12AB and approval under section 80G would be subject to the outcome of future proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Tribunal reasoned that once registration/approval is granted after examining the application and material, it cannot be made contingent on a possible future outcome of higher judicial proceedings. The exercise of jurisdiction under section 12AB and 80G must be completed based on the law applicable at the time of the order. The possibility of a subsequent alteration of the legal position does not justify qualifying the granted registration/approval. The Ld. CIT(E) had already considered the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in 'The Chamber of Tax Consultants & Ors. vs. CIT(E)' and granted registration/approval. Therefore, imposing such a condition diluted the effect of the granted registration/approval. The Tribunal noted the assessee's steps to modify the trust deed but stated it was not necessary to opine on those proceedings as registration was already granted. Accordingly, the Tribunal deleted the condition imposed by the Ld. CIT(E) in both orders. The registration and approval granted shall operate in accordance with law without being subjected to the impugned condition.

The Tribunal decided on several grounds. For grounds 10 and 11 (AY 2021-22) concerning the taxability of interest on ECBs, the Tribunal restored the issue to the AO to recompute the taxable amount after considering the income already attributed to the Indian PE, ensuring no double taxation, following earlier orders in the assessee's own case. These grounds were allowed for statistical purposes. For ground 12 (AY 2022-23) regarding surcharge and health/education cess on income taxed at treaty rates, the Tribunal held that these cannot be levied over and above the treaty ceiling and directed the AO to recompute tax accordingly, allowing the ground. For grounds related to TDS credit (ground 12 for AY 2021-22 and grounds 13-15 for AY 2022-23), the Tribunal directed the AO to verify credits from Form 26AS and supporting documents and grant credit as per law, allowing these grounds for statistical purposes. For ground 13 (AY 2021-22) on the tax rate for interest under Section 244A, the Tribunal directed the AO to recompute tax at the applicable treaty rate, following a Bombay High Court decision in the assessee's own case, allowing the ground. For grounds on interest under Sections 234A, 234B, and 234C (grounds 14-16 for AY 2021-22 and ground 16 for AY 2022-23), the AO was directed to recompute if leviable, while verifying the return filing date for Section 234A, allowing these grounds for statistical purposes. For ground 17 (both years) concerning penalty proceedings, the Tribunal held the challenge to be premature and not requiring adjudication in the quantum appeal. The issues related to deductibility of HO expenses (grounds 1 & 2), transfer pricing adjustments (grounds 4, 5, 6), and allocation of HO expenses (ground 7) were not explicitly decided in the provided excerpt.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) erred in his observation regarding the commencement of activities and the calculation of delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay of 192 days in filing Form No. 10AB, finding that the assessee had reasonable cause for the delay, supported by FIRs and trustee affidavits. Regarding the objects of the trust, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(E)'s apprehension that the assessee was spending beyond territorial limits was based on clauses providing for scholarships and publications. However, the assessee clarified that no such expenditure or publication occurred outside India. The Tribunal opined that whether the assessee incurred expenditure beyond the objects and if such expenditure could be allowed under Section 11 is a matter for the Assessing Officer during assessment. The Tribunal found no reason to deny registration under Section 12AB, especially since the trust had been granted registration in 1976 on the same objects, and directed the CIT(E) to grant registration from AY 2026-27. Consequently, the appeal regarding Section 80G approval was restored to the CIT(E) for decision on merits, and the appeal related to the denial of registration was dismissed as infructuous.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee filed its application in Form No. 10AB on 26/10/2025, and the CIT(E) rejected it solely on the grounds of delay and lack of power to condone. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's submission that CBDT Circular No. 06/2026 dated 02/07/2026, issued under Section 119(2)(b), specifically addresses the condonation of delay for applications filed between 01/10/2025 and 31/03/2026. The Tribunal found it appropriate to restore the matter to the CIT(E) with a direction to examine the assessee's application in light of this Circular. The CIT(E) is to decide the issue in accordance with the Circular and applicable provisions, considering the delay and then examining the eligibility for approval under Section 80G(5) on merits. The assessee will be given an opportunity of being heard. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the principal objection of the CIT(E) was regarding enabling clauses in the MOA that permitted the application of funds outside India. However, the assessee had expressed a categorical willingness to amend the MOA to remove or restrict these clauses. The Tribunal found that the CIT(E)'s rejection solely on the ground that amendments had not been carried out was not appropriate, given the assessee's willingness. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order for Section 12AB registration and restored the application to the file of the CIT(E). The assessee was directed to amend/delete/restrict the relevant clauses and furnish the amended MOA. The CIT(E) was directed to examine the amended objects and application afresh. The Tribunal clarified that no opinion was expressed on the merits of the assessee's entitlement to registration, leaving all issues open. Consequently, the appeal concerning Section 80G approval, which was consequential to the Section 12AB rejection, was also set aside and restored to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication after considering the outcome of the Section 12AB proceedings. Both appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the principal objection of the CIT(E) was regarding enabling clauses in the MOA that permitted the application of funds outside India. However, the assessee had expressed a categorical willingness to amend the MOA to remove or restrict these clauses. The Tribunal found that the CIT(E)'s rejection solely on the ground that amendments had not been carried out was not appropriate, given the assessee's willingness. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order for Section 12AB registration and restored the application to the file of the CIT(E). The assessee was directed to amend/delete/restrict the relevant clauses and furnish the amended MOA. The CIT(E) was directed to examine the amended objects and application afresh. The Tribunal clarified that no opinion was expressed on the merits of the assessee's entitlement to registration, leaving all issues open. Consequently, the appeal concerning Section 80G approval, which was consequential to the Section 12AB rejection, was also set aside and restored to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication after considering the outcome of the Section 12AB proceedings. Both appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the condition imposed by the Ld. CIT(E), making the registration and consequential tax benefits subject to the outcome of the proposed Special Leave Petition/decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, cannot be sustained. The Tribunal reasoned that the Ld. CIT(E) was aware of the binding judgment of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court and granted registration in "respectful compliance" with it. Once a judgment is rendered by the jurisdictional High Court, it binds authorities within its jurisdiction unless stayed or reversed. The mere proposal by the Revenue to challenge the judgment does not dilute its binding character. The Tribunal found that by accepting the binding nature of the High Court's judgment and granting registration, the Ld. CIT(E) could not simultaneously make the registration's efficacy contingent on a proposed SLP, as this introduces uncertainty. The Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(E) to expunge the conditional stipulation from the registration order. The registration granted under Section 12AB(1)(b) shall otherwise continue to operate in accordance with law and subject to statutory conditions. The direction is confined to expunging the impugned condition making the registration and benefits contingent on the proposed Supreme Court proceedings.

