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604 orders · Page 2 of 13
The CIT(A) deleted the protective addition and the commission addition, finding that the donation amount was explained and added back in the computation of total income, and no deduction was claimed. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities disregarded the assessee's submission to refer the matter to the DVO for estimation of fair market value. Therefore, the matter was restored back to the AO to refer it to the DVO and pass a fresh order.
The Tribunal condoned the 332-day delay in filing the appeal, subject to a deposit, observing that the Ld. Commissioner should not have dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution. The assessment orders were also found to be ex-parte.
The Tribunal held that the assessee may be given one more opportunity to present his case before the first appellate authority, adhering to the principles of natural justice. The issues were remanded for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the 332-day delay in filing the appeal, subject to a deposit, observing that the Ld. Commissioner should not have dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution. The assessment orders were also found to be ex-parte.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal without condoning the delay and adjudicating on merits. The Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to condone the delay, considering the liberal view taken by higher courts, and to decide the appeals on merits.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of the section 80P deduction was not justified because the amendment to section 143(1)(a)(v) was effective from April 1, 2021, and therefore not applicable to AY 2019-20. The return was filed within the permissible extended time under section 139(4).
The Tribunal held that while the amendment treating ULIP as a capital asset applied from A.Y. 2021-22, a ULIP policy where the benefit under Section 10(10D) was not taken qualifies as a 'capital asset' under the broad definition of Section 2(14)(a). Therefore, the appellant is entitled to treat the amount received as capital gains/loss, and the appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the furnishing of the audit report (Form 10B) is a procedural requirement and its substantial compliance is sufficient. The delay in filing should not deny the benefit of exemption, especially when the legislature has conferred powers to condone such delays.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals, citing sufficient cause and the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal held that adjustments made under Section 143(1) without an opportunity of being heard to the assessee were unsustainable.
The ITAT held that the amendment to Section 11(3) by the Finance Act, 2022, is prospective in nature, applying from AY 2023-24 onwards for income accumulated thereafter, and does not retrospectively limit the utilization period for earlier accumulations. Relying on previous tribunal decisions and a Supreme Court judgment, the tribunal concluded that the addition made by the CPC on a debatable issue under Section 143(1) was incorrect and thus deleted the addition.
The Tribunal found the reasons for the delay unconvincing but, considering that justice must be served, decided to remand the appeal to the AO. This is subject to the assessee paying a cost of Rs. 30,000/- to the Prime Minister's Relief Fund.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO was based on Form 26AS and TDS deducted, without sufficient corroborative evidence of actual receipt of interest by the assessee. The assessee's claim that the interest was waived was supported by an oral agreement, and the burden was on the revenue to prove receipt.
The Tribunal held that the mention of utilizing funds outside India in the MOA does not automatically warrant rejection of registration. It reasoned that such clauses can be interpreted as availing services from foreign counterparts for the benefit of people in India.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals, citing sufficient cause and the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal held that adjustments made under Section 143(1) without an opportunity of being heard to the assessee were unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 dated 31.03.2017 was invalid. The reasoning was based on the Supreme Court's decision in ITO vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das, which emphasizes the necessity of a direct nexus between the material before the AO and the formation of the belief that income has escaped assessment. The Tribunal found that the AO's belief was based on borrowed satisfaction, relying solely on information from the Investigation Wing without independent verification. The excel sheet data, which formed the basis of the alleged escaped income of Rs. 24,00,000/-, was not sufficiently substantiated. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted a violation of natural justice, as the assessee was denied the opportunity to cross-examine the directors of the Cosmos Group, whose statements were crucial for the addition, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Andaman Timbers Industries vs. CCE. Consequently, the reassessment order dated 28.12.2017 was deemed bad in law and void ab initio. As the assessment proceedings were quashed, the addition made by the AO did not survive and was directed to be deleted. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal held that penalty under section 271(1)(c) can only be levied on the income that ultimately survives the appellate process. Since the addition was restricted to the profit element, the penalty should also be restricted to that amount.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment notices issued under the new regime were time-barred as they were issued beyond the period prescribed under Section 149(1) of the Act. The sanction for issuing the notice was also not obtained from the appropriate authority as per Section 151 of the new regime.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals due to the authorized representative's ill-health. On merits, it held that the lower authorities failed to adequately verify the source of investments and the nature of transactions. Consequently, the matter was remitted back to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after proper verification and providing the assessee with an opportunity to substantiate the source of funds.
The Tribunal held that the cash deposit was out of earlier withdrawals and deleted the addition. For agricultural income, the Tribunal accepted the income from own cultivation but upheld the disallowance of income from an AOP due to insufficient evidence.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee was non-compliant throughout the appellate proceedings, but considering the principles of natural justice, it granted the assessee one more opportunity. The issues were remanded to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the source of investment of Rs. 12,97,795/- was established, as the funds were borrowed from ECL Finance Ltd. and invested by them on behalf of the assessee. The amount not invested was refunded. Therefore, the addition retained by the CIT(A) was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263 as the AO had taken a possible view, relying on jurisdictional High Court and Tribunal rulings. The PCIT's order was found to be without jurisdiction and bad in law.
