HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED ,MUMBAI vs. DCIT, CIRCLE 1(1)(1), MUMBAI

PER SHRI OM PRAKASH KANT, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER: The cross-appeals by the assessee and the Revenue are directed against order dated 29th October, 2024 passed by the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-56, Mumbai (in short "the learned CIT(A)") for assessment year 2017-18.

“1. Addition of Interest on TDS payment/deduction default u/s. 201(1A) - Rs.3,64,272/- The appellant submits that on the facts and in the circumstances of case: a. Ld. CIT(A) erred in adding interest on delayed TDS payment/deduction for Rs. 3,64,272/- u/s 37 of the Act, being in the nature of penalty without appreciating the fact that it is compensatory in nature. b. Ld. CIT(A) erred in not following rulings of Hon'ble Mumbai and Kolkata Tribunal which provided that interest on delayed TDS payment/deduction are allowable expense u/s 37 of the Act. 2. Additional Ground for exemption of capital gains tax in respect of land acquired under Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (RFCTLARR) - Rs. 8,91,74,349/- a. Ld. CIT(A) erred in not granting exemption from capital gains tax in line with CBDT circular no. 36 of 2016 dated 25/10/2016 in respect of land acquired which has been exempted from levy of income tax vide section 96 of RFCTLARR Act. b. Ld. CIT(A) erred in not granting exemption from capital gains tax in respect of land exempt under RFCTLARR Act, despite the AO's report admitting that "assesse was not taxable on capital gains as above, it would be the duty of the tax administration to collect only the correct and due taxes on income". c. Ld. CIT(A) erred in not following principle of natural justice by not considering the judgments of higher courts and the fact that CIT(A) may allow any additional ground. At para 19.2 of the impugned order, CIT(A) admitted the additional ground. However, CIT(A) also relied on, the advice of AO given in his remand report that "since claim was never made before AO, additional claim of deduction was not allowable" without appreciating the fact that at the time of raising claim/additional ground, proceedings were pending before CIT(A) only.”

petroleum products. The assessee company filed its return of income for the year under consideration on 01/12/2017 declaring total income of Rs. 63,48,63,06,130/- under the normal provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short "the Act") and book profit of Rs. 86,50,72,56,560/- under section 115JB of the Act. The return of income was further revised from time to time and lastly it was revised on 29/03/2019 declaring total income of Rs. 65,05,23,40,710/- under normal provisions and book profit of Rs. 86,51,36,85,772/-. The return of income filed by the assessee was selected for scrutiny for verification of the various issues and statutory notices under the Act were issued and duly served upon the assessee. During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer observed specified domestic transactions of supply of electricity by Captive Power Plant, entered into by the assessee with its Associated Enterprises and, accordingly, the Assessing Officer made a ‘reference’ under section 92CA(1) of the Act to the learned Transfer Pricing Officer(TPO) on 26/08/2019 for determination of the arm's length price of those specified domestic transactions. The ld. TPO proposed an adjustment of Rs. 99,45,52,070/- to the transaction value declared by the assessee , but he further noted that Assessing Officer may limit the adjustment to the actual claim of the assessee for deduction under section 80IA of the Act. After taking into consideration proposed adjustment as recommended by the ld TPO, the ld Assessing Officer passed a draft assessment order proposing addition on various other corporate grounds along with the transfer pricing adjustment proposed by the ld TPO. As the assessee did not file any objections against the draft assessment

order to the ld Dispute Resolution Panel within the prescribed time period as provided under provisions of Act, the Assessing Officer passed the impugned assessment order on 26.11.2021, wherein the total income was assessed at Rs. 69,42,94,80,606/- under normal provisions and at Rs. 86,55,79,31,277/- as book profit under section 115JB of the Act.

7.1 The facts in brief qua the issue in dispute are that during the course of assessment proceeding, the Assessing Officer, on perusal of the audit report under section 44AB of the Act and computation of the income, noticed that auditor vide clause 34(c) of the audit report, quantified an amount of interest paid by the assessee under section 201(1A) of the Act at Rs. 3,64,272/- for delayed remittance of tax deducted at source . This interest was claimed by the assessee as part of expenditure under profit and loss account. The Assessing Officer accordingly issued a show cause notice to the assessee as to why said claim of the interest as deduction might not be disallowed. After considering the submission of the assessee, the AO disallowed this sum under Section 37, and relying on Bharat Commerce & Industries Ltd. v. CIT [1998] 230 ITR 733 (SC).

7.2 The assessee submitted before the learned CIT(A) that interest for delayed payment of tax is compensatory and not penal in nature, relying on Lachmandas Mathuradas v. CIT [2002] 254 ITR 799 (SC) and CIT v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [2009] 315 ITR 102 (Kar.). The assessee further submitted that Bharat Commerce & Industries (supra) was distinguishable, concerning interest on delayed advance tax under Section 215 and not TDS interest under Section 201(1A). The assessee relied on Coordinate Tribunal decisions allowing such interest as deduction, including Rungta Mines Ltd (ITA 1531/Kol/217 dt 05.10.2018; Narayani Ispat (P) Ltd (ITA 212/Kol/2014 dt 30.08.2017; and Resolve salvage & Fire India (P) Ltd (2022) 139 taxmann.com 196 (Mum. Trib)

7.3 The learned CIT(A), however, rejected this submission, following the decision of the Bangalore Bench of this Tribunal in Expat Engineering India Ltd. v. ACIT, Bengaluru (30.03.2023), which, in the assessee's own case, had disallowed interest under Section 201(1A), holding that the Tribunal was bound to follow the Hon'ble Madras High Court's decision in CIT v. Chennai Properties & Investment Ltd. [1998] 239 ITR 435 (Mad.), applying the rule of judicial discipline in CIT v. Godavari Devi Saraf [1978] 113 ITR 589 (Bom.), namely, that in the absence of a jurisdictional High Court ruling, a Tribunal must follow the view of another High Court until the jurisdictional High Court rules otherwise.

7.4 Before us, the learned counsel for the assessee referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd vs. Mrs. V.P. Damle reported in 157 ITR 812. The Learned Counsel further relied on the decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Resolve Salvage & Fire India Private Limited versus Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 2022, 139 taxmann.com 196.