The Tribunal condoned the delays in filing the appeals, finding sufficient cause based on the principles of substantial justice as laid down by the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy. The Tribunal held that the rejection of applications for renewal of registration under Section 12AB was not justified as the CIT(E) had not afforded a proper opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal set aside the orders rejecting Section 12AB registration and restored the applications to the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication, directing the CIT(E) to provide a reasonable and effective opportunity to the assessees. Regarding Section 80G approval, the Tribunal held that since the Section 12AB rejection orders were set aside, the consequential rejection of Section 80G approval could not independently survive. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders rejecting Section 80G approval and restored those applications to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration, to be adjudicated consequent to the decision on Section 12AB applications. The Tribunal explicitly stated that no opinion was expressed on the merits of eligibility for either Section 12AB or Section 80G.

The Tribunal held that the assessee's contention that the surrender of bogus expenses (depreciation and amortization) was voluntary was rejected. The Tribunal found that the assessee's claim of buying peace and avoiding prolonged litigation also fell flat, as the Act provides for immunity from penalty under Section 270AA, which the assessee did not opt for. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee's case squarely fell under clauses (a) and (d) of Section 270A(9) of the Act, as the transactions were with bogus, non-existent parties providing entries at arbitrary/inflated prices without any standard operating procedure or business rationale, constituting misrepresentation of a glaring fact. The issue regarding the absence of specific clauses in the show cause notices was rejected as it was not raised before the lower authorities. Consequently, all grounds of appeal were dismissed.

The Tribunal decided on several grounds. For grounds 10 and 11 (AY 2021-22) concerning the taxability of interest on ECBs, the Tribunal restored the issue to the AO to recompute the taxable amount after considering the income already attributed to the Indian PE, ensuring no double taxation, following earlier orders in the assessee's own case. These grounds were allowed for statistical purposes. For ground 12 (AY 2022-23) regarding surcharge and health/education cess on income taxed at treaty rates, the Tribunal held that these cannot be levied over and above the treaty ceiling and directed the AO to recompute tax accordingly, allowing the ground. For grounds related to TDS credit (ground 12 for AY 2021-22 and grounds 13-15 for AY 2022-23), the Tribunal directed the AO to verify credits from Form 26AS and supporting documents and grant credit as per law, allowing these grounds for statistical purposes. For ground 13 (AY 2021-22) on the tax rate for interest under Section 244A, the Tribunal directed the AO to recompute tax at the applicable treaty rate, following a Bombay High Court decision in the assessee's own case, allowing the ground. For grounds on interest under Sections 234A, 234B, and 234C (grounds 14-16 for AY 2021-22 and ground 16 for AY 2022-23), the AO was directed to recompute if leviable, while verifying the return filing date for Section 234A, allowing these grounds for statistical purposes. For ground 17 (both years) concerning penalty proceedings, the Tribunal held the challenge to be premature and not requiring adjudication in the quantum appeal. The issues related to deductibility of HO expenses (grounds 1 & 2), transfer pricing adjustments (grounds 4, 5, 6), and allocation of HO expenses (ground 7) were not explicitly decided in the provided excerpt.