The Tribunal held that ULIPs should be considered capital assets and the redemption proceeds taxed under the head 'Capital Gains', not 'Income from Other Sources'. It also directed the AO to allow indexation and credit for TDS.
The Tribunal held that since the purchase bills were confirmed to be bogus and the assessee failed to substantiate the genuineness of purchases with cogent evidence, the addition made by the Assessing Officer was upheld. However, considering the assessee's claim that documents were not considered, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 11(3) of the Income Tax Act, which restricted the utilization period, was prospective. Since the utilization occurred in the year immediately following the prescribed five-year period and before the amendment's effective date, the addition was unjustified.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in passing an ex-parte order, violating the principles of natural justice. The CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the issues on merits as required by Section 250 of the Income-tax Act.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under section 148 for AY 2015-16 was barred by limitation, following the Supreme Court's concession that such notices issued after April 1, 2021, would be dropped. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, holding that there was a reasonable cause for the delay due to issues with email communication. The appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the appellate authority can entertain a fresh claim made by the assessee, citing Supreme Court and High Court judgments. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission that the claim was inadvertently missed. The impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that in the interest of justice and fair play, the assessee should be granted one more opportunity to represent its case on merits. The matter was restored to the AO for de novo adjudication after providing due opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the loan advanced by the assessee to K. R. Foundation qualifies as 'application of income' under Section 11 of the Act. The reasoning was based on judicial precedents and CBDT Circular No. 100 dated 24.01.1973, which clarify that money advanced to another charitable trust with charitable objects can be treated as application of income. The Tribunal noted that the scope of 'applied' is wider than 'expenditure' and funds do not need to go irretrievably. It was also observed that the assessee had offered loan repayments as income in subsequent assessment years, aligning with the CBDT circular. Consequently, the assessee is eligible for the benefit of Section 11. Regarding the Revenue's grounds, the Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s finding that the conditions of Section 13(1)(c) and Section 13(2) of the Act were not applicable, as none of the persons listed in Section 13(3) were found to have benefited directly or indirectly. Therefore, the grounds raised by the Revenue were dismissed. The Tribunal left other issues raised by the assessee undecided.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment was based on a misconception, as the assessee never claimed exempt long-term capital gains. The transactions were in the ordinary course of business, a small fraction of the total turnover, and already offered to tax as business income. Section 68 has no application when income is already taxed.
The Tribunal held that the loan advanced to another charitable trust with similar objects qualifies as an application of income under Section 11. It also upheld the CIT(A)'s finding that there was no violation of Section 13 due to the common trustee.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271(1)(b) for non-compliance with notices should be deleted. The reasoning was that the alleged defaults were inextricably linked to assessment proceedings that have now been set aside in toto. Sustaining a penalty for earlier non-compliance would be incongruent with the objective of the remand, which is to wipe the slate clean. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had correctly identified the notices as infructuous but erred in dismissing the appeals for statistical purposes. The penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was also set aside. The Tribunal reasoned that where the assessment finding itself is set aside, the factual and legal edifice on which the penalty rests disappears. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in K.C. Builders v. ACIT, the Tribunal held that the penalty cannot survive when the additions forming its basis are obliterated. The penalty order was set aside to the file of the AO to be re-examined de novo upon completion of the reassessment, if warranted, after granting due opportunity to the assessee. The penalty of Rs.40,000/- under Section 271(1)(b) was deleted, and the appeal against the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was allowed for statistical purposes, with the matter restored to the AO.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had failed to consider the documentary evidence filed by the assessee and had not gone into the merits of the issue. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the issue back to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the loan advanced to another charitable trust with similar objects qualifies as an application of income under Section 11. It also upheld the CIT(A)'s finding that there was no violation of Section 13 due to the common trustee.