7.5 On the contrary, the Learned DR relied on the decision of the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of M/s. Expat Engineering India Limited, (supra), which has been relied by the Learned CIT(A).

7.6 We have considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. The assessee has relied upon various decisions to contend that interest under section 201(1A) is compensatory and not penal in nature, not attracting Explanation to section 37 of the Act. We find that the said proposition, by itself, does not decide the issue before us. The question for consideration is whether such interest is allowable as deduction under the main provision of section 37(1) of the Act. The learned CIT(A) has followed the decision of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in Expat Engineering India Ltd.(supra) The relevant part of the decision of the Tribunal is reproduced as under:

“9. We have heard rival submissions and perused the material on record. The Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in assessee's own case had categorically held after relying various judicial pronouncements that interest u/s 201(1A) of the I.T.Act cannot be claimed as a deduction. The relevant finding of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in assessee's own case, reads as follows:- "11. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. The coordinate Bench of this Tribunal in Velankani Information Systems Ltd. (supra) dealt with this issue and held that interest on delayed payment of TDS cannot be allowed as deduction. The relevant observations of the Tribunal are as follows:- "21. As far as delay in remittance of tax deducted at source u/s. 201(14) of the Act is concerned, we find that the Hon'ble Madras High Court has taken a view that interest paid u/s. 201(1A) is also in the nature of tax and notwithstanding the fact that it is not the tax liability of the assessee, the same cannot be allowed as a deduction. The following were the relevant observations of the Hon'ble Madras High Court:- "14. As already noticed the payment of interest takes colour from the nature of the levy with reference to which such interest is paid and the tax required to be but not paid in time, which rendered the assessee liable for payment of interest was in the nature of a direct tax and similar to the income-tax payable under the Income-tax Act. The interest paid under Section 201(1A) of the Act, therefore, would not assume the character of business expenditure and cannot be regarded as a compensatory payment as contended by learned counsel for the assessee. 15. Counsel for the assessee in support of his submission that the interest paid by the assessee was merely compensatory in character besides relying on the case of Makalakshmi Sugar MillsCo. also relied on the decision of the apex court in the cases of Prakash Cotton Mills Pvt Ltd. v. CIT [1993] 201 ITR 684; Malwa Vanaspati and Chemical Co. v. CIT [1997] 225 ITR 383 and CIT v. Ahmedabad Cotton Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1994] 205 ITR 163. In all these cases, the court was concerned with an indirect tax payable by the assessee in the course of its business and admissible as business expenditure. Further liability for interest which had been incurred by the assessee therein was regarded as compensatory in nature and allowable as business expenditure. 16. The ratio of those cases is not applicable here. Income-tax is not allowable as business expenditure. The amount deducted as tax is not an item of expenditure. The amount not deducted and remitted has the character of tax and has to be remitted to the State and cannot be utilised by the assessee for its own business. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Commerce and Industries [1998] 230 ITR 733, rejected the argument advanced by the assessee that retention of money payable to the State as tax or income-tax would augment the capital of the assessee and the expenditure incurred, namely, interest paid for the period of such retention would assume character of business expenditure. The court held that an assessee could not possibly claim that it was borrowing from the State, the amounts payable by it as income-tax, and utilising the same as capital in its business, to contend that the interest paid for the period of delay in payment of tax amounted to a business expenditure". (emphasis supplied) 22. The decision cited by the ld. counsel for the assessee of Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal on the issue is contrary to the decision of the Hon'ble Madras High Court. Though the decision of the Tribunal is later in point of time, judicial discipline demands that the decision of the Hon'ble Madras High Court is to be followed. It is also worthwhile to mention that the Kolkata Bench of Tribunal in the case of Narayani Ispat (P.) Ltd. (supra), which was cited by the ld. counsel for the assessee, did not consider or did not have an occasion to consider the decision of the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Chennai Properties and Investment Ltd. (supra). In these circumstances, we follow the decision of the Hon'ble Madras High Court & uphold the order of the CIT(A) insofar as it relates to disallowance of interest on delayed remittance of tax deducted at source u/s. 201(1A) of the Act." 12 Following the above decision of the Tribunal, we hold that interest on delayed payment of TDS is not an allowable deduction and dismiss the ground raised by the assessee. The Id. AR submitted a detailed written submission on various case laws which we will discuss in the ensuing paras 13. At the outset it has to be mentioned that the question whether interest paid u/s.201(14) of the Act, is an allowable business expenditure has to be examined within the parameters of Sec. 37(1) of the Act and not on the basis of the prohibition contained in Sec.40a(ii) of the Act. Sec.37(1) of the Act provides that expenditure which is not capital or personal in nature laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business shall be allowed in computing the income chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession". Sec.40(ii) provides that any sum paid on account of any rate or tax levied on the profits and gains of any business or profession or assessed at a proportion of, or otherwise on the basis of any such profits or gains, shall not be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession". Both these sections operate in different fields, the former is an enabling provision while the latter is a disabling provision. 14. The question directly arose for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Commerce and Industries Ltd. v. CIT [1998] 230 ITR 733 and the question that was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that case was whether payments required to be made by way of income-tax 'under the Income- tax Act are not deductible as expenditure and the further amounts which a person may be required to pay by a reason of failure to comply with the provisions requiring the payments of the tax are also amounts which cannot be regarded as deductible expenditure under Section 37 of the Act. The exact question considered by the Hon'ble Court was:- "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the claim for deduction of interest levied under Section 139 to the extent of Rs. 11,470/- and interest levied under Section 215 to the extent of Rs. 1,04,339/- was rightly rejected as not allowable under Section 37 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 for the assessment year 1972-73?" 15. The Hon'ble Court held as follows: "It cannot be said, in the present case, that the payment of interest is in any way an expense incurred wholly or exclusively for the purpose of assessee's business. Nor is it a payment made for the purpose of preserving and protecting the assessee's business as in the case of Birla Cotton Mills (supra).