The Tribunal held that the assessment proceedings were substantially conducted during the Covid-19 period, and notices under section 142(1) were issued preceding the severe second wave. Considering the extraordinary circumstances, the assessee had a reasonable cause for not placing the requisite evidence before the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal found that the Ld. Commissioner ought to have considered the additional evidence, potentially after obtaining a remand report from the Assessing Officer, instead of rejecting it solely on the grounds of earlier non-compliance. Therefore, the matter was restored to the file of the Ld. Commissioner for fresh adjudication on merits after considering the additional evidence. The Ld. Commissioner was directed to obtain a remand report if necessary and decide the issues after affording a reasonable opportunity to the assessee. The assessee was directed to file the requisite evidence afresh and cooperate. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that for issue 1 & 2 (broken period interest), the Ld.CIT(A) was correct in allowing the claim. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in the assessee's own case and the Bombay High Court's decision in American Express Banking Corp., affirming that where securities are treated as stock-in-trade, broken period interest is allowable as revenue expenditure. The factual position that securities constituted stock-in-trade was not controverted. For issue 3 (supervisory/oversight functions), the Tribunal held that these functions did not constitute a separate international transaction warranting an independent remuneration. The employees' activities were incidental to their primary employment in India. The Tribunal noted that there was no evidence of dedicated personnel or specific expenditure for rendering independent services, nor was there an identifiable service availed by overseas branches for which a charge would arise. The revenue-based allocation by the TPO was insufficient to establish a separate transaction or benefit. The Tribunal deleted the adjustment sustained by the Ld.CIT(A). Accordingly, Assessee's Ground No. 15 was allowed, and Revenue's Ground No. 9 was dismissed.

The Tribunal condoned the delays in filing the appeals, finding sufficient cause based on the principles of substantial justice as laid down by the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy. The Tribunal held that the rejection of applications for renewal of registration under Section 12AB was not justified as the CIT(E) had not afforded a proper opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal set aside the orders rejecting Section 12AB registration and restored the applications to the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication, directing the CIT(E) to provide a reasonable and effective opportunity to the assessees. Regarding Section 80G approval, the Tribunal held that since the Section 12AB rejection orders were set aside, the consequential rejection of Section 80G approval could not independently survive. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders rejecting Section 80G approval and restored those applications to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration, to be adjudicated consequent to the decision on Section 12AB applications. The Tribunal explicitly stated that no opinion was expressed on the merits of eligibility for either Section 12AB or Section 80G.

The Tribunal addressed specific grounds. For the disallowance of Rs. 26,554,550 (expenditure for earning interest on foreign currency loans), the Tribunal followed its own prior decisions for earlier assessment years, which were upheld by the Bombay High Court. These decisions held that Section 14A does not apply to income taxable at a lower rate, and expenses should be allowed in full. Therefore, the disallowance was directed to be deleted. Regarding broken period interest of Rs. 10,67,69,760, the Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in CIT v. Citi Bank N.A. and the Bombay High Court decision in American Express International Banking Corporation v. CIT, which held broken period interest to be allowable as a deduction. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order on this issue. Concerning VRS expenditure, the Tribunal followed the Bombay High Court decision in CIT v. Bhor Industries Ltd. and the Madras High Court decision in CIT v. Simpson & Co. Ltd., holding that VRS expenditure incurred for workforce reduction is revenue expenditure as it does not result in acquiring a new asset or income source. The Tribunal also noted that Section 35DDA was not applicable for AY 2000-01. Thus, the CIT(A)'s decision to allow the expenditure was upheld. The Tribunal did not explicitly decide all grounds raised by the Revenue, but based on the resolutions of the grounds discussed, the appeals were disposed of.

The Tribunal condoned the delays in filing the appeals, finding sufficient cause based on the principles of substantial justice as laid down by the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy. The Tribunal held that the rejection of applications for renewal of registration under Section 12AB was not justified as the CIT(E) had not afforded a proper opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal set aside the orders rejecting Section 12AB registration and restored the applications to the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication, directing the CIT(E) to provide a reasonable and effective opportunity to the assessees. Regarding Section 80G approval, the Tribunal held that since the Section 12AB rejection orders were set aside, the consequential rejection of Section 80G approval could not independently survive. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders rejecting Section 80G approval and restored those applications to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration, to be adjudicated consequent to the decision on Section 12AB applications. The Tribunal explicitly stated that no opinion was expressed on the merits of eligibility for either Section 12AB or Section 80G.

