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548 orders · Page 9 of 11
The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of exemption under Section 11, stating that the assessee failed to adhere to the time limitations for filing the audit report. The Tribunal found the assessee to be a habitual defaulter and saw no reason to interfere with the lower authorities' orders.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of bad debts against CSIR was not sustainable as the assessee had satisfied the requirements for claiming bad debts. For other disallowances, the Tribunal remitted the issues back to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that an object clause allowing application of funds outside India does not, in itself, disqualify a trust from registration. It also noted that filing under a wrong sub-clause, if an inadvertent error, should not be a reason for rejection if the assessee is otherwise eligible.
The Tribunal held that the BUP IDs did not represent separate bank accounts and that the peak balance in the relevant customer profile had already been taxed. Following previous decisions in similar cases, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions.
The Tribunal held that the BUP IDs did not represent separate bank accounts and that the peak balance in the relevant customer profile had already been taxed. Following previous decisions in similar cases, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions.
The Tribunal held that the BUP IDs did not represent separate bank accounts and that the peak balance in the relevant customer profile had already been taxed. Following previous decisions in similar cases, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions.
The Tribunal held that the BUP IDs did not represent separate bank accounts and that the peak balance in the relevant customer profile had already been taxed. Following previous decisions in similar cases, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions.
The Tribunal held that the BUP IDs did not represent separate bank accounts and that the peak balance in the relevant customer profile had already been taxed. Following previous decisions in similar cases, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions.
The Tribunal held that the BUP IDs did not represent separate bank accounts and that the peak balance in the relevant customer profile had already been taxed. Following previous decisions in similar cases, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions.
The Tribunal held that the penalty levied under section 270A of the Act was unsustainable in law and liable to be deleted. The primary reasoning was that the very foundation for levying penalty under section 270A, which requires the existence of "under-reported income", was absent. The Tribunal emphasized that penalty under section 270A is not automatic and requires satisfaction of jurisdictional conditions. In this case, it was an admitted fact that the assessee's returned income and assessed income were both Nil. The disallowance of depreciation, even if impermissible under section 11(6), did not result in any positive taxable income, reduction of loss, or conversion of loss into income. Furthermore, the assessee had demonstrably not availed any benefit of carry forward or set-off of any loss in subsequent years, nor had it secured any present or future tax advantage. The Tribunal also noted that section 270A(2)(a), which refers to assessed income being greater than returned income, was not satisfied as both were numerically equal (Nil). The Tribunal concluded that penalty provisions must be construed strictly and cannot be invoked based on perceived revenue loss divorced from the actual statutory impact, especially when the disallowance does not result in taxable income or tax payable. Consequently, the penalty was deleted.
The Tribunal held that interest earned by a cooperative society from deposits with a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The disallowance made by the lower authorities was deleted.
The Tribunal admitted additional evidence filed before the CIT(A) that was not considered and restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee with adequate opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that an object clause allowing application of funds outside India does not, in itself, disqualify a trust from registration. It also noted that filing under a wrong sub-clause, if an inadvertent error, should not be a reason for rejection if the assessee is otherwise eligible.
The Tribunal held that interest earned by a cooperative society from deposits with a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The disallowance made by the lower authorities was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to provide the assessee with an opportunity to cross-examine the alleged entry providers, specifically Shri Rajendra Jain, whose statement formed a basis for the assessment. This failure violated the principles of natural justice, as the assessee was statutorily obligated to be given a chance to dispel the material used against them. Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO for a de novo assessment. The AO was directed to facilitate the cross-examination of Shri Rajendra Jain and any other person whose statements were used to draw adverse inferences regarding the purchase transactions. The assessee was also required to produce the stock register for reconciliation. Regarding the Cross Objections, the Tribunal found that the ground concerning the applicability of Section 153C instead of Section 147 required factual verification and was therefore remitted to the AO. The issue on merits concerning the restriction of addition to 12% was rendered infructuous as the entire issue was remitted back to the AO. Thus, the Revenue's appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution without adjudicating on merits, as per statutory provisions and High Court rulings. The impugned order was set aside, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the notice dated 28/07/2022 was issued without following the procedures laid down under the Act and therefore deserved to be quashed. The Supreme Court in the cases of Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal and Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal emphasized that the appropriate authority for issuing notices under the new provisions of Section 151 cannot be altered. In the present case, the notice was issued beyond the period of three years from the end of the assessment year. As per the Supreme Court's decisions, the approving authority should have been as per Section 151(ii), i.e., a Principal Chief Commissioner, whereas the approval was taken from Pr. Commissioner-19, Mumbai. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the notice issued under Section 148A(d) and Section 148. Since the initiation of proceedings was quashed, the consequential assessment order passed under Section 147/144/144B became null and void, rendering the addition academic. Grounds 1-3 raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to provide the assessee with an opportunity to cross-examine the alleged entry providers, specifically Shri Rajendra Jain, whose statement formed a basis for the assessment. This failure violated the principles of natural justice, as the assessee was statutorily obligated to be given a chance to dispel the material used against them. Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO for a de novo assessment. The AO was directed to facilitate the cross-examination of Shri Rajendra Jain and any other person whose statements were used to draw adverse inferences regarding the purchase transactions. The assessee was also required to produce the stock register for reconciliation. Regarding the Cross Objections, the Tribunal found that the ground concerning the applicability of Section 153C instead of Section 147 required factual verification and was therefore remitted to the AO. The issue on merits concerning the restriction of addition to 12% was rendered infructuous as the entire issue was remitted back to the AO. Thus, the Revenue's appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of exemption under Section 11, stating that the assessee failed to adhere to the time limitations for filing the audit report. The Tribunal found the assessee to be a habitual defaulter and saw no reason to interfere with the lower authorities' orders.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had not discharged the onus of proving the genuineness of purchases and had not complied with previous ITAT directions. However, the Tribunal also noted that the AO had not properly facilitated cross-examination of the alleged entry providers.