Apart from section 37, the assessee has also present into service Section 36(1) (iii) which permits deduction in respect of the amount of interest paid in respect of capital borrowed for the purposes of the assessee's business or profession. For the reasons set out earlier, the claim for deduction under section 36(1)(iii) is also misconceived just as the assessee's claim under section 37 is misconceived. In the premises, the question raised has to be answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed with costs." 16. Therefore it is clear that the basis why tax or interest is not allowed as deduction u/s.37(1) of the Act is on the reasoning that it cannot be regarded as an expense incurred wholly or exclusively for the purpose of Assessee's business. Therefore the allowability of interest on taxes paid should not be looked out from the definition of tax as given in Sec.2(43) of the Act. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the Assessee are based on a misconception that the definition of interest u/s.2(43) of the Act is relevant and that the disallowance in question has to be judged in the parameters of Sec. 40(a)(iib) of the Act. We shall now deal with the various submissions made by the learned counsel for the Assessee. 17. In the case of Harshad Shantilal Mehta vs Custodian, (1998) 231 ITR 871 (SC) the Supreme Court was concerned with the interpretation of Sec. 11 of The Special Court (Trail of Offenders Relating Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, (hereinafter referred to as the Special Act) which reads thus:-

"11. Discharge of liabilities - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code and any other law for the time being in force, the Special Court may make such order as it may deem fit directing the Custodian for the disposal of the property under attachment. (2) The following liabilities shall be paid or discharged in full, as far as may be, in the order as under :- (a) all revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due from the persons notified by the Custodian under sub-section (2) of Sec.3 to the Central Government or any State Government or any local authority (b) all amounts due from the person so notified by the Custodian to any bank of financial institution or mutual fund; and (c) any other liability as may be specified by the Special Court from time to time." 18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court framed the following questions for consideration:- (1) What is meant by revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due? Does the word "due" refer merely to the liability to pay such taxes etc., or does it refer to a liability which has crystalised into a legally ascertained sum immediately payable?

(2) Do the taxes (in clause (a) of Section 11(2) refer only to taxes (2) relating to a specific period or to all taxes due from the notified person? (3) At what point or time should the taxes have become due? (4) Does the Special Court have any discretion relating to the extent of payments to be made under Section 11(2)(a) from out of the attached funds/property? (5) Whether taxes include penalty or interest? 19. While answering Question No.5, the Court held:- "One other connected question remains: whether "taxes" under Section 11(2)(a) would include interest or penalty as well? We are concerned in the present case with penalty and interest under the Income Tax Act. Tax, penalty and interest are different concepts under the Income Tax Act. The definition of "tax" under Section 2(43) does not include penalty or interest. Similarly, under Section 157, it is provided that when any tax, interest, penalty, fine or any other sum is payable in consequence of any order passed under this Act, the Assessing Officer shall serve upon the assessee a notice of demand as prescribed. Provisions for imposition of penalty and interest are distinct from the provisions for imposition of tax. Learned Special Court judge, after examining various authorities in paragraphs 61 to 70 of his judgment, has come to the conclusion that neither penalty nor interest can be considered as tax under Section 11(2)(a). We agree with the reasoning and conclusion drawn by the Special Court in this connection."

Alloys Corporation Ltd. v. CIT, (1992) 196 ITR 406 (Bom.). In that case, the Hon'ble Bombay High Court was specifically considering the allowability under section 37 of interest paid under section 201(1A), along with interest under sections 215 and 220(2). The Hon'ble High Court answered the question against the assessee and upheld the disallowance.

7.8 We may also observe that the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. V.P. Damle, ( supra), relied upon by the assessee, does not lay down a contrary proposition. Hon’ble High Court(supra) decided whether interest under Section 201(1A) could be waived for want of deliberate default. The Hon’ble High Court held that the levy is not penal. The question whether the said interest expenditure is allowable under section 37(1) was not the issue before the Hon’ble Court. It did not decide whether the interest, once paid, is deductible under Section 37(1) of the Act. It accordingly does not assist the assessee on the question before us, and is distinguishable on this ground.

7.9 On the substance, we accept the distinction correctly drawn by the Bangalore Bench (supra). The question, whether interest under Section 201(1A) is penal or compensatory, which is what Lachmandas Mathuradas(supra) and the decisions following it address, governs only whether the Explanation to Section 37, disallowing expenditure incurred for a purpose that is an offence or prohibited by law, is attracted. It does not, by itself, answer the separate and independent requirement of the main provision namely Section 37(1), that the expenditure be laid out wholly and

exclusively for the purposes of the business. An assessee may clear the Explanation to section 37 but still fail this independent test of main section of 37(1). Therefore, the fact that interest under section 201(1A) is compensatory and not penal does not by itself make it allowable under section 37(1). Section 37(1) requires the expenditure to have been laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business.

7.10 The interest under Section 201(1A) arises from a statutory default i.e. failure to remit, within the prescribed time, tax that never formed part of the assessee's own income but was withheld on behalf of another and held for the Government. The liability to pay this interest is a consequence of that default, not an outlay incurred in the carrying on of the assessee's business. This is the basis on which the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court held, in Ferro Alloys Corporation (supra), that such interest cannot assume the character of business expenditure, however compensatory its purpose might be. We are, therefore, bound by the decision of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd. (supra). The contrary decisions of the Tribunal relied upon by the assessee cannot prevail over the binding decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court.

7.11 Respectfully following Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd. v. CIT (supra), we hold that the interest of Rs. 3,64,272/- paid by the assessee under Section 201(1A) is not deductible under Section 37(1), and accordingly, we find no infirmity in the conclusion reached by the learned CIT(A).The ground No. 1 raised by the assessee is accordingly dismissed.