The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application solely on the ground of delay, without considering the applicability of CBDT Circular No. 06/2026, could not be sustained. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's application was filed on 26.10.2025, which fell within the period covered by the Circular. The Circular specifically provided for the consideration of delay in filing Form No. 10AB under certain circumstances. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) with a direction to examine the application in light of the said Circular. The Ld. CIT(E) was directed to first consider the condonation of delay as per the Circular and, if condoned, then examine the application for approval under section 80G(5) on merits. The Tribunal also directed that the assessee be afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the qualification imposed by the Ld. CIT(E), making the registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G, along with their consequential tax benefits, conditional upon the outcome of proceedings proposed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, cannot be sustained. The Tribunal reasoned that a judgment of the jurisdictional High Court is binding on subordinate authorities unless stayed, reversed, or modified. The mere proposal or intention to challenge a binding judgment before a superior court does not render the judgment's operation conditional. Since the Ld. CIT(E) granted the registration and approval in compliance with the binding Bombay High Court decision, it was not open for him to dilute the consequences by making statutory benefits contingent on prospective proceedings. The Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(E) to expunge the observations contained in Condition No. 15 of the Section 12AB order and Condition No. 5 of the Section 80G order, stating that the registration and approval shall otherwise remain undisturbed and operate in accordance with law and the remaining applicable conditions. The substantive grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) had misunderstood the figures in the balance sheet. The AO mistakenly picked up the proposed dividend to be distributed in the next financial year (FY 2013-14) instead of the actual dividend received by the assessee in the current financial year (FY 2012-13, AY 2013-14). The Tribunal noted that the assessee had received a dividend of Rs. 1,02,83,600 on 14.08.2012, which was approved by the AGM held on 03.08.2012. This amount was declared in the return of income and claimed as exempt under Section 10(34). The AO had incorrectly used a proposed dividend of Rs. 41,13,440 for FY 2013-14 to reduce the exemption. The Tribunal found that the actual dividend received by the assessee during the assessment year 2013-14 was Rs. 1,02,83,600. Therefore, the AO was directed to allow the claim of exemption under Section 10(34) for the dividend receipt of Rs. 1,02,83,600 and set aside the disallowance of Rs. 62,16,690. The ratio decidendi is that dividend exemption under Section 10(34) is to be considered based on the actual receipt of dividend during the assessment year, and figures of proposed dividends for subsequent years should not be used to reduce the exemption for the current year.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order could not be regarded as erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue to warrant the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 263. The Tribunal found that the issue of exemption under Section 11, including capital expenditure, was specifically examined by the AO. Notices under Sections 143(2) and 142(1) were issued, and a specific show-cause notice dated 07.03.2024 was sent regarding capital expenditure, to which the assessee provided replies and supporting documents. Therefore, it was not a case where the AO accepted the claim without inquiry. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(E) referred to earlier assessment years, but the subsequent appellate history for those years, including a Bombay High Court decision for AY 2011-12 and an ITAT decision for AY 2012-13, were in favour of the assessee. The AO had followed the view emerging from these appellate orders. Consequently, the prerequisite conditions for Section 263 jurisdiction were not met, and Explanation 2 to Section 263 was not applicable. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s revisional order and restored the AO's assessment order.

The Tribunal condoned the delays in filing the appeals, finding sufficient cause based on the principles of substantial justice as laid down by the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy. The Tribunal held that the rejection of applications for renewal of registration under Section 12AB was not justified as the CIT(E) had not afforded a proper opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal set aside the orders rejecting Section 12AB registration and restored the applications to the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication, directing the CIT(E) to provide a reasonable and effective opportunity to the assessees. Regarding Section 80G approval, the Tribunal held that since the Section 12AB rejection orders were set aside, the consequential rejection of Section 80G approval could not independently survive. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders rejecting Section 80G approval and restored those applications to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration, to be adjudicated consequent to the decision on Section 12AB applications. The Tribunal explicitly stated that no opinion was expressed on the merits of eligibility for either Section 12AB or Section 80G.

The Tribunal held that the qualification imposed by the Ld. CIT(E), making the registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G, along with their consequential tax benefits, conditional upon the outcome of proceedings proposed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, cannot be sustained. The Tribunal reasoned that a judgment of the jurisdictional High Court is binding on subordinate authorities unless stayed, reversed, or modified. The mere proposal or intention to challenge a binding judgment before a superior court does not render the judgment's operation conditional. Since the Ld. CIT(E) granted the registration and approval in compliance with the binding Bombay High Court decision, it was not open for him to dilute the consequences by making statutory benefits contingent on prospective proceedings. The Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(E) to expunge the observations contained in Condition No. 15 of the Section 12AB order and Condition No. 5 of the Section 80G order, stating that the registration and approval shall otherwise remain undisturbed and operate in accordance with law and the remaining applicable conditions. The substantive grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) was not justified in making the registration granted under Section 12AB(1)(b) and its consequential tax benefits conditional upon the outcome of prospective proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner himself acknowledged the binding decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in 'The Chamber of Tax Consultants & Ors. v. CIT(E)', which held that a public charitable trust is deemed irrevocable by operation of law unless the instrument expressly provides for revocation. Since registration was granted in compliance with this binding pronouncement, it could not be rendered conditional or uncertain merely because the Revenue proposed to challenge the decision before the Supreme Court. The Tribunal reasoned that a High Court judgment remains binding until stayed or reversed by a superior court, and no such stay or reversal was brought on record. The Tribunal further stated that any consequences arising from a subsequent binding pronouncement of the Supreme Court would operate in accordance with law. Therefore, Condition No. 15 and the associated observations were expunged. The registration granted to the assessee was otherwise to remain undisturbed, subject to other statutory conditions. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's grounds of appeal.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to furnish a return of income initially and did not participate seriously in the reassessment proceedings, leading to additions. Similarly, before the learned CIT(Appeals), the assessee did not furnish any response to substantiate the grounds of appeal, resulting in an ex-parte dismissal. The assessee contended that hearing notices were not properly delivered to their email ID. The Tribunal observed that the learned CIT(Appeals) dismissed the appeal without a decision on merits. In the interest of substantive justice and considering the factual matrix, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the matter to the file of the learned CIT(Appeals). The assessee is to be provided another opportunity through notice on an email ID to be communicated by the assessee. The assessee is also directed to consider the appeal proceedings more seriously and submit written submissions along with evidence to substantiate the grounds of appeal. The appeal filed by the Assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal considered the submissions of the parties. In view of the request made by the assessee, the appeal was permitted to be withdrawn. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The assessee was granted liberty to pursue the appropriate remedy before the competent Bench in accordance with law. The Tribunal explicitly stated that no opinion was expressed on the merits of the issues involved in the appeal. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.

