ITAT Mumbai Judgments — January 2026

The Tribunal held that a co-operative bank is distinct from a co-operative society for the purposes of Section 194A(3)(v) of the Act. Specific provisions regarding TDS for co-operative banks override general exemptions for co-operative societies.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a co-operative society engaged in banking, was exempt from deducting TDS on interest paid to other co-operative societies under Section 194A(3)(v) of the Income Tax Act. The proviso inserted later did not apply to the assessment years in question.

The Tribunal held that the co-operative bank is covered by specific provisions of Section 194A(3)(i)(b) and 194A(3)(viia)(b), not the general provision of Section 194A(3)(v). Therefore, the assessee was liable to deduct TDS on interest payments above the threshold.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, a cooperative bank, was obligated to deduct tax at source on interest paid to other cooperative societies, as specific provisions for cooperative banks override general exemptions for cooperative societies. The assessee's argument for exemption under Section 194A(3)(v) was rejected.

The Tribunal held that Section 194A(3)(i)(b) makes it clear that the exemption from TDS for a Co-operative society engaged in banking is only up to Rs. 10,000/-. Since the payments exceeded this threshold, the assessee was obliged to deduct tax.

The Tribunal held that the co-operative bank was covered by specific provisions of Section 194A(3)(i)(b) and 194A(3)(viia)(b) of the Act, not the general provision of Section 194A(3)(v). Therefore, it was liable to deduct TDS on interest payments above the threshold.

The Tribunal held that the co-operative bank is covered by specific provisions of Section 194A(3)(i)(b) and 194A(3)(viia)(b), not the general provision of Section 194A(3)(v). Therefore, the bank was liable to deduct TDS on interest paid to other co-operative societies.

The Tribunal held that the assessee bank is covered by specific provisions of Section 194A(3)(i)(b) and 194A(3)(viia)(b) of the Act, not the general provision of Section 194A(3)(v). Therefore, the assessee was liable to deduct TDS on interest payments above the threshold.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a co-operative bank, was covered by specific provisions of Section 194A(3)(i)(b) and 194A(3)(viia)(b) of the Act, not the general exemption under Section 194A(3)(v). Therefore, the assessee was liable to deduct TDS on interest payments exceeding the threshold.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, a cooperative bank, was obligated to deduct tax at source on interest paid to cooperative societies that were not members, as specific provisions override general exemptions. The assessee's claim of exemption under Section 194A(3)(v) was rejected.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, a cooperative bank, was obligated to deduct tax at source on interest paid to cooperative societies that were not its members. The specific provisions of Section 194A override general exemptions.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a co-operative bank engaged in banking business, was liable to deduct TDS on interest paid to other co-operative societies, as specific provisions of Section 194A(3)(i)(b) and 194A(3)(viia)(b) applied, overriding general exemptions.

The Tribunal held that a co-operative bank is distinct from a general co-operative society and specific provisions of Section 194A, including amendments, mandate TDS on interest payments to non-member co-operative societies. Therefore, the assessee was liable for TDS.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a co-operative society engaged in banking, was exempt from deducting TDS on interest paid to other co-operative societies under Section 194A(3)(v) of the Income-tax Act. The exemption was applicable even for time deposits.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a cooperative bank, was obligated to deduct tax at source on interest paid to other cooperative societies, as specific provisions under Section 194A of the Act applied. General exemptions for cooperative societies were not applicable in this case.

The Tribunal held that the Co-operative bank was covered by specific provisions of Section 194A(3)(i)(b) and 194A(3)(viia)(b) of the Act, not the general provision of Section 194A(3)(v). Therefore, the assessee was liable to deduct TDS on interest payments.

The Tribunal held that the assessee was not required to deduct TDS on interest paid to other co-operative societies based on the exemption provided under Section 194A(3)(v) of the Income-tax Act. The specific provisions relied upon by the revenue were not applicable in this context.

The Tribunal held that a co-operative bank is distinct from a co-operative society and is subject to specific TDS provisions. The exemption under Section 194A(3)(v) is not applicable to co-operative banks for interest paid to non-member co-operative societies.

The Tribunal held that the reopening proceedings were initiated after more than three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. As per Section 151(ii), approval should have been obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner. However, the approval was granted by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, who was not the specified authority under the law for such cases. Therefore, the order passed under Section 148A(d) and subsequent proceedings were deemed bad in law.

The Tribunal considered that the assessee herself admitted ownership of the jewelry found at her residence during the search. Her subsequent claim that it belonged to her daughter was contradictory and lacked documentary evidence. However, jewelry in the locker, which was jointly owned with her daughter, was returned. The addition made by the AO under Section 69A was upheld.