8. As far as ground number 2 (two) of the appeal is concerned, , the learned CIT(A), after considering the assessee’s additional claim that the capital gain of ₹8,91,74,349/- arising from acquisition of land was exempt under section 96 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, admitted the additional ground under section 250(5). The ld CIT(A) noted that the assessee had originally offered the capital gain to tax in its return but subsequently claimed that the amount was not taxable in view of section 96 of the RFCTLARR Act and CBDT Circular No. 36/2016 dated 25.10.2016. The assessee also relied upon judicial precedents to contend that the acquisition remained compulsory even where compensation was settled through negotiation. The ld CIT(A) called for a remand report from the Assessing Officer. The AO stated that the exemption claim was raised for the first time before the CIT(A). While observing that, on the facts, the assessee appeared not to be taxable on the capital gain and that only the correct tax should be collected, the AO relied upon Chiranjeevi Wind Energy Ltd. v. ACIT(2014) 51 taxmann.com 84 (Chennai Trib.), to contend that a claim not made before the AO could not be allowed as an additional claim before the appellate authority. Accordingly, the AO suggested rejection of the additional ground. The ld CIT(A) admitted the additional ground but the record reproduced before us does not show any adjudication by the CIT(A) on the actual eligibility of the capital gain for exemption under section 96 of RFCTLARR Act, 2013.

8.1 We have considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. The assessee had offered capital gain of ₹8,91,74,349/- in the return of income in respect of the

land acquired in connection with the Bangalore Metro Rail Project. During the appellate proceedings, the assessee raised an additional ground claiming that the said capital gain was not chargeable to tax in view of section 96 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and CBDT Circular No. 36 of 2016 dated 25.10.2016. The learned CIT(A) admitted the additional ground and called for a remand report from the Assessing Officer. However, neither the learned CIT(A) nor the Assessing Officer has examined the assessee's claim on merits with reference to the relevant documents and the conditions prescribed under the law. The remand report proceeds mainly on the ground that the claim was not made before the Assessing Officer.

8.2 In our view, the mere fact that the assessee did not make the claim in the return of income cannot, by itself, determine whether the amount is legally taxable or exempt. The first issue to be examined is whether, on the facts of the case and on proper verification of the acquisition proceedings, the compensation received by the assessee falls within the scope of section 96 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and the consequential clarification contained in CBDT Circular No. 36 of 2016. This aspect has not been examined by the authorities below.

8.3 We, therefore, consider it appropriate to setaside the finding of ld CIT(A) and restore this issue to back to him for fresh examination. The ld CIT(A) shall call for a remand report from the AO asking him to examine the assessee's claim on the basis of the acquisition documents, nature of the compensation received, the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, the applicable provisions

of the Income-tax Act and CBDT Circular No. 36 of 2016, and thereafter decide whether the capital gain of ₹8,91,74,349/- is exempt from tax. Needless to say, the ld CIT(A) shall afford adequate opportunity of being heard to both the assessee and the Assessing Officer and pass a speaking order in accordance with law. Accordingly, the ground No. 2 of the appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.

10.1 The ld AO observed that, although no deduction under section 80-IA had been claimed in respect of the GTU, the assessee had not furnished its final accounts so as to ascertain its actual working results. According to the AO, in the absence of such accounts, it could not be ascertained whether the GTU had earned any profit or incurred any loss during the year. The AO further observed that the assessee had purchased power from the GTU at a rate higher than the arm’s length price, resulting in reduction of the assessee’s taxable profits by ₹99,45,52,070/-. Accordingly, the AO made a transfer pricing adjustment of ₹99,45,52,070/- to the total income of the assessee.

10.2 Before the ld CIT(A) , the Authorized Representative for the assessee submitted that the assessee had not claimed any

deduction under section 80-IA in respect of the GTU, as the unit had incurred losses and had substantial accumulated losses. It was therefore submitted that no deduction under section 80-IA had been claimed in any year. It was further submitted that the assessee had furnished the details relating to the GTU during the assessment proceedings, including Form No. 10CCB and the financial statements of the unit. According to the assessee, the final accounts of the GTU had also been furnished to and examined by the TPO. It was, therefore, contended that the AO's observation that the working results of the GTU were not available was not factually correct. The assessee further submitted that, in the draft assessment order dated 28.09.2021, the AO had recorded that, since no deduction under section 80-IA had been claimed in respect of the Visakh Refinery, the transfer pricing adjustment of ₹99,45,52,070/- proposed by the TPO was being made. According to the assessee, the final assessment order proceeded on a different basis by referring to the non-furnishing of the final accounts of the GTU. It was contended that the basis of the addition had thus been changed at the stage of the final assessment order. The assessee also submitted that a similar issue had arisen in AY 2014-15, when no transfer pricing adjustment was made after taking into consideration the fact that no deduction under section 80-IA had been claimed in respect of the GTU. It was further submitted that the issue had again arisen in AY 2017-18, when a transfer pricing adjustment was made notwithstanding the fact that no deduction under section 80-IA had been claimed. The assessee further submitted that, from AY 2020-21, it had opted for the tax regime under section 115BAA,

under which deduction under section 80-IA was not available. According to the assessee, it had not claimed any deduction under section 80-IA in respect of GTU-5 and GTU-6 up to AY 2019-20 and could not claim such deduction thereafter on account of its having opted for section 115BAA. On these grounds, the assessee contended that the transfer pricing adjustment of ₹99,45,52,070/- was not warranted and prayed for deletion of the addition.

10.3 The learned CIT(A), after considering the facts of the case and the submissions of the assessee, noted that no deduction under section 80-IA had been claimed in respect of the GTU. He accordingly observed that the AO should verify the computation of income and, if it is found that no deduction under section 80- IA had been claimed, the corresponding transfer pricing adjustment should not be made.

10.4 The learned CIT(A) further observed, in the alternative, that the assessee had purchased power at ₹7.99 per unit and considered this rate as an internal CUP. He therefore held that the said rate was to be preferred over the external CUP of ₹3.79 per unit adopted by the TPO. He also referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT v. M/s. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. and observed that the market value of power captively consumed is the price which the power could fetch in the open market, stated by him to be ₹3.79 per KWH, being the rate at which power was supplied by the State Electricity Board. On the above basis, the learned CIT(A) allowed the ground raised by the assessee.