The Tribunal held that the action of CPC Bengaluru in making disallowance under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act for A.Y. 2019-20 was incorrect. The Tribunal noted that the power to disallow deductions claimed under Chapter VIA, specifically under the heading 'C - Deductions in respect of certain incomes', was introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, and was applicable for assessment years commencing on or after April 1, 2021. Therefore, CPC Bengaluru did not possess the authority to make such a disallowance for A.Y. 2019-20. The Tribunal relied on the decision in the case of Vishva Villa Co op Housing Society Ltd. for this proposition. Consequently, the disallowance of deduction claimed under Section 80P(2)(d) by the CPC was set aside. The appeals were allowed on this ground, and the matter was not remanded as the primary issue of the CPC's power was decided.

The Tribunal held that the CPC Bengaluru did not have the power to make a disallowance of deduction claimed under Section 80P(2)(d) under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act for the assessment year in question. The Tribunal noted that the power to disallow deductions under Chapter VI-A was introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, and was applicable for assessment years commencing on or after April 1, 2021. Therefore, the action of the CPC in making such a disallowance was incorrect. The Tribunal also considered the argument regarding the delay in filing the return and the reasons provided by the assessee. The appeals were allowed on this primary ground, setting aside the disallowance made by the CPC and confirmed by the CIT(A). The Tribunal did not explicitly address the applicability of Section 80AC in its final decision, focusing instead on the CPC's lack of power for the specific disallowance.

The Tribunal held that the action of CPC Bengaluru in making disallowance under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act for A.Y. 2019-20 was incorrect. The Tribunal noted that the power to disallow deductions claimed under Chapter VIA, specifically under the heading 'C - Deductions in respect of certain incomes', was introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, and was applicable for assessment years commencing on or after April 1, 2021. Therefore, CPC Bengaluru did not possess the authority to make such a disallowance for A.Y. 2019-20. The Tribunal relied on the decision in the case of Vishva Villa Co op Housing Society Ltd. for this proposition. Consequently, the disallowance of deduction claimed under Section 80P(2)(d) by the CPC was set aside. The appeals were allowed on this ground, and the matter was not remanded as the primary issue of the CPC's power was decided.

The Tribunal held that the appeal was maintainable. The primary issue was the disallowance of deduction claimed under Section 80P(2)(d) for AY 2019-20. The assessee contended that CPC Bengaluru had no power to make such a disallowance under Section 143(1)(a) for that assessment year, as the relevant power was introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, and applicable for subsequent years. The assessee relied on the decision in Vishva Villa Co Op Housing Society Ltd. The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) had confirmed the disallowance based on the assessee's failure to comply with Section 80AC, which is applicable from AY 2018-19. However, the assessee argued that CPC's power to disallow deductions under Chapter VIA was limited to assessment years commencing on or after 01/04/2021. The judgment does not explicitly state the Tribunal's finding on the maintainability of the appeal or the merits of the disallowance, but implies the matter is being considered based on the grounds raised.

The Tribunal addressed specific grounds. For the disallowance of Rs. 26,554,550 (expenditure for earning interest on foreign currency loans), the Tribunal followed its own prior decisions for earlier assessment years, which were upheld by the Bombay High Court. These decisions held that Section 14A does not apply to income taxable at a lower rate, and expenses should be allowed in full. Therefore, the disallowance was directed to be deleted. Regarding broken period interest of Rs. 10,67,69,760, the Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in CIT v. Citi Bank N.A. and the Bombay High Court decision in American Express International Banking Corporation v. CIT, which held broken period interest to be allowable as a deduction. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order on this issue. Concerning VRS expenditure, the Tribunal followed the Bombay High Court decision in CIT v. Bhor Industries Ltd. and the Madras High Court decision in CIT v. Simpson & Co. Ltd., holding that VRS expenditure incurred for workforce reduction is revenue expenditure as it does not result in acquiring a new asset or income source. The Tribunal also noted that Section 35DDA was not applicable for AY 2000-01. Thus, the CIT(A)'s decision to allow the expenditure was upheld. The Tribunal did not explicitly decide all grounds raised by the Revenue, but based on the resolutions of the grounds discussed, the appeals were disposed of.