The Tribunal partly allowed the assessee's appeals, directing the AO to delete certain additions. The Tribunal also dismissed the Revenue's cross-appeals, finding no merit in them given the partial allowance of the assessee's appeals.
The Tribunal partly allowed the assessee's appeals, directing the AO to delete certain additions. The Tribunal also dismissed the Revenue's cross-appeals, finding no merit in them given the partial allowance of the assessee's appeals.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO for unaccounted sales was devoid of merits and evidence. The extrapolation of sales based on limited CCTV footage without corroborative evidence was considered invalid. The Tribunal also noted that the AO rejected the books of account without proper justification.
The Tribunal held that the AO erred in disallowing expenses and depreciation on a proportionate basis without proper verification. The Tribunal remitted the issue of expenses and depreciation back to the AO for fresh examination with directions to call for necessary documentary evidence.
The tribunal held that the deduction u/s. 80G is allowable even if the expenses were initially claimed as CSR, following coordinate benches. The issue of limitation was not adjudicated, and the ALP adjustment was dismissed based on a subsequent Bilateral Advance Pricing Agreement.
The Tribunal held that the AO erred in disallowing expenses and depreciation on a proportionate basis without proper verification. The Tribunal remitted the issue of expenses and depreciation back to the AO for fresh examination with directions to call for necessary documentary evidence.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had not discharged the onus of proving the genuineness of purchases and had not complied with previous ITAT directions. However, the Tribunal also noted that the AO had not properly facilitated cross-examination of the alleged entry providers.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had not discharged the onus of proving the genuineness of purchases and had not complied with previous ITAT directions. However, the Tribunal also noted that the AO had not properly facilitated cross-examination of the alleged entry providers.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus satisfactorily and it would be unfair to penalize it for the misdeeds of BAIPL. The Tribunal found no apparent basis for treating the expenses as accommodation entries or bogus. Therefore, the disallowance was deemed uncalled for. The Tribunal set aside the appellate order and directed the AO to delete the addition made. Consequently, the relevant grounds of appeal for the assessee were allowed. For the Revenue's cross-appeals, the Tribunal noted that since the assessee's appeals were partly allowed and the disallowance was set aside, the cross-appeals lacked merit and were dismissed. The issue of depreciation on capitalized amounts was rendered inconsequential as the entire disallowance was allowed. The Tribunal found that the assessee had engaged BAIPL's services for bonafide purposes and had provided sufficient evidence to discharge its onus.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under Section 147 was not justified as the information received did not constitute 'reason to believe' that income had escaped assessment. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer's conclusion that BAIPL was a bogus contractor was based on BAIPL's non-compliance and failure to provide documents, which, in itself, did not automatically render the transactions with JSW Steel as bogus. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had erred in restricting the disallowance to 15% of the transactions, as the very basis for disallowance was flawed. The Tribunal set aside the appellate order and directed the AO to delete the addition made, allowing the assessee's grounds of appeal. Consequently, the revenue's cross-appeals were dismissed. The Tribunal noted that the issue of depreciation on capitalized amounts was inconsequential as the entire disallowance was allowed. The Tribunal's ratio decidendi is that the failure of a third-party vendor to provide documentation does not automatically validate the AO's belief that the assessee has engaged in bogus transactions, especially when the initial reasons for reopening are not sufficiently substantiated.