The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal noted that the entire premise of reopening was based on an investigation into organized rackets of generating bogus LTCG in penny stocks. However, it found that on similar facts, a coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the assessee's own case for AY 2013-14 had decided the issue in favour of the assessee. In that decision, the Tribunal had observed that SEBI, after investigation, had revoked its earlier interim orders against the assessee, finding no violation of SEBI Act provisions. The Tribunal further noted that the subsequent SEBI order dated 30/09/2022, relied upon by the Revenue, did not name the assessee among the fraudulent players. Since no new facts were brought on record by the Revenue, the Tribunal found no reason to deviate from the view taken by the Ld. CIT(A) and the coordinate bench. Therefore, the additions made by the AO were directed to be deleted. The grounds pertaining to the invocation of reassessment proceedings under Section 147 were rendered academic.

The Tribunal held that GST receipts should not be included for computing presumptive income under Section 44B, following its own prior decisions. It also held that Section 115JB is not applicable to the assessee due to Explanation 4A. Issues regarding TDS, advance tax credit, and interest were directed to be adjudicated by the AO.

The Tribunal held that since the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) had ultimately exonerated the assessee and other entities regarding alleged over-invoicing, and the basis for reopening and addition was set aside by adjudicating authorities, the addition would not survive. The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s order.

The Tribunal noted that the issue relating to the addition and TDS credit had already been resolved by the Assessing Officer through a rectification order. Consequently, the assessee was no longer aggrieved by this aspect. In light of this development, the appeal was rendered infructuous. The Tribunal did not delve into the merits of the grounds raised by the Revenue concerning the validity of reassessment proceedings or the deletion of additions, as the underlying dispute had been settled by the AO's subsequent action. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as infructuous. No specific finding was given on the validity of reassessment proceedings or the addition itself, as the matter was resolved procedurally.

The Tribunal held that since the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) had ultimately exonerated the assessee and other entities regarding alleged over-invoicing, and the basis for reopening and addition was set aside by adjudicating authorities, the addition would not survive. The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s order.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the Assessing Officer erred by ignoring opening work-in-progress and by including indirect and selling/marketing expenses in construction cost. The assessee's method was in consonance with recognized accounting principles.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee's submissions and evidence were presented for the first time before the CIT(A) without being shared with the AO. This was considered a violation of Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1963, and a breach of the principle of natural justice. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the AO for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the lack of malafide intention and relying on various High Court and Supreme Court judgments emphasizing substantial justice over procedural technicalities. On merits, the Tribunal noted that the funds were given to the student in India and there was no evidence of direct payment to the foreign university, therefore, it did not constitute a violation of Section 11(1)(c).

The Tribunal found contradictory findings by the CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer to re-adjudicate the issue after granting the assessee an opportunity to present evidence. The penalty under Section 271(1)(b) was deleted, granting the benefit of Section 273B due to reasonable cause for non-compliance.

The Tribunal found contradictory findings by the CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer to re-adjudicate the issue after granting the assessee an opportunity to present evidence. The penalty under Section 271(1)(b) was deleted, granting the benefit of Section 273B due to reasonable cause for non-compliance.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Regarding the validity of reassessment proceedings, the Tribunal noted that although a legal ground was raised, no arguments were advanced by the assessee's counsel. The CIT(A) had already decided this issue against the assessee, and in the absence of submissions, the Tribunal did not adjudicate it separately. On the merits, the Tribunal found that the revenue had not brought on record comparable incriminating material such as investigation reports, VAT violations, or evidence of the suppliers being hawala operators, nor was there evidence of cash withdrawal or a money trail. The Tribunal distinguished the case from N.K. Industries Ltd. by noting the absence of such corroborative material. The Tribunal held that the Director's statement, admitting sales in transit without physical delivery, did not amount to an admission of bogus purchases or accommodation entries, especially as sales in transit are a recognized commercial practice. However, the Tribunal acknowledged an element of opacity in the transactions and the sale-in-transit mechanism, suggesting a possibility of profit suppression. Therefore, the Tribunal held that while the full disallowance under section 69C was not justified due to lack of conclusive evidence, an estimated addition to cover the profit element was warranted. The addition was restricted to 6% of the impugned purchases, and the AO was directed to recompute the addition accordingly. The addition of Rs. 10,22,92,928/- was deleted to the extent of 94%.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) correctly deleted the addition made by the AO. The Tribunal found that the assessee's capital was not 'Nil' in the preceding year and had been built up over several years, with returns filed and disclosures made. The AO's comparison of the assessee's total capital with his capital in the firm was incorrect.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) were not sustainable. The Tribunal relied on its previous decisions in similar cases, emphasizing the lack of independent corroborative evidence and the violation of natural justice principles.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) were not sustainable. The Tribunal relied on its previous decisions in similar cases, emphasizing the lack of independent corroborative evidence and the violation of natural justice principles.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) were not sustainable. The Tribunal relied on its previous decisions in similar cases, emphasizing the lack of independent corroborative evidence and the violation of natural justice principles.