The Tribunal held that a fundamental requirement of appellate adjudication is to provide the assessee with a reasonable and effective opportunity of being heard. Additionally, appellate orders must demonstrate due application of mind to the grounds raised and provide reasons for the conclusions. In this case, the Tribunal found that the assessee's grievance regarding the lack of an effective hearing and the absence of reasoned orders was valid. Consequently, the impugned orders of the learned CIT(A) were set aside in the interest of substantial justice. The matters were restored to the file of the learned CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The learned CIT(A) was directed to afford the assessee a reasonable and effective opportunity of being heard, consider any necessary documentary evidence the assessee wished to place on record, and pass a speaking and reasoned order dealing with all grounds raised. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the additions or other issues, leaving them open for the learned CIT(A)'s adjudication. Both appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing a justice-oriented approach and relying on Supreme Court decisions in N. Balakrishnan v. Krishnamurthy and Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, emphasizing that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations and that a litigant does not benefit from delay. Regarding the substantive grounds, the Tribunal held that the addition made under Section 68 in respect of the sales proceeds of shares was not sustainable and deserved to be deleted. The reasoning was that the AO had not conducted independent inquiries beyond the documentary evidence furnished by the assessee. The transactions could not be treated as sham merely because the scrip was identified as penny stock, without proving a pre-determined mind to generate artificial gains. The purchase and sale through a SEBI-registered broker and demat account were not disputed, and the assessee's name or broker's name did not appear in lists of price rigging beneficiaries. Suspicion cannot replace evidence, and the assessee had discharged the primary onus with documentary evidence, which the Revenue failed to rebut. The Tribunal also held that the addition under Section 69C for commission could not survive once the primary allegation of bogus capital gains was unsubstantiated. The Tribunal directed the deletion of both additions. The decision was clarified to be specific to the peculiar factual matrix and not applicable to other penny stock cases involving sham transactions. The appeal was allowed on both grounds.

The Tribunal held that the addition of the entire purchase amount of ₹86,89,263/- was not warranted. While the assessee had participated in assessment and appellate proceedings and provided purchase bills, ledger accounts, bank statements, and audited books, the AO relied on general information from the CGST Department. The Tribunal noted that the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in SVD Resins and Plastics Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held that rejecting documents solely on general information from the Sales Tax Department, without strong documentary evidence or specific findings from that department that the transactions were bogus, is not a proper approach. The AO should have conducted a case-to-case verification and, if necessary, consulted the sales tax department. Therefore, the Tribunal found it appropriate to restrict the addition to the gross profit element embedded in the alleged non-genuine purchases. The Tribunal directed the AO to compute this difference and make the addition accordingly, referencing the judicial pronouncement in Mohammed Haji Adam and Company (supra). The grounds raised by the assessee in this regard were partly allowed.

The ITAT held that while the delay of 712 days was substantial and the assessee was expected to be diligent, a final opportunity should be granted to examine the matter on merits. Considering the interest of justice and the fact that the assessment was completed ex parte, the Tribunal decided to condone the delay. This condonation was made subject to the assessee depositing a cost of ₹25,000/- with the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund and producing proof of payment before the Assessing Officer. The ITAT restored the entire matter to the file of the Assessing Officer for de-novo consideration, thereby setting aside the order of the CIT(Appeals) which had dismissed the appeal on limitation. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(Appeals) and dismissed all grounds raised by the Revenue. The Tribunal found that the addition of ₹1,13,087/- was based on an assumption that the assessee must have earned commission because his PAN was used in accommodation-entry transactions. However, there was no material showing the payment or receipt of such commission, nor independent evidence of the assessee's active participation in the accommodation-entry activity for consideration. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer himself observed that the main commission income had already been assessed in the hands of Shri Bhanwarlal Jain and no new evidence was found during the present proceedings. The addition was made solely by following the treatment in earlier assessment years, which the Tribunal found insufficient when no fresh evidence establishing income earned during the relevant year was found. The Tribunal referred to its own decisions in Mahalaxmi Gems Pvt. Ltd. and Meenaxi Diamonds Pvt. Ltd. (and connected cases) which held that commission income already assessed substantively in the hands of the main operator (Shri Bhanwarlal Jain) could not be sustained on a protective basis in the hands of entities controlled by him. The Tribunal concluded that the Revenue could not substitute general information about the Bhanwarlal Jain Group's modus operandi for evidence of income in the hands of this specific assessee. The assessee had provided an explanation, furnished bank statements, denied transactions, and placed supporting circumstances on record. Therefore, the Revenue was required to establish by some material that the assessee had acted as an entry provider for consideration and had actually earned commission. Since no such material was brought forth, the deletion of the addition by the CIT(Appeals) was upheld.