The Tribunal noted that the appeals were in the second round of litigation, with the previous ITAT order remitting the matter back to the AO for examining concerned parties and allowing cross-examination. The Tribunal observed that the assessee did not comply with the ITAT's directions in producing relevant details to prove the genuineness of purchases, and the onus on the assessee had not been discharged. However, the Tribunal also found that the AO had declined the assessee's request for cross-examination, which militated against the mandate of law. Therefore, adverse inferences drawn by the AO could not be summarily accepted. Accordingly, the Tribunal considered it appropriate to set aside the appellate order and send back the entire matter to the AO to frame a de novo assessment. The AO was directed to allow adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee to prove the genuineness of the impugned purchases and also to allow the assessee to cross-examine the alleged entry providers directly linked to the purchasers. Consequently, the grounds of the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes, and the cross-appeals of the Revenue were also allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide the quantum of addition or the method of calculation, leaving these for the de novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was a procedural defect and that the substantial issue should be decided on merits. The assessee was given one more opportunity to present its case.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus to prove the genuineness of the transactions with M/s Birla Aircon Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (BAIPL). The Tribunal found that it would be unfair to penalize the assessee for BAIPL's non-compliance and failure to file returns. The Tribunal noted that BAIPL could be held accountable for its actions, but the assessee, having engaged BAIPL's services for bonafide purposes, should not be penalized. The Tribunal found no basis to treat the expenses as accommodation entries or bogus. Therefore, the disallowance was deemed uncalled for. The Tribunal set aside the appellate order and directed the AO to delete the addition made. Consequently, the grounds of appeal related to this issue were allowed. For AY 2014-15 and 2015-16, similar disallowances were made, and as the issues were identical, the findings from AY 2013-14 were applied mutatis mutandis, leading to the appeals being partly allowed. The Revenue's cross-appeals were dismissed as they lacked merit, given the Tribunal's decision to delete the disallowances. The ground relating to depreciation was also dismissed as inconsequential.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus satisfactorily and it would be unfair to penalize it for the misdeeds of BAIPL. The Tribunal found no apparent basis for treating the expenses as accommodation entries or bogus. The Tribunal noted that BAIPL was engaged in civil construction/sub-contracting work for the assessee's plant expansion, and all payments were towards capital expenditure under contract. The Tribunal found that BAIPL's non-compliance and failure to file returns did not automatically make the assessee's transactions bogus. The Tribunal set aside the appellate order and directed the AO to delete the addition made. Consequently, the grounds of appeal related to the disallowance were allowed. The Tribunal also dismissed the Revenue's cross-appeals, finding no merit in them given the decision on the assessee's appeals. The ground related to depreciation was deemed inconsequential as the underlying disallowance was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the error in clause selection was a procedural defect and not a substantive non-compliance, noting the first application was timely. It found the CIT(E)'s rejection inconsistent with its own factual findings on the trust's activities. The CIT(E)'s order was set aside, and the CIT(E) was directed to grant registration under Section 12AB, treating the application as validly made within time and under the appropriate clause.
The Tribunal held that the revision order passed by the PCIT under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was not sustainable. The Tribunal found that the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. The reasoning was that the AO had applied his mind to the material available on record and had made necessary inquiries before passing the assessment order. The PCIT, in its revision order, had not pointed out any specific material that was ignored by the AO or any specific inquiry that was not conducted. The Tribunal concluded that the PCIT had merely substituted its own view for that of the AO, which is not permissible under Section 263. Therefore, the revision order was quashed, and the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed. The operative direction was the deletion of the additions made pursuant to the revision order.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) order was unsustainable as it failed to deal with the assessee's submissions and evidence, violating principles of natural justice and Section 250(6). The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 for Assessment Year 2018-19 was invalid because it was issued beyond the period of three years and the approval was obtained from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) instead of the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (PCCIT), as required by Section 151(ii) of the Act. The assessment completed based on this invalid notice was therefore quashed.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the AO had not conducted independent inquiries or provided cogent evidence against the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the transactions were conducted through registered brokers and banking channels, and the assessee had provided substantiating evidence.
The Tribunal decided on the following issues: 1. Regarding the short-term capital loss of Rs. 2,32,67,278/-, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had revised its computation and requested to ignore the claim. However, the Ld. CIT(A) had remitted the issue back to the Ld. AO to carry out necessary modifications in respect of the block of assets for computation of income and consider the claim in accordance with law. The Tribunal found this approach reasonable and thus partly allowed the assessee's ground for statistical purposes. 2. Regarding the additions made under Section 69A for excess stock of gold, the Tribunal upheld the Ld. CIT(A)'s deletion. The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) had relied on detailed statements and documents furnished by M/s. Abhushan Creations Pvt. Ltd., which confirmed the transactions. The Tribunal found that the entries were reflected in the audited books of both the assessee and the supplier, indicating no bogus purchases. The Tribunal also considered that the survey was conducted mid-financial year, implying books might not be updated in real-time. Therefore, the revenue's grounds of appeal were dismissed. 3. The judgment does not explicitly address the disallowance of Section 80G deduction in the 'held' section, but it is mentioned as an issue raised by the assessee. The operative part states the assessee's appeal is partly allowed and the revenue's appeal is dismissed.