The Tribunal dismissed all appeals filed by the Revenue. It found that the penalty proceedings initiated under Section 271(1)(c) for the Assessment Year 2019-2020 were not sustainable as the Assessing Officer had indicated initiation of proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) and not Section 270A.

The Tribunal dismissed all appeals filed by the Revenue. It found that the penalty proceedings initiated under Section 271(1)(c) for the Assessment Year 2019-2020 were not sustainable as the Assessing Officer had indicated initiation of proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) and not Section 270A.

The Tribunal dismissed all appeals filed by the Revenue. It found that the penalty proceedings initiated under Section 271(1)(c) for the Assessment Year 2019-2020 were not sustainable as the Assessing Officer had indicated initiation of proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) and not Section 270A.

The Tribunal dismissed all appeals filed by the Revenue. It found that the penalty proceedings initiated under Section 271(1)(c) for the Assessment Year 2019-2020 were not sustainable as the Assessing Officer had indicated initiation of proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) and not Section 270A.

The Tribunal dismissed all appeals filed by the Revenue. It found that the penalty proceedings initiated under Section 271(1)(c) for the Assessment Year 2019-2020 were not sustainable as the Assessing Officer had indicated initiation of proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) and not Section 270A.

The Tribunal dismissed all appeals filed by the Revenue. It found that the penalty proceedings initiated under Section 271(1)(c) for the Assessment Year 2019-2020 were not sustainable as the Assessing Officer had indicated initiation of proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) and not Section 270A.

The Tribunal dismissed all appeals filed by the Revenue. It found that the penalty proceedings initiated under Section 271(1)(c) for the Assessment Year 2019-2020 were not sustainable as the Assessing Officer had indicated initiation of proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) and not Section 270A.

The tribunal condoned the delay after being satisfied with the reasons provided by the assessee. It was observed that the CIT(A) had disposed of the appeal without properly considering the assessee's submissions and evidence.

The penalty under Section 271AAC is consequential to the income addition. Since the addition under Section 69 was deleted by the CIT(A) and the revenue did not appeal this deletion, the foundation for the penalty no longer exists. Therefore, the penalty cannot be sustained.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding sufficient cause. For AY 2012-13, the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, directing the CIT(A) to decide afresh after considering submissions. For AY 2013-14 and 2015-16, the appeals were also allowed for statistical purposes, with a similar direction to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal held that while a specific purpose is required for accumulation under Section 11(2), a general mention of 'charitable purpose' in Form 10 might not be fatal if the AO was aware of the specific purposes through other information provided. Relying on various High Court decisions, the Tribunal directed the AO to consider the claim based on the discussions and ratio laid down in those decisions.

The Tribunal held that the omission to claim Section 54F deduction in the original return does not preclude appellate authorities from examining it, referencing the Supreme Court decision in Goetze (India) Ltd. However, as the statutory conditions for Section 54F were not verified by the lower authorities, the issue was restored to the AO for de novo verification.

The Tribunal held that the addition made by the Ld.CIT(A) was not sustainable. The Tribunal noted that the AO of the assessee's husband had verified the necessary facts before dropping the Section 148 proceedings, and in that order, the AO concluded that there was no escapement of income in the husband's case. The Tribunal reproduced the relevant observations from the husband's assessment order, which indicated that the AO was satisfied with the explanation regarding the property purchase and the consideration paid. The Tribunal found no force in the addition made by the Ld.CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition in the hands of the assessee. Therefore, the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed on merits. Regarding the legal issue, the Tribunal allowed the additional grounds raised by the assessee, stating that the approving authority for issuing notice under Section 148A should have been the Principal Commissioner. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding sufficient cause. For AY 2012-13, the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, directing the CIT(A) to decide afresh after considering submissions. For AY 2013-14 and 2015-16, the appeals were also allowed for statistical purposes, with a similar direction to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding sufficient cause. For AY 2012-13, the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, directing the CIT(A) to decide afresh after considering submissions. For AY 2013-14 and 2015-16, the appeals were also allowed for statistical purposes, with a similar direction to the CIT(A).