The Tribunal held that the principal controversy regarding the disallowance of interest of Rs. 2,79,952/- requires examination of the actual utilization of borrowed funds and the corresponding interest income earned. The assessee's contention of two distinct components of interest received from the firm (interest on capital and interest on loans) and the factual grievance regarding the computation of disallowance were noted. The issue of brokerage of Rs. 96,893/- was considered consequentially connected to borrowing and the nexus with interest-bearing advances. Similarly, the grievance regarding the CIT(A)'s limited direction on expenditure of Rs. 1,55,758/- was acknowledged. Consequently, the issues relating to the disallowance of interest, brokerage, and the expenditure of Rs. 1,55,758/- were restored to the file of the Ld. AO for fresh adjudication after verifying the nexus, actual interest paid, interest income earned on loans, brokerage expenditure, and individual components of the Rs. 1,55,758/- expenditure. The assessee was to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to furnish evidence. For the disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D, the Tribunal noted the assessee's specific pleas regarding availability of own interest-free funds, absence of nexus, positive net interest income, and duplication of disallowance. This issue was also restored to the Ld. AO for fresh adjudication, who was to examine the claim based on relevant accounts and record requisite satisfaction after granting a reasonable opportunity. Ground No. 1 was considered general and requiring no separate adjudication. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) that the reassessment proceedings were barred by limitation. The Tribunal found that the actual alleged escapement of income, after removing duplicate entries and reconciling the transactions, amounted to Rs. 46,20,390, which was below the threshold of Rs. 50 lakh stipulated in Section 149(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Since the notice under Section 148 was issued beyond the normal three-year limitation period, the mandatory jurisdictional condition under Section 149(1)(b) was not met. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings initiated beyond three years were vitiated as barred by limitation and void ab initio. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Ganesh Dass Khanna vs. ITO and the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal. In light of the finding on the jurisdictional issue, the grounds raised on the merits of the case were rendered academic and were not adjudicated upon. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not press the legal grounds challenging the validity of reopening under sections 147/148 and the assessment order under section 144 read with section 147. These grounds were dismissed as 'Not Pressed'. Regarding the merits, the assessee confined submissions to the addition of ₹13,32,682/- under section 69A. The assessee claimed that ₹8,84,652/- was PF receipt and ₹3,50,000/- was Gratuity, aggregating to ₹12,34,652/-. The Tribunal found that the nature and source of these two credits required verification. It held that the subsequent withdrawal of amounts in cash did not automatically make an explained receipt unexplained. However, supporting evidence for these credits needed examination by the AO. Therefore, the Tribunal restored this limited issue to the AO for verification of the PF receipt and the nature and source of the Gratuity credit. If supported by records, the addition to that extent would be deleted. The assessee was to be given an opportunity to produce evidence. For the balance additions, no specific arguments were made, but the assessee was given liberty to produce supporting documents in the interest of justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the assessee was severely prejudiced in defending his case. Firstly, before the CIT(A), the assessee was deprived of an opportunity to present his defense as hearing notices were sent to wrong email addresses, resulting in an ex-parte order without adjudication on merits. Secondly, before the Assessing Officer, the addition of Rs. 65,13,62,382/- under section 68 was made on account of alleged sham sales without confronting the assessee with the full search materials, statements, or third-party investigation reports of M/s Loha Ispaat Ltd. relied upon by the Department. Applying the principle of natural justice (audi alteram partem), the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication on all issues, including legal grounds regarding reopening and the merits of the addition. The Assessing Officer was directed to provide all relied-upon material, grant a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and pass a speaking order. The assessee was directed to cooperate. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal found that Ground No. 4, which contested the validity of the assessment order on the basis that proceedings were taken against a struck-off company, was a significant issue. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's Authorized Representative (AR) had drawn attention to this ground at the outset. However, the judgment does not record any specific finding or decision by the Tribunal on this crucial ground or any other grounds raised by the assessee. The Tribunal only addressed grounds 1 to 3, stating they were general in nature and dismissed them in the absence of arguments on merits. The operative part of the judgment, which would detail the Tribunal's decision on the substantive issues and the final outcome, is not provided in the excerpt. Therefore, the Tribunal's decision on the remaining grounds, including the legality of reassessment proceedings against a struck-off company, the correctness of bank credit assessment, and the validity of approvals, remains unrecorded in this portion of the judgment.