10.5 We have heard rival submissions and perused the record. It is not in dispute that no deduction under Section 80-IA was claimed for the GTU in the year under consideration. That fact, however, does not by itself dispose of the appeal. The dispute is not confined to the quantum of deduction claimed; it concerns whether the assessee's non-eligible consuming unit claimed excessive expenditure by purchasing power from the GTU above its arm's length price. We note that the TPO, at paragraph 6.10 of his order, has recorded that the price paid by the consuming unit should be benchmarked against power generators and not distributors, and that the rate at which the Discom sells power to a consuming unit is not comparable to the rate at which a captive power plant supplies power to that unit. In other words, the adjustment targets the price paid by the non-eligible consuming unit, independent of whether the GTU itself claimed any Section 80-IA deduction. The fact that the GTU incurred losses and that no deduction under section 80-IA was claimed does not, by itself, determine whether the expenditure incurred by the consuming unit is allowable in computing the taxable income of the assessee. The transaction, therefore, requires examination in the light of the provisions governing the determination of the arm's length price of the inter-unit transfer.

10.6 The CIT(A)'s order conflates two distinct questions that call for separate treatment: whether the transfer pricing provisions apply at all, given the non-claim of deduction under Section 80- IA, but tax consequence of the transfer-pricing adjustment on expenditure claimed ,and, if they do, what the correct arm's length price of the power transfer is. The CIT(A) answered the part

of first question in the assessee's favour, and addressed the second only in the alternative, without the two findings being properly reconciled.

10.7 We accordingly set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restore the issue to his file for fresh examination of both questions: first, whether the transaction is governed by the relevant transfer pricing provisions notwithstanding the non-claim of deduction under Section 80-IA, and, if so, the correct arm's length price of the power supplied by the GTU, having regard to the comparables relied upon by the TPO and the material placed on record by the assessee, including the internal CUP of Rs. 7.99 per unit. The CIT(A) shall thereafter determine the consequential tax effect on expenditure claimed by power consuming units , if any, strictly in accordance with law, after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard both to the assessee and the Assessing officer. Ground No. 1 of the Revenue's appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.

11.1 The assessee, for the year under consideration, had shown exempt income of Rs. 81,29,55,238/- and had itself disallowed Rs. 1,90,09,495/- as expenditure relatable thereto on proportionate basis. The Assessing Officer by ay of notice under 25

section 142(1) dated 01.03.2021, called upon the assessee to furnish the working of disallowance under Rule 8D read with section 14A. In its reply dated 19.03.2021, the assessee contended, inter-alia, that no direct expenditure had been incurred in earning the exempt income, that its investments were funded out of surplus and interest-free funds, that only investments which had actually yielded exempt income during the year ought to be reckoned, and that interest expenditure ought to be considered net of interest income — and accordingly prayed that no disallowance beyond the Rs. 1.9 crores already offered be made.

11.2 The Assessing Officer did not accept this explanation. He held that the presence or absence of an intention to earn exempt income is not a precondition for invoking section 14A, and that an investment capable of yielding exempt income falls within the sweep of Rule 8D regardless of whether such income has in fact accrued in the year, having regard to the word "shall" in the definition of the value of investment under Rule 8D(2)(ii). He further held that the maintenance and management of investments necessarily entails administrative expenditure, so that a disallowance computed under Rule 8D(2)(ii) , being the limb of Rule 8D(2), as it stood amended with effect from the year under consideration, representing administrative expenditure attributable to exempt income , was called for. On the assessee's claim of investment out of own funds, the Assessing Officer held that share capital and reserves do not constitute idle funds and are deployed across the business as a whole, that the assessee had furnished only tabulated fund-flow figures without bank

statements or other material establishing an actual nexus between specific own funds and specific investments, and that the assessee's borrowings had in fact increased substantially during the year. He also rejected the contention that only income- yielding investments should be reckoned, again on the language of Rule 8D(2)(ii), and rejected the contention that interest expenditure be considered net of interest income, Rule 8D containing no provision for such netting.

11.3 Applying Rule 8D(2)(ii), the Assessing Officer computed the disallowance at one per cent of the annual average of the monthly averages of the opening and closing value of investments, being Rs. 632.55 crore, yielding a disallowance of Rs. 6,32,55,000/-. After adjusting the suo motu disallowance of Rs. 1,90,09,495/- already offered by the assessee, this resulted in a proposed addition of Rs. 4,42,45,505/-, which was put to the assessee by show-cause notice dated 26.04.2021. In response, the assessee reiterated that the disallowance ought to be restricted to Rs. 1.9 crore and, relying on the principle in Future Retail Ltd. v. CIT (supra) and on orders in its own favour for earlier years i.e. before the Tribunal up to A.Y. 2007-08, and before the ld. CIT(A) from A.Y. 2010-11 to 2016-17 , requested that the proposed addition, be dropped. The Assessing Officer did not accept this submission, observing that the orders relied upon had not attained finality, the Department having carried the issue in appeal before higher forum, and that the assessee had, in any event, not furnished the basis of its own suo motu computation. Finding no reason to depart from the method prescribed under Rule 8D, the Assessing Officer confirmed the disallowance of Rs.

6,32,55,000/- under section 14A read with Rule 8D, and brought to tax the net addition of Rs. 4,42,45,505/-, after giving credit for the suo motu disallowance already made by the assessee.

11.4 Before the ld CIT(A), the assessee submitted that it had sufficient interest-free funds in the form of share capital and reserves and surplus, which exceeded the investments giving rise to exempt income. It was further submitted that the assessee had sufficient cash generated from profits, depreciation and operating activities and that there was no proximate nexus between the borrowed funds and the investments. In support, the assessee relied upon a Chartered Accountant's certificate and details of its borrowing history. The assessee further submitted that, in its computation, it had voluntarily identified and offered ₹1,90,09,495/- as indirect expenditure attributable to the exempt income, based on apportionment of expenditure between exempt and non-exempt income. It was accordingly contended that no further disallowance was warranted under section 14A read with Rule 8D. The assessee also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in CIT Vs. HDFC Bank Ltd. (366 ITR 505) and submitted that, where interest-free funds were sufficient to cover the investments, a presumption would arise that the investments had been made out of such funds. It also referred to the orders passed in its own case for earlier years and prayed that the disallowance be restricted to ₹1,90,09,495/- as voluntarily offered by it.