The Tribunal condoned the significant delay, emphasizing that substantive justice should prevail over procedural technicalities and finding no mala fide intention on the assessee's part. It held that penalty proceedings under Section 271D are independent of quantum additions settled under the VSV Scheme. Consequently, the Tribunal remitted the appeal back to the Ld. CIT(A) for a fresh consideration on the merits of the penalty, ensuring a proper opportunity of hearing for the assessee.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Ld. CIT(A), affirming that disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(iii) is to be restricted only to those investments that have yielded exempt income during the year, relying on the Special Bench decision in Vireet Investment (P.) Ltd. It also directed the AO to compute any Section 115JB adjustment based on book accounts, independent of the Section 14A disallowance.
The Tribunal held that the assessee deserved an opportunity to be heard on merits before the Ld.CIT(A). The Tribunal found that the non-appearance before the Ld.CIT(A) was due to bonafide reasons, as supported by the affidavit filed by the assessee. The affidavit clearly explained that notices and the final order were sent to an incorrect email ID due to a typographical error in the hyphen. The Tribunal acknowledged that the impugned order passed by the Ld.CIT(A) was an ex parte order, and the assessee was dismissed for not contesting the case, which was due to the non-service of notices. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to remit the issue back to the Ld.CIT(A) to consider the case in accordance with the law, taking into account the submissions and evidence furnished by the assessee. The Tribunal emphasized that a proper opportunity of being heard must be granted to the assessee. No specific issue was left undecided.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) passed a non-speaking order that did not deal with the assessee's submissions or evidence. The order was set aside, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) order was non-speaking and failed to address the assessee's submissions and evidence, violating principles of natural justice. The matter was set aside for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the relationship between the assessee and its stockists was principal-to-principal, not principal-to-agent, thus Section 194H was not applicable. It also held that TDS on ESOPs is deductible only at the time of exercise, not grant, and that interest on delayed payments to MSMEs is not covered under Section 194A.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal. Regarding Ground No. 1, the assessee did not press the ground concerning the validity of reopening under Section 147, and it was dismissed as not pressed. For Grounds No. 2 to 4, the Tribunal found that the assessee had discharged its onus under Sections 68 and 69C. The Tribunal noted that the lower authorities failed to find fault with the submissions made by the assessee, particularly concerning the denial of cross-examination and reliance on the retracted statement of Mr. Vipul Bhatt. The Tribunal also referred to the CIT(A)'s observation that the loan parties had creditworthiness as per their balance sheets and that all loans were repaid in the same financial year. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in M/s. Skylark Build and a coordinate bench decision in the case of M/s. Manba Finance Ltd. The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus by providing necessary evidence, including confirmation letters, bank statements, and financial statements of the corporate entities, proving the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions. Therefore, the AO was directed to delete the additions made under Sections 68 and 69C. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order for deleting the impugned additions.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, deserved to be quashed. The Tribunal found that the AO had not brought any new material on record to establish that the assessee had failed to fully and truly disclose all material facts necessary for the assessment. The AO relied on audited accounts and other documents already available on record, which did not constitute new tangible material. Furthermore, the notice was issued after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. As per the first proviso to Section 147, reopening after four years is permissible only if income escaped assessment due to the assessee's failure to disclose material facts. In this case, the assessee had furnished all necessary details during the original assessment. The Tribunal, referencing the Bombay High Court in Asian Paints Ltd. and the Supreme Court in Kelvinator India Ltd., stated that the AO has no power to review a concluded assessment. Since the root cause of the assessment proceedings (the Section 148 notice) was quashed, the consequent assessment order was deemed void ab initio. Therefore, the additions made became academic. Ground Nos. 2 and 3 raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of disallowance under Section 80G, finding that while CSR expenditure is disallowed under Section 37(1), there is no prohibition under Section 80G for claiming deduction on payments to eligible institutions, even if they fall under CSR obligations. The Tribunal noted that the Explanatory Memorandum to the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014, clarifies that only allowance under Section 37(1) is restricted. Regarding MTM losses and fair value adjustments on RPS, the judgment omits the Tribunal's specific findings and reasoning, stating only that grounds 5 and 6 were dismissed. For Section 14A, the Tribunal restricted the disallowance to Rs. 7,622/-. The Tribunal found that the assessee had not earned any exempt income during the year, and relied on High Court decisions which hold that Section 14A cannot be applied in the absence of exempt income. The Tribunal also noted that the amendment to Section 14A by the Finance Act, 2022, is prospective and not applicable to the assessment year in question. The operative direction was to allow the appeals partly.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the principles of substantial justice over technicalities and referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Land Acquisition Collector Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. The appeal was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication, with a direction to provide one more opportunity to the assessee.