The Tribunal addressed several grounds. Regarding the addition of interest on delayed TDS payment (Assessee's Ground 1), the judgment notes that this issue was previously restored to the file of the Assessing Officer in the assessee's own case for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal, following this precedent, restored the issue to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after calling for a remand report from the AO and verifying underlying facts, including foreign exchange gain or loss. For the capital gains exemption (Assessee's Ground 2), the Tribunal admitted the additional ground but found that the factual basis required examination. Following a coordinate bench decision, the Tribunal restored this issue to the CIT(A) for adjudication after verification of facts and considering the decision in Cooper Corporation Pvt. Ltd. Regarding Revenue's Ground 5 (Section 14A for 115JB), the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition, following the binding precedent of the Special Bench in ACIT v. Vireet Investment (P.) Ltd., which held that Section 14A cannot be read into clause (f) of Explanation 1 to Section 115JB. The Tribunal found no infirmity in this view. The other grounds raised by the Revenue were not explicitly detailed in the provided excerpt but the concluding remark indicates that both appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that an incorrect reporting in Form 3CD or return of income is not conclusive when factual evidence demonstrates otherwise. Revenue authorities are duty-bound to assess true taxable income and not capitalize on inadvertent errors. The assessee consistently maintained that payments were made to resident individuals/entities. The details of PANs and addresses provided prima facie indicate resident taxpayers. Section 40(a)(i) applies to payments to non-residents, while Section 40(a)(ia) governs payments to residents without TDS, with a statutory disallowance limited to 30%. The Assessing Officer did not conduct independent factual verification. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for limited factual verification. The Assessing Officer is directed to verify the residency of payees. If they are residents, Section 40(a)(i) disallowance will not apply. The applicability of Section 40(a)(ia) should be examined, with disallowance restricted to 30% if warranted. The benefit of the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) should be extended if payees declared the income. The assessee must furnish necessary documents. The grounds raised by the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in quashing the reassessment proceedings. For AY 2017-18, where the notice under Section 148 was issued on 30.07.2022, and the escaped income exceeded Rs. 50 lacs, the proceedings fell under Section 149(1)(b) of the Act, requiring approval from the authority specified in Section 151(ii). This specified authority is the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General. In this case, the approval was obtained from the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, which is not the competent authority as defined under Section 151(ii). The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s finding that the approval was obtained from the authority specified under Section 151(i) instead of Section 151(ii) of the new regime. In the absence of approval from the competent authority, the notice under Section 148 was held void ab initio, and consequently, the reassessment proceedings were quashed. The CIT(A) rightly followed the decision of the Jurisdictional High Court in Alag Property Construction (P) Ltd, which considered the Supreme Court's decision in Rajeev Bansal. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings in ITA No. 6869/MUM/2025 (AY 2019-20) were bad in law, as they were based on borrowed reasons and lacked independent application of mind by the AO. This decision was applied mutatis mutandis to the identical ground in ITA No. 6871/MUM/2025. Regarding the disallowance of depreciation, the Tribunal found that an identical issue in the case of a sister concern, Zee Akaash News P.Ltd (ITA No. 6869/Mum/2025), was allowed for statistical purposes. Therefore, for ITA No. 6871/MUM/2025 (AY 2019-20) and ITA No. 6870/MUM/2025 (AY 2022-23), the grounds relating to depreciation disallowance were set aside and remanded to the AO for de novo consideration. The issue of interest under Section 234B was not explicitly decided in the provided excerpt.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings in ITA No. 6869/MUM/2025 (AY 2019-20) were bad in law, as they were based on borrowed reasons and lacked independent application of mind by the AO. This decision was applied mutatis mutandis to the identical ground in ITA No. 6871/MUM/2025. Regarding the disallowance of depreciation, the Tribunal found that an identical issue in the case of a sister concern, Zee Akaash News P.Ltd (ITA No. 6869/Mum/2025), was allowed for statistical purposes. Therefore, for ITA No. 6871/MUM/2025 (AY 2019-20) and ITA No. 6870/MUM/2025 (AY 2022-23), the grounds relating to depreciation disallowance were set aside and remanded to the AO for de novo consideration. The issue of interest under Section 234B was not explicitly decided in the provided excerpt.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings in ITA No. 6869/MUM/2025 (AY 2019-20) were bad in law, as they were based on borrowed reasons and lacked independent application of mind by the AO. This decision was applied mutatis mutandis to the identical ground in ITA No. 6871/MUM/2025. Regarding the disallowance of depreciation, the Tribunal found that an identical issue in the case of a sister concern, Zee Akaash News P.Ltd (ITA No. 6869/Mum/2025), was allowed for statistical purposes. Therefore, for ITA No. 6871/MUM/2025 (AY 2019-20) and ITA No. 6870/MUM/2025 (AY 2022-23), the grounds relating to depreciation disallowance were set aside and remanded to the AO for de novo consideration. The issue of interest under Section 234B was not explicitly decided in the provided excerpt.

The Tribunal held that the reasons adduced by the assessee for the delay of 667 days were flimsy and superficial, and did not constitute a "sufficient cause" for condonation. The Tribunal found the assessee's negligence to be palpable, noting that as a company, it was expected to follow up on income tax proceedings. The Tribunal extensively referred to various Supreme Court judgments, including Basawraj and another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu village v. Bhargavi Amma, Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, Shiv Dass v. Union of India, and Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., to emphasize that delay should not be condoned merely out of generosity or sympathy. The Tribunal stressed that the law of limitation is a substantive law, and a valuable right accrues to the other party due to the failure of the applicant to explain the delay with sufficient cause. The assessee failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds for the delay and was found to have neglected to assert its rights in a timely manner. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed in limine as not maintainable.