11.5The learned CIT(A) considered the assessment order and the submissions of the assessee. He noted that the issue had been

considered in the assessee's own case for earlier assessment years, where the jurisdictional High Court's decision in HDFC Bank Ltd (supra) had also been taken into consideration. Following those decisions, and taking note of the assessee's computation based on apportionment of expenditure between exempt and non-exempt income, the learned CIT(A) held that the disallowance made by the AO was not justified beyond the amount of ₹1,90,09,495/- offered by the assessee. The ground was accordingly allowed to that extent.

11.6 We have considered the rival submissions and carefully perused the material available on record. The Revenue has challenged the relief granted by the learned CIT(A) in respect of the disallowance made under section 14A read with Rule 8D. The assessee had computed an amount of ₹1,90,09,495/- as indirect expenditure attributable to exempt income on the basis of apportionment between exempt and non-exempt income. The assessee had accordingly requested the AO to restrict the disallowance to that amount. The AO, however, was not satisfied with the assessee's computation. He invoked Rule 8D and made the impugned disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(ii). Thus, the disallowance made by the AO was towards the expenditure computed under Rule 8D(2)(ii). No separate disallowance was made by the AO in respect of direct expenditure, under Rule 8D(2)(i).

11.7 The learned CIT(A), while allowing relief, proceeded mainly on the basis that the assessee had sufficient interest-free funds to cover the investments and relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in HDFC Bank Ltd. (supra). The said decision

lays down the principle that where sufficient interest-free funds are available, a presumption arises that the investments have been made out of such funds.

11.8In the present case, however, the actual disallowance made by the AO was under Rule 8D(2)(ii), and the record does not show any separate disallowance of direct interest expenditure under Rule 8D(2)(i). Therefore, the question whether the assessee had sufficient interest-free funds to cover the investments, was not relevant to a disallowance of expenditure under Rule 8D(2)(ii), if interest is not part of expenditure considered for disallowance. The learned CIT(A)'s reliance on HDFC Bank Ltd. (supra) is, therefore, academic in the facts of the present case to the extent the impugned addition is considered with reference to the assessee's voluntary computation of ₹1,90,09,495/- and the disallowance actually made by the AO. The material question is whether the AO was justified in rejecting the assessee's computation and invoking Rule 8D, and, if so, whether the disallowance made under the particular limb of Rule 8D invoked by the AO is sustainable. Since the AO has recorded dissatisfaction with the assessee's computation and thereafter proceeded to determine the disallowance under Rule 8D, the issue is required to be examined with reference to the precise computation made by the AO and the nature of expenditure to which Rule 8D(2)(ii) has been applied.

11.9 We, therefore, restore this issue to the file of the ld CIT(A) for fresh examination. The ld CIT(A) shall examine the assessee's computation of ₹1,90,09,495/-, the basis on which dissatisfaction

was recorded by the AO, the expenditure actually considered while applying Rule 8D(2)(ii) and whether the voluntary disallowance made by the assessee include proportionate interest expenditure. The ld CIT(A) shall also examine the availability of interest-free funds and the applicability of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in HDFC Bank Ltd.(supra) to the extent relevant to the disallowance of interest expenditure , if so covered under disallowance made under Rule 8D(2)(ii) . The disallowance shall thereafter be recomputed strictly in accordance with section 14A and Rule 8D, after providing adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The ground raised by the Revenue is accordingly allowed for statistical purposes.

12.1 During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer, by notice under section 142(1) dated 01.03.2021, called upon the assessee to furnish details of the Establishment expenses debited to the Profit & Loss Account for A.Y. 2017-18 and to clarify whether the said amount had been capitalized to Capital Work-in-Progress ("CWIP"). In response, by letter dated 19.03.2021, the assessee stated that a sum of Rs. 79,72,61,476/- representing salary/establishment charges incurred on monitoring and supervision of the execution of various projects, though capitalized to CWIP in the books of account, had been

claimed as a revenue deduction in the computation of total income on the ground that the expenditure was routine in nature, incurred in the day-to-day functioning and expansion of the assessee's existing business rather than in setting up a new line of business, and was accordingly allowable under section 37(1) of the Act. In support, the assessee relied on CIT v. Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. (103 ITR 715), Shivkami Mills v. CIT (120 ITR 211), and CIT v. Shah Theatres (169 ITR 499).

12.2 The Assessing Officer did not accept this submission. Referring to Note 4, Page 137 of the Annual Report for A.Y. 2017-18, the AO observed that the Establishment charges of Rs. 79.73 crores had been added as expenditure during the year to the opening balance of CWIP under the sub-head "Construction period expenses pending apportionment (net of recovery)," and that the assessee's own books therefore characterized the expenditure as capital in nature. Relying on the principle that the treatment given by an assessee to an item in its own books, while not conclusive, is indicative of its true character, and on the Supreme Court's decision in CIT v. Sri Mangayarkarasi Mills (P.) Ltd. (315 ITR 114), the AO held that the claim under section 37(1) could not be sustained once the expenditure was admittedly capital in the assessee's own audited accounts, since section 37(1) expressly excludes expenditure of a capital nature. The AO further noted that the identical issue had been decided against the assessee for A.Y. 2003-04 to A.Y. 2013-14, with the disallowances for A.Y. 2003-04 to A.Y. 2009-10 having already been confirmed by the CIT(A), and that the assessee's submissions for A.Y. 2017-18 were materially similar to those

made in the earlier years. On this basis, a show-cause notice dated 26.04.2021 was issued proposing to treat the sum of Rs. 79,72,61,476/- as capital expenditure and disallow the corresponding deduction.