The Tribunal held that if the addition made emanating from the 'reason to believe' for reopening is deleted at any appellate stage, then any other addition made during reassessment which is not part of the 'reason to believe' would not survive. In this case, the reason for reopening was the disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) for non-deduction of TDS on payments for alternate accommodation. The CIT(A) deleted this disallowance. The surviving disallowance was under section 36(1)(va) for belated remittance of PF/ESI, which was not the primary reason for reopening but arose from an explanation enabling other additions. Following the ratio in CIT vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd. and other judicial precedents, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the disallowance made under section 36(1)(va). The alternate contention regarding the validity of the survey action was left undecided as the appeal was allowed on the primary ground. The decision for AY 2018-19 was applied mutatis mutandis to AY 2019-20 and AY 2020-21.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had submitted new documents and evidence at the appeal stage. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to remit the issue back to the AO for de novo verification of the evidence furnished by the assessee, ensuring a proper opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that while the CPC could process the return without prior intimation when no adjustment was made to the total income, the issue of surcharge rate was debatable. Since debatable issues are outside the purview of CPC processing under Section 143(1), the adjustment made by the CPC regarding the surcharge rate was beyond its jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that if the addition made emanating from the 'reason to believe' for reopening is deleted at any appellate stage, then any other addition made during reassessment which is not part of the 'reason to believe' would not survive. In this case, the reason for reopening was the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) for non-deduction of TDS on payments for alternate accommodation. While the AO also made a disallowance under Section 36(1)(va) for belated PF/ESI remittance, this was not the primary reason for reopening. The CIT(A) deleted the Section 40(a)(ia) disallowance, and the revenue did not appeal. The Tribunal found that the surviving disallowance under Section 36(1)(va) did not emanate from the original reasons for reopening but from the explanation to Section 147. Following the ratio laid down in the cited judicial precedents, including the Hon'ble High Court and Coordinate Benches, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the disallowance made under Section 36(1)(va) for all the assessment years. The alternate contention regarding the validity of reopening due to the absence of a survey other than under Section 133A(2A) was rendered academic and left open.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271(1)(b) for non-compliance with notices should be deleted. The reasoning was that the alleged defaults were inextricably linked to an assessment proceeding that had been set aside in its entirety by the CIT(A) for violation of natural justice and for consideration of fresh material. The Tribunal stated that sustaining a penalty for earlier non-compliance would be incongruent with the objective of the remand, which is to wipe the slate clean. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had correctly recognized the infructuousness of the notices but erred in dismissing the appeals for statistical purposes. The penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was also set aside. The Tribunal reasoned that where the assessment finding itself is set aside, the factual and legal edifice on which the penalty rests disappears. Citing the Supreme Court decision in K.C. Builders v. ACIT, the Tribunal held that the penalty cannot survive when the additions/assessment forming its basis are obliterated. However, unlike Section 271(1)(b), which concerned a procedural default rendered otiose, Section 271(1)(c) concerned the substantive outcome. Therefore, the proper course was to set aside the penalty order to the AO to be re-examined afresh if warranted upon completion of the reassessment pursuant to the CIT(A)'s remand. The penalty of Rs.40,000/- under Section 271(1)(b) was deleted, with liberty to the AO to initiate penalty afresh if fresh defaults occurred in remand proceedings. The penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was set aside and restored to the AO for reconsideration.
The Tribunal condoned the 229-day delay in filing the appeal, admitting additional evidences that prima facie established the genuineness of the loan and its source. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the AO's addition was made on an ad-hoc basis, considering only credit entries without accounting for corresponding debit entries. The commission income was also already offered to tax by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D must be confined to investments that have actually generated exempt income during the year. The legislative intent is to disallow expenditure incurred "in relation to" earning income not includible in total income, not expenditure relatable to the entire portfolio. This position has been affirmed by the Delhi High Court in Cargo Motors (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [453 ITR 554], which held that only investments yielding exempt income are to be considered for Rule 8D. The Tribunal also referred to several coordinate bench rulings supporting this view. Therefore, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order to restrict the disallowance to investments that actually yielded exempt income. The grounds raised by the Revenue were dismissed. The issue regarding the pending appeal before the High Court was implicitly addressed by the Tribunal following established jurisprudence.
The Tribunal held that if the primary reason for reopening under Section 147 is deleted, any other additions made during reassessment that were not part of the original reasons for reopening cannot be sustained. Consequently, the disallowance under Section 36(1)(va) was also deleted.
The Tribunal held that claiming deduction under Section 80G for donations made from CSR expenditure is permissible if the conditions of Section 80G are met, as it is independent of the disallowance under Section 37(1) for CSR expenses. The PCIT's revisionary order was found to be erroneous as the Assessing Officer had taken a plausible view.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided documentary evidence and confirmations for the unsecured loans. It noted that four of the five lenders had been confirmed as genuine by previous Tribunal decisions. Relying on judicial precedents, the Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had not brought sufficient evidence to controvert the genuineness of the transactions.
The Tribunal held that the loan advanced to K. R. Foundation qualifies as an application of income under Section 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal relied on judicial precedents and CBDT Circular No. 100 dated 24.01.1973, which state that money advanced to another charitable trust with similar objects can be treated as application of income. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had offered the repaid amounts as income in subsequent assessment years. The Tribunal also observed that the departmental authorities had not questioned such claims in prior and subsequent assessment years, except for the disputed years. Regarding the Revenue's grounds concerning violations of Section 13(1)(c) and 13(2)(h) due to common trustees, the Tribunal agreed with the First Appellate Authority that none of the conditions specified in Section 13(3) applied to the assessee's case. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 13(1)(c) and Section 13(2) of the Act were not applicable to deny the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 11. The issue of interest under Sections 234B and 234C was not specifically adjudicated as it was dependent on the primary issue of application of income, and the Tribunal stated that other issues raised by the assessee were kept open.
The Tribunal held that the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 should be excluded for the purpose of limitation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as directed by the Supreme Court. The First Appellate Authority's order disregarded this direction.