12.3 In reply dated 04.05.2021, the assessee contended, without conceding the capital/revenue characterization, that if the amount was treated as capitalized, the corresponding sum ought to be reduced from the block of assets so as to make it eligible for depreciation. By further submission dated 12.10.2021 made against the draft assessment order, the assessee pointed out that the Tribunal, for A.Y. 2003-04 to A.Y. 2007-08, had allowed the identical expenditure as revenue in nature, and that the CIT(A) had consistently allowed the same for A.Y. 2012-13 to A.Y. 2016- 17. Without prejudice to its primary contention that the expenditure was revenue in nature, the assessee submitted that Rs. 61,56,41,319/- (being the amount capitalized in the books during the year) had been backed out of the block of assets, and claimed depreciation thereon — computed at the normal rate of 15% plus additional depreciation of 20% on the component used for more than 180 days (Rs. 14,12,28,832/-, yielding Rs. 2,11,84,325/- and Rs. 2,82,45,766/- respectively), and at half the normal rate (7.5% and 10%, in terms of the second proviso to section 32(1)(ii)) on the component used for less than 180 days (Rs. 47,44,12,487/-, yielding Rs. 3,55,80,937/- and Rs. 4,74,41,249/- respectively), aggregating total depreciation of Rs. 13,24,52,276/-. On this computation, the assessee submitted that the net disallowance, if sustained at all, ought to be restricted to Rs. 79,72,61,476/- minus Rs. 13,24,52,276/-, i.e., approximately Rs. 66.48 crore.

12.4 The Assessing Officer, having considered this submission, declined to grant the depreciation claim and confirmed the disallowance in full. As regards the favourable orders of the Tribunal and the CIT(A) for the earlier years, the AO held that those orders had not attained finality, the Department having preferred appeals before higher forums on the issue, and that no relief could be granted to the assessee on that basis. As regards the alternative claim for depreciation, the AO held that since the capitalized amount formed part of CWIP which was admittedly incomplete and not put to use during the year, the asset did not qualify for depreciation, and that the mere making of book entries did not by itself entitle the assessee to the claim. Accordingly, the entire sum of Rs. 79,72,61,476/- was treated as capital expenditure and disallowed while computing the assessee's income from business.

12.5 The relevant finding of the learned CIT(A) is reproduced as under:

8.3 Decision: I have considered the A.O.'s order as well as the appellant's submissions. Having considered both, I find that the Hon'ble ITAT, Mumbai vide order dated 23.11.2016 in appellant's own case for AY 03-04 to AY 05-06 held that the expenses incurred on various personnel/employee in the project is certainly allowable as business expenditure u/s 37(1) of the Act and accordingly set-aside the order of CIT(A). The Hon'ble ITAT placed reliance on Tuticorin alkali Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. vs CIT reported in 227 ITR 172(SC) wherein Supreme Court held that the accounting practice cannot override section or any other provisions of the act. Respectfully following the said ITAT order dated 23.11.2016 and I find that similar issue was decided by my predecessor for AY 2010-11 to AY 2016-17 in the Appellants own case. In view of the same, this ground of appeal is allowed.”

12.6 We have heard rival contentions and perused the record, including the orders of the authorities below and the precedents cited at the Bar. The learned CIT(A) has allowed the assessee's claim by following the order of this Tribunal dated 23.11.2016 in the assessee's own case for Assessment Years 2003-04 to 2005- 06, which held the identical establishment expenditure allowable under Section 37(1) of the Act, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals & Fertilizers Ltd. v. CIT [1997] 227 ITR 172 (SC), for the proposition that an assessee's own accounting treatment cannot override the substantive provisions of the Act. The learned CIT(A) has further noted that the same view was taken by his predecessor for Assessment Years 2010-11 to 2016-17.

12.7 We find no reason to take a different view. The question in issue as to whether establishment and supervision charges of this nature, though capitalized in the books, are allowable as revenue expenditure under Section 37(1) , stands settled in the assessee's own favour by a binding order of this Tribunal, which the Revenue has not shown to have been reversed or stayed by any higher forum. That the Revenue's appeals against the earlier orders remain pending does not, by itself, deprive those orders of their binding character for the present purpose; judicial discipline requires us to follow a decision of a Co-ordinate Bench in the assessee's own case unless and until it is set aside. We accordingly uphold the order of the learned CIT(A), and Ground No. 3 of the Revenue's appeal is dismissed.

13. The ground number 4 of the appeal of the Revenue relates to deletion of the addition on account of foreign exchange (forex) losses in closing stock.

13.1 During the course of assessment, the Assessing Officer proposed to include a proportionate share of Exchange Rate Variation ("ERV") cost in the valuation of the assessee's closing stock, on the ground that an identical addition had been sustained in the assessee's own case for Assessment Years 2015- 16 and 2016-17. The assessee was accordingly show-caused.

13.2 In reply, the assessee submitted that its inventory is valued under Ind AS-2, and that Ind AS-23 (Borrowing Costs) — on which the proposed addition rested — expressly excludes from its scope inventories that are manufactured or produced in large quantities on a repetitive basis, under paragraph 4(b) of that Standard. The assessee accordingly contended that no part of the ERV cost was required to be loaded onto the value of its closing stock.

13.3 The Assessing Officer did not accept this submission. Following the reasoning adopted in the assessment order for Assessment Year 2016-17, and applying the same methodology to the year under appeal — namely, computing closing inventory as a percentage of net sales, and applying that percentage to the total ERV adjustment reported by the statutory auditor for the year (Rs. 527 crore) — the Assessing Officer computed the addition at Rs. 46,11,25,000/-, inventory having worked out to 8.75% of net sales for the year.

13.4 By its further submission dated 04.05.2021, and again in its response dated 12.10.2021 to the draft assessment order, the assessee reiterated its objection on the scope of Ind AS-23, pointed to the CIT(A)'s favourable orders for Assessment Years 2012-13 to 2016-17 on the identical issue, and submitted, without prejudice, that even on the Department's own historical methodology, the computation was incorrect: the Rs. 527 crore figure represented an Ind AS adjustment and not an actual exchange-rate-variation loss, since the assessee had in fact credited Rs. 147.44 crore to its profit and loss account as a gain on foreign-currency translation during the year, and a consistent application of the Department's own formula to the actual opening and closing exchange-rate movement would yield a net deduction of Rs. 41.52 crore rather than an addition.

13.5 The Assessing Officer rejected this submission as well, holding that ICDS-II — which requires the cost of inventories to include all costs incurred to bring them to their present location and condition — governed the valuation, that the auditor's reported ERV adjustment of Rs. 527 crore for the year had to be proportionately loaded onto closing stock on this basis, and that the resulting addition of Rs. 46,11,25,000/- stood confirmed.

13.6 Before the learned CIT(A), the assessee reiterated its submissions on the non-applicability of Ind AS-23 to inventories produced in large quantities on a repetitive basis, relied on the orders of the CIT(A) for Assessment Years 2012-13 to 2016-17 deleting the identical addition, and pressed its without-prejudice computation that, properly applied, the Department's own methodology — using the actual Rs. 147.44 crore foreign- exchange gain for the year rather than the Rs. 527 crore Ind AS adjustment — produced a net deduction rather than an addition.

13.7 The learned CIT(A) noted that the Assessing Officer had made the addition by following the approach taken in the assessment orders for the two preceding years, without reference to the CIT(A)'s own orders for Assessment Years 2012-13 to 2016- 17, which had held an identical addition to be unjustified. Recording that the order for Assessment Year 2016-17 (dated 22.11.2019) had itself followed the earlier order for Assessment Year 2012-13 (dated 30.12.2016) in deleting the addition, and holding further that ICDS-II, read with ICDS-IX, did not apply to the assessee so as to require capitalisation of the ERV/borrowing cost in question, the learned CIT(A) held that the Assessing Officer was not justified in making the disallowance, and allowed this ground of the assessee's appeal.

13.8 We have heard rival submissions of the parties and perused the relevant material on record. We find that this issue stands covered by the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the assessee's own case, which, on identical facts, restored the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after verification of the underlying facts. Relevant finding of Coordinate Bench is reproduced as under:

5.3. Having considered the rival submissions and on perusal of record, we admit the Additional Ground No. 1 raised by the Assessee in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT: 229 ITR 383. However, we find merit in the contention advanced in behalf of the Learned Departmental Representative that the factual basis on which the Assessee has set up his claim for deduction would require examination of underlying facts. The utilization of ECBs for the Purchase of assets from India would need to be verified from the assessment records. Therefore, keeping in view of the above submissions of the Ld. Departmental Representative, we remand the issue back to the file of Assessing Officer for adjudication after verification of facts as averred on behalf of the Assessee and after taking into consideration the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Cooper Corporation Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Satara: 159 ITD 165. In terms of the aforesaid, Additional Ground No. 1 raised by the Assessee is allowed for statistical purposes. 13.9 Respectfully following the same, and for parity of reasoning, we set aside the order of the learned CIT(A) on this issue. Ordinarily in such case matter should be restored to the file of the AO but we find that on other issues , we have restored the matter to the ld CIT(A), so restoring the matter to the AO on this issue would lead to simultaneous multiplicity of proceedings. So we prefer to restore this issue also the file of ld CIT(A) , who shall call for a remand report from the AO , decide the issue afresh, after verifying the underlying facts , including the actual foreign- exchange gain or loss reflected in the assessee's accounts for the year and after affording the assessee as well as the ld AO a reasonable opportunity of being heard. In the result, Ground No. 4 of the Revenue's appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.

14.1 While computing book profit under Section 115JB of the Act, the Assessing Officer added back Rs. 4,42,45,505/-, being the disallowance computed under Section 14A read with Rule 8D, without recording any independent reasoning for importing that figure into the computation of book profit.

14.2 The assessee submitted that Section 14A, by its own terms, applies only "for the purposes of computing the total income under this Chapter" — that is, Chapter IV — and has no application to Section 115JB, which falls under the distinct code of Chapter XII-B. Reliance was placed on the order of this Tribunal in Reliance Industrial Infrastructure Ltd. v. Addl. CIT, ITA Nos. 69 & 70/Mum/2009, dated 05.04.2013, holding that Section 14A cannot be imported into clause (f) of Explanation 1 to Section 115JB, and on the consistent view taken by the learned CIT(A) in the assessee's own case for Assessment Years 2008-09 to 2016-17. The assessee further pointed out that it had itself offered Rs. 1,90,09,495/- towards disallowance under Section 14A, and prayed that any addition to book profit be restricted to this self-disallowed figure, consistently with the earlier years' orders.

14.3 The learned CIT(A) accepted this submission, following the decision of the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi, in ACIT v. Vireet Investment (P.) Ltd. [2017] 165 ITD 27/82 taxmann.com 415, which holds that the computation under clause (f) of Explanation 1 to Section 115JB(2) is to be made without recourse to Section 14A read with Rule 8D. Following this binding precedent, and consistently with the view taken in the assessee's own case for Assessment Year 2016-17, the learned CIT(A) deleted the addition of Rs. 4,42,45,505/- and allowed the ground.

14.4 We have heard rival submissions and perused the record. The learned CIT(A) has deleted the addition by following the binding decision of the Special Bench in Vireet Investment (P.) Ltd. (supra), which holds that Section 14A cannot be read into clause (f) of Explanation 1 to Section 115JB. We find no infirmity in this view. Ground No. 5 of the Revenue's appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Sd/- Sd/- (ANIKESH BANERJEE) (OM PRAKASH KANT) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Mumbai; Dated: 07/10/2026 Saumya , Sr. P.S. Copy of the Order forwarded to : 1. The Appellant 2. The Respondent. 3. CIT 4. DR, ITAT, Mumbai 5. Guard file. ABHINAV ANANT BY ORDER, Digitally signed by ABHINAV //True Copy// ANANT GAVANDE GAVANDE Date: 2026.10.15 17:52:36 +05'30' (Assistant Registrar) ITAT, Mumbai Date Initials Original dictation pad is enclosed at Yes the end of file 1. Draft dictated on: 25.09.2026 Sr. PS/PS 2. Draft placed before author: 29.09.2026 Sr. PS/PS 3. Draft proposed & placed before the JM/AM second member: 4. Draft discussed/approved by Second JM/AM Member: 5. Approved Draft comes to the Sr. Sr. PS/PS PS/PS: 6. Order pronounced on: Sr. PS/PS 7. File sent to the Bench Clerk: 8. Date on which file goes to the Head Sr. PS/PS Clerk: 9. Date on which file goes to AR 10. Date of Dispatch of order